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Crimson flames tied through my ears 
Rollin' high and mighty traps 
Pounced with fire on flaming roads 
Using ideas as my maps 
'We'll' meet on edges, soon,' said I 
Proud 'neath heated brow. 
Ah, but I was so much older then, 
I'm younger than that now. 
BobDylan 
The warrior is now a worker 
and his war is underground, 
with cordite in the darkness 
he milks the bleeding veins of gold, 
when the smoking rock face 
murmurs, he always thinks of you, 
African sky blue ••• 
Juluka 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis brings together two important themes within Geography and 
Development Studies. First, post-colonial analyses of social identity and difference; 
secondly, the relationship between social identity and the 'new' historiography of South 
Africa. These themes raise important intellectual and practical questions central to re-
thinking the relationship between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. During the 
apartheid era political and cultural relations between core and periphery were (are) 
integral to the fragmentation of South African society and space. Apartheid discourse 
constantly manipulated social and cultural differences and divisions. These divisions 
were epitomised by the enforced racial and ethnic partition associated with the 
bantustans. By focusing on one bantustan, namely Bophuthatswana, the thesis shows 
that complex identities and interests also emerged within these territories. Under the 
guise of independence various marginal groups sought power and influence through 
vigorous efforts to create and promote a new national identity. A range of issues are 
used to identify and emphasise the intersection of two major discourses, ethno-
nationalism and modernisation. These serve to illustrate the complex interplay of local 
and regional characteristics alongside more general processes associated with the 
changing nature of apartheid. By reference to the creation of the national capital, 
Mmabatho, the thesis demonstrates the shortcomings and contradictions of this nation-
building exercise and of the modernist discourses on which it was based. 
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Chapter One 
Chapter One: Identity and Development 1 
1. The Problem and Place ofldentity in Development Theory 
1.1. The Absence ofldentity 
A dominant theoretical tendency within development literature is to 
homogenise the global, flattening diversity and denying cultural difference. This 
tendency has been captured in the term 'One World'. At one time a salutary effort to 
promote development and equality in the 'Third World' and enthusiastically deployed 
within development terminology, 'One World' has now been indelibly associated with 
the implacable march of modernity. By casting the global within a western idiom with 
its attendant 'regime of reason and rationale',' it is now more appropriate to begin to 
ask 'whose world?'. This hegemonic approach is now characterised as 'evolutionary, 
ahistorical and delocalised'.' The remaking of social relations through the triumvirate 
of State, Science and Market has encouraged a flattening of the local and specific. 
Sachs provides powerful symbolism for the erosion of the local under the aegis of 'one 
world' and its will to universalise: 
'Ever since the temples of Tenochtitlan were destroyed in Mexico and a Spanish 
cathedral built out of their stones, European colonialism has been busy ravaging 
place-centred cultures and imposing space-centred values. In ever new waves and in 
all five continents, the colonialists have been terribly inventive in robbing peoples of 
their gods, their instztutions and their natural treasures. The establishment of 
universities in New Spain, the introduction of British law in India, the blackmailing of 
North American Indians into the fur trade, these were all instances in the history of 
spreading science, state and market throughout the world'.' 
1 Sachs, W, (1992) "One World" in The Development Dictionary, Sachs, W. (ed.) 
Zed Books. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. (1992:111). 
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At the vanguard of this drive to universalize have been ideas and processes associated 
with 'development'. The ideological baggage accompanying the ways in which we 
conceptualise 'progress' and change can be illustrated through 'mapping' the 
interaction and tensions between identity formation and theorisation of'development'. 
The process of 'worlding' through western imagery operates at one level 
through a 'geo-politics of incursion' into the non-west. These images depict a reading 
of the globe as if 'naturally' based upon western experience and universalization of 
western ethnocentrism.' The concept of development is therefore central to this 
disciplining of the non-western 'other'. Recent interpretations now locate development 
within and as: 
' ... a discourse, as an interwoven set of languages and practices ... as a modernist 
regime of knowledge and disciplinary power. As such it can not be reduced to the 
outworldng of deeper economic logics and structures but has its own logic, internal 
coherence and effects'.' 
As a central organising concept whose meaning still eludes defmition, 
development continually engages the imagination and compulsion for a better future.• 
This remains equally true for governments and development institutions who de-
politicise development through their bureaucratic machinery.' An enduring analogy is 
provided by the idea of a journey from a condition of lacking development to a 
modem destination characterised as developed. Propelled by the hitherto 
unquestionable arrow of time, the always elusive end stop of modernity is portrayed 
4 
' 
Slater, D. (1993) "Challenging Western Visions of the Global: The Geopolitics 
of Theory and North-South Relations", European Journal of Development 
Research, Vol. 7, No. 2. 
Crush, J. (1995: xiii) Preface in, The Power of Development, Crush, J. (1995) 
(ed.) Routledge. 
6 Schuurman, F. (1993) suggests that the New Social Movements can be 
interpreted as mobilising in order to demand access to modernity, in 
"Introduction: Development Theory in the 1990s", m Schuurman, F. ( 1993) 
( ed.) Beyond the Impasse, Zed Books. 
1 Ferguson, J. (1990) The Antz-Polztzcs Machme: Development, Depolzticzsatzon 
and BureaucratiC Power zn Lesotho, Cambndge University Press. 
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as a departure from disorder, civil and religious conflict. Associated with modernity, 
the archaeology of'development' is therefore rooted in western thought which at worst 
orders the 'unredeemable' Other or otherwise at least provides 'guardianship' (read 
intervention), akin to the parental guidance, until the child can fend for itself 
independent of the parent. • The internalisation of this idea within 'less developed' 
entities, such as nation-states, is of particular concern as will be shown in the context 
of the relationship between South Africa and one of its peripheries. 
These notions were central to western thinkers' constructions of 'development' 
which became steeped in religiosity and reordering the relationship between man, god 
and nature. The idea of maturation was also linked to a biological unfolding or 
unfinished evolutionary progression.' The specificity of language, thought and action 
is therefore subordinated to the paramount need demanding escape from the 
abnormality of being 'undeveloped'. The path to progress is therefore a constant 
remainder both of the possibility of escape but moreso for those without 
'development', it signifies an undesirable and undignified condition and what they are 
not." Whilst this Utopian future is always unmade and an elusive fulfilment, it 
nonetheless provides a powerful discourse which legitimises interventions 
('incursions') and transforms landscape in the name of 'development'. The place and 
territoriality of 'identity' is therefore prisoner to western/universal abstractions of 
space and economy. 
1.2. Aims of the Research Project 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate that at the vanguard of the drive to 
universalize are conflicts surrounding nation-building. The thesis discusses the 
ultimate example of a fragile, fragmented, artificial and heavily dependent would-be 
8 Manzo, K. (1995) "Black Consciousness and the Quest for a Counter-Modernist 
Development", in Crush (ed.) The Power of Development, op. cit . 
• See Cowen, M. and Shenton, R. (1995) "The Invention of Development", and 
Watts, M. (1995) "A New Deal in Emotions", both m Crush, J. (1995) op. cit. 
10 Esteva, G. (1992) "Development", in Sachs (ed.) The Development Dictionary, 
op. c1t. 
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nation-state, which can be characterised by its detachment from its civil society and its 
politics of patronage. The contention of the thesis is that these conflicts and 
contradictions can and must be informed by examining the interaction between 
national (and regional) identity and its relationship with development. A range of 
studies have begun to identify the creation of ethnicity as a fundamental challenge to a 
homogenous conception of the nation-state. Furthermore, (post) development 
literature is tackling the universalist assumptions implicit in concepts of progress and 
modernity. However, there has been a hitherto lack of interaction between the two sets 
of literature. Cultural identity has not so much been ignored, as analysed outside the 
relationship between nation-building and development. The failure of the nation-state 
to accommodate ethnic and regional differences and developmental aspirations has 
been connected to two fundamental abstractions: 
-the frrst concerns the abstract idea of the nation-state as an imagined 
homogeneous (cultural) community which denies difference. 
-the second reflects the pursuit of development and modernisation which is 
directed towards promoting the abstract conception of 'national' development or the 
'national' economy. 
The thesis seeks to contribute to these important debates by illustrating the 
relationship between these two abstractions and, in so doing, to show what happens to 
'difference' when caught between them. The thesis examines the symbolic 
expressions and the practices involved in enacting one particular 'nation-building' 
project. This includes the contradictions between local culture and universal practices 
involved in the creation of a 'national' capital city; the promotion of 'national' 
development through prestige projects and modernisation of the landscape; the 
consequences of modernisation for culture, identity and 'tradition'; and the regime's 
ensuing political (and economic) instability and illegitimacy. A central tenet of the 
thesis is to suggest that our understanding of the conflicts surrounding 'nation-
building' can be improved upon by adopting as a case study, and an analytical device, 
one of the most powerful symbols of the colonial, economic and institutional 
dependency and territorial artificiality of the 'nation-state'- the South African 
- --------------------------------------------------------------------
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bantustan. 
The post second world war era and emergence of development as theory and 
practice was central to an ethnocentric discourse managing the globe as if 'an 
homogenised space, waiting to be organised by universally applicable programmes 
and technologies'." This chapter therefore locates the suspicion and disciplining of 
diversity within the emergence of development studies as a modern discipline and 
then situates this discussion alongside the analysis of nation-building as a key conduit 
for both national identity and developmentalist ideas and practices. First, the post-
colonial challenge to orthodox theories of development is placed within the context of 
rethinking Marxist ideas of 'dependency'. Second, the relationship between space, 
( ethno) national identity and nation-building is discussed. As a prelude to an 
introduction to the bantustans and the historical and regional case study of one, 
namely, Bophuthatswana, the last section of the introductory chapter applies these 
ideas of modernisaton and identity to the South African context. At the end of the 
chapter the major themes of the eight remaining chapters are summarised and 
methodological issues are addressed. 
1.3. Post-colonial Geographies: Rethinking Dependency 
The introductory section to this chapter highlighted a new wave of writings 
about 'development'. These raise important questions regarding discursive power, 
representation, and the need to search for alternative epistemologies. These 
approaches-'anti-development'- are closely related to post-structural and post-modern 
theoretical concerns of the 'interpretative turn'. Taken together they subvert the 
previous economic primacy of theoretical analysis and promote or at least raise 
questions of cultural diversity. Re-thinking the implications of 'Dependency Theory' 
can help to explore questions of identity and relate the economic to cultural spheres of 
human activity which are essential for alternative theorisation of'development'. 
This process of 'worlding' and western intervention therefore relates on one 
11 Sachs, W. (1992) ibid. 
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level to the ethno-centrism of theory." This absence of ethnic identity within 
development geography closely mirrors changes within the social sciences and 
development studies more generally. Important questions for theory and methodology 
are therefore suggested by such an absence. The key to understanding how the core 
ideas of development theory reflect western historical experience of social change can 
be gleaned not only from the founding fathers of western social science but also from 
the specific temporal and spatial milieu in which 'development' itself evolved. The 
development of modernisation theory, whilst drawing upon Marx and Weber's 
conceptions of social change, nonetheless were refracted around the emergence of the 
idea of the 'Third World'. The latter was initially itself a positive term for newly 
emerging decolonised countries steering a 'third path', or way, between the dominant 
polarised capitalist and socialist blocs during the Cold War." Modernisation was 
therefore also connected to the reformist ideology of the west which was designed to 
convince the 'third world' of the merits of capitalist development. More specifically, 
the rapid growth of the new discipline 'Development' would tackle the more specific 
developmental and technical challenges facing the 'third world'. Development is 
therefore particularly useful in times of disorder and different historical junctures." 
The basic premise of modernisation theory portrayed 'third world' societies as 
locked in a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Larrain states three particular 
versions: the sociology associated with Parsons and Hoselitz, the Psychology of 
McClelland, and above all the influential economic modernisation of Hirschman and 
Rostow." These ideas centred upon notions of an expanding capitalist nucleus and 
structural functionalist approach to modernisation through which the internal barriers 
to modernisation (i.e. tradition) would be eroded. This would be brought about by the 
capacity of, for example, formal schooling, transportation, long term planning, media, 
12 Slater, D. (1992) "On the borders of social theory: learning from other regions", 
Environment and Planning D. Soc1ety and Space, Vo1 10, pp. 307-327. 
13 Harris, N. (1986) The End of the Third World, Zed Books The vagaries of Cold 
War destabilisation in Africa is shown in Hansen, E. 
14 Crush, J. (1995) op. cit 
" Larrain, J. (1989) Theories of Development: Capitalism, colomailsm and 
dependency, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
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communications and especially economic growth. These features were seen as 
enabling the creation of a more complex society from which the prerequisites for a 
democratic, in other words capitalist, culture could be laid. The creation of 'modem 
values', norms and attitudes would therefore engender innovation and social change. 
This dominant discourse has particular significance for conceptions of identity. Hettne 
has suggested the anomaly between development theory's primary interest in national 
development, yet despite such a focus, its 'glaring' neglect of theorising ethnicity and 
etlmic conflict in relation to development. This tendency he suggests, is common to 
all three major strands of development theory: 
1) In modernization theory, ethnic identity belonged to the traditional obstacles to 
development which, however, were supposed to disappear, ultimately, in the course of 
development. Claims to ethnic identity were thus seen as anti-development ... Although 
the older modernization theory gave a comprehensive macro view on the function of 
ethnicity in society, it did not focus on ethnic conflict as such, since this was more or 
less seen as a 'pre-modem' epiphenomenon. 
2) For Marxists ... ethnicity discussed within the National Question, has been outside 
and beyond Marxist theorising, and as in modernization theory, associated with pre-
modem values. Ethnic mobilization is usually described in terms of class, as a class 
struggle in disguise. Nationalism was good when it promoted social revolution, 
otherwise bad. 
3) Dependency theory and neo-Marxism emphasised external factors, and therefore 
had little to say about ethnic conflicts per se, although it usefully introduced the 
international context into the analysis ... More relevant to the analysis of ethnic conflict 
is the idea that ethnicity is activated in centre-periphery exploitative relations, for 
instance in situations of 'internal colonialism'." 
All established Eurocentric biases within 'Development' and the basic yet fundamental 
tension between development as material advance and the struggle to preserve cultural 
16 Hettne, B. (1996) "Ethnicity and Development", in Drakakis-Smitb, D. (ed. 
1996) Ethniczty and Development, Geographzcal Perspectzves, Wzley. 
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identities." These particularly negative attitudes towards features of 'developing' 
societies such as tradition, implied the passing away of the primitive or traditional 
before development could take place. This can be located in the origins of influential 
academic discourses within modem social science and mainstream development 
theory. A 'theory of ideology' can be used to illustrate how modes of theoretical 
discourse act as expressions of 'western ideology' and often the worst excesses of 
western sociological intervention in the 'periphery'." Furthermore the relationship 
between Geography and Imperialism has also been examined." In fact Geography and 
Anthropology vied to be the colonial science." 
Although Weber's concept of 'ideal types' provides a degree of relativity and 
attempts the avoidance of value positions, his barely concealed negative attitude 
towards 'tradition' is revealed in the Protestant Work Ethic. In one particular passage 
Weber addresses an analysis of agricultural piece-rates and attempts to provide an 
explanation for the labourers resistance towards increasing productivity for additional 
wages. This assumed irrationality was located in Weber's identification of'tradition' as 
the 'most important opponent with which the spirit of capitalism ... has had to 
struggle'." Moreover, Lawrence suggests that Weber's interpretation of what 
constitutes a 'rational social action' is therefore economically defined. The implication 
is that Weber universalises western capitalism as the 'essence of man' and relegates 
subjectivity and difference as 'irrational'. As suggested, these ideas of rationality, 
modem values and norms have been central to the power and appeal of modernisation 
theory. Marx's (in)famous statement about Indian historical change was also in a 
similar vein, that in its future was reflected the mirror image of the European 
17 See also Hettne's 1deas on ethnodevelopment in Hettne, B. (1990) Development 
Theory and the Three Worlds, Longman, Essex. 11 Lawrence, M. (forthcoming) Ideology, Development and Western Sociology, 
Department of Education, University of the North West, Mmabatho. 19 Driver, F. (1992) "Geography's empires: histories of geographical knowledge", 
Env~ronment and Planmng D: Society and Space, Vol. I 0, pp. 23-40, and 
Hudson, B. (1977) "The new geography and the new imperialism", Ant1pode, 
Vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 12-19. 
20 Sidaway, J. (1992) "In other worlds: on the politics of first world geographers 
in the 'third world"', Area 24, 403-408. 
21 Weber, M. in Lawrence, op. cit. 
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experience of evolutionary social change. Although rooted in European industrial and 
historical experience these ideas have impacted upon and set the parameters for the 
'spaces' within which the 'Third World' could conceive of development.22 
These developments were paralleled within development geography, albeit 
with its own specific disciplinary interests. These moved from: concerns with surface 
description of regions; to spatial science and where this was interested in mapping 
modernisation through spatial planning for integration. The Marxist approach 
dominated much of Radical Development Geography from the mid-1970s to mid 
1980s and sought to provide a coherent theoretical framework challenging the 
objectivity of spatial science and its value neutrality by providing models of 
cansation." The contributions and critiques of Marxist Dependency Theory are briefly 
reviewed as a prelude to discussion of plurality and post-colonial geographies. 
1.3.1. The Analytical Value of Dependency 
As a product of the political climate and theoretical questions of the day 
Marxism raised important issues concerning development and identity. The 
pioneering work of Baran and Sweezy on 'monopoly capitalism' and 
underconsumption in the West, entered Development Studies through Gunder Frank. 
Rather than detailed coverage of Marxism per se, the salient feature of Frank's thesis 
for this discussion of development and identity concerns the idea of dependent 
development in the periphery through stagnation, unequal exchange and a comprador 
elite. Whilst there remain many different interpretations of dependency ideas 
Schuurman points to a consensus regarding: 
-Underdevelopment is an historical process and not intrinsic to the Third World. 
- The dominant and dependent countries together form a capitalist system 
21 It also remains a durable idea, recast in different guises as 'neo-modernisation'. 
For example, Hyden, G (1983) No Short Cuts to Progress, Heinemann, provides 
a political scientist view of the constraints of the 'economy of affection' upon 
institutes of governance in Africa. 
23 Cloke, P., Philo, C., and Sadler, D. (1991) Approachmg Human Geography, 
PCP. 
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- Underdevelopment is inherent to the world system and the periphery is plundered of 
its surplus leading to development of the core and underdevelopment of the 
periphery." 
1bis historic process of underdevelopment was accompanied by an ideology of 
consumption alienating the periphery from itself. 1bis is achieved through the 
penetration of bank and industrial capital into the periphery, making it dependent 
upon the core." An important feature of dependency lies in its critique of a linear 
progressive path to modernisation. Frank's overall contribution was to shift emphasis 
for causes of underdevelopment away from the internal blockages of 'tradition' or 
'backwardness' to the effects of insertion into the external international capitalist 
economy. 
However, a range of criticisms were levelled at neo-Marxism from within and 
without Marxism. In some instances this was a simplification and caricature of neo-
marxism efforts to engage with this critique." A number of Marxist anthropologists in 
particular sought to rectify the criticism made of abstract theorisation, by providing 
concrete examples and specificity of social forms. Formulations of the articulations of 
the modes of production approach attempted to show the interactions between pre-
capitalist structures and relations of capitalism." A particularly significant variant of 
these debates concerned Wolpe's theorisation of apartheid's racist social system as 
essentially functional to capitalist relations returned to in the section on South Africa. 
Nonetheless, by the early 1980s disenchantment with the ability of Marxism, 
albeit in its different guises, to explain events was becoming widespread and the mood 
24 Schuurman, F. (1993) op. ctt. 
25 Schuurman, ibid. 
26 See Watts, M. (1988) for an alternattve assessment of Corbndge's cntictsm from 
within Marxism. Watts regards the latter as caricaturing RDG by ignoring 
important urban and local scale work, and positing a choice between either 
absolute determinism or absolute contingency, "Deconstructing Determinism: 
Marxism, Development Theory and a comradely critique of Corbndge, S., 
Capitalist World Development", Antipode, 20:2. 
27 For example Rey P. P (1975) The lineage mode of production, Critique of 
Anthropology, Vol. 3, pp. 27-79 and especially note Wolpe, H (1972) 
Cap1tallsm and Cheap Labour Power: From Segregation to Apartheid, in 
Bemart, W. and Dubow, S. (1995). 
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appeared to be captured by Booth's seminal paper of 1985." Booth's specific criticism 
of Marxism as economistic, reductionist and class reductionist has been emphasised 
by Corbridge who also called for 'new causal narratives' and 'new theory formation'. 
This was especially critical of the tendency to define capital in laws of motion which 
work together to produce a fixed set of spatial outcomes." Important implications 
follow for conceptualising political struggles as not simply read off from the two 
major classes of capitalist society: the proletariat and bourgeoisie. More recently, 
commenting on that period in the 1980s, Booth has suggested that: 
'Initially stimulating theoretical debates, most of them Marxist ... had run into sand and 
real world questions were not being addressed and the gulf between academic 
enquiry and development policy and practice was increasing'." 
This was related to the 'highly generalised and economistic explanatory frameworks 
of Marxism and neo-Marxist origin that dominated social development theory in the 
west during the 1970s'. Marxist focus upon a class subject, centred and determined by 
economic relations had reduced the complexity of identity and therefore wider 
questions of agency and structure, to generic functionalism. The abstract concept of 
'class' had been theoretically enforced upon a highly diverse number of social 
formations and situations. Although providing insight into structures of society and 
their transformation, as well as providing more scope for local varieties of political 
struggle, class remained the privileged agent of change. Social and political struggles 
contested by New Social Movements could not simply be understood through class 
struggle. Social formations of Third World countries were therefore regarded as 
determined by the Metropolitan 'core'. This informs the wider theoretical debates 
28 Booth, D. (1985) "Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpreting the 
Impasse", World Development, Vol. 13, no. 7, July. 
29 Corbridge, S. (1989) "Marxism and Development Theory", in New Honzons in 
Human Geography, (ed.) Gregory, D. (1989). 
30 Booth, D. (1993) "Development Research- From Impasse to a New Agenda", in 
Schuurman, F. (1993). 
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within Marxism and the limitations of the usefulness of 'class' when seen as 
predetermining identity. The basic premise of dependency theory and its depiction of 
the relationship between core and periphery is nonetheless a useful tool for 
discussions of post-colonial geographies. 
Dependency has been criticised as inherently flawed through its adherence to 
iron laws which generalised the outcomes of periphery-core relations. Both 
circulationist and mode of production approaches to dependency concentrated upon 
seeking out a global explanation for the failure of capitalist development to take root 
in the periphery. Despite the grounding of some approaches in different localities, the 
'last instance' logic of the global system determined processes in the periphery. This 
totalising logic has been a particular target for criticism especially as it might have 
been avoided: 
'From the neo-Marxist point of view, the process of diffosion is understandable only if 
located within a matrix of domination/ subordmation relationships ... operating at both 
the national and the international level... One would expect as a logical outcome .. a 
research strategy, stressmg context in terms of space and time, a research strategy 
that ceases to treat the Thzrd World in blanket fashion and draws attention to the 
enormous complexity and variation of the various countries of the so-called Third 
World Instead of this, the neo-Marxist dependency traditzon has proffired a plethora 
of theories which in their attempts to account for the development or lack of 
development of the Third World as a whole, repeat some of the very mzstakes that the 
neo-evolutionists committed in the early fifties'." 
Dependency is therefore on one level central to the project of modernity wherein it 
advocated national autonomy and economic growth and reproduced the parent-child 
dichotomy of progress and modernity." It was still bound up with the lack of industry 
31 Mouzelis, Nicos, P. (1990) Post-Marxist alternatives: the constructwn of soc10/ 
orders, Macmillan Press. 
32 Manzo, K. (1995) in Crush, J. (1995) op. cit. 
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and development. One can also add that perhaps dependency was never intended as an 
absolute alternative theorisation of development. Indeed located in its own time and 
place its emergence within Latin America was initially to counteract the woeful 
neglect of external systemic causes of underdevelopment." To this extent vital 
epistemological questions concerning conceptions of development and historical 
change are also raised through 'dependency'. This is based around its critique of the 
assumptions of modernisation theory and the 'inevitable' evolution towards modernity. 
This process of answering back to the metropolitan 'core' signified an important 
interruption with dependency theory as: 
'an intellectuaVpolitical movement. which argued, wrote and theorized back. This 
was the significance of dependencia and the fact that associated modes of reflection in 
other parts of the South during the same years ... In the encompassing context of North-
South relations, the dependency writers constructed and deployed a geopolitical 
imagination which sought to prioritize the objectzves of autonomy and difference and 
to break the subordmating effects of metropolis-satellite relations. To the Western 
mind inculcated in the Cartesian tradition, 'dependency' seemed little more than a 
vague discontent, but zn actual fact it was a key body of alternative critical thought'." 
Whilst, as suggested, 'the objectives of autonomy and difference' might be seen in the 
context of demanding access to modernity, there is also the possibility of creating 
openings for an anti-modernist imagining of development. Furthermore, autonomy 
could also be read in some dependentista accounts as recognising cultural plurality, 
and autonomy of different groups. The value of dependency therefore lies in its 
awareness or potential awareness of the possibility of spatial variation. Dependency 
has therefore been interpreted within different communities of the South in different 
ways. A Marxist explanation would emphasise the economic processes involved in 
alienation. This could be extended to include increased dependence upon the 'market' 
" Slater, D. (1993) 
34 Ibid. 
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and goods of consumption, alienating the peripheral society from itself. However, 
there is also an economic sense in which the 'core' is dependent upon the periphery for 
its labour and markets. 
Of fundamental importance for this thesis are the ways in which dependency 
provides not only the clash or dichotomisation of 'internal' and 'external' but also the 
ways in which the domination of the 'core' is internalised within the 'third world'. This 
calls for alternative ways in which the 'comprador bourgeoisie' can be conceptualised, 
not merely bound hand and foot through economic relations but also through 
discursive formations and Eurocentric knowledge. Fanon captures the dynamics of 
dependency, which he says: 
' ••• IS the outcome of double process primarily, economic; subsequently, the 
internalisation- or, better, the epidermalization- of this inferwrity'." 
The African petit-bourgeoisie has been identified as the major social force defining 
and mobilising African Nationalist movements in the post-world war two era. This 
broad category's interests were seen as commensurate with Metropolitan economic 
interests, as standard bearers of territorial nationalism especially against colonialist 
exploitation and important for mobilising other social groups." Whilst on one level 
regarded as opportunistic, it must also be asked what other influences shaped these 
new leaders and state mangers. Reasons for the general and continental failure of the 
nation-state in Africa have been identified by Davidson: 
'It may be fairly easy to understand that new nation-states, emerging from imperial or 
colonial oppression, have to modernize their institutions, their modes of government, 
their political and economic structures. Very well. But why then adopt models from 
" Fanon, F. (1970:10) Black Skin: White Masks, (Paladm, London). 
36 Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) "The National Question and the Crists of Instability in 
Africa", in Perspectives On Peace and Development, Hansen, E. (ed.)(l987) Zed 
Books. 
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those very countries or systems that have oppressed and despised you? Why not 
modernize from the models of your own history, or invent new models?'." 
Davidson has described these models and ideas of the nation-state in Africa, which he 
regards as integral to colonialist and imperialist strategies, as the 'Black Mans burden'. 
By re-thinking 'dependency' the constraints of the economic can be seen 
alongside cultural, political and institutional relations influencing the response of the 
periphery. There is therefore no simple dichotomy or economic flow but instead a 
complex interplay between 'core' and 'periphery': 
'Whzle the imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the 
periphery ... it habitually blinds itself to the ways m which the periphery determines the 
metropolis- beginning, perhaps, with the latter's obsessive need to present its 
peripheries and its other continually to itself." 
This relationship therefore encompasses the interactions and exchanges, particularly 
the legacy of European ideas and visions of Africa, which includes the prominent role 
given to the nation-state. Then, using this approach, not only can the true face of 
power of the centre be exposed in what it drives to the periphery, but also the different 
ways in which manifestations in the periphery illustrate a similar hidden logic in the 
centre." A wave of post-colonial writing is similarly addressing the cultural and social 
processes of marginalisation and Imperialism. The signification and mobilisation of 
racial or cultural differences, 'othering', has been identified as central to colonialism 
and Imperialism. Said in particular has shown how cultural knowledge produced 
about the 'Orient' has created and reinforced Metropolitan 'superiority' by projecting 
negative repressed aspects of the self onto the 'Other'. Central to Said's ideas 
37 Davidson, B. (1992:18&19) The Black Man's Burden. Afrzca and the Curse of 
the Natzon-State, James Currey. 
38 Pratt, M L. (1991) Imperzal Eyes: Travel Wrztzng and Transculturation, 
Rout1edge, London. 
39 Slater, D. (1993) op. cit 
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concerning the reading of history and contested identities, is the opposition between 
'advocates of a unitary identity and those who see the whole as a complex but not 
reductively unified one' ... From the clash of these two perspectives, according to Said, 
two historiographies emerge, 'one linear and subsuming, the other contrapuntal and 
often nomadic'. To grasp 'the reality of historical experience', to reflect that 'all 
cultures are involved in one another"' through hybridity and heterogeneity, ouly the 
second perspective captures the complexity of identity. Similarly Mudimbe illustrates 
the complex ways through which Africanist thought has structured representations of 
Africa and through which colonialists had the desire for Africa to become European." 
Evocations of 'The Dark Continent' are central to the manner in which Europe has 
intervened in Africa." These images are constructed within discursive formations, the 
primary one being the 'West' and 'the Rest'. Although acting to exclude the 'Rest' and 
drive them to the boundaries or edge of civilisation, this 'Other' remains always 
present in western discourses." Rather than seeing each as discreet entities Spivak has 
attempted to emphasis the silences and indeed repetition involved in colonial 
'othering' in order to use these contradictions to prise open the dichotomisation." By 
suggesting heterogeneity and difference, multiple identities of race, class, gender and 
ethnicity can inform the critique of western universalism and transcends these binary 
opposites. Crush has focused these questions within the context of South Africa and 
40 Said, E. W. {1994:xxix) Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, London. 
4I Ibid. 
42 Mudimbe, V. {1988) The InventiOn of Africa, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington. 
43 Brantlinger, P. {1985) "The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent", 
Critical Inqu1ry, 12, 1985. and Jarosz shows how Afnca has been 
simultaneously incorporated and excluded as a negative reflection of the 
western self-Image by different western geographic representations of the 
continent, Jarosz, L. {1992) "Constructing the Dark Continent: Metaphor as 
Geographic Representation of Africa", GeografiSka Annaler, 74 B, 2, pp.I05-
115. 
44 Hall, S. {ed. 1992) "The West and The Rest" m Formations of Modernity, Open 
Unoversity Press. See For alternative geographies of the third world more 
generally see Bell, M. {1994) "Images, Myths and Alternative Geographies of 
the Third World", in Gregory, D, Martin, R., and Smith, G. {eds) Human 
Geography; society, space, and social science, Macmillan. 
45 Spivak, G. in MarxiSm and the Interpretation of Culture, Nelson, C. and 
Grossberg, L. {1988){eds.), University of Chicago Press. 
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human geography, promoting a post-colonial geography which addresses: 
'the unveiling of geographical compllczty m colonial domination over space; the 
character of geographical representation in colonial discourse; de/inking of local 
geographical enterprise from metropolitan theory and its totalizing systems of 
representation; and the recovery of those hidden spaces occupied and invested with 
their own meaning, by the colonial underclasses' ... 
The stress upon diversity assists in providing alternatives to the structures: 
agency dichotomy by raising questions of identity. For Laclau identity is essentially 
an unfinished business in which 'the field of social identities is not one of full 
identities but their ultimate failure to be constituted'." National identity is such an 
attempt to create a bounded, enclosed identity. Yet this process is inherently 
contradictory as the attainment of purity is always elusive and therefore leads us to an 
understanding of identity formation defmed as much by what they lack as by what 
they include'." These debates essentially concern the clash between humanism and 
anti-humanism which remain deep-seated and fundamental to closing the gap between 
the 'ideational' and 'material' realms. For example is identity and consciousness 
created through structures or essentially self-sufficient, united and equal as in 
interpretation of liberal humanism." These tensions and possibilities can be explored 
by locating the creation of differences within space and place. Corbridge has 
46 Crush, J. (1991) "The dzscourse of progresszve human geography", Progress m 
Human Geography, 15, 395-414. For an overview of the condition of South 
Afncan Human Geography in the 1980s, with reference to the academic boycott, 
see Rogerson, C. and Parnell, S. (1989) "Fostered by the laager: apartheid 
human geography in the 1980s", Area, 21.1, 13-26. For a critical review of 
geographical contributions to these objectives see Mabin, who doubts whether 
any of such work has actually proven that geography truly does 'matter' to 
processes of social and political change, Mabin, A. (1989) "Does geography 
matter? A review of the past decade's books by geographers of contemporary 
South Africa", South Afrzcan Geographzcal Journal, 11, 121-126. 
47 Keith, M. and Pile, S. (1993) Place and the Politzcs of Identzty, Routledge. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Bondi, L. (1993) "The Place of Identity Politics", m Keith, M. and Pile, S , 
Ibid. 
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highlighted ways for new approaches to causality, determination and conditions of 
existence to illustrate and by-pass dualisms and dichotomies such as base-
superstructure itself. This would involve new ways to combine inter-dependency and 
political and cultural mobilisations within the periphery through the possibilities of 
the 'new' regional geography: 
'The promise of the new regional geography is to hold together the complex interplay 
of the local and super-local and to take seriously the constitutive role of class, of 
gender, of ethnicity and culture in the production of place~"' 
These terms can be used to rethink the process of marginalisation at different scales, 
not merely reduced to economic determinism. This would go some way to rectifying 
political economy neglect of cultural dynamics and incorporation of local forms by 
the global system." Diversity would there put the 'human' back into human societies 
and suggest new interpretations of social action and political mobilisation." 
It has been show how ideas based upon mobilisation and construction of a 
'modem' identity are central to 'dependency' modernisation, and development. This 
can been shown in the various debates concerning a particularly important identity-
national identity and its relationship with Space. 
1.4. Spaces of Difference 
Meaning is created by discourses rooted in spatial locations and geographic 
imagery. Power relations are embedded in these geographies and have been a 
particular feature of post-structuralist and post-modernist literature with its embrace of 
a spatial vogue." Throughout social theory the use of geographical metaphors has 
5° Corbridge, S. (1990) "Post-marxism and development studies: Beyond the 
impasse", World Development 18: 623-639. 
51 Escobar, P. (1995) in Crush, op. c1t For a cnt1cal review of some of the key 
post-structural and postmodern development texts see Brown, E. (1996) 
"Deconstructing development: alternative perspectives on the history of an 
idea", Journal of HIStorical Geography, 22, 3, 333-339. 
52 Booth, D. (1993) op. cit. 
" Antony Giddens, Frederic Jameson, Homi Bhaba, Edward Said and Spivak. 
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been widespread. Michel Foucault has employed terms such as territory, domain, soil, 
region and so on. His specific use of spatial metaphors was in order to locate the 
relations that are possible between power and knowledge: 
'Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, 
displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge 
functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power'." 
Foucault's particular concern was with developing a critique of the strategies through 
which modem society was able to discipline and control its population by using the 
knowledge claims and practices of the human sciences- criminology, sociology, 
psychiatry, psychology, medicine." Foucault's approach has had a significant impact 
upon shifting the emphasis of social science to focus upon the consequences of space 
rather than time." The revitalisation of space therefore is particularly exciting for 
human geography. A central concern involves the perception that as a constructed 
meaning system, culture is far from being 'natural' and is entwined with and 
constitutive of economic and political systems. In analysing representations of culture 
and difference, three related issues draw upon this 'interpretative turn'. Firstly, its 
configurations in time and space, secondly, the potential role of politics and thirdly, 
competing constructions of identity." Furthermore, the 'annihilation of space by time'" 
and the 'erosion of the cultural distinctiveness of places'" through globalisation, raises 
important questions for identity formation. Identity formation also entails not only the 
erosion but also the 'shuffiing' and refashioning of 'location, identity and community' 
54 Foucault in Sarup, M. (1993:49) Introduction to Postmodermsm and Post-
structuralism, Wheatsheaf. 
" See for example, Hoy, D. (1986) Foucault: A Crlllcal Reader, (Basil Blackwell). 
'
6 See for example the key works of Soja, E. (1991) Postmodern Geographzes, 
London, Verso, and Harvey, D. (1989) The Condztzon of Postmodermty, Oxford, 
Blackwell. 
" Keith, M. and Pile, S. (1991) op. cit. 
,. Harvey, D. op. cit. 
'
9 Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (1992:9) "Beyond 'Culture"', Cultural Anthropology 
7. 
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within incompletely globalised sites." Watts reiterates Massey's concern in calling for 
a global sense of place. 
1.4.1. Identity and the Nation-Building 
A particularly important and enduring collective identity is that of the 'etlmo' 
national group and its often uneasy relationship with the 'state'. The 'nation-state' has 
been pregnant with the promise of attaining 'progress' and propelling modernisation. 
Its construction can not be isolated from the project of modernity and therefore 
western thought, which posits that the nation be equated with 'cultural nation'." 
Diversity is therefore eliminated through an homogenising tendency steeped in 
European experience of nation-building. Indeed, the conflation of national culture 
with progress and development suggest this symbiotic relationship. This 
homogenising drive can be found in the European nineteenth century influence of a 
uniforrnising national culture. This was centred upon the urban middle classes and 
addressed ideas such as conscription, schooling, transport, urbanism, print capitalism 
and erosion of local markets." The conception of 'bourgeois nation' is linked to 
Marxist and modernisation theorists alike and fails to locate the 'nation' outside 
capitalist social formations. Thus, to think of the nation outside the project of 
modernity is to miss its centrality and influence upon a range of western thinkers, 
bursting with Utopian fulfilment: 
The destruction of inequality between nations, the progress of equality within one 
and the same nation, and finally, the real perfecting of mankind. .. We shall find, from 
past experience .. that nature has assigned no limits to our hopes.. The time is 
doubtless approaching when we shall cease to play the role of corrupters and tyrants 
60 Watts, M. (1996) "Place, Space, and Community in an Afncan City", in Yaeger, 
P. (ed.) The Geography of Identity, Michigan 
61 Sibert, J. (1992) "Progress" in Sachs, op. cit. 
62 Williams, C., and Kofman, E. (eds.) (1989) Commumty Conflict, Partition and 
Nationalzsm, Routledge. 
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in the eyes of these people (in Africa and Asia) ... Then wzll the Europeans respect that 
independence which they have hitherto vzolated with such audacity ... and those 
thieves' counting houses (established by Europeans) will become colonies of citizens 
who will propagate, in Africa and in Asia, the principles and the example of freedom, 
and the reason of/earning in Europe~" 
The construction of 'nations' would follow many different paths but was inseparable 
from securing and attaining modernisation. Hence ambivalence was borne at the 
outset of these projects." This thesis provides a range of examples to illustrate the 
ways in which the ambiguities of identity formation are rooted within the context of 
the conflicts surrounding the creation of a nation-state in pursuit of modernisation. 
The thesis explores expressions of this relationship, such as the importance of the 
creation of a capital city, and the promotion of economic development, international 
relations and 'prestige' projects, which all demonstrate the linkages between the 
global and local scales of nation-building." 
The dominant discourse and practical implementation of nation-building 
represented the creation of the nation-state as born only through the passing away of 
traditional society." In spite of reifying Africa as some how a special case, 
nonetheless, modernisation and neo-modemisation theorists maintained an 
evolutionary perspective." Development was primarily concerned with the material 
strengthening of the state and increased cultural homogeneity. Therefore much of 
63 Condorcet, m Sibert, J. (1992) ibid. 
64 Again see Basil Davidson ( 1992) op. cit. 
6
' The hybridity of colonial and post-colonial cities has been recently examined in 
Forms of Dominance, Alsayyad, N. (ed.) (1992), Avebury With his suggestion 
that analyses of cities 'as essentially discrete entities and therefore as having 
more or less unique physical form, fabric and social life, are limited in 
conception' David S1mon provides an important reminder that cities ex1st as 
part of a global system , m S1mon, D. (1992) Cllies, Capital and Development, 
Belhaven Press. 
66 Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) op. cit. 
67 It is also ironic that in calling for a reversal of this evolutionary perspective 
some advocates of national socialist revolution in Africa, such as Nzongola-
Ntalaja (1987) adopted another evolutionary perspective. 
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mainstream development theory was identical to modernization and the nation-
building project." This was assumed as state-centric and therefore guided by a 
national elite responsible for instilling a national culture. The idea of cultural unity as 
national ideal, remains central to development as modernization. This always entails 
the identification of ethnicity or alternative identities as sacrilegious, obstructing the 
progressive impulse of history. 
Another important critique of the process of modernisation, albeit within the 
European context, is provided by the work ofFoucault. His central concern was with 
the intervention and administrative control through which the rise of the modern state 
defined itself. Foucault saw this as enabled by the discourses associated with 
intellectual thought and leading to the ordering and disciplining of the subject. As 
such this can also be read as an attack against historicism and the call instead for 
writing history without 'progress'. This also has implications for identity through 
Foucault's decentering of the Cartesian self-knowing and conscious individual. 
Instead human 'reality' is seen by Foucault as constructed, locally and culturally 
specific and struggling against the single totalising truth and metaphysics of 
modernity." 
Geographical concepts can therefore heighten insight into rethinking the 
global and local pressures upon national identity. Taylor suggests that nationalism is 
inherently territorial," and geography can illuminate the 'mapping' devices used by 
Imperialism and this clash between specificity and universalism. The notion of 
'transparent' space and its illusion of truth corresponds to a 'cartographic identity' 
63 Hettne, B. (1996) op. cit., prefers to avoid the evolutionary connotations of the 
'nation-building project' by calling it mstead the 'nation-state' project. 
69 For an interesting discussion of three different theoretical approaches to 
modernity, which the author categorizes as, rationalist (Gellner), muslim 
fundamentalist (Ahmed) and critical relativism (Giddens), see Tjomsland, M. 
(1994) A Discussion of Three Theoretical Approaches to modernity: 
Understanding modernity as a Globalising Phenomenon, Working Paper, Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen, Norway. 
70 Taylor, P. 1.(1989) Polztzca/ Geography: World-economy, natzon-state and 
/ocalzty Longman. Despite this assertiOn he laments the paucity of geographic 
writing on natiOnalism. 
Chapter One: Identity and Development 23 
mapped upon objects." This emptiness or homogenisation of space can be scrutinised 
by undermining the hegemonic claims underpinning these maps.n The image of the 
nation-state is an important controlling mechanism claiming to present each nation-
state with its own 'universe'. The conflict between the unique and the universal is 
epitomised through the deliberations to integrate a modern state whilst it faces 
resistance to this standardisation and centralisation from the constituent parts of its 
nation(s). A paramount dilemma for post-colonial states is whether to promote a 
universal cosmopolitanism or specifically local identity. Whilst lamenting only 
indirect interest in the post-colonial Other, principally stemming from western 
scholars and societies redemptive analysis of the 'self', Duncan nonetheless accepts the 
problems and pressures facing the hybrid construction of national identity: 
'Having said this (the lack of interest in 'other' cultures per se), there is no question 
that it has become increasingly dijjicult (some would say impossible) since the 
colonial period to talk about other cultures apart from the west. Identities and 
practices of everyday life within colonial and post-colonial societies have been 
fashioned out of fragments of the local and western. Even when national cultural 
identities are explicitly purged of western tamt, it could be argued that the result can-
not be understood meaningfUlly except as a purifying process to expunge 
colonialism~" 
Various strategies and combinations of local fragments and the 'western' are at the 
centre of endeavours to reverse the perception and condition of being marginalised. 
Discussions of nationalism and national identity have tended to reinforce the 
uneasy dichotomisation between the local and western scales because influential 
studies have either considered themselves as belonging to either a 'modernist' or 
71 Crush, J (1995) op. cit. 
n Blunt, A. and Rose, G. eds. (1994) Writing Women and Space· Colonial and 
Post-Colonzal Geograph1es. Guildford Press, New York-London. 
73 Duncan, J.S. (1993:368) "Landscapes of the self/landscapes of the other(s): 
cultural geography 1991-1992", PH Geog, 17, 3, pp. 367-377. 
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'primordialist' position. For example, Smith claims that nations and nationalism can 
only be understood as distinct cultural phenomena through grasping the pre-modern 
antecedents and questions of ethnic identity and community. Debunking modernist 
explanations he suggests the centrality of pre-modern ideas: 
'If nationalism is part of the 'spirit of the age' it is equally dependent upon earlier 
motifs, visions and ideals~" 
Alternatively, various modernist positions deny this continuity and explain the rise of 
nationalism as contingent through either the social division of labour, uneven 
development, or various combinations such as the emergence of print capitalism 
which enables communities to imagine themselves." In the modernist interpretation 
the evolution of states requires nations, particularly with the emergence of the 
bourgeoisie which 'creates' nationalism. Political analysis although similarly 
modernist, emphasises the struggle for political power and hence the state as central to 
this. Once again elites are seen as competing for power and manipulating nationalist 
feeling." The British social historians have regarded national culture as the strategies 
through which the ruling classes have attempted to eo-opt the masses. Similarly, 
Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to illustrate the role of culture in forming 
national-cultural collective identities which state managers, through local and national 
class projects, could ensure that hegemony. Despite focusing on culture as a terrain 
vital to ideological struggle, culture is nonetheless reduced to a hegemonic tool 
diffusing downwards. In the process of hegemonic formation, Gramsci noted that for 
hegemony to be successful it needed to have appeal to the masses. 77 Geographical 
perspectives on ( ethno) nationalism can negotiate a way to transcend the dichotomy of 
74 Smith, A. D. (1991) Natwns and Natwnalzsm, Verso 
15 Gellner, Cairn, and Bened1ct Anderson, respectively, in the collection by 
Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds. 1994) Natwnalum, Oxford University 
Press. 
76 Brass, P. R. (1991) Ethniczty and Natzonalzsm: Theory and Comparison. Sage, 
New Delhi. 
77 Forgacs, D. (1988) A Gramscz Reader, Lawrence and Wishart. 
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the general and particular processes associated with local conditions and structures. 
Despite the Eurocentric and restricted outlook of much of the localities and 
regionalism literature its emphasis upon the politics of place in the context of the 
global is particularly useful. Three main approaches informing this literature can be 
expanded to cover broader debates on nationalism. In providing a review of the three 
dominant theories of political regionalism Cooke suggests avoidance of either a 
culturally or economically reductionist argument. Firstly, the region can be seen as the 
context in which capital is invested and as a product of local responses to capitalist 
processes. The region is therefore structured by these localised expressions of 
capitalist accumulation. Variations of this theme include David Harvey's concept of 
'structured coherences' to explain the formation of regional class alliances. This 
regards the local state as embedded in local class relations which have been elongated 
through a particular mix of technologies. 
Alternatively, the region is seen as the focus of identity in that places are 
culturally specific. Residents are tied together through locally focused 
communications and ideas about the place. This broadly translates as an etlmo-
regional explanation of regional difference. 
A social-spatial oriented view interprets the region as a medium for social 
interaction within which people are integrated through locally based social interaction. 
This integration constructs collectivities with shared cultures or imagined 
communities which can bring together cultural and economic factors: 
'the effects of spatially distinct patterns of production will always be combined with 
and mediated through spatially distinct social practices arising in local civil society 
and sustained culturally through an imagined commumty'.,. 
The result is regional variations in the creation of infrastructure within which 
capitalism can operate. Social relationships are also differentiated in this trade off 
78 Dune an and Goodwin in Reynolds, D. ( 1991) "Progress Report Political 
Geography", Pro g. Hum. Geog. Vol. 16, no. 3. 
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between capitalist development and its filtering through the sieve of local cultures. 
This provides linkages for all three perspectives but perhaps undermines its own 
explanatory value through the lack of a more interpretative framework. For example, 
we need to assess how these meanings of events are interpreted and the ways in which 
social and economic structures are themselves reproduced through those 
contingencies. Once again the centrality of space and spatial discourse can elaborate 
on the association between places and perceptions of daily life. 
Therefore connecting social identity and territorial affiliations is central to the 
ideological dimensions involved in the formation of a region. This tells ns more not 
only of the role of regions in social processes but the meaning and significance of 
regions themselves." Murphy contends that a huge gulf exists between theory and 
practice when the regionalisation process is being addressed. He suggests that there is 
a dire need to account for regions instead of taking them for granted as 'area! 
frameworks'. The region should be seen not as a backdrop but constitutive of society. 
The fundamental starting point for this approach would be in asking how and why 
does the 'region' acquire significance or ideological import? 
If we take nationalism and its off-spring, ethno-nationalism, then these 
ideologies represent circuits of ideas, which are rooted literally in the soil of the 
locality and then the nation-state. However, they also operate just as effectively within 
the homeland of the mind. The sociologist Rob Shields has proposed that a spatialised 
discourse for analysing the cultural interface between centre and margins can most 
profitably be shown as: 
'key to the transformation of purely discursive "imaginary geographies" into everyday 
actions, gestures, crowd practice, regional identities, the "imaginary community" of 
the territorial nation state, and geo-politics'." 
79 Murphy, A. (1991) "Regions as Social Constructs", Prog Hum. Geog. Vol. 15, 
No.!. 
80 Shields, R. (1992.65) Places on the Margms· Alternative Geograph1es of 
Modermty, Routledge, London. 
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Nationalism involves the interpretation and construction of social space. However the 
essentially contested concept of 'nation' is to be defined, it involves ideas about 
territory and the uniqueness of space and place. Smith and Williams suggest that the 
nation be seen as mans 'natural' social organisation, in which a national culture is used 
as a tool kit to bind space and infuse it with meaning. The identity of the nation is 
bound up with memory which is rooted in the concept of a homeland: 
'History has natiOnalised a strip of land, and endowed its most ordinary features with 
mythical content and hallowed sentiments'." 
The importance of place and context in accounting for the origins of nationalism 
reminds us that the latter is never autonomous. Instead the ' ... strength of its appeal is 
its ability to tap a responsive chord among the local population'." Nationalist 
movements use and then in turn shape local and regional political cultures and 
attachments to place." This is important for emphasising that political and cultural 
mobilisations occur in particular times and places and therefore can not be explained 
through the primacy of economic or cultural factors. Instead the intersection of the 
social and spatial can provide the context for viewing multiple causation. The shaping 
and construction of national space involves the infusion of meanings into landscape 
which legitimises development strategies in the name of transformation. This thesis 
provides examples of these attempts to create one such wholly artificial 'national' 
space and looks at the inherent tensions in doing so based upon two inter-related yet 
usually separated concepts. 
Firstly, this was underpinned by an array of eurocentric imagery and meanings 
81 Smith, A. and Williams, C. (1983) "The National Construction of Social Space", 
Prog. Hum. Geog. Vol. 7, No I 
82 Agnew in Williams and Kofmam ( 1989) op .cit. 
83 See Osbourne who also refers to thts as a clash between gemeinschaft and 
geschelschaft, in Osborne, B. S. (1992) "Interpreting a nations' identity: Artists 
as creators of national consciousness", pp. 230-250, in Baker, A. R. H. and 
Biger, G. (1992) (eds.) Ideology and landscape m hzstorical perspective, CUP. 
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related to 'othering' and Imperialism. This embraced colonial ideas and tropes which 
created a powerful eurocentric-modernist framework or 'gaze' upon the African. A 
principal colonial mechanism involved the notion of 'trusteeship' which for Manzo 
has been paramount in (re)creating a parent-child dichotomy between coloniser and 
colonised. The implication is that European intervention has been legitimised in the 
name of 'civilisation' and 'progress' with the colonial 'other' considered culturally 
and politically 'immature'." A range of traditions introduced from Europe into Africa 
based upon 'invented traditions' have formed control and socialisation mechanisms 
for the colonising powers. The African petty-bourgeoisie has been a key conduit for 
Eurocentric ideas concerning hierarchy, state, etiquette and especially education." 
Therefore the rituals and incantations associated with 'nation-building' have also to be 
seen in this context of modernisation and the 'will to develop'. 
Secondly, of equal significance is the impact that this 'gaze' has had upon 
conceptions of 'African culture' and 'tradition' and the mobilisation of local cultural 
and political identities. In many instances this has been objectified and refracted 
around modernisation. This has involved on the one hand European categorisation, 
definition and therefore 'invention' of African cultural and traditional features. On the 
other, therefore, to mobilise local traditional values and identities is not ever to find a 
'Garden of Eden' or anti-modernist alternative. In other words, for Manzo, the 
uncritical promotion of 'tradition', used to counter 'modernity', in fact threatens to 
reinscribe modernity in its most violent form because the modernist imagery has not 
been transcended." The choices and ambiguous responses available to and made by 
local groups, particularly the state leaders, captures this hybridisation and 
contamination of the local with wider eurocentric gaze. The intersection of these two 
broad spheres- modernisation and (ethnic) identity will now be discussed in the 
84 See also Ashforth, A. (1990) The Politics of Off•c•al Discourse in Twentieth-
Century South Africa, Oxford University Press and Beinart, W. (1984) "Soil 
Erosion, Conservation and ideas about Development: a Southern African 
Exploration, 1900-1960", JSAS, Vol. 11. 
ss See Ranger, T. (1983) in Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (1983) (eds.), The 
Invention of Trad1t1on, CUP. 
86 Manzo, K., op. cit. 
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context of the creation of separate ethnic and racial places in South Africa. Culture is 
a powerful tool for contesting social struggles, and in this sense it can be used 
positively and negatively. However, it is never simply autonomous but embedded in 
political and economic structures. 
The manipulation, invention, creation and politicisation of 'culture' in South 
Africa is a powerful reminder that culture can not stand outside these processes. As 
Kofman and Williams conclude, culture is located in the modem world, responsive to 
socio-economic realities and reflective of tensions in global economic 
transformations." 
1.5. South African Spaces ofldentity 
These broad debates which embrace questions of identity and developmental 
fulfilment take on heightened significance when placed in the context of South 
African society and space. The construction of a formalised system of racial 
discrimination and segregation, elaborated during the apartheid era, has been the 
salient feature of the South African intellectual and political landscape. Issues 
concerning race relations were not marginalised like in other numerically superior 
white settler Dominions but were instead central to South African national 
historiography." Furthermore, spatial division and territorial controls have 
underpinned South Africa's political, economic and moral divisions. The explanation 
of these spatial and social divisions has been the primary objective of social science 
and historians. These intellectual debates were dominated for a number of years 
particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, by attributing causation to either 
capitalism or racial domination. These have been broadly identified and labelled as 
the 'Liberal' (Race) and 'Revisionist' (Capital) debate." Briefly, the contours of the 
87 Williams, C. and Kofman, E. (eds.) 1989, op.cit. 
.. . Bemart, W., and Dubow, S. (eds.) (1995) Segregatzon and Apartheid, Routledge. 
89 The debates form an extremely large literature but for a general overview see 
Pose I, D. ( 1983) 'Rethinking the Race-Class Debate in South African 
Historiography', Socwl Dynamzcs, Vol. 9, No. I. Also see Saunders, C. (1988) 
'Historians and Apartheid', ID Lonsdale, J.,(ed) South Afrzca zn Questzon, James 
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debate concerned the liberal attachment to the view that apartheid race relations were 
essentially archaic and an irrational impediment to the beneficial market forces.,. 
However, the 'revisionists' regarded race as merely functional to the underlying 
structure and logic of capitalist accumulation. The pivotal mechanism enabling these 
deeper economic structures was interpreted as the extension of the oscillating migrant 
labour system. Thus, it can be suggested that for Marxist analysis the former native 
reserves (recast in the apartheid era as Bantustans, and from which migrants entered 
'white' South Africa), have been central to South Africa's economic and social 
relations. 
The most influential work concerning the reserve-subsidy thesis is that of 
Harold Wolpe. His central idea was that segregation was merely the appearance and 
adjunct to the underlying need for mining and farming to acquire cheap labour. This 
was secured through the migrant system which enabled the capitalist owners to meet 
only the basic salary of the migrant because the physical and social reproduction of 
his family was to take place within the reserves." In this way the poorest regions of 
Currey, London. 
90 Vanations on this theme included English speaking historians identification of 
Afrikaner racism and nationalism as the primary cause of segregatiomsm, 
particularly following 1948. For the Boer the frontier was one of continual 
expansion and appropriation of land and labour and it is this fiercely 
mdependent drive mto the mterior of Africa that has been propelled from the 
confusion of being in the continent. For Afrikaner interpretations see, for 
example, Bnnk, who put this 'drive' as follows: 'In the Afr~kaner's evolution 
towards nation-hood there had always been ... two m a; or streams of experience: 
a positive factor, wh1ch resided m the Afr~kaner's increasing exploration of and 
IdentifiCation w1th Afr~ca; and a negative, in hu attempts to assert himself- one 
of Gods chosen people- agamst others Wllh the adoption of apartheid as 
1deology most su1ted to the Afr~kaner Establishment's 1mage of Itself, only the 
negative factor was reaff~rmed at the expense- no, at the total exclusion-of the 
pos1t1ve', Brink, A. (1982) Mapmakers m a State of Siege, Verso, London. See 
also Gihomee, H. and L, Schlemmer (1989) From Apartheid to Nation-Bu1lding, 
Oxford University Press, Cape Town. For a critical view and assessment of 
whether British colonial race relations in Natal were really that significantly 
different from the Afrikaner see Marks, S. (1986) The Ambigu111es of 
Dependence, Ravan, 1o'burg. 
91 See Wolpe, H. (1972) "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power: From Segregation 
to Apartheid", in Dubow and Beinart, op. cit. and Legassick, M. (1974) South 
Africa: "Capital Accumulation and Violence", Economy and Soc1ety, Vol. 3, No. 
3, 1974. For alternative views at the time, see also Kantor, B.S. (1976) "The 
Poverty of Neo-Marxism: The Case of South Afnca", JSAS, Vol. 3, No. I. 
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South Africa were underpinning the industrial and economic development of the more 
prosperous (white) areas. There were obvious parallels therefore for applying ideas of 
dependency theory, with South Africa's black peripheries seen as historically 
underdeveloped by the 'white' core." The creation of rural labour reserves, stagnation 
and poverty of these territories has obvious implications for the way in which identity 
politics within the bantustans have been seen. 
1.5.1. South Africa and the Bantustans 
Between 1959 and 1991 the bantustans were the central pillars of the apartheid 
edifice, designed to preserve white minority rule in South Africa. The bantustans were 
elaborations of the scattered pockets of land set aside for blacks by the racial partition 
of South African territory ordained by the 1913 Land Act. This had given blacks, the 
majority of the population, only 13% of the total land area whilst whites had the 
remainder. From 1959 these impoverished and fragmented native reserves were recast 
as ethnically constituted 'Less Developed Countries'. However, the majority of each 
ethnic group lived outside these bantustans and within South Africa itself. Between 
1960 and 1983 in compliance with the apartheid state's policy of 'ethnic cleansing' and 
with the Republic of South Africa now defmed as the 'white fatherland', more than 
three and a half million people were forcibly removed to the bantustans. They were 
therefore associated with brutal relocation of millions of people to these remote 
territories on the periphery of 'white' South Africa. Furthermore, in 1985 it was 
estimated that despite having 41.6% of the total population of South Africa, the 
homelands only accounted for 7% of GDP." The international community, African 
National Congress and residents of the homelands themselves, therefore attacked the 
Knight, G.B and Lenta, G. (1980) "Has capital underdeveloped the Labour 
Reserves of South Africa", Oxford Bulletm of Economy and Statistzcs, No. 42 
92 See the classic studies of Bundy, C. (1979) The RlSe and Fall of the South 
Afrzca Peasantry, Heinemann and Pa1mer,R. and Parson, N. (eds.) (1976) The 
Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Afrzca, Heinemann. 
93 Development Bank of South Africa, SA TVBC Statistics, Halfway House, 
Johannesburg. 
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bantustans as a mockery and diminution of black birthright as South Africans. The 
bantustans have been characterised as being 'puppet' states of Pretoria riven by both 
internal and external failure to gain legitimacy which was barely concealed by a 
facade of'nation-hood'. 
Marxist interpretations of South Africa society and the creation of the 
reserves/bantustans were therefore related to class struggle and capitalist 
development. This academic theorising often accompanied the increasing political 
polarisation within South Africa and implied a revolutionary rather than evolutionary 
(liberal faith in rationality of market forces) change. Southall's influential work on the 
'independent' Transkei bantustan suggested that it was impossible for this policy to be 
understood, unless located within the overall context of South Africa's political 
economy. Only then was it possible to 'decipher the nature of the relationship between 
the white 'core' and its bantustan peripheries'. For Southall, the act of 'independence' 
was essentially the South African government attempts at elevating a class 
relationship (exploitation) to an apparently international transaction between discrete 
(white and black) nationalities. Apartheid was therefore regarded as complementary to 
capitalist development: 
'Apartheid is principally a system whereby capital secures cheap black labour under 
certain historically defined conditions specific to the development of the South African 
social formation, its roots lying in the policies of 'segregation' which were adopted by 
the state subsequent to the inauguration of the Union in 1910'.94 
This analysis emphasised the role of an emergent black petite-bourgeoisie, encouraged 
by the South African state. As a comprador class this bantustan elite would enforce 
the suppression of resistance and compliment the array of oppressive legislation. 
However, in the last instance the 'logic' of the system was concerned with minimising 
labour costs and absorbing the 'periphery' into the structure of the South African 
94 Southall, R. (1982:21) South Afnca's Transke1, Heinemann. 
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economy. The key features of the bantustan were therefore symptomatic of 
underdevelopment, appropriation of economic surplus, emergence of stratification in 
the form of a wage labouring-mass, and a relatively privileged elite." Whilst Southall 
provided detail of internal political developments and change, this was nonetheless 
read off from the economic base. This implied that chiefly control and manipulation 
of the electoral system and tribalism was no more than a 'mask for class privilege'." 
The emergent bourgeoisie consisting of petty-traders and businessmen, politicians, 
bureaucrats and chiefs, because fmancially dependent upon the state ' ... are more likely 
to use this influence to promote support for, and to suppress resistance to, separate 
development'." 
Critiques of 'dependency theory' more generally were therefore applied to 
South African analysis. Bundy reflected upon his own failure to identity internal 
cleavages and conflicts which had therefore hidden a range of dynamic tendencies 
within these territories. A uniform homogenised outcome of underdevelopment had 
been generalised rather than the timing, diverse reactions and causes to this.'' There 
was also an air of pessimistic inevitability about the outcome and futility of struggle 
within the reserveslbantustans related causation. Recently, Southall himself accepted 
that the model of stagnation presented by the dependency approach could not account 
for the social upheavals which 'punctured the rural acquiescence of the bantustans 
from the mid-1980s'. This neglect had the effect of therefore presenting a one-
dimensional view of thoroughly hamstrung dependencies: 
~ .. /was exaggeratedly impressed by the weight of repression and the inexorable logic 
of a one-dimensional model. What was needed was a more dynamic approach capable 
of respondzng to indzcations of how rapidly the bantustans were changing'.'' 
9
' Southall, R. (1982:71) 1bid. 
96 Sk1ar in Southall, ibid. 
97 Southall, R. (1977: 16) "The Beneficiaries of Transkeian Independence", JMAS, 
15, 1, pp. 1-23. 
98 Bundy,C. (1988) Rzse and Fall of the South Afrzcan Peasantry, 2nd Edition. 
99 Southall, R. (1992: 14) (ed.) Undoing Independence: Regzonalzsm and 
Rezncorporatzon ofTranskei znto South Afrzca, JCAS, Vol. 11, No. 2. 
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A new wave of literature has begun to correct certain generalisations of these radical 
analyses which on one level never attempted to define the relationship between 
homeland leaders and the local bourgeoisie, simply assuming that their interests were 
identical.'"' Rather than Wolpe's capitalist continuity between segregation and 
apartheid these new approaches also linked this to the differentiation within the 
bantustans and the impact of state and political policy.'" The rural periphery was not 
simply neatly and uniformly compartmentalised but internally differentiated by the 
uneven and variable manner in which they had been captured or uncaptured by 
apartheid. There was still a dire need to accept that the bantustans were valid and 
distinct analytical entities: 
'For many people from subsistence farmers to rural teachers in homeland schools to 
tribal authorities, to government bureaucrats, this is their reality. The aspirations, 
past experience, attitudes, beliefs and motivations of homeland residents can not 
simply be dismissed as false consciousness. They must be accounted for and 
recognised as the real- not imaginary consequences of grand apartheid policy'.'" 
Intellectual interest therefore shifted to the questioning of the passive role 
attributed to Africans, especially within the 'dependency view'. A more agency 
100 Peires, J., in Southall, R. (1992) tbid. and Graff, J. ( 1990) "Towards an 
Understanding of Bantustan Politics", in Nattrass, N. and Ardington. E. ( 1990) 
The Political Economy of South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town. 
101 Charles Simkms regards political factors in post-1948 as more important 
effects upon agricultural production in the bantustans than does Wolpe, see 
Simkins, C. (1981) "Agricultural Production in the African Reserves: South 
Africa 1918-1969", JSAS, Vol. 7, No.2. Economic differentiation also took 
place through the rapid increase in manufacturing, raising different issues for 
dtfferent sectors of the economy. See Lipton, M. (1986) indicatmg the 
manufacturing sectors need for a more stable urban based workforce. Hindson, 
D. (1987) expands a radical interpretation of labour differentiation and the 
creation of 'urban insiders', in Pass Controls and the urban Aft~can proletariat 
m South Aft~ ea, Ravan. 
102 Lawrence, M, Patterson, A. ( 1991) "South Africa's Rural Chickens come home 
to Roost", Mat/hased1, Vol. 10, No. 
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oriented analysis injected important issues about class, consciousness and gender into 
the debate.'"' Through the concept of 'domain construction' Bozzoli provided an 
influential approach to relating race, ethnic and gender relations bound up within the 
context of a society undergoing rapid and widespread economic and industrial 
development. Anthropologists provided crucial insights into processes within the 
bantustans themselves. This concentrated on the one hand upon the consequences of 
the 'dumping grounds' and hundreds of thousands of displaced people, with 
settlements urban in size yet rural in terms of access to services."' This has also 
encouraged a wave of South African Geographic literature embracing new insights 
into the past and present through linking 'the hidden spaces' and struggles over the 
spaces to sexuality, urban protest, alcohol, disease and migrancy. The primary result 
has been to insist upon African agency rather than passivity. For example, Africans 
also manipulated the migrant system for their own ends such as control over land, 
chieftaincy and women. A highly significant strand of the new literatures therefore 
concerned the African response to changing circumstances. In many rural areas there 
was traditional based opposition to incorporation into colonial sphere and modernity. 
-
1.5.2. Marginalisation and Ambiguities of Dependence 
The analysis of a range of black elite 'modernisers' was also particularly 
important for it reveals that having been denied access into colonial society, many 
103 See Bozzoli, B. (1987) Class, community and conflict, Ravan Press, South 
Africa. It is also interesting to note Wolpe's more recent position ID which he 
has sought to move from an overly class reductionist analysis He does this by 
suggestmg contingency and that for class unity or interests to converge at a 
particular conjecture requires not simply labour and capital concepts but also 
practices, diScourses and organisations. Thus 'class' IS reproblematised and 
relations of domination in South Africa reconceptualised: 'Soc1al classes zn 
Marx1an sense of the relat1onsh1p to the means of product1on exist hy defznltlon, 
as they must zn any cap1tal1st country, but they are not meanzngful soc1al 
realities. Clearly, p1gmentat1on, rather than ownership of land or cap1tal IS the 
most s1gnif1cant crzterza of status zn South Africa', Wolpe, H. (1988:13) Race, 
Capital and the Apartheid State, Unesco, Paris. Therefore neither class nor 
racial structures are for Wolpe, predetermined. 
104 See Colin Murray's work. 
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mission-educated blacks sought out strategies which were highly ambiguous. These 
alternated between internalising colonial etiquette and then sometimes utilising and 
manipulating ethnic or regional affiliations.'" As over 80% of Africans were still 
living in rural reserves by 1930, there was in some cases strenuous efforts to preserve 
the old way of life and 'traditions'. Given the rapid changes in society it is therefore 
vital to introduce the question of modernisation and social and cultural assumptions 
underpinning territorial fragmentation.'" 
This involves on one level scrutinising the different strands of apartheid 
discourse. Dubow has uncovered the ideological assumptions of segregation and the 
role of intellectna! and scientific thought in creating a racial science. His identification 
of 'Scientific racism' in South Africa is seen in relation to the forces and turbulence of 
modernisation: 
'The development of a tradition of racial science in South Africa ought to be seen, like 
segregation itself, as both a response and a solution to the traumatic confrontatiOn 
with industrial modernity. This process was exacerbated by virtue of the fact that 
industrialisation and urbanisation occurred so suddenly and dramatically followmg 
the discovery of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century. The impact of rapid 
industrialisation on predominantly agrarian societies was profound and brought with 
it the characteristic problems and anxieties associated with modernity· 
proleterianisation, mass poverty, crime, disease and soczal breakdown. The concerns 
of racial science spoke directly to these anxieties. Its findings helped to rationalise 
social strictures against racial and cultural intermixture, and its warnings of 
pollution, defilement and degeneration served as powerfUl justificatiOns of the need 
for statutory segregation along lines of colour. In so doing, racial science helped to 
105 Marks, S. (1986) The ambiguities of dependence, Ravan, discusses this in 
context of Natal and emergence of Zulu ethno-nattonalism. See also Willan, B. 
(1984) An African Natlonalzst: Sol Plaatje, James Currey. 
106 Crush, (1987) combines both a cultural and economic approach to Swazi society 
and its specific response to the challenge of moder01ty, in The Struggle for 
Swazi labour, 1890-1920, Queens University Press, Ontario. 
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facilitate the realisation and ideological mamtenance of white power and authonty'.'" 
This therefore drew upon earlier colonial tropes and metaphors which spoke to wider 
white fears of racial degeneration. Following 1948 this segregationist framework was 
infused with Christian Nationalism and anthropological conceptions of cultural 
relativity rooted in German romanticism of 'ethnos'."' Despite the centrality of systems 
of'difference' within South Africa, it is surprising that this signification of'difference', 
or 'othering' has not been extensively discussed."' 
As a result, Pamell and Mabin have recently provided an important article 
illustrating the irony of racially defmed empirical work which despite its good 
intentions has failed to challenge racial classification of segregationist and apartheid 
ideology. Race they argue should not be seen as pre-given but created as part of the 
intricate development of modem (urban) society. These geographers have urged the 
posing of questions which will illuminate the racialisation of social relationships 
through which racial categories were fashioned and entrenched. To that end we have 
still failed to grapple with 'the rationale, purpose and consequences of defining and 
building racial places'."' A discussion of modernity within South Africa can provide 
important ways to transcend the dualisms and binary opposites which remain so 
entrenched within apartheid discourse."' 
The discussions of racial purity and pollution upon which constructions of race 
discourse were based represent the other side of the same modernist coin. In other 
107 Dubow, S. (1995.285&286) Scientzfic Raczsm zn Modern South Africa, CUP. 
108 See article on Verwoerd's particular role, by Mill, R.B (1993) "Science and 
society in the early career of H. F. Verwoerd", JSAS, Vol. 19, pp. 634-661. 
109 Robmson, J. in Blunt, A. and Rose, G. (eds.) (1993). 
110 Parnell, S., Mabin, A. (1995:39) "Rethinking Urban South Africa", JSAS,Vol 
21, Number I, March 1995. See also Mabin, A. (1995) "On the Problems and 
Prospects of Overcoming Segregation and Fragmentation in Southern Africa's 
Cities in the Postmodern Era", in Watson, S. and Gibson, K. (eds )(1995), 
Postmodern Citzes and Spaces, Blackwell. 
111 See Manzo on logocentrism in South Afnca, op. ctt. See also with reference to 
the role of post-structuralism m reshaping South Africa's academic institutions, 
Macleod, C. (1994) "Transforming the research system", Development Southern 
Afrzca, Vol. 11, No. 3. 
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words, the formation of racial identity and a form of race nationalism was in close 
proximity to the fears of modem society in South Africa. This represented the essence 
of apartheid in that it resonated with western discourses on race and metaphysics. As 
such it contained an 'identitary logic' embedded in totalising modernist discourse, 
whose major emphasis was upon identity formation: 
'This is what I have called the identitary logic: the logic of what is involved in the 
process of identzty construction, in its broadest sense, wherein the impossibility of 
bridging the gap between identification and the reaching of a fully fledged identity is 
denied. Against such an identitary logic, the possibility of developing a more 
democratic logic of a 'never-sutured identity: will be held out'.112 
Norval therefore argues that we need to understand the way in which apartheid has 
divided social and political space through the ambiguity of its 'discriminatory and 
discerning logic'. This ambiguity is not captured by the classifications such as 'capital' 
or 'race' but instead through the ability of apartheid to redraw political frontiers and 
locating blacks to the periphery through the binary dnalisms of social spaces. This 
leads back to the earlier discussion concerning the frictions between state and nation 
formation. The ambitions of the national state were integral to this project of 
modernity and its quest for cultural unity. The inherent contradictions of modernity 
therefore relate to this logic of identity formation upon which an 'order-chaos' polarity 
is found. 113 
The approach taken in this thesis is to re-situate the bantustans within the 
context of the creation of and interplay between a range of complex identities. 
African's were represented as geographically illegitimate within 'white' South Africa 
whilst many embraced a diverse range of identities in order to reverse a sense or 
112 Norval, A. (1994) "Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid", in The 
Makmg of Polzllcal Identities, Laclau, E. (1994) (ed.) Verso. 
113 Norval, A. J. (1995) "Decolonization, demonization and difference: the difftcult 
constitution of a nation", Phzlosophy & Soczal Crztzczsm, vol. 21 no. 3, pp.31-
51. 
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condition of marginality. This approach involves assessing the ways in which space 
has been represented, moralised and signified as distinct racial (and ethnic) places.'" 
To construct a truly post-apartheid order there is therefore a great need to assess what 
apartheid spoke directly to- the universal logic within every 'national' and 'racial' 
identity. 
This can be transcended once again through mapping the relationships 
between culture, development and space. By looking at the discourses and practices 
available to the bantustan state leadership this thesis brings together two crucial but 
still separated sets of literature which addresses those forces permeating, constraining 
and creating the bantnstans. The purpose is to correct the failure to recognise these 
territories as 'socially differentiated and economically structured geographies'."' This 
involves, firstly, those broad eurocentric ideas and practices concerning development 
and modernisation, as alluded to at the end of the section on 'national identity'. 
This is particularly pertinent in the South African context and requires the 
identification of 'othering' which was so central to the creation of colonial and racial 
frameworks. Underpinned by ideas of civilisation, progress and enlightenment, Manzo 
has focused discussion of the role of 'trusteeship' in enabling colonial intervention 
and alienation of the African. Historical geographic approaches have begun to 
nncover the relationship between the colonial naming and labelling of landscape and 
the creation of racial, environmental and gender discourses of exclusion. Powerful 
racist discourses embracing 'progress' have also been more recently recast as ideas of 
'development'. The phenomenon of the growth of state and non-state development 
institutions has been examined by Tapscott who places the 'rise of development as 
theory and policy' within the context of South African state crisis in the late 1970s. 
114 Dixon, J., Foster, D., Durrheim, K., Wilbrahim, L. (1994) "The Discourse and 
Politics of Space in South Africa: the 'squatter cris1s'", Discourse and Soc1ety, 
Vol. 5(3) pp. 277-296. See also Robmson, J. (1995) Transforming Spaces: 
Spatiality and democracy in the transformation of local government in South 
Africa, Paper to The Societies of Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, University of London. 
"'Pickles and Woods, (1991) "South Africa's Bantustans in the Age of Reform: 
Qwa Qwa", Annals of the Assoc. Amer1can Geographers, No. 15. 
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According to the author this structural crisis manifested itself at the economic, 
political and ideological levels of South African society. It resulted in policy changes, 
encouraged by state and ruling elites, in particular those interests represented by big 
business and military-security concerns. The latter envisaged a 'hearts and minds' 
campaign designed to legitimise separate development by giving blacks a stake in its 
structures and also 're-orienting the ideological discourse of the white population': 
These two social forces, in effect, created a socio-political milieu in which the notion 
of 'development' was to gain currency in South Africa at the start of the 1980s, 
although individual academics from Afrikaans medium universities had for some 
years been speaking of the need for a "new development parad1gm ·~ Thereafter, with 
state endorsement, the concept was taken up by and advanced by a variety of social 
agencies, including the academic community, private consultants and the press, to the 
extent that "development" in South Africa became something of a growth industry 
w1th a momentum entirely of its own'.'" 
Development provided a key intellectual discursive framework which rapidly 
permeated across South Africa society. However, by placing the rise of development 
largely in the context of structural responses, it does not adequately ask just why it 
was that development had such 'momentum' and was inter-changed so readily with 
racism and the ethnic group. Furthermore, despite apparent recognition of diversity 
within and between the bantustans, nonetheless Tapscott says: 
This stated, the political and administrative genesis of the bantustans suggests that 
while the particularities of different areas vary, their dependence on the South African 
state and the basic structure and function of their institutional systems ensure that 
116 Tapscott, C. (I 994:56-57) The Rise of 'Development' as theory and policy in 
South Africa, 1976-1988, unpublished doctoral thesis, LSE. See also Tapscott, 
C. (I 992) "The Rise of 'Development' Thinkmg in Transkei", in South all, R. 
(I 992) op. cit. and Tapscott, C. (I 995) "Changing Discourses of Development in 
South Africa", in Crush, J. (1995) op. cit. 
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policies pursued are broadly similar'."' 
Whilst recognising these structural features of 'dependency', nonetheless, it 
would be erroneous to accept Tapscott's inference that the other nine bantustans were 
broadly similar to Tapscott's study of the Transkei. I will argue that to understand the 
dynamics of dependency we must assess the specific temporal and spatial context of 
the bantustans. Therefore the second broad grouping of literature addresses the 
specificities and characteristics of cultural and ethnic identity through which groups 
mobilise to secure the perceived fruits of that 'development'. 
This literature has received belated attention in South Africa until recently 
because of the highly negative use and cynical manipulation of culture through 
apartheid. It is suggested here that any assessment of ethnicity should incorporate the 
following elements: acknowledgement of cultural distinctiveness, use of cultural 
symbols such as language and customs; the invention of tradition to create norms and 
roles for the members, and to establish boundaries between the 'other'. It should also 
recognise that in confirming group legitimacy and coherence the reading of history as 
a sacred text is important. Lastly, that the sense of 'them' and 'us' reinforces apartness, 
both superiority and inferiority, through cultural imperialism.'" For the analysis of 
ethnicity within a South African context I also suggest the need to observe the 
specificity of the local and regional, and its creation as a historical process which is 
fluid and contextual.'" 
The bantustan literature has begun to address these specific inquiries but the 
creation of ethnicity remains for many commentators wholly cynical, overly corrupt 
and functional to apartheid 'divide and rule'."' The failure to popularise ethno-
117 Tapscott, C. (1992) Development as Theory and Practtce m South Africa, 1976-
1988, PhD, LSE. 
118 See Mare, G. (1993) Warrzors born of Blood· Ethmctty and Pol1t1cs m South 
Africa, Zed Books. 
119 See the pioneering collection on ethnicity in V ail, L. ed. (1989) The Creatton of 
Trzbaltsm m Southern Afrzca, James Currey. 
120 See Mare, G. and Hamilton, C. (1986) Appet1te for Power. Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg and Mzala (1988) Ch1ef wtth a double agenda, Ravan Press, 
regarding Buthelezi. See Peires, J. (' Anon.')(1989) "Ethnictty and Pseudo-
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nationalism in contexts such as the Ciskei, and Qwa Qwa, has often be explained by 
their wholly artificial 'nation-hood' and inability to relate to local experiences. It is 
also important to locate these failures (although far from lacking in impact) within the 
ambiguities and conflicts of the discourses of ethno-nationalism and development 
themselves. 
The impact of the bantustan policy is therefore better understood not simply as 
promoted by 'collaborationists' who in some way were simply promoting the apartheid 
state's separate development policy, as opposed to the 'authenticity' of broader South 
African nationalist opposition to apartheid. Rather, the bantustan policy can be 
reconceptualised to illustrate the more fundamental clash and conflicts between a 
genealogy of 'progress/modernity', integral to eurocentric thoughts on 'development' 
and the efforts to construct and mobilise identity from the fragments of the local and 
particular. This is the logic not only of apartheid but modernism itself. 
Although a pattern of bantustan dependency upon South Africa was indeed 
generalised we must assess the different ways in which each entity internalised and 
drew upon competing discourses and practices in response to marginalisation. The 
thesis therefore addresses one such response to the 'characteristic problems and 
anxieties associated with modernity'"' and peripherality. 
1.5.3. Bophuthatswana 
Bophuthatswana was one of four bantustans which gained 'independence' from 
the apartheid regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s with another six given 
Ethnicity in the Ciskei", in Vail, L. (ed.) op. c1t. This was written anonymously 
at the time by Jeff Peires due to its sensitive nature and represents th1s stance. 
However, more recently an alternative view locates the failure of Qwa Qwa 
ethno-nationalism within a more complex framework, see Banks, L. (1995) "The 
fa1lure of Ethnic nationalism: Land, Power, and The Politics of Clansh1p on the 
South African Highveld", Afnca 65( 4 ). Also for Bophuthatswana State 
constructions of Batswana Identity, see Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) 
Dog of the Boers, the rise and fall of Lucas Mangope in Bophuthatswana, paper 
to the History Workshop, University of W1tswatersrand. 
121 Dubow, S. (1995) op. cit. 
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self-governing status. Bophuthatswana consisted of seven scattered parcels of land 
which from 1959 had been designated the homeland ofTswana speakers. Each area of 
Bophuthatswana was markedly different (see figure 1.1). The districts towards the east 
were close to the economic heart of South Africa, the PWV (now know as Gauteng, 
centred on Johannesburg) and were considerably more industrialised, and also mineral 
rich, than elsewhere in Bophuthatswana. Those to the west were mainly rural and 
agriculturally based. 
The capital Mmabatho straddled this east-west axis, near to the border with 
Botswana, and became the centre within which the Bophuthatswana state and 
institutions defmed and implemented 'development'. The specific focus of the thesis is 
upon a range of strategies and projects, centred upon Mmabatho, which were used to 
articulate expressions of (ethno)'nation-hood' in order to bind these territorial 
fragments together and to denote nation-hood and sovereignty. 
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Figure 1.1 Boplzutlzatswanam 
Mmabatho was pivotal to Mangope's regime and was the centre of political 
power, decision-making and 'national' prestige. It symbolises both the imagined and 
real consequences of the Bophuthatswana nation-building exercise. Built in the late 
1970s, it became a multi-million dollar undertaking to give expression to the 
'nation-building' desires of the Mangope regime and in 1980 it incorporated another 
town, Mafeking. As if to confirm the artificiality of the bantustans, Bophuthatswana 
collapsed in March 1994 following opposition to President Mangope's refusal to allow 
the bantustan to take part in the first ever non-racial, non-ethnic elections in South 
Africa The turmoil of that period illustrates the complex social relations in South 
Africa which had previously been subordinated to the stark dichotomy of white-black. 
One of the more bizarre images, was thousands of white extremist Boer Kommandos, 
racing as if cavalry, from the western Transvaal. They poured into the capital and 
122 Note that the X depicts the seventh region belonging to Bophuthatswana, 
namely, the Thaba' Nchu region, between Bloemfontein in the Orange Free 
State and Lesotho. Adapted from Drummond, J. (1990) "Rural Land Use and 
Agricultural Production in Dtnokana Village, Bophuthatswana", Geo-Journal. 
22.3, pp. 335-343. 
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power base ofBophuthatswana, Mmabatho, to preserve Lucas Mangope's fantasy of a 
Tswana homeland and with it the lasting hope to create their own 'Volkstaat' 
(Afrikaner bantustan). Although majority rule has been achieved these dramatic 
events illustrate the problems of creating a unified South African identity. 
My thesis reinterprets the previous conceptions of the bantustans which were 
often portrayed in popular and academic debate as static dumping grounds for surplus 
people. It focuses on Bophuthatswana, to illustrate the importance of internal 
dynamics which have driven a process of change in these territories, often dismissed 
cynically as simply the manifestation of apartheid policy. The research concentrates 
on the post-'independence' era ofBophuthatswana from 1977-1994 in order to analyse 
the concerted efforts that President Mangope's regime made towards nation-building 
and modernisation. The cultural and political identities of these territories were seen 
as uncomplicated by most observers and as ethnically homogeneous by apartheid 
regimes. 
Bophuthatswana provides a case study to show how the regime was not simply 
a puppet but had its own specific political, cultural and economic agenda. The thesis 
demonstrates the complex interplay and shuffiing of multiple- (regional, national, 
ethnic, class) identities in the context of the impetus for transformation and 
modernisation. The approach taken is, firstly, to show the ways in which the 
Bophuthatswana regime's ideal or grand scheme of nation-hood drew upon the 
renewal and desired input of Batswana tradition, identity and culture. Secondly, the 
ideal then needed to be translated into practice. These practicalities involved 
dependence upon the different types of modernist or expert knowledges associated 
with, among others, economists, planners and developmentalists. In the efforts to 
modernise Bophuthatswana and to reverse its marginal status, these practices were 
also culturally specific, producing profound conflicts with Batswana culture. The 
following chapters address the contradictory nature of identity formation in this 
region, each by taking a broad theme: 
Chapter Two focuses upon the historical and regional context within which 
- - -- -----------------------------------
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apartheid discourse was deployed. This involves frrstly, tracing the contours of the 
Eurocentric colonial framework which set the discursive and spatial parameters upon 
which subsequent efforts to imagine both racial and ethnic identity and conceptions of 
'development' were based. Secondly, this 'othering' was closely related to 
conceptions and definitions of the essence ofBatswana 'culture' and 'characteristics'. 
The ambiguities of this frontier interaction are illustrated through the one hundred 
year struggle over the settlement of Maflkeng (Place of the Stones) and white and 
black community responses to being on these cultural and political 'margins'. It is 
argued here that the rise of the bantustan policy and shifts in apartheid discourse 
should be placed in this complex regional context. 
Chapter Three is based around the theme of cultural identity and the local 
mobilisation of Batswana ethnic identity. It involved questions of cultural purity, 
education policy and cultural heritage in the context of 'nation-building'. These 
debates were linked, crucially, to the other side of 'trusteeship' and internalised 
locally as 'maturation' of the 'nation'. The invention of ethnic nationalism relates 
directly to these debates and practical concerns over territory, and citizenship in the 
context of dependency upon South Africa. 
Chapter Four, takes its main theme as the transformation of the landscape by assessing 
the inherited structures and ideas of modernisation available to the Bophuthatswana 
regime. 
Chapter Five looks at the creation of an appropriate 'national' capital as a powerful 
symbol of the purity of 'nation-hood' and 'independence' from Pretoria. The debates 
surrounding incorporation of the colonial town of Mafeking into Mmabatho, 
symbolise the widening of the Bophuthatswana regime's official discourse to embrace 
multi-racialism and modernisation. The design, planning and political functions built 
into the urban fabric of the capital illustrate the conflicts of nation-building. 
Chapter Six shows the regime's efforts to locate Bophuthatswana in the world 
community of 'nation-states' and the various strategies, most notably to do with 
economic and diplomatic initiatives, underpinned by the conception of the prestige 
project. 
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Chapter Seven takes the theme of contradiction to explain the manifestation of 
pronounced economic and political crises in Bophuthatswana. 
Chapter Eight shows the regime's attempts, in the wake of fundamental political 
changes in South Africa, to mould the 'nation-building' discourse into a distinctive 
regionalist power base, with proposals for the demarcation of new regional boundaries 
based upon ethnic and linguistic considerations. The regime fmally implodes after 
intense local and national pressure for reincorporation into South Africa. 
Chapter Nine, by way of conclusion, places the legacy of the misplaced 'nation-
building' efforts of Bophuthatswana 'independence' briefly within in the context of the 
problems and possibilities associated with the period of transition in the new North 
West Province of South Africa. 
1.5.4. Conducting the Research Project 
The research project was based upon a critical textual analysis which used a 
wide and diverse range of sources. Many of the sources were available in Britain and 
these were underpinned by a period of field research carried out in South Africa 
between November 1994 and March 1995. If we are in agreement with Sidaway's 
observation that the researcher is part of the political and social world we research,"' 
then, before looking at each category of sources used in the study, it would appear 
particularly important to discuss some of the issues surrounding field work and the 
impact that this has upon the research process. 
The debates concerning field work, and more generally what has been 
characterised as the 'crisis of representation', have been particularly vocal in 
anthropological research. The way we write and the ethnographic discourses and 
methods that we use for representing the 'researched' are deeply implicated in what 
the subaltern or 'other' is allowed to say."' Sidaway also reminds us that it is not just 
123 Sidaway, J. (1992) op. c1t. 
124 Crush, J. (1991) "The discourse of progressive human geography", PHG 15, 4: 
395-414. 
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that we should identity the 'problems' of the researcher or of writing. Instead there is 
a need to locate this within the social context and conditions of the research, 
especially its consequences. In stressing the importance of local context for the 
research process, Madge takes the argument a stage further. Madge also explores the 
inter-relationship between ethics, knowledge and power in which she identifies the 
potential to expose power relations by turning 'boundary disputes' (for example 
between self-identity and ethical decisions) into positive reflections. Nonetheless, 
Madge also concludes, somewhat pessimistically, that perhaps radical change can 
never be delivered through the Academy.m However, we perhaps therefore need to 
conceive alternative affiliations for the researcher and to rethink the relationship 
between research, policy-making and personal politics. Furthermore, there are surely 
positive dimensions to the ways in which researchers can throw both the local and 
global scales, and their inter-relationship, which the researcher embodies, into stark 
relief."' 
The responses to my queries and questions within South Africa, and the 
mediation of information made available to me, were structured through the 
relationship that exists between the researcher and the researched. Nonetheless, whilst 
aware of the politics surrounding this relationship, as an outsider, without affiliations 
to any local group or faction, I did not have any proclivity or bias towards any 
particular social or interest group (beyond that of the researcher as representative of an 
international class in itself). For example, whilst conducting the fieldwork it was 
highly noticeable that South Africa had its own core and periphery, particularly 
between the former bantustans and the metropolitan areas. As Jones suggests, 
125 Madge, C. "Eth1cs of Research in the Periphery" in Robson, E and Willis K 
(eds.) 1994 Postgraduate Fieldwork in Developing Areas: A Rough Guide, 
Monograph No. 8, Developing Areas Research Group, Institute of British 
Geographers. 
126 See the interesting discussion by Batterbury concerning positive aspects to 
considering different affiliations in Batterbury, S. (1994) "Alternative 
Affiliations and the Personal PolitiCS of Overseas Research: Some Reflections" 
in Robson, E. and W111is, K. (1994) (eds.) op. cit. See also Jones, P. S (1996) 
"Academic Cultural Imperialism: Exploring Core and Periphery", Matlhasedi, 
Aprii/May, Volume 15, No. I. 
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therefore, to uncritically reity the local and the particular as inherently authentic is to 
misread the dynamics within the country being researched and is dangerously 
parochial. It can be argued that the neo-liberal pressures which are impinging upon 
academia, in conjunction with some conservative facets to the post-modem and post-
structural approach"' are having the effect of contributing to the marginalisation of 
Africa.'" These pressures from within and without the Academy obviously affect the 
research being undertaken.'" 
The approach taken to the study was to gather a range of interesting sources, 
bearing in mind that I would have only five months for field work in South Africa. 
The limited time-span therefore ruled out a more grass-roots/etlmographic approach. 
Instead, the decision to focus upon state-elite and institutional discourses of nation-
building, including the print and broadcasting media, identified clearly the range of 
sources sought. These can be divided up into three broad categories. Firstly, the 
official Bophuthatswana and South African government and parastatal publications. 
Secondly, the print (and to some extent broadcasting) media. Thirdly, semi-structured 
interviews and informal discussions. 
Taking the official publications first, both the South African Parliamentary 
Hansards and Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly debates contained interesting 
insights into the discursive representations of identity and development. The London 
School of Economics and the School of African and Oriental Studies contained a vast 
range of South African publications. A monthly publication by the Bophuthatswana 
127 The ability of the post-modern turn to be truly reciprocal and empowering is 
questioned by Mohan who instead suggests that the production of geographic 
knowledge is driven by its 'commod1fication' over and beyond academic fashion 
and the quest for knowledge, by neo-ltberal forces, 10 Mohan, G. {1994) 
"Destructions of the con: geography and the commodification of knowledge", 
Area, 24, pp.387-390. 
121 Jones, P. S. {1996) op. c1t. 
129 For example, the preparation for undertaking field work and its duration, in 
addition to academic fashion and ethnographic debates also depends, cntically, 
on the more mundane, yet essential, level of funding. Indeed, it can be argued 
that these pressures are felt d1fferentially withiu academia, with, as an example, 
the pressures facing young post-graduates and the nature of the PhD process 
itself, somewhat different to the problems facing establtshed researchers who 
have stronger institutional and financial backing, see ibid. 
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Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bophuthatswana Pzoneer, was particularly 
important for government views. The Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 
held an almost complete set of the Pioneer. Within South Africa itself, promotional 
documents, policy papers and even video material, concerning the Bophuthatswana 
National Development Corporation and Bophuthatswana Development Council were 
obtained. 
Access to Bophuthatswana state documentation was greatly constrained due to 
the lack of a 'national' archive in Mmabatho. There was dependence upon the 
goodwill of individuals and especially the helpfulness of the Bophuthatswana 
National Library staff. The Cullen Library at the University of Witswatersrand, the 
University Library (University of the North West, formerly University of 
Bophuthatswana) and the State Archives in Cape Town, all contained significant 
sources. The local journal, Matlhasedi, produced in the Department of Education at 
the University of the North West represents an important voice 'for and from the rural 
periphery'. 
Fortunately, the most important and widely used sources, the print media, 
were obtainable in Britain. The one hundred year old Mail newspaper (Mafekmg Mm! 
until 1982, when it was bought by the Bophuthatswana government) provided 
valuable iusights into the Mafikeng area over one hundred years and more recently 
acted as the 'national' weekly newspaper for Bophuthatswana Although the 
circulation never exceeded 10,000 readers under the editorship of Joe Pobrey (1955-
1980) when it was the Mafeking Mail, and barely touched 15,000 into the 1990s,'" the 
contents of the newspaper were directed towards the power-holding elite of the 
Bophuthatswana regime. This included local Mmabatho residents, civil servants and 
business people resident in the capital. The British Newspaper Library at Colindale 
held almost all of the issues from 1960 to 1992. The National South African print 
media were also an extremely important source of information and, once again, I was 
130 Saul, B. Editor of the Ma1l, interview, February, 1995, Mmabatho. Pobrey, J., 
Owner and Editor of the Mafekmg Ma~l, 1955-1980, interv1ew, Johannesburg, 
November, 1994. 
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fortunate to have access to the superb collection of press cuttings from all the major 
English-speaking newspapers, compiled over twenty years by the International 
Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and stored at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 
Lastly, interviews and discnssions within South Africa were extremely 
important for contexualising the study. There was no survey undertaken or 
questionnaire but instead a number of semi-structured interviews conducted with a 
range of policy-makers/shapers and influential actors/organisations. Interviews and 
discnssions were held with civil servants within the North West Province's 
Department of Town Planning, local African National Congress (ANC) and South 
African Communist Party (SACP) political parties, development workers, architects, 
engineers, local Mrnabatho Municipality officials, academics and residents of 
Mrnabatho. I was fortunate enough to interview Danie Schoeman whose career 
spanned over twenty years' (except for a brief period in Namibia) involvement with 
development agents in Mrnabatho, as firstly, the chairman of the Bophuthatswana 
Development Council, secondly, a regional employee of the Development Bank of 
South Africa and more recently he was Director of the Directorate of Development 
Administration and Planning in the Bophuthatswana/North West government. I also 
relied on a number of sources which Mangope's former economic advisor, Karl 
Magyar, was able to send. 
Other important interviewees included the former editor of the Mafoking Mail 
who provided valuable insights into the race and political relations in a small 
marginalised town. Interviews with the 1995 editorial staff of the Mail indicated the 
specific nation-building agenda that the newspaper was given by the Bophuthatswana 
government, with considerable interference in its publication. There were similar 
discussions at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation and also access to their 
news archives. Much of the preparation for the interviews was done 'on the spot' 
because most contacts could not be established prior to the field work and involved 
rapid use of day to day introductions. The questions put to interviewees were directed 
by a broad set of issues addressing the perceptions of Bophuthatswana 'nation-
building' and the regime's developmental and cultural 'achievements'. With the 
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Mangope regime brought to the end of its era and with transitional structures in place 
at the time of the field work, some of the interviews became either very personal 
reflections (in some cases of over twenty years involvement with Bophuthatswana) 
whilst others were very formal and cautious responses. Some important points 
concerning interviews and discussions should be expanded upon. 
My arrival in Mmabatho took place eight months after the collapse of the 
Mangope regime. On the one hand this meant that certain officials involved with the 
Bophuthatswana administration were reluctant to discuss the old regime because of 
the activities of two commissions of inquiry, which had been established by the ANC 
in order to investigate corruption and malpractice in the old Bophuthatswana state and 
local government structures. Many officials, whose positions were threatened during 
the transition, therefore simply dismissed my 'academic' inquiries as detracting from 
the efforts directed towards building the 'new' South Africa. On the other hand, 
others, particularly civil servants, again whose positions were vulnerable and whose 
tax packages were drastically adjusting from the Bophuthatswana regime's generous 
terms to the South African national level, were very critical of the new ANC 
administration. More generally, however, the collapse of the regime did mean that 
there was much more openness and emphasis upon, and even celebration of, 
transparency within government. Most people were very keen to discuss issues and 
were curious about the presence of such a young (!) British post-graduate researcher. 
There is all probability that had there been more time available for the field 
work, then more information could have been acquired or improved upon. For 
example, on numerous occasions I attempted to interview the local chief and former 
state officials (even Mangope himself) but without success. Furthermore, the nature of 
my funding and the time frame for the project precluded the opportunity to build up 
contacts over a longer period oftime within South Africa and, importantly, to achieve 
any degree of proficiency in Setswana. As a result, this inevitably influenced my 
access to sources and also to the range of people interviewed. Those interviewed were 
mainly educated, 'westernised' office-holding elites. However, it can be argued that it 
was exactly this group- the nucleus of the institutional and professional 
Chapter One: Identity and Development 53 
Bophuthatswana elite, who, as the proponents and definers of Bophuthatswana 
'nation-building' and development, were particularly well placed to provide important 
insights into the research project's objectives. With some invaluable personal contacts 
built up in Mafikeng, and many 'opportunistic' moments of contact and reflection 
(even on the bus or mini-cab), I was able to tap into a broad cross section of people 
and opinion which provided a vital context for British and archival based sources. 
Furthermore, ifl had spoken Setswana and stayed for a longer period of time in South 
Africa then the focus of the research and its direction would have inevitably produced 
a very different kind of study. 
As it turned out, in view of the issues explored and the constraints that the 
project would entail, new opportunities were created which enabled the project to give 
a strong, and vital, emphasis to nation-building as a product of both the local and 
global scales. 
Chapter Two 
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2. 'The Last Civilised Stop on the Long Trek to the North'•: 
Mafeking and the Ambiguities of Being on the Margins. 
2.1. Introduction 
Before establishing the broad contours and content of the Bophuthatswana 
'nation-building' discourse, it is necessary to establish the regional context within 
which apartheid discourse operated and interacted. Apartheid's 'identitary logic' fed 
off older discourses manipulating anxieties and fears regarding cultural and political 
identity. The invention of Bophuthatswana can be related to a series of different and 
contested identities which have long been an integral feature of the region. These 
embraced the fostering of race and ethnic differences which were premised upon 
competing representations of the nature and character of nation-hood, and which were 
closely related to notions of 'progress' and group advancement. These regional 
characteristics can be seen in the context of two dominant historical periods in the 
area's unfolding historical geography. 
First, the frontier associated with British Imperial advance, dispossession and 
colonial 'othering'; European interpretations of race and tribe provided colonial tropes 
and metaphors lending themselves to a segregationist discourse creating a white-black 
division following the Boer War. Second, from 1948 the apartheid era signified a 
recasting of these older racial ideas and shifted the emphasis to the manipulation of 
ethnic differences. With the native reserves now represented as 'ethno-national 
homelands', apartheid discourse sought to legitimise the bantustan policy as the 
awakening to 'national self-realization'. Apartheid was vigorously promoted as the 
policy through which the preservation of these cultural and political differences could 
be ensured. 
Taken together, these two broad periods, associated with 
Mafeking Town Council Brochure, Mafeking Fastest Growing Border Town, 
undated. 
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colonialism/segregation and the apartheid era, provided the context within which the 
African was considered as legitimate only within the peripheral native reserves or 
later, the bantustans. The powerful forces which demarcated and detached black from 
white spaces were also regionally conditioned. Local anxieties concerned the enduring 
regional perception of being marginal and peripheral. This marginality should be 
interpreted not merely as topographical or economic but also as the cultural interface 
between core and periphery. Both black and white communities sought to either 
accommodate, embrace or reject the disruptive forces associated with modernisation 
by creating 'new' or defending 'old' identities. This mobilisation of local identities 
was irrevocably entwined with a society which had been incorporated into the colonial 
sphere and which was undergoing rapid industrialisation and modernisation. 
A cultural clash between universalising 'western' norms and local 
mobilisations is illustrated by reference to the historical town of Mafeking, itself 
rooted within and reflecting regional history over one hundred years. Mafeking and its 
surrounding area symbolises the manner in which local groups have interpreted and 
played out competing identities. This geographic emphasis is particularly important 
given that the area became pivotal to Bophuthatswana nation-building efforts. The 
first section focuses on the controversial origins ofMafeking in the context of colonial 
'othering' of the Batswana. It will be shown how enduring ideas linking landscape, 
progress and culture sought to normalise this colonisation and, in doing so, provoked 
variable responses. Secondly, the changing relationship between Mafeking and 
Botswana illustrates the apartheid interpretation of (ethno) Nationalism, in which 
Mafeking was caught ambiguously between the opposite poles of African nationalism 
and white supremacy within the emerging bantustan policy within South Africa. The 
core ideas of apartheid will be discussed in this context and with these, the increasing 
appeal of the concept of a 'Tswana' homeland to various groups. 
2.2. Mafeking on the Margins 
'Mafeking seemed a place that had a tenuous hold on the outside world: just the thin 
- - - -------------------------------
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line of the razlway across the wilderness, with the telegraph poles besides it striding 
away as far as the eye could see ... All around stretched the veld, like a barren, stony 
prazrze, dzpping a little where the town ended and then, a lzttle later, rising again here 
and there to gentle slopes Mafeking lay lzke some insignificant scrap of toast in an 
enormous, shallow, brown-and-green plate'.' 
The region has been variously described by 'insiders' and 'outsiders' as a 
frontier or border zone, marginal or peripheral, threatened and neglected. A wide 
variety of groups have settled the region with the concept of marginality central to the 
creation and reshaping of identities. Referring to the town on the eve of the siege of 
1899, Gardiner's description of Mafeking implied that the only comforting 
appearance of 'progress' appeared to be the 'thin line ofrailway ... with telegraph poles 
besides it'. Otherwise, the grip was indeed tenuous with marginality, wilderness, and 
shadowy desolation all around. Mafeking was therefore likened to a vulnerable 
bastion of civilisation amidst the barren veld. This imagery has provided enduring 
ideas and practices through which Batswana culture has been alienated or at best 
filtered and refracted around. Shifting conceptions of the 'frontier'' provide an 
analogy for over one hundred years of the creation, erosion and subsequent 
reaffirmation of group boundaries within and between black and white communities. 
The production and communication of cultural forms, reflected in this changing urban 
form, were integral to shifting and fluid configurations of identity. These processes of 
identity formation should be seen in conjunction with changing local economic and 
political conditions. 
Mafeking had been integral to British imperial identity and more particularly 
the expansion of the British Empire in Southern Africa at the turn of the century. 
Throughout the twentieth century this small town on the fringes of the Kalahari and 
northern Cape, which by Botswana's independence in 1966 had a population of barely 
2 Gardiner, B. (1966:30&31) Mafekmg: VIctorian Legend, Cassel, London. 
3 Crush, J. (1992) 'Beyond the Frontier', in McCarthy, J. and Rogerson, C. (1992) 
(eds.) Geography in a Changmg South Afnca, Oxford University Press, Cape 
Town. 
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four thousand, was inextricably connected to a series of 'nation-building' projects. 
Mafeking's origins long before 1948 and the apartheid era symbolise the deep roots of 
segregationism which preceded the bantustan policy. This policy was then entwined 
with complex pre-existing social formations of which Mafeking was a major example. 
Although Mafeking was a product of European frontier with expansionism and 
segregationism built into the town, ironically, its close proximity to 'black' rather than 
'white' Africa, although at times sharpening racial and cultural differences also served 
to differentiate the town from 'white' South Africa. The racial divisions between 
Mafeking and Mmabatho were eventually subordinated to the common objective of 
'developing' the city which was on the margins of the South African economy and 
society (chapters five). Throughout its short history Bophuthatswana has been 
characterised as a peripheral backwater and Mafeking shared this similar experience 
of being 'on the margins'. Mafeking was at the vanguard of colonisation of the region 
and symbolised Imperial and Eurocentric 'othering'. Yet, due to its location and 
proximity to the border of the Batswana 'other', the town remained marginal and faced 
questions of cultural and economic survival. These issues were also raised among the 
Batswana in relation to the creation and preservation of self-identity. 
2.2.1. The Frontier of Conquest and Dispossession: Mafeking As Imperial 
Outpost 
'From its very beginning 'the road to the north' had been a concept, even a slogan; 
not something given by a neutral, impersonal geography. It had come into existence 
for specific historical, political, and commercial reasons, as the names by which it 
was known made manifest(the missionary road, the hunters' trail, the traders' trail, 
the Suez canal of the South etc) Here- and here- and here- was a route which would 
open up the continent. Which would bring the word of God to the 'benighted heathen'. 
Which would 'put Africa on the map' (literally). Which would place in the hands of 
this group or that the key to the jitture development of the territory'.' 
4 Jacobson, D. (1995:12&13) The Electronic Elephant, Penguin, London. 
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Figure 2.1 Mafeking's location in relation to A) 'Road to tire Nortlt' and tlte Union 
ofSoutltAfrica and B) Native Reserves of 1913 and 1936' 
'Adapted from Word en, N. (1994) The Making of Modern South Africa, Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
------ -- ------------
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The history of this white settlement and its association with the surrounding area 
illustrates the complexity of race and ethnic relations in the country. This small 
corner of North West South Africa has evolved a distinctive and enduring identity 
during the course of this century. Mafeking's white residents have consistently viewed 
their town as distinctive. Ultimately this was manifest in the unique decision to join a 
black homeland producing a set of race relations which contradicted the rigid 
apartheid principles of segregation. It is argued here that this distinctive quality as 
interpreted by its residents and indeed absorbed by the South African government at 
certain times is due in part to the town's unusual if not exceptiouallocation. 
Mafeking was located at the remote northern edge of the Cape Province, near the 
border with Bechuanaland (which became Botswana in 1966), adjacent to Batswana 
native reserves later to form the core of Bophuthatswana and occupying a site within 
700 yards of the Batswana settlement ofMafikeng ('Stadt'). 
At the turn of the century Mafeking, as a gateway into the African interior, 
played a pivotal role in the British advance from the Cape Province. It was the frontier 
along which European settlers moved into the interior of Africa bringing with them 
notions of 'enlightenment' and 'progress'. The town became associated with the 
progressive mythology of the frontier and in 1895 became the administrative capital 
of Bechuanaland, rather unusually outside this territory. The high point of its 
association with the British Empire came in the aftermath of the Boer War in 1902 
with the great prestige of the Siege and enhanced optimism for the town's future. Ten 
years later with the 1913 Land Act and demarcation of native reserves, Mafeking 
became the last white settlement on the border between 'white' South Africa and the 
Tswana native reserves. The latter had become associated with wilderness and 
peripheralisation. In consequence, the town's status was also transformed from an 
Imperial outpost to a marginal settlement. Although Mafeking felt the streamlining 
imprint of segregationism and from 1948 apartheid racial zoning, the town 
nevertheless remained differentiated from other South African towns in the region due 
to the influence of its peripheral location. 
Mafeking's prestige, status and economic benefits were finally eroded with the 
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decision to relocate the capital of Botswana to Gaborones. The British colonial 
character of the town began to disappear as it became transformed into one of the 
surrounding Afrikaner 'dorps' (rural-'platteland' towns). However, at the very time 
when Mafeking appeared to be losing its distinctive identity, the most important 
decision for the future of the town was taken.' In 1963 Central government in Pretoria 
located the administrative headquarters of its newly created Tswana bantustan in the 
town. Mafeking was now entwined with another 'nation-building' project. 
Mafeking has been popularly perceived as a Victorian legend.' The siege 
during the Boer War fired the imagination of the whole British Empire, bestowing a 
symbolism on the town greatly exceeding its actual economic, political and even 
military importance. However, what is less well known is that in the 1850s, just one 
and a half kilometres away from the site upon which the European township would be 
built, there existed a Batswana settlement, Maflkeng. This was the 'other' Mafeking, 
hidden behind the facade of Empire-Building and in the shadow of the white town. 
The construction of a European settlement adjacent to this Batswana town illustrates 
the emerging European and colonial ideas of 'trusteeship' whereby 'native interests' 
would be supposedly safeguarded until considered 'mature'. This involved on the one 
hand barely concealed racist colonial assumptions about the native. On the other, there 
was a more insidious strand of Eurocentric race and tribal discourse which invented 
tribaVnative culture and tradition. However, both were subordinate to the conception 
of 'native improvement' and 'civilising'. In other words, 'trusteeship' was a holding 
exercise until the emergent westernised African could be considered civilised. 
These notions provided powerful legitimatory discourses justifying the 
alienation of native lands. This became based upon identifying the essence of 
Batswana characteristics and customs which were not considered commensurate with 
'progressive' colonial settlement and use of the landscape. A brief overview of 
Batswana social and spatial organisation will suggest that any undermining and 
alienation of historical lands would inevitably have a devastating impact upon these 
6 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (1991) 'Mafikeng-Mmabatho', in Lemon, A., ed. 
(1991) Homes Apart, Routledge. 
7 Gardener, B. (1966) op. cit. 
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communities. Furthermore, with this onslaught on many fronts and levels of Batswana 
society there was the fundamental question of maintaining cultural identity and/or 
accommodation of this 'progressive' terminology of the European. This produced a 
profound ambiguity within Batswana society as illustrated through the perception of 
dangers to the Batswana settlement at the 'Stadt' from the adjacent European town of 
Mafeking. It is these ambiguities which were so integral to the later apartheid era and 
rise of the bantustan policy. 
By the early 1870s South Africa as we know it today was far from resembling 
the modem South African state.• The more powerful African 'Nations' at this time 
were still largely independent and resisting external control.' The Tswana covered 
extensive lands from modem Botswana into South Africa, with the Southern Tswana, 
as the South African groups can be broadly labelled, occupying the central and 
western region of South Africa, bounded by the Vaal and Orange rivers to the South 
and the Kalahari to the North West. Schapera suggested that distinct Sotho-Tswana 
states emerged under powerful lineage chiefs by the sixteenth century, having 
separated from the main body of Bantu somewhere around the Great Lakes of Central 
and East Africa." A clearer pattern of African history south of the Limpopo River is 
pieced together from 1500, with a thread of continuity established between the Late 
Iron Age and the present. This runs counter to the misconception promoted through 
apartheid discourse of static, insulated, self-contained, ethnically isolated African 
communities." 
8 Pampalhs, J. (1991) Hzstory of South Afrzca, Ravan, Johannesburg. 
9 The African societies can be divided into two main sub-sections. Firstly, the 
Ngum, comprising the Swazz, Zulu, Mpondo and Xhosa Secondly, the Tswana-
Sotho. The latter occupied lands to the north of the Drakensburg mountain 
range, the Highveld, with the Nguni spread along the southern side along the 
fertile coastal strip. Thus the Northern Sotho were in the north and east of 
present day Transvaal, and the Southern Sotho south of the Vaal nver towards 
the Drakensburg. 
10 Schapera, I. (1953) The Tswana, InternatiOnal Africa Institute. Archaeological 
evidence of the occupation of lands could be found m stone walled enclosures 
throughout the area and an iron works site at Phalaborwa. Thompson, L and 
Wilson, M. (1969) The Oxford History of South Afrzca, Vol. I, Oxford 
Universzty Press. 
11 Maylam, P. (1986) A Hzstory of the Afrzcan People of Southern Afrzca, Croom 
Helm, London 
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In describing the geography and social relations of the Southern Tswana, the 
over riding importance of dryness must be seen as determining the limitations of this 
regions ecology." Whereas the Southern Sotho formed small, loosely arranged 
villages, the Tswana had much larger, more compact and densely populated 
settlements of which Mafikeng or 'the Place of Stones' was one. Initially therefore the 
Tswana displayed a positive response to outside forces because of these 
environmental restrictions: 
The driving force behind this response seems to have been the Southern Tswana's 
need to overcome the severe productive limitations of their environment'." 
The origins of Mafeking must be seen within the context of a highly unstable 
northern Cape frontier towards the turn of the century. Indeed, as Maylam suggests, 
the Tswana were subjected to a four pronged attack. First, the dislocation following 
the Difaqane (upheaval associated, in part, with Shaka's expansionism); second, Boer 
12 Shillington, K. ( 1985) The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900, 
Sigma Press, Pretoria. With rainfall being seasonally unreliable and sparse, 15 
to 20 mches in the east and less than 8 inches in the North West, the delicate 
ecological balance between the Tswana and their environment was of primary 
Importance. Furthermore, the Tswana 'ward' was characterised as 
geographically fragmented with residential areas being some distance from farm 
lands unlike the Southern Sotho. The bas1c units of production were households 
within homesteads and wards which were usually autonomous political and 
economic units. They were principally involved w1th subsistence production 
through rearing cattle and some growth of crops These bUlldmg blocks of 
social organisation were often grouped into VIllages under the charge of minor 
members of the royal family, or uniquely for the Tswana, towns of up to 20 000 
people in this pre-colonial era. The social system was closely integrated with 
traditional systems combining kinship, language and culture With chieftaincy, 
territory and production. 
13 Shillington, K. (1985·3) op. cit. However just as there had been a positive 
response by some Tswana to external economic stimuli, this was to be the 
undoing of the fabric of Tswana society. In particular the almost semi-nomadic 
pattern of movement reflecting the vagaries of the climate meant that a large 
expanse of land had been necessary for sustaining that system particularly cattle 
grazing. Shillington prov1des a good example of this, in indicating that between 
1800 to 1870 the pnncipal centres of Tlhaping settlement, including theu 
'capitals' moved seventeen different times. The Batswana had occupied territory 
from as early as the f1fth century but by the nineteenth century this was 
threatened on a number of 'fronts'. 
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thirst for land; third, British and Cape strategic-business interests which challenged 
Batswana authority; and fmally, the influence of missionaries including Robert Moffat 
and David Livingstone amongst others, on traditional Tswana social relations and 
customs, which directly affected Tswana economic, political and spiritual institutions. 
The westward expansion of the Transvaal border into eastern Tswana land caused 
consternation among the Rolong and other tribes. 
For Europeans, the frontier was associated with the 'progress' and advance of 
civilisation, embodying the 'emptying' of the landscape of Africans. Africans 
responded to this cultural contact and dispossession of their land in a variety of ways, 
shaped mainly by resistance. Mafeking was an integral component of frontier 
expansionism and its character was shaped through the next century by this frontier 
experience. There are various ways in which this effect of European penetration into 
Tswana territory can be interpreted. On one level there is the impact upon political 
organisation of Tswana 'space' as land was consistently alienated. Indeed, for southern 
Africa as a whole it must be stated that: 
'No important aspect of history m South Africa for the last three centuries can be 
understood without confronting the enormous fact of dispossession'." 
Batswana subsistence organisation had been bounded by the limits of kinship and 
kinship alliances. However, Tswana lands were increasingly circumscribed spatially 
with increasing hardening of political boundaries." Whereas borders had previously 
14 Davidson, B. (1991) Africa m H1story, Phoemx, London. The 'emptymg' of the 
high veld dunng the Difaqane (Mefecane in Zulu) in the early nineteenth 
century, ttself often attributed to Shaka's expansionism, created a fundamental 
myth. Wtth depopulation of the high veld during this era, subsequent mythology 
was created that Afrikaner settlement was therefore 'invited' into these vacant 
lands. This has led to the enduring visual imagery, central to both colonial ideas 
and Afrikaner Nationalism, of a horse shoe shaped formation of Bantu 'historic 
homelands', surroundmg but always peripheral to the 'white heartland' based 
upon the High Veld {and Cape). This mental map has been used to justify white 
settlement and even subsequent legislatiOn: 'The 1913 Nat1ves Land Act and the 
Mfecane were close companions, the latter describing as self-mfltcted what the 
former took by force' in Maylam, P. (1986) op. cit. 
" See Drummond, J. and Manson, A. {1991) 'The Evolution and Contemporary 
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been flexible and fluid between pre-colonial societies, a hardening definition was 
taking place." On another level, frontier interaction produced trade, religious activity 
and other contacts which began to heighten social differentiation amongst the Tswana. 
There was an accelerated process of fixing boundaries in order to procure labourers to 
feed the expanding mines and farms of Southern Africa" 
The Keate Award of 1871 had attempted to fix the troublesome western 
boundary of the Transvaal and to determine the ownership of the territory surrounding 
Kimberley." However the Boers took advantage of British indecision and internal 
Tswana divisions, to extend their western boundary. Conflict engulfed the area 
between 1881-1884, with the diamond territory of Griqualand West having been 
annexed to the Cape between 1871-1880. Further Boer incursions into Tswana 
territory led to a land grab. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 removed the Rolong 
faction of Chief Montshiwa from the watered areas around the Molopo River. By 
1884, British concern over continuing Boer expansionism fmally resulted with the 
London Convention. Once again, further British weakness in acting decisively 
enabled the Boers to take even more Tswana land. With an unstable frontier and the 
establishment of the proxy Boer 'Republics' of Goshen and Stellaland, the British 
fmally annexed Tswana lands. 
2.2.2. The Creation ofMafeking 
British imperial aims and objectives centred upon geo-political concerns 
expressed under the pretext of the 'civilising mission'. British concern in the northern 
Cape centred upon keeping the 'Road to the North' open and preventing a German-
Significance of the Bophuthatswana-Botswana Border', in Rumely, D. and 
Minghi, J. (eds.) The Geography of Border Landscapes, Routledge. 
16 Colonial territorial definition was increasingly synonymous with a nascent state 
structure, which in the European context was interpreted by Dodgson as: 'In this 
simple but profound change we are confronted with one of the decisive 
revolutions in human spatial order'. Dodgson, in Agnew and Knox (1989) The 
Geography of the World Economy, Edward Arnold, London. 
17 Drummond, J. and Manson, A. op. cit. 
18 The Keate Award and the Batswana gnevances relating to loss of terntory were 
consistently referred to and manipulated by the Bophuthatswana government. 
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Afrikaner axis forming from German South West Africa to the Transvaal. The 'Road' 
stretched from the Cape passing into the northern Cape and north west corner of South 
Africa, just west of the Transvaal border into the interior of Africa, and was 
considered of high strategic value. It appealed to missionaries, hunters, traders, the 
British and Afrikaners. However, for the local inhabitants, the Tswana amongst 
others, it was not a road but the territory they occupied. The 'Road' seemed to centre 
upon the gateway through Tswana lands and Jacobson suggests the deep rooted 
significance that the imagery of this 'Road' commanded: 
'The advancement of science, of commerce, of true religion, of civilisation ztself, let 
alone of the British Empire in Africa, or the independence of the Boers, or the 
ultimate well being (or otherwise) of the blacks themselves, would depend upon it'." 
Britain had a foothold at the Cape from the early 1800s but had been reluctant 
to venture into the interior for a complex range of reasons." Boer aggression had been 
appeased through a combination of British domestic party politics and financial 
considerations underwriting an indecisive and vacillating colonial policy." Following 
the Berlin Congress in 1884, the 'Scramble for Africa' led to a general upsurge in 
European colonial activity." Now the Barolong town at Mafikeng was considered 
pivotal to controlling the region. Under the pretext of pacifYing the area a British 
force was despatched and the Warren Expedition, as it was known, established its 
headquarters at Mafikeng in March 1885. Batswana territory was divided into the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate for the lands north of the Molopo River and the Crown 
Colony of British Bechuanaland to the south. The boundary along the Molopo would 
lead to very different local formations either side of this border. British colonial policy 
was therefore responsible for dividing historical Tswana territory. Land was set aside 
19 Jacobsen, D (1995:13) op. cit. 
20 See Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J. (1961) Africa and the Vtctorians: the offtctal 
mind of impertaltsm, Macmillan, London 
21 Packenham, T. (1979) The Boer War, Futura, London and Davenport, T. (1986) 
A New Htstory of South Afrtca, Macmillan, London. 
22 Packenham, T. (1993) The Scramble for Africa, Futura, London. 
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for Batswana native reserves by the end of the nineteenth century. However, the 
southern Tswana were to experience more rapid alienation from their territory than the 
Tswana to the north in Bechuanaland (today Botswana) with the reserves as scattered 
fragments of former Batswana territory. For example, the Hurutshe Tswana in the 
extreme west of the Transvaal Republic where pushed into 'Moiloa's Reserve' and the 
Rolong in the northern Cape the 'Molopo Native District Reserve'. Both were a 
fraction of the original territory and with British colonialism effectively splitting the 
Tswana lands in two, this grievance provided a central tenet of Bophuthatswana 
'nation-bnilding' discourse. 
The fortified garrison adjacent to Mafikeng attracted artisans and traders. In 
the same year, following permission from the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Hercules Robinson, the European town of Mafeking was laid out in grid-iron fashion 
by the Royal Engineers." The site ofMafeking had apparently been decided through a 
combination of strategic considerations, availability of water supply and also the 
potential for British commerce in the region." At the time the close proximity of black 
and white at Mafeking caused controversy. The local Batswana Cluef Montshiwa 
protested at the establishment of the white town so close to his own settlement at 
Mafikeng (henceforth the 'Stadt'). Montshiwa's fear of having his authority and 
Batswana culture undermined by Mafeking was put to the colonial authorities by the 
W esleyan missionaries: 
'He says the town of the white people, bezng only about a mile from his town, will 
most surely destroy his people, and that in order to save them he will have to move 
away and desert the place for which they fought and bled during a war lasting four 
23 Mafzkeng Place of Stones 1885-1980, (1980) 'A short history of Mafikeng to 
commemorate zts incorporation into Bophuthatswana', Craft Press. 
24 Sillery, A. (1971) John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, A Study in Humanitanan 
Imperzalzsm, 1835-1899, A.A. Balkema. Furthermore, a member of the 
Expedition, after stating the pacifying purpose of this then suggested that: 'It 
was then that the town of Mafeking was founded, with the object of creating for 
the British enterprise on the west of the Transvaal, and as a base for further 
trade into the central regions of Africa', Goold-Adams, H. (1897) Journey from 
Mafeking to Lialuz, Barotseland and hence to the borders of the Belgian Congo 
and back', Royal Colonial Institute. 
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years, and which is the last remaining town of his nation, all others have been 
destroyed during the war. He protested against the nearness of the new township 
when it was being surveyed, and most earnestly pleaded that it might be established a 
few miles away, but he pleaded in vain'." 
The specific complaints centred upon the decision to establish the European 
township within less than a mile of the Batswana settlement. The arguments against 
the decision were based upon evidence of the detrimental effects that the close 
proximity and racial contact was having upon the Batswana and European alike. This 
included the sale of alcohol to local Batswana and damage to their local cropping 
systems caused by Europeans. Most controversial of all was the alleged rape of 
Batswana women by members of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. These issues 
formed the basis of a series of fascinating debates in the British Parliamentary Papers 
for the Colonies and British press," revealing different interpretations of racial contact 
and virtues of the Imperial mission. In addition, Silas Molema, a Batswana historian 
and physician, noted that Montshiwa' s opposition could also be seen in conjunction 
with two other factors, the frrst being the threat the Mafeking Municipality would 
pose to the Batswana water supply at Groofontein; the second, and of particular 
significance for arguments here, anxieties concerning European impact upon 
Batswana group identity. 
The second was based upon what Molema referred to, with great admiration, 
as 'Montshiwa's prophetic eye', which saw, it was suggested, the future of 
segregation in South Africa with white and black placed 'miles and miles apart'. 
Molerna advocated segregation in relation to factors concerning 'health' (Molema was 
a doctor and resident of the 'Stadt') and 'especially for purity'." These reflections 
illustrate the other side of segregation. Whilst forced upon Africans, some were also 
25 British Parlimentary Papers for the Colontes {BPP) No 44·7, 1883-1886, and see 
Molema, S. {1966) Montshiwa {1815-1896) Barolong Chief and Patnot, C. 
Struik, Cape Town. 
26 See for example the Times, 26.11.1886. 
27 Molema, S. {1960: 13) 'A Kaletdoscopic View', in '75 Anniversary- Mafeking 
Souvenir Programme', May, Mafeking Mail Printers. 
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crafting identities based on the pursuit and maintenance of the purity of group identity 
in the midst of the social disruption associated with modernity." 
The controversy over the European town therefore embodied the contradictory 
stance of colonial policy towards the African based on 'civilising' the native whilst 
accommodating colonial-settler aspirations. The ambivalence of 'othering' was 
therefore symbolised by and built into Mafeking, overshadowing the Batswana 
community itself. Nonetheless there was evidence of discord within the colonial 
community about the decision regarding the establishment ofMafeking so close to the 
Batswana: 
'There was no reason for the hasty construction of this European town, from an 
Imperial point of view. The defonce of Mafiking was also confined to certazn known 
limits, and had been peacefUlly regulated by the chief for many years. Neither the 
defonce nor trade of Mafiking needed the European township, which was planned 
and laid out for an entirely different set of reasons'." 
This quotation, by John Mackenzie, alludes to certain more naked colonial ambitions. 
Momentum had been building from Cape politicians, notably Cecil Rhodes, who, 
attracted by the 'Road to the North', had sought to secure this gateway to the African 
interior. Significantly, Rhodes had replaced the so-called 'humanitarian imperialist', 
John Mackenzie, as Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland and advocated the 
incorporation of the whole region into the Cape. Mafeking was therefore placed on the 
map of empire as a product of confused and contradictory British colonial policy. 
The colonial authorities, military and various townspeople denied the charge 
of 'corrupting the good manners of the Rolong tribesmen'. Significantly, in doing so 
they attempted to detract from what was a blatant example of imperial exploitation by 
emphasising the condition or essence of Batswana culture itself as lacking 
28 See later Molema's views of the 'detribalised native' in the context of interwar 
segregation. 
29 Mackenzie, (1886:335) Austral Afnca, Longman, Greens and Co, emphasis 
added. 
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'progressive virtues'. The dispute soon became racialised and simply reduced to the 
word of'untrustworthy ... deceitful and unveracious natives or insincere and pharisaical 
negrophilists', against that of virtuous colonials." It was implied that any indiscretion 
was due to the characteristics of the Batswana, woman in particular. This 
representation played an important role in defining Batswana tribal characteristics 
which were portrayed in a negative way in comparison to the Zulu: 
'The code of morality among a large proportion of the Bechuanas is very low, and in 
this respect they offer, I am informed, a striking contrast to the Zulus'." 
A former resident of Mafeking also at the time reinforced this tribal stereotyping and 
negative representation of the Batswana: 
'The Bechuanas are I believe the most miserable race of nations-if race they can be 
called- on the face of the earth .. wretched looking creatures ... whereas those under 
Klzama and Lobengula are fine men Zulus (are)trained to fight, (but) the former make 
the very worst of servants-lazy-thieves-good for nothing One I had to whom I gave 
my boots, gaiters and spurs to clean on a Sunday, (he) bolted with them when I was in 
church and I have never heard of him or the things afterwards, the latter particularly 
the Matabeles make splendzd servants but they are scarce, when you do get one you 
are to be congratulated'." 
This depiction of tribal 'essences' was closely related to perhaps the most significant 
development of this period concerning the fmdings of the Bechuanaland Land 
Commission. This was set up in 1886 to arbitrate land claims in the region and also 
marked the first plot of Mafeking on 21st May." The intention behind the 
30 Royal Commission of Inquuy to clear the name of Mafeking, BPP, no. 44·21. 
31 Captain Leverson of the Bechuanaland Border Police regiment m BPP op. cit. 
32 The unpublished diary of a H. Estridge (1887) 'An Illustrated Trip from England 
to Bechuanaland, 1886-1887'. 
33 Mo1ema, S. (1960) op. cit. 
-----------------------
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Commission was supposedly to seek a balance between 'native protection and 
European expansion'. According to Sillery its most revealing clause concerned the 
differentiation between Batswana native locations and territory considered as 'waste 
land'. The assumption that under-utilised land was therefore considered as 'waste land' 
implied that it could then be available for colonial settlement. The effect was to halve 
ChiefMontshiwa's land from 1,535 square miles to approximately 800 square miles." 
This was justified by linking European and colonial ideas of efficient and progressive 
use and settlement oflandscape. 
The significance of this racial and tribal labelling and stereotyping" was 
magnified given that the same Mr. H. Estridge mentioned above was also the Receiver 
General and Accountant General for the Province of British Bechuanaland. According 
to Estridge's diary, he was keen to survey the territory and sort out the disputes in 
order to settle the land. He had been quoted in numerous newspapers on his views 
advocating European settlement in the territory. These included what he considered as 
the major hindrance to European settlement, the inflated price of land, and his desire 
to see land given free for the first three to five years of settlement. Estridge was 
therefore keen to identify what he regarded as the connection between land remaining 
unsurveyed, or unsettled, with the effect of 'colonialism making little progress ... (if 
this) land remains nncultivated'. If the survey was quickly completed and reasonable 
terms were offered to persons willing to try their fortunes in Bechuanaland then 
according to Estridge: 
~. no doubt many farms will be quickly occupied, trade increased, money circulated, 
the revenue expanded, and consequently a brighter future (would be) in store for 
British Bechuanaland~" 
Mafeking was central to these efforts to annex the Batswana 'waste lands' and harness 
them for this brighter 'progressive' future. Although regarded as relatively defensive 
34 Sillery, A, (1971) op. cit. 
"See Vail (ed.) (1989) op. ctt. 
36 Undated newspaper clipping in Estridge's diary. 
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ofBatswana 'rights', Mackenzie himself was also keen to promote this mythology of 
the 'waste-lands'. Mackenzie saw them as the vehicle through which the regeneration 
of the English race could take place. Colonisation and settlement were projected as the 
remedy for Britain's poverty and over-crowding, as well as providing salvation to the 
heathen native. Mackenzie's influential view regarded 'progress' as man's ability to 
control the environment with 'man destined to subdue the wild beasts, and to raise 
human homes throughout every unoccupied land': 
'Having lived for a long time in one of those comparatively unoccupied regions of the 
earth- Bechuanaland- I am deeply Impressed with the truth that there is still, for many 
years to come, abundance of room for God's flowers in the garden of the Great 
Husbandman~ 
Whilst questioning the wisdom of the closeness of the European town, Mackenzie was 
not against its establishment or colonial settlement itself." For Mackenzie it was not 
so much the question of land per se for the native but rather its utilization which was 
regarded as optirnised through specifically European values: 
'Individualism and competition are the great factors of progress in South Africa; and 
the Bechuanaland Land Commission has done well to keep before the view of 
Government the introduction among the natives, when they are quite prepared for it, 
of this well tried and elevating principle~" 
Whilst championing Batswana culture and arguing for the sanctity of protected native 
reserves, or 'trusteeship', this was clearly subordinate to the promotion of progressive 
European values. Mackenzie was bitterly disappointed that the Commission finally 
decided to preserve native communalism rather than making land free-hold. This 
decision can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, even the more supposedly altruistic 
37 Mackenzie (1886:9). 
38 Mackenzie (1886:348) 
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concerns of 'hwnanitarian' imperialism espoused by Mackenzie, were nonetheless 
reordering Batswana culture and shaping it in the imagery of 'progress'. Secondly, the 
decision itself can be seen as representing the invention of colonial and native 
tradition for a specifically imperial agenda. This agenda was shaped around a 
European interpretation of native culture with a view to controlling it and facilitating 
both governance of 'native reserves' and colonial settlement. Furthermore, communal 
land tenure would provide far less competition from the Batswana to white farmers. 
Both views illustrated this process of conquest and appropriation of Batswana culture. 
With the Anglicisation of 'Mafeking' from 'Mafikeng', the settlement was cast 
literally in the idiom of Empire; the Batswana landscape was renamed. The Batswana 
were considered, somewhat conveniently, as nomadic wanderers who in spite of the 
controversial origins of Mafeking, were considered as likely to move away from the 
European town to new lands." Yet these lands were being rapidly alienated from the 
Batswana who were labelled as inefficient and steeped in 'native custom'. 
These ideas coalesced to provide a European gaze upon Africa, confining and 
condemning Africans to peripheral locations on the margins of South African society 
long before the bantustan strategy was introduced. Within their 'own spaces' natives 
could be exposed to 'their own' traditions and culture, or a distortion of them and 
subordinated to the imperative of 'enlightenment' and 'progressive' (individual, 
Christian and competitive) development. Crucially, Africans responded in different 
ways to this alienation of their culture, some embracing, others rejecting 'progress'. 
The following section illustrates these anxieties in both black and white communities 
at Mafeking. With the region depicted as underproductive and therefore ripe for 
European settlement this process of marginalisation was accelerated once a 
rapprochement had been reached between the Afrikaner and the British following the 
BoerWar. 
39 The European Town was therefore mitigated by turnmg Batswana culture against 
itself with the view that as a' ... pastoral and agricultural commumty they (the 
Batswana) wtll not continue in large villages but when they feel that they have 
security for life and property elsewhere' . (BPP op. cit.) 
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2.3. The White Man's War 
In 18 86 the discovery of gold at Witswatersrand led to a fundamental 
remodelling of South Africa's social relations, based on the 'Mineral Revolution' ... The 
Imperial connection with Mafeking had already been forged and in 1895 deepened 
with the decision to make the town the extra-territorial seat of government for 
Bechuanaland. A few years earlier in 1889, and not uncoincidentally, Rhodes had 
obtained a Royal Charter for his British South Africa Company. Rhodes used the 
town as a springboard for his expansion into the African interior with the Pioneer 
column passing through Mafeking in 1890, colonising what became Rhodesia. The 
town also acted as a 'jumping off point' for Mashonaland expeditions lead by the 
'great' Sir Charles Frederick Selous and therefore became an important supply depot 
for equipment and personnel for the 'trek to the north'." Furthermore, these Imperial 
credentials were heightened through the Jameson Raid an event particularly associated 
with precipitating the Boer War. Although originating in Pitsane Potlogo in the 
Protectorate, the Raid was planned in Mafeking." Despite the traffic along the 'Road 
to the North' and Mafeking's role in empire building the potential of the town had not 
been realised. Only ten years after its creation there were concerns about the survival 
of this frontier town and fears of being marginalised: 
'We are continually hearing the doom of Mafeking foreshadowed, and the 
prognostications are almost invariably of ruin and decay. For various reasons we do 
not share this view, two of which will suffice for the present. Firstly as the frontier 
town of the Cape Colony, it is bound to be a milztary depot of more or less 
importance; and it is absurd to suppose that a fertile and fairly well watered country, 
equal in extent to France is going to be passed over and neglected although we grant 
40 Drummond, J. and Manson, A. (1991) op. cit. 
41 75 Anniversary Mafeking, (1960·6) op. cit. 
42 Mafeking Place of Stones (1985). This had been hatched by Rhodes to create a 
rebellion of the Uitlanders (foreigners) workmg the Transvaal mines to 
destabilise the Afrikaner government and bring the republic under the Union 
Jack. Once again Mafeking's strategical location was used in order to recruit 
members of the disbanded BPP formerly stationed in the town. The Raid ended 
disastrously for the participants and with Rhodes' resignation as Cape Premier. 
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that Matebeleland will advance with greater rapidity. As there exists at present, no 
town after Mafeking is passed, until Bulawayo is reached, it becomes the base of 
supply to the Protectorate; the development of which may be expected to commence 
with the opening of the railway. Not only will this town become a base of supply, it 
must also be the market for much of the produce. From this consideration alone, 
Mafeking has an assuredfoture~" 
Whilst the frontier optimism was still apparent, by the late nineteenth century 
Mafeking's condition remained marginal. Seemingly by-passed by the benefits of 
modernisation, something extraordinary was required in order to lift the prestige of 
this small border town. 
2.3.1. The Siege 
The siege during the Beer War ensured a place for Mafeking within imperial 
mythology and was also a brilliant propaganda victory for the British empire." 
However, the tensions resulting from the close proximity of the town to the Batswana 
was heightened when, at times of vulnerability during the siege, Europeans acted first 
and foremost to uphold their 'progressive' virtues whilst the Batswana contribution to 
the war effort was almost completely wiped from siege history." The most pressing 
43 Mafekmg Advertiser, 5th September, 1896 
44 For seven months between October 1899 and May 190 I, the British government, 
press, public and indeed the Empire at large seized upon the 'physical and moral 
pluck' displayed m the defence of the town orchestrated by Baden Powell. In a 
hitter war with many set-backs for the British, the siege provided a valuable 
psychological weapon and left a deep imprint on impenal identity. The 
subsequent mythology, however, tended to obscure the town's own view of the 
siege and created discord between the Batswana, colonials and imperial officers. 
The town was besieged by over six thousand Boers (soon dropping to two 
thousand) due to the Boer perception of the towns proximity to the vulnerable 
western flank of the Transvaal. With hindsight the strategic value of Mafeking 
has been questioned and it appears that at the time even the Cape government 
was reluctant to want to provide defence for the town. See Packenham (1979). 
The siege had been a major d1srupt1on for the residents many of whom preferred 
a return to normality rather than 'making history for the Empire', Will an, B. 
(1984) op. c1t. 
" Despite this being labelled 'the white man's war', the Batswana formed the bulk 
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problem was that of extending the provision of rations for the inhabitants of the white 
town and the Stadt during the prolonged siege. As a last effort to extend the (white) 
rations the commanding officer, Robert Baden-Powell took the decision to 'encourage' 
the refugee and foreign natives to go across the border to Kanye in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. This included some two thousand Batswana told to 'leave or starve'. The 
Batswana starved on limited rations and those outcast fared even worse, digging up 
the corpses of dead dogs buried outside the town. Natives were given a clear message 
once again, that they belonged over the frontier in 'Africa' itself and not European 
defmed Africa. Indeed following the end of the siege a relief fund of £29,000 was 
raised for the town. Yet despite the immense sacrifices made by the Batswana, in lost 
cattle, damaged property and starvation, not a penny was given to the 'Stadt'." 
In the aftermath of the war Englishness and its 'progressive' spirit was duly 
celebrated with the construction of a Gothic style church which began in 1902, 
designed by Messrs Baker and Masy, the same Baker who later built the Union 
Buildings. Furthermore, in addition to the Victoria hospital, an impressive Town Hall 
was built in the same year with fitting memorials to the dead of Mafeking during the 
of the town's defence force. Furthermore they provided labour to bolster the 
intricate network of trenches and also acted as runners, often risking death 
trying to cross Boer lines. Pakenham, T. (1979) op. cit. Meanwhile, after over 
two hundred days the Empire celebrated the lifting of the siege and ensured 
Mafeking's status as a Victorian legend. The huge outpouring of emotions in 
London and Cape Town contnbuted a new word to the English language, 'to 
maffick' meaning rejoice riotously. This small border town became a powerful 
symbol for the whole Empire and its message reached all levels of British 
society. 
46 The relief force sent to Mafeking Itself was a symbolic attempt to cement the 
unity of the Empire with 814 Imperial Light Horse, formerly of Johannesburg, 
122 colonials from the Kimberley Mounted Group and I 00 Royal Horse 
Artillery. As if to announce this brave new dawn for the Empire, upon Mliner's 
suggestion, exactly I 00 British infantry were sent w1th 25 each from the four 
regions, England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, solidifying the foundations of 
British Empire. It was indeed a good day to be English and accordingly notmg 
this triumph of Englishness, Major Bailhe, present during the siege commented: 
'These foreigners Start to qu1ck and fmish qu1cker. They are good men but we 
are better, and we have proved so for several hundred years'. (Baillie, in 
Packenham, 1979). Joe Pobrey (1994) former owner and editor of the Mafekmg 
Mail, described how in the 1950s he received a letter from a fifty year old 
women in Australia called Mrs. Mafeking Bagley, so called in honour of the 
siege. 
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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siege and with the motto 'Ne Cede'- 'Never Give In'. The ceremonial laying of the 
foundation stones of both projects was timed to coincide with the coronation of King 
Edward VII. In 1905 this wave of optimism was capped by the town's construction, 
from its resident's own private fund, of a stretch of railway line to the Transvaal 
border to ensure that Mafeking would be the railway junction between Cape Town 
and Bulawayo (Lobatsi had previously been nominated by planners). For such a small 
town of only 1500 whites, of mainly British stock, this indicated the concerted 
'progressive' attempts to uplift the town following the immeuse publicity of the siege. 
At this time Mafeking also comprised a smaller number of Indians, Chinese, 
Coloureds and over 5000 Batswana in the 'Stadt'." Mafeking's economy was 
remarkably ordinary dependent upon retail, agriculture and the railway junction. It 
was indeed the Boer War which had bestowed on the town a distinctive imperial 
identity. 
The war had been fought for the 'equal rights of all civilised men' and in the 
true interests of Christianity it had upheld an imperial order based upon equality 
before the Jaw." What followed however, with the Peace Treaty ofVereeniging was 
the British imperial policy of 'Reconciliation' and its wholesale betrayal of the African 
who had made large sacrifices during the war, not least the Batswana of the 'Stadt'. 
Despite the bitterness of the war between Briton and Boer, the foundations had 
already been laid for a black-white division of the population which subsumed white 
ethnic and class differences. 
Although never entirely smooth, this division based upon colour was to be the 
key feature, gaining momentum and dominating South African society from 1902-
1948. The town was evidently aware of its role in the 'civilising mission' and 
attributed this to being British rather than Afrikaans, and rekindled civic pride in its 
frontier origins: 
' (it is) these associations with Empire-building that accounts for the British and 
47 Cowley, J. (1985) 'Mafikeng to Mmabatho: Village to Capital City', conference 
of the Society for Geography, Mmabatho. 
48 Willan, B. (I 984) South Afncan Nat10nalzst Sol Plaatje, Routledge. 
- ------------------------------------
Chapter Two: Mafeking on the Margins 77 
progressive spirit of the inhabztants'." 
The relationship between Mafeking and the 'Stadt' was based around the town's view 
ofBatswana culture as slowly 'advancing' towards the higher standards set by western 
civilisation. The Cape Province extended the franchise gradually, to only 'civilised' 
Africans and Mafeking also supported this evolutionary ideology. These sentiments 
are revealed in the following quote from the Municipal Handbook of 1912: 
This ''Stadt" is well worth inspection, as it is one of the largest in this part of the 
country. Most of the huts are round, with reed-thatched roofs, but many of the more 
recently erected dwellings are square, built of brick, and covered with the far less 
picturesque corrugated iron. This advancement from mud hut with an entrance hole, 
to brick building with doors and glazed windows- although, doubtless, in great part 
due to the appreciation of a higher standard of comfort and the desire to imitate white 
men- is perhaps not entirely dzssociated with polztical ambition, as in the Cape 
Colony, residence in a buildzng valued at not less than seventy pounds is a main part 
of a qualification for the franchise'." 
With the creation ofMafeking, the 'Stadt' had become increasingly pulled into 
the orbit of this evolutionary ideology depicted in the above passage. Indeed 
Batswana cultural and political organisation was symbolically and physically bounded 
by this Eurocentric imagery which assumed 'imitation of the white man' and a 
qualified franchise. Alternatively, the 'Stadt' was represented by some Batswana 
themselves as increasingly associated with a once untroubled 'prosperous and happy' 
time, described somewhat romantically as set: 
' ... amidst acacias, wzllows and thorn bush which adorn the valley of the Molopo and 
(which)combine to make it one of the most artistic and picturesque settlements 
49 Mafeking Mumcipal Handbook, 1912. 
"Ibid. 
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anywhere in South Africa'." 
Whilst the Batswana were encouraged by Europeans to embark upon the golden path 
to 'civilisation', there was certainly a sense in which some Batswana were mindful of 
their own lost golden period. A recreation or reassertion of Batswana identity was one 
strategy to mediate the disruptive forces of colonisation and modernisation. 
Furthermore, white attitudes were ambiguous and periodically hardened by the 
town's location on the periphery of the Northern Cape. A major issue involved the 
growth of a post war 'white' regionalism in the northern Cape area of South Africa. 
The issue developed with various businessmen, traders and others wishing to annex 
both the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Mafeking district into the Transvaal. 
Mafeking's economic relationship with the Transvaal at times brushed aside their 
opposition to the former Afrikaner Republic's refusal to allow any franchise for the 
native. In the early 1900s this briefly produced a form of white regionalism within 
these peripheral areas of the Cape and Transvaal. Local member of Parliament for the 
Mafeking District, J W De Kock, epitomised the resentment of decisions taken far 
away at Cape Town. In an address to a public meeting in 1910 he argued that 'Coast 
Legislation had milked them (the North) dry'." This reinforced feelings about western 
province or Cape bias and a lack of representation for the northern territories at the 
seat of power in Cape Town. Mafeking's previously important location was rapidly 
becoming a major obstacle to the town's prosperity and the concerns regarding 
marginality were being realised with the constant battle to keep Mafeking's hard 
fought place on the map of the Empire. A year later the white racialised sense of 
identity cemented the territorial segregation now cast in stone throughout the Union 
with the 1913 Land Act. 
A local Batswana owned and run newspaper, Koranta, articulated and 
effectively expressed the Tswana position. Under the editorship of Sol Plaa~e, the 
paper was critical of the administrations of the Crown Colonies of the Transvaal and 
"Molema, S. (1960:12) op c1t. 
"Mafekmg Mail, 31.1. I 9 I 0. 
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Orange Free State, as well as being full of anger at the native commissions and sub-
commissions in these provinces." The white Mafeking Mail's response was to publish 
an extract from a Johannesburg paper referring to the 'Kaffir' paper which had 
expressed 'disloyalty'. The Mafeking Mail seemed unambiguously to promote its 
solution to the problem, clearly revealing what was thought about the 'native' Plaatje: 
'It would be mercifUl if a little cat o'nine tails were applied now'." 
A second dispute masqueraded as 'The Dog Tax' and appeared in the local 
Mafeking Mail as a seemingly mundane article about the 'numberless mongrels' in 
the 'Stadt'. In effect it symbolised the rapid erosion ofBatswana authority, which had 
been happening since the establishment of Mafeking and accelerated with the 
annexation of British Bechuanaland into the Cape in 1895. The creation ofTswana 
reserves had been supposedly to ensure autonomy and space for 'progress' for the 
Tswana but in 1903 the Mafeking Divisional Council had tried to implement control 
over Tswana affairs in the Stadt by enforcing the 'Dog Tax'. However both this action 
and the 1904 attempt by the local magistrate to impose the Native Location Act was 
defeated in the Supreme Court in Cape Town. This ruling sustained the belief among 
elements of the Batswana community in the gradual extension of the franchise and 
Cape judicial policy throughout the provinces. Plaatje himself embraced this 
'progressive' feature of imperialism and would later form part of the African elite at 
Kimberley who gravitated towards the virtues of the British 'civilising mission'." 
" Plaatje was able to influence Barolong chiefs and even secured the colonial 
secretary Chamberlain's assurance of the Barolongs' (and other Tswanas') nghts 
and status. 
54 Mafeking Ma1/, and see Willan, B. (1984). 
55 See Willan, B. (1984) op. cit. Plaatje's belief in the Cape judicial system was 
enhanced following the involvement of Chief Sekgoma of Bechuanaland in a 
successionist movement and his subsequent detention without trial by the 
Protectorate authorities, deemed unlawful by Cape law. Plaatje himself was 
emerging as an increasingly important nationalist figure and his vocal and 
energetic opposition to segregationism is of particular interest given his 
residence in the region. Plaatje focused upon the contradiction that ex1sted 
between British imperial theory and practice such as the confusion during the 
Sekgoma incident. 
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With the Land Act of 1913 Plaatje was bitterly disappointed that the African 
opposition to this was ignored." Furthermore, it indicated the immense ambiguity for 
the African petite-bourgeoisie involved in gbosting between the progressive and 
universal ideals, whilst also defending aspects of their own tradition and culture. 
Despite this lively space that Koranta, and other black publications of the day 
occupied, its continued fmancial problems and closure gave a clear message that 
segregationism was becoming dominant within government circles and general white 
opinion." 
The African intellectual elite, such as Plaatje, were increasingly denied access 
to this world of 'white' civilisation, leading to a diversity of responses, including 
support for African nationalism, labour militancy, the crafting of new regional 
identities centred upon ethnic affiliation or some combination of each." Koranta's 
disappearance was symbolic of efforts to segregate all aspects of South African 
society. 
56 See Plaatje, (1995, new ed.) Nat1ve Life m South Africa, Ravan, Johannesburg, 
concerning the devastating impact of the Land Act of 1913 
57 Massive fmancial debts plagued Koranta, which was to be an endemic feature 
for all black publications accentuated by widespread Illiteracy. By January 
1908: 'Koranta ea Bechuana may have been one of the fmest, l1vel1est 
newspapers of 1ts day, by the time of 1ts collapse it had left 1ts ed1tor m a 
desperate fmanclal state', in Willan op. cit. 
" Plaatje was one of the founders of the South African Natives National Congress, 
which became the ANC. He began his career as a postman in Kimberley before 
becommg a court interpreter at Mafeking where be produced a famous account 
of the Siege as seen through black eyes. He was also a novelist and produced 
what many regard as the fust novel to be produced by a black South African, 
Mbudi, as well as translating Shakespeare into Tswana. However, in view of 
Plaatje's above connections With early South African black natiOnalism (be died 
in 1936) it is interesting to note that the Bopbutbatswana regime in later years 
would attempt to appropnate Plaatje' s Batswananess for their own 'nation-
building'. According to Will an, Plaatje at one pomt even co-operated with the 
mining giant De Beers, ID order to receive support for his self-improvement and 
Christian based 'Brotherhood movement'. This was clearly intended to keep the 
'Bolsheviks out of Johannesburg'. Will an, B (1984) op. cit. John Du be had 
been ousted as Congress leader due to his pro-segregationist stance and along 
with other Natal Congress members was increasingly concerned with mobilising 
Zulu regionalism, especially in order to combat the radicalism of the Industrial 
and Commerctal Workers' Union (ICU), in Marks, S. (1986:36&37) op. cit. 
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2.3.2. Mafeking and Segregation 
Mafeking interpreted this period of segregationism along similar lines to other 
'white' towns. In particular there was a common aim of controlling the flow of natives 
into urban areas." In the inter-war period, urban control of the native became a key 
issue and integral to the definition of 'white' South Africanism.60 The impress of 
segregation was evident within Mafeking and urban control was closely associated 
with crime and the morality of the native." These controls seemed to reflect the Union 
wide white fear of the 'black peril' with the association made between 'Bolshevism', 
black urbanisation and detribalization." The Mafeking council had written to the 
Provincial Secretary in 1927 with a formal application for establishment of a native 
location, proposing a site which the local magistrate claimed to have inspected and 
deemed adequate. This site would replace the older native location, the creation of 
which in the late nineteenth century was puzzling given the proximity of the Stadt and 
availability of labour there." The 1925 Native (Urban Areas) Act was one measure 
designed to decrease the flow of natives into the location and in 1935 the 'Committee 
on Natives in Urban Areas' was typical of similar efforts. It aimed 'to enforce the 
principle of limiting the numbers of natives in urban areas' particularly those it 
regarded as 'superfluous'. In the 1930s the archives show that 'about' one thousand 
natives occupied the existing native location (as distinguished from the 'Stadt' and 
coloured location) mainly as labourers for the railways, municipality or as domestic 
59 Cape Archives, I &3 MFK. 
60 Dubow, S. (1989:39) suggests that pnor to the 1920s although elements of 
segregationism were already introduced, these 'were seldom interpreted as 
mtegral elements of a united Ideological package', m Rac~al Segregation and 
the orlgms of apartheid in South Afrzca, Macm11lan, London. 
61 MFK 1/3 
62 See Mafeking Maz/ in the 1920s, with the fear of 'red tide of Bolshevism' 
reflected in the coverage of industrial disputes w1thm South Africa and abroad. 
The Mail identified 'greedy workers out for the control of industry' w1th the 
leadmg article of 30.3.20, quoting the President of the National Federation of 
Buliding Trades in Pretoria, who was fearful of 'a dictatorship of labour'. The 
same edition covered the great coal miners strike m England, and suggested that 
'hotheads' were taking over the South Wales branch of the National Coal 
Miners Union and pronounced the likely demise of the British Labour Party. 
63 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (199l)op. cit. 
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servants." This figure was deemed adequate for the labour required to service the 
white town. However, whilst there had long been examples of residential mixing 
between Indians and whites, and even some whites resident in the Stadt, town officials 
were particularly concerned about the mixing of blacks with coloureds. This focus of 
official attention seemed to be based upon preventing socialising and, with it, the 
consumption of alcohol which was prohibited for blacks. 
In 1943, a decade before the Group Areas Act, the Town Clerk proposed a 
new location with the aim of constructing fifty houses in conjunction with the 
Railway Administration and a loan from the Central Housing Board. The intention 
behind the new location also took into consideration racial mixing thought of as 
undesirable: 
'The removal of the Nat1ves will allow extension of the coloured township and have 
the additional advantage of separating them, at present they are much too close'." 
There was approval, and even concern from central government regarding 
overcrowding and the delayed relocation. This action must be seen in the context of 
1930s national concern regarding the sanitation of black urban locations which had 
reached Mafeking. It was suggested that the black location was in such disrepair that 
perhaps it should be removed rather than the coloured location. However, despite 
these concerns the reply from the Town Clerk indicated that the town was now not in 
favour of a new native location because: 
'/ might mention that Mafeking is surrounded by large Native Areas from which 
Native Labour is largely drawn, and the local Native Location is becoming a 
harbourage for alien Natives from the north and the undesirables from the Stadt, and 
64 With regards to the Stadt it was suggested that historically White feehng was 
reflected m that: 'The whttes, when they thought of it at all, regarded it as a 
place where all their blacks were confined', (Pobrey, J, personnel 
communication, 1996) 
65 MFK 113 
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the question arises as to whether a Native Location is really required in Mafeking '." 
This quotation referred to the number of Rhodesians who were entering the location 
as labourers particularly as they were not eligible for stands from the Tswana chief in 
the 'Stadt' ." In addition to the undesirability of a new location, the Mafeking 
Municipality faced the problem of choosing a site given the limited acreage around 
Mafeking and presence of the Molopo Native Reserve. An unsuccessful attempt had 
been made to purchase a slice of the 'Imperial Reserve' from the Bechuanaland 
Administration. These difficulties in deciding upon a new site therefore made the 
Council reconsider its decision to create a new location. However, Central 
government under the United Party intervened directly due to mounting concern and 
criticism about overcrowding. In 1945 a land swap was made exchanging a piece of 
commonage for tribal land of the Reserve and from 1948 the town would come more 
forcefully under strict apartheid racial zoning. 
The 'Stadt' itself came under the jurisdiction of the Native Commissioner in 
conjunction with regular meetings of the Natives Location Advisory Boards. In 1939 
the outgoing Native Commissioner declared that he was 'very interested in the 
progress made by the natives in the district'." Although marginalised and devoid of 
services the reserves nonetheless provided spaces within which tradition could be 
invented as a coping mechanism and a social force. This response often amplified 
ChiefMontshiwa's earlier efforts to stem the erosion ofTswana identity and authority. 
Whilst sometimes giving the appearance of segregation, it reflected a desire to 
preserve the 'purity' of self-identity and culture. 
A 1940s circular from the Natives Representative Council, the only channel 
available to express national black opinion in South Africa, discussed the role of 
marriage and attempted to mitigate what were regarded as the negative effects of 
modernisation. It is particularly interesting to note the different characterisation of 
'rural' and 'urban' attributes because these differences were accentuated under the 
66 Mafeking Town Clerk, MFK 1/3 
67 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (199l)op. cit. 
68 MFK 1/3. 
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bantustan system with the deliberate manipulation of rural identities. The urban 
African was associated by white and black alike with erosion of tribal differences: 
'I think that the matter affects Natives more who are living under urban condztions 
and in bigger towns where moralzty and immorality plays an important part. Natives 
there live and work under conditions which are so different to rural conditions they 
have come under wrong influences and then regression starts. Endeavours should be 
made to protect the sanctity of family life and to check this retrogression'." 
These views reflected the anxieties of earlier debates regarding 'trusteeship' and a 
paternalistic preservation and protection ofTswana culture. There was concern for the 
safeguarding of 'natives' in order to mitigate the social decay associated with the 
European and now South African experience of industrial revolution." Dr. Molema, a 
prominent local resident of Mafeking, and member of the Advisory Board, voiced 
concerns about illegitimate children born out of wed lock and painted a picture of 
declining morality. He stated his satisfaction with the inquiry as 'we can not progress 
under these circumstances'. The decline in moral standards was attributed to the 
womenfolk who it was claimed, needed education 'to keep up a high moral standard 
... improving the position'. The seriousness of the deliberations were indicated by the 
involvement of village courts or 'Kgotlas' in the district. It was an attempt to prevent 
'promiscuous unions', by registering 'native marriage' in tribal areas as long as they 
were entered into with 'formality', in other words with consent of parents and payment 
ofBogadi (cattle to the brides father). Within urban areas proof of'civil' marriage was 
required and unless there was one or the other 'persons ... should have no privileges'. 
This issue served to illustrate that whilst whites had fears of a detribalised 
native who, by implication, if shorn of tribal custom would surely move to white 
69 Native Commissioner for Molopo Native Reserve (1943) MFK 1/3. 
70 Howard Pim, advisor and friend to Milner, reflected these ideas and promoted 
this view of segregation as protectiOn for the African so he could live 'under 
natural conditions which he understands and has created for himself', in Rich, 
P. (1980) 'The origms of apartheid ideology', African Affairs, 35, 229-51. 
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areas, some sections of native society also invoked notions of Tswana culture in a 
rapidly changing society. It was claimed by Molema that: 
'Detribalised natives live an unnatural life. They live neither according to nat1ve 
custom nor European custom'." 
This was but one illustration of how many Africans clung to a semblance of 
'tradition' in response to the social changes taking place, with retreat into or the 
nurturing of tribal custom as strategies by which to deal with the pressures of that 
change. It was advocated by amongst others, Dr. Molema, physician, historian and 
keen defender of Batswana culture. It has been pointed out how Molema identified 
with the earlier response of Montshiwa as a defence of Batswana 'purity'. Indeed, 
prior to Molema' s death in the 1960s it is highly significant that he began to advocate 
his support for a Tswana homeland." Furthermore, prior to his death in 1966, Molema 
left many his private papers with the Tswana (Bophuthatswana) Department of 
Education, and to his widow." It was an intellectual and conservative reaction which 
was being promoted by certain sections ofBatswana society. 
From 1948 apartheid planning invigorated and streamlined segregation, which 
although a feature of Mafeking had remained quite haphazard prior to the National 
Party victory. However, Mafeking's proximity to these black areas also confined the 
town to this periphery and the promised 'take off never arrived. Mafeking was now 
placed in a highly ambiguous position given its historical connection to these black 
margins whilst apartheid planning reached its zenith. 
2.4. Mafeking, Botswana and Apartheid Discourse 
The transition from segregationism to apartheid should not be seen as a 
71 Molema addressing meeting of the Native Location Advisory Committee, MFK 
1/3. 
12 In Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit. 
73 Bureau for Economic Development re Bantu Areas (BENBO) (1977) 
Bophuthatswana at Independence, van Rensburg publications, Pretona. 
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smooth continuum and must be viewed against fundamental economic changes in 
South Africa. An upturn in the South African economy became pronounced during the 
second world war. Between 1939 and 1945 the value of manufacturing sector 
increased by 116% and the size of the workforce by 53%." This rapidly industrialising 
economy produced waves of urbanisation with the increase in workforce numbers 
consisting overwhelmingly of blacks. Liberal historians have interpreted this period as 
one of a partial erosion of segregation through the modernising, rational influence of 
capitalism, sweeping away the archaic race relations of three centuries." The 1948 
General Election had been fought upon the segregationist issue and saw the coalescing 
of a triumphant alliance between sections of A:frikaans labour, agricultural capital and 
the petty bourgeois. The National Party election victory brought an extra dimension to 
the segregationist framework already in place. This was shaped by Afrikaners' own 
experiences and mobilisation as an ethnic group in which earlier ideas of segregation 
premised upon conceptions of race and level of 'civilisation', were reformulated. 
2.4.1. Apartheid Discourse and Race-Tribe concepts 
From 1948, the central premise of apartheid discourse concerned the cultural 
and political incompatibility of different racial and tribal groups. This grew out of 
earlier colonial thinking which had created a racialised sense of identity based upon 
'trusteeship' of the uncivilised 'native', legitimising white supremacy in a supervisory 
role as parent over the 'child-like' African." Apartheid policy and discourse sought 
constantly to signify these racial differences by renegotiating the content and 
74 Thompson, L. and W1lson, M. (1971) op. cit. 
75 Lipton, M. (1986) Capitalism and Apartheid, Wheatsheaf, and see also 
Thompson, L. and Wilson, M. (1971) Oxford History of South Africa, Oxford 
University Press. However, Terence Moll has suggested that the apartheid 
economy has actually been in prolonged economic slump from the 1940s. He 
also regards apartheid as having hampered efficient resource allocation and 
prevented companies from making full use of black workers but Molls critique 
is somewhat different from the above authors. Whilst Lipton etc. are critical of 
apartheid state intervention, Moll instead questions the quality and direction 
given to that intervention. JSAS, Vol. 17, no. 2, June, 1991. 
76 Manzo, K. (1996) op. cit. 
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appearance of white hegemony. The modernist and eurocentric underpinnings to these 
discourses (and indeed of nation-building and development), as suggested in chapter 
one, linked questions of identity formation to the reconfiguration of political frontiers 
and the 'identitary logic' contained in apartheid discourse. The core ideas of apartheid 
discourse were centred upon the perception of 'harmful' consequences of racial 
contact and with it the erosion of distinctive group characteristics each rooted in 
separate racial spaces of the 'Bantu' and 'European'. These core ideas and beliefs are 
depicted in the following diagrams which illustrated the 'official' apartheid discourse 
as centred upon the fear of the consequences of assimilation within a common living 
space (shown by the shaded triangle of Figure 2.2). 
The first two stages, A and B (Figure 2.2: A, Figure 2.3: B) reflected the 
preliminary stage of contact between white and black through the frontier relationship 
between the Bantu, pioneer, trader and hunter (and in addition in B, settler, missionary 
and officials). These diagrams depict the undermining of the 'till now self-sufficient 
Bantu' and significantly for the bantustan policy referred to the Bantu as 'strongly 
attached to their central point, the tribal chief. The dislocation of the Bantu group 
thought to be enhanced by a Bantu tendency towards 'mutual extermination', 
conjuring images of immutable tribal warfare, supplanted by European 'intrusion'. 
Through contact with Europeans (implying another sub-text of restoration of order to 
warfaring tribes) it was assumed that inevitably the Bantu would want to acquire the 
fruits of 'civilisation' otherwise known as the 'cultural possessions of the European'. 
Being unavailable within Bantu areas, the acquisition of these possessions would 
consequently lead to the third or 'urbanisation' phase of contact (C: Figure 2.4), with 
migration into what was represented as the European sphere. These migrants with 
wives and children were depicted as 'squatters' in this white created and defmed 
space, explained by the 'cultural distance' of white from black. Despite the best 
intentions of the civilising mission and the first two phases of racial contact, this 
distance remained unbreached. As a consequence these separate racial spaces were 
matter of factly based upon the assumption the European simply did not want to let 
the Bantu into the 'heart of his own sphere of life'. The policy of separate racial 
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development was therefore premised upon maintaining this distinction: 
'The driving force behind this policy followed by the European population is its desire 
to preserve its identity. However, its actions are not based solely on the fact that it is 
white, that is on purely racial grounds. These actions are a result of a totality of 
factors which might be regarded as the creation of the European population in South 
Africa. In the absence of discrimination, what would happen is that the foundations 
on which European civilisation rests would vanish before the European himself 
disappeared. It is for this reason that the European population will not tolerate any 
conduct which might endanger the foundations on which its continued existence 
depends'.71 
The fundamental basis of apartheid was centred upon the maintenance of this 
European authority, with the warnings of dire results if this was not ensured. This 
authority was represented as based upon specific values, traits and characteristics 
which signified the European right to preserve these distinctions. Political boundaries 
were therefore constructed to maintain this authority and keep intact these 
characteristics of white spaces with the presence of any Bantu in these areas depicted 
as an intrusion. 
The determination to preserve these frontiers was regarded as provoking three 
reactions from the Bantu (Figure 2.4, 'A', 'B', 'C'). The first, mentioned above, was 
the Bantu desire for European cultural possessions and therefore presence in the white 
areas, depicted as 'squatting' or attempts at 'intrusion' leading to 'assimilation' 
(Figure 2.4 • A'). This strategy was seen as creating pressure on the European 'to open 
the doors leading to his sphere of life', synonymous with labour strikes, unrest and 
violence. Secondly, and most alarming for European survival, was the 'nationalistic 
reaction' of the Bantu (Figure 2.4 'B') considered most threatening to the political and 
racial frontier and leading to 'elimination'. The third reaction was seen as passing or 
71 South African Government (1955: 17) UG 61/1955, Summary Report for the 
Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South 
Africa, Pretoria. 
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'escapism' (Figure 2.4 'C') whtch would eventually lead to either the first or second 
response. Whilst 'squattmg' was considered as undermimng the racial dtvtsion, the 
'nationalistic response' phase was depicted as incompatible with and threatening the 
very basis of survival of the white population. This was shown by the arrow in the 
diagram which pterces straight through the European space. Bantu nationalism was 
therefore considered the fundamental challenge to white authority because its 
' ... ultimate aim is the elimination of the European sphere of living'. 
Group X Group Y 
Phase A: 
( Tra.;ellers 
( Hunters 
( 
Europeans 
Figure 2.2 Assimi/atio11' a11d Phase 'A' of Co11tacf' 
78 Adapted from SA government, 1955. 
·. 
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These scenarios, we are told, presented the European in South Africa with two 
clear choices, assimilation whether peacefully or violently achieved, or the provision 
of spaces to accommodate this 'nationalistic aspiration' of the Bantu: 
' ... they (the Europeans) must provide foil opportunity for this effort to develop 
positively alongside ot and not in opposition to, the European sphere of life'." 
This shift in emphasis from 'tribal' to 'nationalistic' characteristics was central 
to the apartheid era and to the reformulation of outmoded colonial discourse. Skalnik 
has identified the two most widespread concepts in both public and popular discourse 
in South Africa prior to the bantustan state programme, as 'race' and 'tribe'. He 
suggests that these were replaced by ethnic terminology and the fulfilment of this 
(ethno)nationalistic reaction. Similarly, Quinlan notes the switch from state policy 
based upon tribal notions to the rapid embrace of the ethnic dimension during the 
apartheid era." The tribal paradigm therefore rapidly gave way to a belief in the ethno-
nationalist mode of identity with 'national self-realization' considered 'unstoppable' 
becanse it was 'nationalism in essence'." These ideas were rooted within a Germanic 
anthropological tradition centred upon the irrefutable marker of cultural identity or 
'ethnos'. Apartheid discourse was also tied to a spatial framework which identified 
the old native reserves as the suitable container for the nationalist aspirations, now 
recast as historic ethnic homelands. The 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act laid the 
framework for native reserves now represented as nascent ethnic-states based upon 
firstly, territorial division and secondly, revival of chieftaincy. Political institutions 
were represented as 'traditional' mechanisms of Bantu society and reflected the 
massive invention of tradition by the National Party. Thirdly, this policy was linked to 
79 Ibid. 
80 Skalnik, P. (1988) 'Tribe as colonial category', in E. Boonzaier and Sharp, J. 
(eds ) South Afr~ean Key Words. the uses and abuses of political concepts, Cape 
Town, David Philip. Quilan, T. (1986) 'The tnba1 paradigm and ethnic 
nattonalism: a case study of polittcal structures in Qwa Qwa', Transformations 
2,31-49. 
81 Boshoff, J. L. (1970) 'The Imphcations of Homeland Development for white 
South Africans', Bantu, December 1970. 
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Missionary 
T racier 
Official 
Se Iller 
Europeans 
Migralory Worlers 
Wives 
farni!ies 
Europeans 
Figure 2.3 Phases 'B' and 'C' of contact' 
82 Adapted from SA government, 1955. 
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a 
lnlrusion 
Europeans 
b 
Europeans 
c 
Escape 
£uropean$ 
Figure 2.4 'African Responses'- 'A', 'B', 'C'." 
13 Adapted from SA government, 1955. 
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the reversal of the disintegrating reserves. The cruder racial basis of the colonial-
segregation and early apartheid discourse was therefore redefmed as 'multi-
nationalism: 
'For South Africa is in fact and in the first place a multi-national country, rather than 
merely a multi-racial country ... (with) homelands of a number of other nations having 
their own separate Identities, each with its own undeniable right to separate 
nationhood in a land which has always likewise been its own... in accordance with 
own national traditions and aspiration .. '." 
White authority was renegotiated by emphasising nationalist affinities, between 
supposedly equal nations each with their undeniable right to separate nationhood. 
In line with this policy, the Tswana native reserves were recast as the 
territorial basis of nascent awakening to Tswana 'nation-hood'. From 1948 it is 
noticeable from the archives that the directives emanating from central government to 
Mafeking town council regarding separate development became more forceful than in 
previous decades. At a national level, the infamous bull-dozing of the multi-racial 
township at Sophiatown, west of Johannesburg, was felt locally in Mafeking. Of the 
forced removal of 45,000 people a number of 'Batswana' were deported to the 
'Stadt'." Although possibly born in Johannesburg, the 'logic' was now ethnic identity 
and a return to the demarcated homelands, once again across the frontier. 
2.4.2. 'Progress' and Apartheid 
A second major focus for this emerging identification of Bantu homelands as 
embodying the 'solution' to the preservation of white supremacy, was the close 
relationship between 'nation-hood', progress and modernity. The political boundaries 
could be redrawn and justified through the depiction of emerging infant, inunature 
84 South African Minister of External Affairs to the U.N.O in 1964, quoted in 
Boshoff ( 1970) op. Cl!. 
85 MFK 1/3 
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ethnic 'nations' evolving under white trusteeship. However, this differentiation could 
also be maintained through an emphasis on the lack of development of the Bantu areas 
and their deficiency when compared to the European areas. Rather than being 
connected to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, this deficiency could be used to 
explain the need for European trusteeship until nation-hood, sovereignty and 
'progress' could be delivered to these ethnic nations. The summary report of the 
Tomlinson Connnission had identified the 'development' of the homelands as a 
necessary component of nurturing this emergent 'nation-hood'. The success or failure 
of reversing the economic and social collapse of homelands was seen as underpinning 
the outcome of separate development, with 'development' itself increasingly given a 
prominent role: 
'The imtial step towards practical realisation of separate development of the 
European and the Bantu, lies in the full scale development of the Bantu areas ... the 
development of the Bantu areas will have to embrace a fully dzversified economy, 
comprising development in primary, secondary and tertiary spheres'." 
The economic recommendations of the Report were very slowly recognised by the 
ruling National Party. The 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act gave increased political 
space to building states in rural areas but it was not until 1968 that real measures to 
expand the poor and underdeveloped homeland economies were introduced with the 
Promotion of Economic Development of Black States Act 1968 (Act 46/1968). This 
signified a departure from the past neglect, with the identification of growth points 
and industrial deconcentration of industry to white border regions with black areas. 
The rapid decolonisation of much of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s and internal unrest 
associated with Sharpeville, placed new pressures upon the maintenance of white 
hegemony." White minority rule was increasingly out of step with an emerging 'third 
86 South African Government (1955:207) emphasis added. 
87 Even Pobrey' s Mafekmg Mat! with it's relatively moderate challenge to some 
apartheid laws was targeted by security officials. Pobrey himself, along with 
others, was detained ID prison for nine weeks during the Sharpeville emergency, 
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world' and by the late 1960s and early 1970s the homelands were rapidly promoted as 
South Africa's own colonies. Their 'independence' as nation-states was seen by the 
National Party as a necessary step in delivering national aspirations, whilst 
conveniently facilitating the preservation of white rule. The bantustan policy, with 
increasing devolution of political power, structures and resources, was favourably 
regarded by some local groups. 
However, given Mafeking's historical connection with the border-landscape 
and particularly its association with Bechuanaland, in particular, the implementation 
of apartheid laws now placed the town in a highly ambiguous position. The town was 
pulled between two opposite poles, one expressing the impetus towards African 
nationalism, with Botswana's implacable moves towards independence. The other 
dragged the town towards the 'white' south which celebrated the virtues of racial 
separation and 'Baasskap' (white supremacy). There were the incongruous images of 
the construction of a classic low-cost apartheid township north west of Mafeking 
called Montshiwa whilst the virtues of black majority rule across the border were 
celebrated. By 30th September 1966, the headline of the Mail proclaimed the 
'Republic of Botswana is born today'. It went as far to suggest: 
~ .. the paper looked at Bechuanaland's independence with warmness and best wishes ... 
with sincerest congratulations from Mafeking, tied to a country by bonds of affection 
which have grown stronger over the decades ... sorrow mztigated by our realzsation 
that their own destiny had to be fulfilled'." 
The persistent theme of marginality returned to Mafeking following 
Botswana's independence in 1966. This loss of prestige and functions for the town 
associated with the removal of Botswana's administrative body to Gaborones was 
amplified by the closure of the town's railway workshops. Rumours were rife of a 
'ghost town', forecasting stagnation and the eventual disappearance of the town." 
Pobrey, J. (1994). 
88 Mafeking Mail, 30.10.1966. 
89 Mafekmg Mail, 5.10.1966. See also chapter five regarding Mafeking's 
---- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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There was also a feeling that central government had been victimising the town, 
possibly in relation to the 'Empire' tag that Mafeking carried.90 In the mid-1960s 
Mafeking had attempted to cross the political and racial frontier by joining Botswana 
but the latter embarked upon its nation-building exercise, independent of the colonial 
town situated in South Africa" In response Mafeking's Publicity Association and 
Town Council attempted to rediscover Mafeking's historical roots as a 'frontier' town 
by promoting tourism and economic investment, as the entry point into the African 
interior: 
There were the days of the Zeederberg Coach which brought big game hunters to 
Weils Stores from which the hunting parties were organised and where Winter's Hotel 
was a favourite hostelry because of its good food and because it was the last civilised 
stop in the long trek to the north'·"' 
This Mafeking Town Council promotional brochure went on to suggest reasons for 
industrialists to locate in a town with ' ... tremendous growth possibilities here for 
border industries' and: 
~ .. with large coloured and Black townships nearby, Mafeking becomes the ideal place 
to invest in.. all these, plus a friendly, rural atmosphere, make Mafeking the ideal 
place in which to live, in which to work; in which to invest and in which to relax'." 
A letter from the Northern Cape Regional Committee called for the promotion of 
incorporation into Bophuthatswana. 
90 Mafekmg Ma1l, 7.11.1966. 
91 Dale, R. (1969) "The tale of two towns (Mafeking and Gaberone) and the 
political modernisation of Botswana", South Afncan Institute of Public 
Adm1mstration, Vol. 4, no. I, pp.l30-144, refers to this proposal for annexation. 
However, Joe Pobrey owner and editor of the Mafeking Mail from 1955-1980, 
has suggested that this never ratsed any real momentum or even interest. Whilst 
his paper promoted the idea, this was ignored by both the Protectorate and 
South African administrations, interview, Johannesburg, December, 1994. 
92 Mafeking Council Promotional Brochure, undated, op. cit. 
93 Ibid. 
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tourism: 
' .. in order to make our region known through out the Republic and Rhodesia'." 
It was a plea for tourism, an appeal for recognition from the rest of South 
Africa, in other words the old battle against marginalisation. Neither tourist or 
industrialist arrived." Residents' fears of the decline of the town continued and 
Mafeking was forced to decide whether to remain 'white' and marginal or align itself 
with the Batswana bantustan. Members of the business community in particular 
favoured the alignment and encouraged the South African government to locate the 
administrative offices of the Tswana Homeland in the old Bechuanaland Protectorate 
buildings in Mafeking. Elements of the white community therefore regarded the 
bantustan as necessary compensation for the erosion of prestige following the 
independence of Botswana. Indeed, it can be argued that given the historical condition 
of marginality, as constantly referred to in this chapter, the bantustan policy was the 
economic life-line that Mafeking desperately required. The most significant decision 
for the future of the town had been taken in 1963 with the sale of the Imperial Reserve 
from Botswana to South Africa and the decision to locate the offices of the Tswana 
Territorial Authority (TT A) in the recently vacated buildings. 
Similarly, a number of Tswana increasingly identified with the merits of 
devolved power and resources to the Tswana Homeland. The ITA had been created in 
1961 with eight Tswana regional authorities centralised with an administrative body. 
ChiefPilane, chairman of the ITA, spoke at the opening of the sixth session of the 
Authority and, although against one man one vote, he was envious of the 'responsible 
and statesmanlike' way in which Botswana had achieved 'independence'. The allure 
94 Mafekmg Mail, 21.1.66 
" Pobrey, J. (1994) had been influential in setting up the Mafeking Publicity 
Association, and despite 1ts promising beginnings soon faded. The Association 
made an iron1c statement of its failure by erecting a tongue in cheek sign 
outside of Mafeking declaring, tongue in cheek, 'Mafeking Industrial Heart of 
the Northern Cape'. In fact, the Mafeking Mail itself with over 120 employees 
(including print works) remained the biggest employer in the town, Pobrey, J. 
(1994). 
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of sovereignty was evident as Chief Pilane talked of the Batswana on his side of the 
border in South Africa. He promoted the concept of self-government and desire to 
control some of the functions of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Education as soon as possible. Pilane stated that the Batswana should take care of the 
establishment of townships, erection and planning of buildings, law and order, 
promotion of education, agricultural planning, recruitment of labour and the collection 
of taxes." This illustrated how the apartheid ideology rapidly sought to nurture the 
creation of a group of 'insiders' who were also mobilising regional identities based 
upon ethnic affiliation in order to derive political and economic benefits from separate 
development. 
The reconstitution of the TIA in 1968 as an Executive Council with members 
of the Authority now elected represented the pace of change. The new chief councillor 
of the TIA, ChiefLucas Mangope, having replaced Pilane, 'expressed appreciation to 
the government for the support received and for further powers promised'. He went on 
to say that the Bantu's greatest gratitude was due to the whites for the introduction of 
Christianity." This reflected the increasing promotion by some groups of ethnic 
separation and the fencing off of the new political and spatial frontiers. 
By 1971 in accordance with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, the TIA 
was replaced by the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly as a self-governing body 
with law making control over Justice, Education, Community Affairs, Works and 
Agriculture. The 'cabinet' consisted of a Chief Minister, who was required to be a 
chief and five other ministers, three of whom could be chiefs. This membership 
reflected the emerging rural and 'traditional' bias underpinning bantnstan structures. 
This was a significant development which within the South African government's 
official policy indicated that Bophuthatswana along with the Ciskei: 
' ... have reached the last stage of constitutional development The next stage these 
homelands will take, will be accepting foil independence'." 
96 Mafeking Ma1l, 1966. 
97 Mafekmg Ma1l, 5 5 70 
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The bantustan was increasingly seen as a vehicle by both white and black 
residents to embolden opportunities for both 'nation-building' and material gains of 
'development'. The 'nation-building' dimension, which is the focns of the next 
chapter, was taken on a stage with further devolved powers. Tswana was declared the 
'national' language and with also scope for a 'national' anthem and flag. The 
Bophuthatswana regime was given considerable scope to emphasise the cultural and 
political dimensions of nation-building. 
Chapter Three 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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3. Maturing the 'Nation': Discourses of Nation-Building in 
Bophuthatswana. 
3.1. Introduction 
'Our people (the Tswana) became fragmented and scattered willy nilly across the 
sub-continent. Our culture, our language, the very fabric of our being as a people, 
began to be dissipated and lost in a bastardized tapestry exacerbated by the evils of 
apartheid. But through all this there remained the flickering flame of nation-hood 
which no amount of abuse or inhumanity could extinguish'. Lucas Mangope.' 
This quotation, by Lucas Mangope, typically reflects the Bophuthatswana 
regime's efforts to reverse the cultural peripheral1ty of the region. Bophuthatswana 
attempted to instil a sense of Batswana identity and to restore 'the fabric of their 
being' through the promotion of ethnic renewal. The dominant factions within the 
Bophuthatswana power base reflected the bias towards 'traditional' structures or at 
least the regime's interpretation of 'traditional Batswana values'. This selective 
reading of Batswana history and culture was promoted as a form of Tswana 
nationalism which, however, also had to accommodate the drive for modernisation. 
This chapter demonstrates the strenuous efforts to communicate the uniqueness of 
being Batswana. The focus of the discussion is based upon a number of themes 
surrounding the cultural and political basis of Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building'. 
First, the promise of cultural renewal embraced rural values and contrasted the 
purity of Batswana in 'traditional' areas with both 'detribalised' urban Batswana and 
also the perceived threat of 'swamping' by other ethnic groups. Inspired by 'tradition', 
the Bophuthatswana and the South African regimes cultivated an agenda to promote 
Batswana culture. This ethnic focus was also used as a political tool by 
Bophuthatswana, with 'traditionalism' increasingly used to prevent opposition and to 
1 Bophuthatswana Government (1987) Nation on the March, Bophuthatswana 1977-
1987, 'Ten Proud Years', Hans Strydom Publishers, South Africa. 
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create an emerging network of patronage. Second, the question of 'independence' for 
Bophuthatswana from the South African government was interpreted as either a sham, 
in lacking viability, or alternatively for certain groups, as delivering sovereignty and 
reflecting the new found 'maturity' of the Batswana nation. Third, 'independence' 
signified the introduction of a specific nation-building agenda directed towards the 
promotion of Batswana identity and sovereignty through education, cultural heritage 
and administration policies. These strategies attempted to create 'unifying gestures' 
for the Bophuthatswana nation. 
Whilst these efforts were overshadowed by dependence upon South Africa 
they represented a particular response to the historical condition of dependency. As 
such, Bophuthatswana' s strategies reflected the emerging tensions between nation-
building and modernisation. 
3.2. Batswana Ethnic Renewal 
It has been earlier shown how apartheid discourse attempted to sustain the 
political and racial separation of white and black by creating 'ethnic' rights within the 
homelands for the black majority of South Africa. By the 1970s the maintenance of 
white supremacy became inextricably linked to giving these peripheral regions a 
semblance of viable entities. This strategy was promoted on the basis of economic 
development and also, importantly, the construction of ethnic and political identities 
within the homelands. The South African government's bantustan strategy was 
centred upon instilling 'national unity' and 'national culture' within each of the 
homelands and, in doing so, it also attempted to create, and maintain, linkages 
between these territories and all black South Africans. These objectives were 
expressed by the Minister for Bantu Affairs and Development during the reading of 
the Bantu Homeland and Citizenship Bill in 1970: 
'This Bill will therefore contribute a great deal towards stimulating among the 
members of each Bantu nation a feeling of national unity and national culture. And 
what is very important, the measure will enable the so-called urbanized Bantu person 
to find a home for his political aspirations with the people to whom he belongs. Too 
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easily do superficial thinkers and opponents of our policy say that the Bantu 
individuals in the white areas have become detribalized and alienated from their 
specific groups'.' 
Apartheid discourse represented the 'detribalized' African as the 'hard core of the 
urban Black problem'.' The political and racial frontier, between the homelands and 
the 'white' defined Republic of South Africa was premised upon the 'failure' of 
blacks to absorb 'western' and 'modem' values: 
'Probably less than ten per cent of all adult Black South Africans (roughly 20 per cent 
of all city Blacks) may be classified as predominantly Westernised, in the sense that 
they have substituted the Western for the traditional lifestyle. And even among these a 
clear maJority will admit to a sentiment of Black national consciousness. Many 
display only, or mainly, the outward trappings of Westernisation, while they still 
maintain fairly strong tribal connections'.' 
Black South Africans were therefore excluded and, in many cases, physically removed 
from the 'white' Republic on the basis that they had not 'fully absorbed the Western 
value system'.' The South African government's role was portrayed as nurturing the 
'national' characteristics of the homelands: 
' ... (because) they foe/ an attachment to their specific peoples and homelands as a 
result of all kinds of ties such as ... origins, descent, relationships, material interests, 
folklore, tribal connections, history and- strongest of all-language.' .• 
South Africa was represented as a geographical block merely accommodating various 
2 South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Hansard, Vol. 28, col. 1782, Bantu 
Homeland Citizenship Bill, 1970. 
3 BANTU, August, 1977. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 House of Assembly Debates, 1970, col. 1782, op. cit. 
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peoples. Of this block, consisting of twelve ethnic units, the Republic of South Africa 
was the fourth which was independent, the other three being Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. The implication was that the other eight ethnic homelands were under the 
political trusteeship of the Republic of South Africa - awaiting 'independence'. By 
manipulating the geographical definition of 'South Africa' the regime provided a 
revamped discourse which served to continue the exclusion of 'Bantu' from South 
Africa At some historical moment blacks had supposedly been jettisoned from the 
'white' Republic of South Africa into an Africa beyond the white frontier. 
The official apartheid discourse posited crude references to inter-ethnic group 
incompatibility and promoted the homelands as spaces of ethnic renewal. Within the 
context ofBophuthatswana the South African government position was as follows: 
'In recent years there has been a cultural revival through the reactivation of the 
Tswana authority and as a reaction against the influx of Non-Tswana into Odi (east), 
Moretelz and Thaba Nchu, which cause anxiety about the retention of the Tswana 
cultural heritage'' 
The role for the Bophuthatswana regime was therefore supposedly directed towards 
promoting this revival and re-affnming 'Tswanaism' and its heritage: 
' ... through practical steps to encourage the survival of what is dear to the Tswana, 
and to protect the Tswana language and cultural heritage from foreign influences '.• 
Although shaped around the specific agenda of the South African government, this 
ethnic manipulation nonetheless sought to exploit local Batswana experiences. 
Chapter two indicated that from the late nineteenth century and particularly the 
beginning of the twentieth century, various groups had consistently raised the issue of 
the Batswana condition. It is argued here that by the early and mid- 1970s these ideas 
7 BENBO (1977:27) op. cit. 
8 Ibid. 
Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation 104 
resonated with certain sections of the Batswana ethnic group, particularly in rural and 
marginal areas. 
Although the Bophuthatswana regime's acceptance of 'independence' and the 
contradictions of the bantustan policy would rapidly alienate the majority of 
Batswana, the underlying 'condition' and issues of cultural identity remained 
important. The opening quotation, by Mangope, captured the sense of dispossession 
and upheaval associated with the Batswana diaspora during the pre-colonial and 
colonial eras.' The Bophuthatswana ruling elite manipulated this instability, 
vulnerability and unease to suggest that they were acting for the Tswana in order to 
create a stable place they could call their own, reflected in the name 
'Bophuthatswana' or 'place were the Tswana people abide'. As Butler et al suggested 
twenty years ago, with 64% of all Batswana situated outside the homeland, 
Bophuthatswana could not qualify to be called the Urheimat or original gathering of 
at least a substantial portion of the people.'• It is shown how the prospects for creating 
a popular nationalist movement in Bophuthatswana foundered upon, most visibly and 
emotively, the fragmented territorial basis and failure to consolidate Bophuthatswana. 
The bantustan strategy was intended to create rural based states and with it a 
fundamental division between rural and urban ('South African') blacks. The old 
Tswana Territorial Authority (TT A) had reflected this bias within the bantustan policy 
towards rural representation tied to traditional structures and equal representation for 
each of the twelve electoral districts in Bophuthatswana." The TTA was dominated by 
chiefs who derived substantial benefits including the establishment of schools for sons 
of chiefs, teacher training colleges, agricultural and industrial training centres, bore 
9 The prevtous chapter indicated that Batswana territory, within the boundaries of 
the old Bntish Bechuanaland, had been rapidly alienated from 1895 with 
annexation to the Cape and its recovery was a fundamental basis of group 
grievances 
10 Butler, J., Rotberg, R. A dams, J. (1977 .9) The Black Homelands of South Africa; 
the politiCal and economic development of Bophuthatswana and Kwa-Zulu, 
University of California Press, Berkeley. 
11 Butler et a!, ibid., make the pomt that although the size of the population may 
have been greatly different between regions, each still had a similar number of 
representatives. Furthermore, only two representatives were elected from each 
district and these were designated by the regional authority. The remammg 48 
seats were ftlled by nominees i.e. chteftaincy and headmen. 
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holes, bus services and boundary fences." The rural bias was also reflected in 
campaigning, elections and within the executive council of the Bophuthatswana 
Legislative Assembly which replaced the TIA in 1972. For example, the 
Bophuthatswana Executive Council had only two university educated members but 
four chiefs. These features therefore indicated for Butler et a! the dominant 
characteristic in the composition of Bophuthatswana politics: 
'The chiefs have strong traditional roots and tend to emphasise the Tswana character 
of their government As a cabinet, it is more natiOnalistic and less overtly politicized 
than its counterparts (than for example, in Kwa-Zulu) '." 
The common Tswana interest of both the Bophuthatswana National Party (BNP), led 
by the chairman of the Bophuthatswana Executive Council, Chief Lucas Mangope, 
and the opposition Seoposengwe (United) Party (SP), led by the former chairman of 
the TTA, ChiefTidimane Pilane, was reflected in the education and language policy 
adopted by both parties." However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s significant 
differences had begun to emerge between them concerning the perception of the role 
that Bophuthatswana would play within the broader framework of South African 
politics. The SP demanded the return of 'our homeland forefathers land' and complete 
territorial consolidation as the basis for granting Bophuthatswana its 'ultimate 
sovereign independence'. Most significantly, Pilane envisaged Bophuthatswana 
within a broader united black homeland federation and was also less overtly Tswana 
traditionalist. This was reflected in Pilane's call for both black unity (within the 
homeland system) and representations by 'commoners' within a totally elected 
12 Butler et a!, ibid. 
13 Ibid. pp65. 
14 Mangope had replaced Pilane as chairman of the TTA/BLA in 1972 following a 
vote of 60 for and 8 against, in Butler et a! op. cit. Both political parties were, 
however, were extremely pro-Tswana. For example, the chairman of the SP, Mr. 
S.J.J Lesolang called for the compulsory introduction of Tswana into non-
Tswana schools within Bophuthatswana, under the pretext that otherwise non-
Tswana would be unable to gain government employment, Mafekmg Mazl, 
25.1.1974. 
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------
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Legislative Assembly. By contrast, Mangope was particularly supportive of the 
prominent role given to chiefs within the homeland: 
'We have been severely criticized for the large number of designated members (i.e. 
appointed chiefs in assembly), but we believe that we must lead our people from what 
they know- for the concept of a general election is unknown in our traditional 
administration'." 
In 1972 with elections to take place within Bophuthatswana, these features were 
reiterated in the manifestos of the two parties. The BNP manifesto revealed Mangope 
as an ardent ethnic nationalist who consistently emphasised the rights of the Tswana 
within Bophuthatswana despite the presence hundreds of thousands of non-Tswana:" 
'I have been with the task of serving the Tswana people, and therefore to do what I 
regard is in the best interests of Bophuthatswana, and nothing else'." 
Mangope had claimed on numerous occasious that a political system based upon the 
concept of one man one vote was inappropriate for South Africa; it would lead to 
ethnic conflict, expressed as 'another Angola'." Mangope associated the homeland 
system, for all its problems, as representing for blacks 'a positive acknowledgement 
and vindication of his particular stamp of black identity'." Mangope, more than 
Pilane, appeared acutely concerned with the status of the Batswana as a minority 
amongst black groups. 
At the 1973 summit between homeland leaders Mangope had initially agreed 
" Mafeking M a~ I, 26.1.1973. 
16 According to the BNP mamfesto in point !(b) the BNP 'aims to build a strong 
and secure Bophuthatswana Nationalism, in Van der Merwe, H. Charlton, N. and 
Kotze, D. (eds.) (1978:499) Afncan Perspecttves on South Africa, Hoover, 
David Philip, Collings, South Africa. 
17 in Butler et al. (1977:88) op. cit. 
18 Mangope in Breytenback, W. J. (1977: 13) Bophuthatswana at Independence, A 
Political Backgrounder, Department of Information at the South African 
Embassy, Trafalgar Square, London. 
19 Mangope in Van der Merwe et al (1978:64) op. cit. 
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to federation with the other homelands. However, he then reneged on this decision 
and expressed concern, along with his deputy, Chief Herman Maseloane, that the 
Tswana would be dwarfed by a Xhosa-Zulu superstate. Mangope had reiterated the 
importance of maintaining links with white South Africa but apparently came under 
severe criticism for his attendance at the conference. "In a radio interview Mangope 
was quoted as saying that proposals for homeland federation were academic and 
'shooting at the moon'. Moreover, he expressed fears about domination by other 
ethnic groups: 
'(Mangope said) His own people would be anxious about being swamped by other 
larger groups, and might prefer an association with Botswana ... '." 
Mangope therefore displayed a distinct tendency and determination to 'go it alone', a 
feature which would be characteristic of his twenty year rule of Bophuthatswana. 
Mangope's rhetorical position on unification between Tswana in Bophuthatswana and 
Botswana would provide a central tenet of his Tswana nationalism, and would re-
emerge in later years." His encouragement of Tswana chauvinism and ethnic 
competition would also characterise his rule. By 1975, Mangope had expressed the 
desire to extent his sphere of influence to the urban people, by supporting the strategy 
of other bantustan leaders to control 'ethnic citizens'." Ethnic competition was 
encouraged through Mangope's references to other ethnic groups such as 'those 
Xhosa who were forging ahead with their own Homeland, Development 
Corporation .. .'." These ideas were also used by Mangope to consolidate his political 
position in Bophuthatswana 
20 Mafekmg Ma1l, 29.3.1973 
21 Mafekmg Mail, 23.11.1973 
22 In the mid-1970s, however, the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama had 
refused any contact or negotiation with Bophuthatswana because 'Accepting the 
homelands is accepting Apartheid', and therefore unjust and impracticable, 
Mafekmg Mall, 25.6.1915 and 30.11.1974 respectively. 
23 Mafeking Ma1l, 3.1.1915 
24 Ibid. 
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3.2.1. Bophuthatswana's Emerging Elite 
In the pre-independence phase, Mangope's emerging discourse also firmly 
accentuated the 'positive' aspects of separate development through which the Tswana 
could empower themselves by controlling their own development and resources. 
Mangope's perceived constituency had included a significant section of the rural 
populace and the struggle over chieftaincy in these areas became central to his 
preservation of control in rural areas. This rural periphery should not be viewed as an 
homogeneous mass. As Lawrence and Manson suggest, a material dimension 
underpinned the bantustan strategy, with a bias for many years from the South African 
Department of Native Affairs towards a prominent rural farming and commercial 
elite. During the 1950s, 1960s and into the 1970s, these groups had aligned 
themselves with the bantustan authorities in order to consolidate and expand their 
benefits. An important point also concerns the unfolding alliance made between a 
black farming elite and Afrikaner farmers in the region. This paved the way for the 
capitalising of agriculture in the bantustan and a development model promoted by the 
Bophuthatswana state parastatal, AGRICOR, characterised as technocratic and large 
scale." Therefore, the homeland structures were attractive for various interest groups 
which stood to benefit materially. 
Throughout the 1970s the economic and employment opportunities in 
Bophuthatswana were expanding." Together with other BNP members, Mangope 
promoted these 'opportunities' as an escape from racism and apartheid's restrictions. 
High profile was given to D. P. Kgotleng, member of the BLA, director of companies 
and also a leading Batswana farmer who demanded equality within separate 
development and claimed that 'the time has come that Blacks should do things for 
themselves and not have things done for them'." Mangope himself farmed and this 
25 Clynick, T. in Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit. See also, Rood!, J. J. 
(1985) "Bophuthatswana's state farming projects: an aggro business?", Indzcator 
South Afr~ca 3, I, pp.6-9. 
26 For example, wzthin government, employment increased from 872 in 1968 to 
2917 in 1974 and 7 304 by 1977, not including over 7000 teachers, in BENBO 
(1977:41). 
27 Tswana Mazl supplement in the Mafeking Mazl, 18.1.1974 
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Batswana farming group offered a potential political basis for the Bophuthatswana 
regime, particularly, according to Murray's observations, within the Thaba Nchu 
region ofBophuthatswana. Here, the Barolong (a Batswana tribe) land owning elite 
were able to convert their advantages into securing prominent bureaucratic positions 
within the emerging Bophuthatswana government." This was far removed from the 
vast mass of landless Africans who were forcibly removed from white areas and 
resettled in the homeland." Although increasingly bolstered by a rapidly growing 
bureaucracy, Mangope's regime sought to develop a coherent, easily identifiable 
ideology aimed at reformulating the unsubtle crudity of apartheid ethnic discourse, 
given the degree of popular resentment and social divisions within Bophuthatswana." 
Batswana businessmen demanded that blacks should serve blacks in shops 
within Mafeking, through breaking the white monopoly on jobs. Other Batswana 
criticised the arrogance of whites, particularly for still referring to the Batswana as 
'boys' and walking uninvited into council meetings and when inspecting black 
businesses." The major South African parastatal promoting economic development in 
the homelands, the Bantu Investment Company, was accused by Batswana of being a 
racist organisation." Black advancement was therefore perceived to be most 
effectively promoted through separate development. The 'crushing' problems of 
Bantu education were also discussed and many argued that education could be 
improved if it was under Batswana control within a Tswana homeland." As an 
increasing number of Africans were forcibly removed from white farms, urban and 
28 See Colin Murray's work (1994) on the Barolong Progressive Association, in 
Black Mountain, Edinburgh University Press. More generally, for those who 
aspired to the BLA, of the 4 7 candidates who stood for election in the 1972 
Bophuthatswana electiOns, most were either farmers, former teachers, 
shopkeepers or directors of companies, in BENBO ( 1977) op. cit. 
29 Lawrence, M. and Manson. (1994) op. cit. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Theo Moatshe, Montshiwa businessman, Tswana Mall in the Mafekzng Mazl, 
31.8.1973 and Coucillor Percy Sampson who claimed that one white man who 
walked into a council meeting 'had no manners at all... if we want racial 
harmony in this country Whites must learn to respect Blacks', Tswana Mail, 
24.8.1973. 
32 A local Batswana shop-owner refernng to BIC official, who had acted in a very 
derogatory manner when inspecting his shop, Mafeking Mail, 27.7 1973. 
33 Mafekzng Mazl, 3.1.1975. 
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rural 'blackspots' and others were deemed to be surplus to the South African state and 
economy, once again the language of ethnic citizenship and rights was used within 
Bophuthatswana to compensate for this removal of rights in South Africa. 
Bophuthatswana officials urged Batswana residents to join the National African 
Chamber of Commerce (NACOC): 
' .. (which) should take the lead in this development. The voice of NACOC should 
reach out to the Bantu man in the street and up to the uppermost part of the country. 
And, the voice should say, 'wake up and develop your own!'." 
The promise of economic opportunities and facilities was therefore another major 
strand ofMangope's strategy to legitimise Bophuthatswana. 
In conjunction with the regime's increasing emphasis upon defining a 
'national identity', it is argued that the political basis of the regime rested precariously 
upon a combination of traditional structures and, increasingly, of modernising agents. 
Each affected the other in contradictory ways. The salient feature of the 
'independence' era was of an ideology of traditionalism permeating institutions and 
through which the Bophuthatswana regime sought to legitimise its control. Crucially, 
the Bophuthatswana regime also attempted to shift the emphasis from separate 
development to a conception of 'development' per se which provided an enabling 
discourse for certain sections of Bophuthatswana society to part take in the material 
and ideological offerings in Bophuthatswana. However, this 'progressive' face 
presented to the world was accompanied by and often qnite contradictory to parallel 
efforts to provide a 'national' conduit for Batswana culture and identity. The series of 
strategies outlined in the following sections represented attempts to accommodate the 
ethnic/traditionalist basis of the state and its modern facade. As such they represented 
'unifying gestures' intended to foment a national 'imagined community' of 
Bophuthatswana. These concerns regarding the Batswana 'condition' as an ethnic 
34 Bophuthatswana official, S. J. J. Lesolang (1972) in "Decentralisation and 
Border Industries", The African Trader. Lesolang was the chairman of the SP. 
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group had long aroused support from Tswana intellectuals who had expressed ethnic 
sentiments through organisations such as the Barolong Progressive Association and 
Barolong National Council, established from the early nineteenth century." A 
recurring theme of the Bophuthatswana 'independence' years was the scope provided 
for Batswana 'tradition' or the interpretation of Batswana culture and history by the 
Bophuthatswana regime. Prior to 'independence', Mangope had already indicated his 
advocation of the mixing of chieftaincy with political decision-making and power, 
which he used to consolidate his political base. 
In 1972, the first elections in Bophuthatswana reflected these trends with 
Mangope ignoring the urban vote and concentrating upon the rural areas. The voting 
pattern clearly showed that urban based Tswana were extremely sceptical about the 
homeland policy and were more concerned about their rights within South Africa 
itself. Of over 50,000 urban based Batswana only 4,661 cast votes whilst 45% of the 
rural population voted in a turn out of 50% with the BNP winning 12 of the 16 
contested seats and the SP the other four."This suggested for Butler et a! that: 
' ... Tswana who lived in or near cities were apt to disdain the whole process of 
separate development and/or fear for their uncertain status if they actually voted. 
Taking time off to go to the polls might also have deprived them of earnings. Rural 
dwellers, more secure and also more attuned to the policies and role of the Tswana 
Authorzty, readzly cast or were persuaded to cast ballots'." 
Whilst these comments captured the vulnerability of the urban Batswana position, for 
rural dwellers the 'policies and role of the TTA' was far more ambiguous than stated 
"Ben edict Anderson, makes the point 'It is imagined because the members of even 
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or 
even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion .. .', 
(1990:6). For these Baro1ong orgamsations see Murray, C. (1995) and Clynick, 
T. (forthcoming). One particularly significant Batswana intellectual was S 
Molema, some of his ideas concerning the Batswana were mentioned in chapter 
two. 
36 This pattern became even more pronounced in the following general elections 
but with each reflecting much decreased turnouts. 
37 Butler et al, ibid. pp53. 
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above. Indeed, the transformation of 'traditional' institutions and political processes 
under the homeland system were creating profound contradictions in rural areas. 
The election results strengthened Mangope's position within the 
Bophuthatswana homeland structure but his own BNP became riven by dissent and 
criticism of his style of leadership. Upon returning from an extensive trip abroad to 
sound out his plans for developing Bophuthatswana, Mangope moved against those 
perceived as his biggest challengers within the party. Another important pattern could 
therefore be seen by the mid-1970s, that of opposition consistently driven out of 
Bophuthatswana as Mangope removed these challengers to his authority by enacting 
his own set of rules." There appeared to be little ideological difference between 
Mangope and his Minister of the Interior, Herman Maseloane. Both were Tswana 
nationalists and reformists who condemned terrorism and spoke moderately about the 
role of goverrunent. However, Mangope perceived that Maseloane was undermining 
his authority." Mangope acted first to remove some key supporters of Maseloane but 
could not remove the Minister or his main ministerial supporter, Chief James Toto, 
under existing legislation. Furthermore, members of his own party accused Mangope 
of authoritarian behaviour and interfering in the rights of chiefs by attempting to oust 
Maseloane. It was also claimed that Mangope was using his official position to spy on 
and intimidate his subordinates and to interfere in the regional authorities, especially 
the Madikwe region ... In particular, Mangope was heavily criticised by his Assembly 
for his tight personal control over the Bophuthatswana Development Fund." This 
displeasure was reflected in a large vote of confidence for Maseloane but Mangope 
consolidated his own position with a vote of confidence in himself as leader with 60 
for and only 7 against. However, in 1974 unable to remove Maseloane and Toto, 
Mangope formed a new political party called the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) and recruited loyal ministers and legislators. 
This action clearly demonstrated Mangope's willingness to create his own 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Madikwe was Maseloane's home region. 
41 Chief E. R Lencoe, in Tswana Mail, 15.3.1974. 
Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation 113 
rules to remove troublesome opposition. It was linked to a specific interpretation of 
'tradition' with Mangope using this to create his own power base. For example, 
Mangope influenced the Barolong chieftaincy succession within the Stadt and rapidly 
grasped control of other traditional structures. Critically this interpretation of 
'traditionalism' would feature prominently throughout Mangope's rule and, according 
to Lawrence and Manson: 
'Mangope, as a traditional leader (though by no means paramount Tswana chief) 
had a profound sense of what he was owed with correspondingly little sense of his 
obligations'." 
The labelling and definition of 'tradition' was emerging as a device used in order to 
justify government policy; a defensive shield behind which such actions could not be 
contested. As Moerdijk observed, the wrenching away of cultural power from 
communities, as if now labelled 'African philosophy', provided an important 
controlling mechanism over rural areas: 
' ... it can not be dzscussed or refuted, for there is nobody to answer for it, nobody to 
admit error. It is thus an ideal tool for authoritarian rulers who wish to justify the 
existing state of things. Objection to it is not dzsagreement but disrespect, lack of 
patriotism or even sacrilege'." 
In addition, Moerdijk suggested that 'tradition' provided a sort of national adhesive, 
embracing 'traditional particularities' of chieftaincy and the 'development spirit' of 
the middle classes within the bantustans. These contradictions were played out in 
Bophuthatswana and were compounded by a lack of effective opposition to the 
bantustan leadership. 
However, 'traditionalism' could also be interpreted as Mangope's own 
42 Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit. 
43 Moerdijk, D, Anti-Development, South Africa and zts Bantustans, Unesco Press, 
1981. 
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ruthlessness and determination to centre all power within the bantustan structure upon 
himself. It heralded the era in which party membership began to determine personal 
advancement. Within Montshiwa township, just outside Mafeking, for example, ruling 
party members were placed in prominent positions within the local council, indicating 
that: 
'The Montshiwa residents believe that the only advantage some of these Government 
nominated councillors had could have been their association wzth the BNP 
Montshiwa branch '.44 
Despite lacking the number of votes normally required in order to be elected to office, 
the new mayor of Montshiwa, previously an information officer in the 
Bophuthatswana government, was appointed by Mangope." Having dealt with 
opposition, Mangope began to create a network of party patronage with promises to 
'carry his people', in other words, to give widespread benefits to his supporters in 
return for their unstinting support. From the mid 1970s there would be little, if any, 
dissension from within the ranks of the ruling elite. In 1975, Mangope's powerful grip 
upon these structures was illustrated in the chieftaincy and headmen's meeting to vote 
on their support for Mangope's plans for 'independence'. Through a combination of 
buying into Mangope's Tswana vision and fear of the consequences of any 
opposition, the traditional leaders endorsed Mangope through a vote of 155 with only 
5 against. This result apparently gave Mangope a 'clear mandate by the chiefs and 
headmen to press for full independence for Bophuthatswana from the Government of 
South Africa'... During the South African Parliamentary debate on granting 
Bophuthatswana's 'independence' , South African government officials and National 
Party MPs seized upon the legitimatory role given to 'tradition'. 'Tradition' was 
depicted as determining and 'deciding' the course of bantustan 'independence'. At 
one moment during the debate, whilst advocating the appropriateness of 'traditional' 
44 Tswana Mail, 27.9.1974. 
45 Tswana Mail, 4.10.1974 
46 Mafeking Mail, 7 .11.1975. 
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values and structures for Bophuthatswana, one National Party MP incorrectly referred 
to Mangope, rather embarrassingly for government representatives, as 'Headman' 
Mangope. The appearance, form or 'fact' of'tradition' seemed of far more importance 
than its dynamics or local detail." 
However, the specific characteristics of this 'independence' were becoming 
problematic. As the political momentum for bantustan 'independence' increased the 
limitations and constraints of the South African government policy were becoming 
clearer. The National Party's refusal to move from the territorial allocations of the 
1936 Land Act amplified divisions within Tswana nationalism and Bophuthatswana 
politics. The refusal by the South African government to grant the white town of 
Mafeking the status of capital of Bophuthatswana and the debates surrounding the 
proposals for a new capital were illustrative of deeper tensions over territory and the 
'purity' ofBatswana cultural identity." 
3.3. Maturing the 'Nation' through 'Independence'. 
By 1977 the fmal negotiations were taking place over the Bophuthatswana 
Independence Bill. The Bophuthatswana regime once again sought to reclaim land 
belonging to the old Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland and much confusion 
remained regarding definition of both boundaries, as well as the need to clarify 
citizenship status, particularly for the Batswana remaining within South Africa. To 
that end, a letter written by Mangope and signed by all the Bophuthatswana cabinet, 
was sent to the South African Parliament and intended as an embarrassing rebuke to 
the South African government's consolidation proposals when read out during the 
'independence' debate. The letter recommended that uuless both the citizenship clause 
of the bill and boundaries be changed then the homeland's decision to opt for 
independence would be frustrated because 'we (Bophuthatswana) are not prepared to 
accept independence at all costs'." 
47 See the South Africa House of Assembly Debates on the Status of 
Bophuthatswana, Hansard, Bill, 6th May, 27th May and 30th May, 1977. 
48 This 'capital' issue forms the bas1s of chapter four. 
49 RDM, 28.5.77. 
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South African opposition MPs and Senators questioned how the bill could be 
pushed through without reconciling these differences and voiced dissatisfaction with 
M.C Botha for apparently withholding the letter instead of reading it out to 
Parliament."' An opposition MP leaked these details to the press which quoted 
Mangope' s angry reference to consolidation, particularly the South African proposals 
to annex the Batswana areas of Bafokeng and Moretele. The South African proposal 
was probably designed to gauge the level of popular opposition to Mangope within 
these urban areas and, furthermore, given the proximity to the vital industrial and 
political Pretoria-Witswatersrand-Vereeniging region (PWV), the potential security 
risk. These regions contained a number of townships, Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane, 
Temba, Muthulung and Thlabane, all constructed to act as dormitory towns for the 
heavily industrialised PWV. Without these regions the territorial and industrial base 
of Bophuthatswana, together with thousands of forced relocations resulting from 
annexation to South Africa, would render 'independence' even less convincing than it 
already appeared: 
'We will not accept independence if these areas are excised, we do not dzspute the SA 
Government's power and strength to excise these areas and remove thousands of our 
people from them. But as an independent Bophuthatswana we are not prepared to 
have been party to an agreement that we now will result in untold hardships, misery 
and pain that will go with removals and dzspossession of land that is ours through the 
love of God'." 
Despite Mangope's alleged concern regarding the impact of forced removals from 
South Africa to Bophuthatswana, these had been an integral feature of racial and 
ethnic separation for many years. The incongruence between territory and different 
population groups had long frustrated and characterised successive National Party 
governments' plans for territorial segregation. For a supposedly ethnically pure state 
50 Ibid. 
51 World, 29.5. 77 
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containing only Tswana, this was simply a fantasy. Between 1968 to 1971 alone, in 
order to endorse this ethnic and racial partition, 79,000 Tswana were subjected to 
removals, often dumped on the open veld: 
'All in all arbztrary and unjust expropriatzon and eviction had been inflicted on the 
people in the name of eventual 'self- determination'." 
Even following many more removals of the 1970s, by 1985 the ethnic composition of 
the population ofBophuthatswana still contained sizeable minorities:" 
Tswana (50 tribes) =67.4% 
Shangaanffsonga =6.7% 
N.Sotho =6.3% 
Ndebele =4.8% 
These removals therefore repudiated Mangope's concern for the welfare of his people 
and caused deep-seated anger and despair amongst the many communities affected." 
However, the Bophuthatswana leader's comments did reflect the platform and 
visibility which the South African government had given to homeland leaders. In an 
attempt to defuse immense opposition to the stripping of South African citizenship 
and with it the few rights that blacks possessed within South Africa, a momentous 
effort to legitimise the bantustan structures would be required. The Soweto riots of 
1976 were an epochal moment for powerful popular opposition against the South 
African state and a strong rejection of separate development and ethnic division. The 
ambiguity of citizenship, particularly for urban residents, provided a central 
contradiction of apartheid discourse. The threat of removals of even those limited 
rights that urban blacks had within the 'white' defmed Republic was a major source of 
" International Defence and Aid Fund (1977) Profile of Bophuthatswana. 
" Jeffery, A. (1993) At the Cross Roads, SAIRR. 
54 See Colin Murray's work on 'displaced urbanisatiOn' in Bophuthatswana. 
--------------------------------------------------------
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opposition to 'independence'." 
Although this opposition exploded in urban areas of South Africa, the 
bantustans were not immune to waves of protest which even reached the 
comparatively quiet seat of the BLA (Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly), 
Montshiwa, adjacent to the proposed capital at Mmabatho. The fury that precipitated 
the burning down of the BLAin 1976 was an indication of the opposition of many 
within the bantustan to the removal of their South African citizenship. Through lack 
of consultation with the so-called regional 'ethnic' citizens, symbols of the 
Bophuthatswana regime were targeted by demonstrators. School children and youths 
rampaged through Montshiwa township and set alight to Bophuthatswana government 
cars and buildings. The editorial in the local newspaper asked 'why did they succeed', 
if, as the Bophuthatswana government claimed, these rioters were simply 
'troublemakers'? Rather, the riots indicated that the underlying current of frustration 
and anger was the real cause." 
Against this backdrop of instability the leader of the SNP, Chief Maseloane, 
came out very strongly against 'independence' and demanded eqnality with white 
South Africans: 
' ... South Africa was full of skyscrapers from the black man's sweat ... are we going to 
leave this for a barren land .. South Africa is surrounded by small begging countries. 
When Bophuthatswana becomes independent, we are going to beg as well because we 
have become alienated from our birthright'." 
" The Bophuthatswana era was characterised by the immense hatred that urban 
blacks held for the bantustan authorities. On many occasions cars passing from 
Bophuthatswana into South Afncan urban areas of the Reef, once identified by 
their license plate, would often be stoned, according to Joe Pobrey, (1995) op. 
cit. Furthermore, following the collapse of the regime in the 1990s many blacks 
in Soweto and other townshtps maintained that the Bopbuthatswana 
government's behaviour was as if due to 'brainwashing', (personal 
communication wtth residents of Soweto, February, 1995). 
56 Mafekmg Mail, 15.8.1976. Of those 15 people arrested, 14 were school children 
but one adult was actually President Mangope's son, twenty year old Shimi 
Mangope. 
57 The World, 1 1.3.1977. 
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Maseloane alleged that Chief Mangope had already agreed to the Status of 
Bophuthatswana Bill on April 25th 1977 at his meeting with Prime Minister J.Vorster 
in Cape Town. However, 'Chief Mangope agreed to the citizenship clauses then but 
when he tested political opinion among Tswanas he took fright'." Again this 
statement reflected how Mangope had 'walked the tightrope' between the structural 
constraints of being a homeland leader and, when concerned about political feeling 
within his territory, the need for (occasional) overtures to his constituency. Given the 
considerable constraints, Maseloane regarded 'independence' as untenable: 
'Independence would simply have the effect of dividzng the nation even further and 
isolating them from the rest of the world... On the present basis, the South African 
Government is not giving independence to our country, what they are doing is giving 
a country to Chief Mangope to rule as he wishes'." 
Interestingly, although the opposition referred to the inadequacy of 'independence', 
they nonetheless expressed this in terms of the harmful effects of 'dividing the 
(Batswana) nation even further'. In other words the imagery of the Batswana ethnic 
group was still potent for many Batswana. Mangope, however, was recreating the 
Batswana group within the limited territorial spaces defmed by Pretoria. A petition 
which stated that 'Homeland independence of the type visualised for blacks in South 
Africa, is a deliberate attempt to divide the people and weaken the forces of unity' 
was presented by the SNP to the South African Peoples Representative Party, 
addressed to the South African National Assembly." At the national level most black 
leaders were cynical of Mangope's earlier political ploy; they regarded the 
Bophuthatswana cabinet's letter as a publicity stunt." Mangope was urged to think 
again on 'independence' and warned of the political repression in the first 
'independent' bantustan, Transkei; that 'illegal child of apartheid unwanted and 
" Ibid. 
'
9 Mafekzng Ma1l, 1 0.6. 77. 
60 Cape T1mes 27 .5. 77 
61 The World 30.5. 77 
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rejected by the whole world'." It was claimed that for Mangope to accept 
'independence' 'he will stand condemned in the eyes of future historians and his 
children will cringe when they admit that he was their father ... '." Black opinion at the 
national level condemned the partition of South Africa through the bantustan system. 
This view was reflected in the following letter to a leading black newspaper: 
'Every square metre of SA soil is my historic homeland, and I am unwilling to part 
with it voluntarily. But you, chief Mangope, are prepared to barter it away in exactly 
the same way the Bushmen did for trinkets and trifles. The Bushmen did not really 
understand what they were doing. You do. You are folly aware of the consequences of 
your actions, and for this reason you will stand condemned before the bar of 
history'." 
Whilst this national and particularly urban based opposition, was forcefully 
expressed," there were different dynamics and discourses for some local and regional 
sections which interpreted even limited 'independence' as a significant stepping stone 
along the road to 'maturity' and 'development' of the Batswana. 
3.3.1. Breaking the Inertia 
During the 1970s Mangope had claimed that any political party rejecting the 
concept of homeland independence would be defeated at the polls." In the 1977 
general election the Bophuthatswana opposition party, which opposed 'independence' 
and boycotted the elections, was annihilated but this also reflected the appalling 
turnout of less than 12% of those eligible to vote!' Mangope was urged to 'listen to 
62 Transkei became 'independent' in 1976. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Letter by W.B Ngakame in The World, 12.6.77. 
6
' Afr~ca, No. 73, September, 1977. 
66 
'It is safe to say that no polztlcal party in thzs country, whether among blacks or 
whztes, which proclaims zts zntention to abolish the homelands, has the remotest 
chance at the polls'. Mangope to the South African Institute of Race Relations 
Conference, Cape Town, 1974, m Van der Merwe et al (1978:62) op. cit. 
67 The World, 25.8.77. 
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your people'." However, Mangope appeared to listen only to himself and his 
Legislative Assembly, now totally dominated by the ruling BDP. Independence was 
perceived as a powerful force which, together with the idea of development, could 
deliver the Tswana Nation from the debilitating effects upon Tswana culture and 
identity of racial and ethnic mixing. The acceptance of the 'Report of the Committee 
on a Constitution for Independent Bophuthatswana' in late 1977, indicated for some 
the 'rationale' behind taking 'independence'. Whilst the opposition criticised the 
logistics and detail of agreements reached between Bophuthatswana and Pretoria as 
falsifying 'independence', the concept itself was elevated to near mystical proportions 
by the ruling party. Independence was portrayed as a departure from stagnation and 
darkness, literally likened to a bright light which was 'kindling for the Tswana 
people' ."The transition to 'independence' was justified as attainment of 'maturity' for 
the Tswana nation and a demonstration of its capability in moving from a condition of 
'trusteeship' or childhood, to an adulthood signified through 'independence'. To 
reinforce this positive attainment of 'adulthood', within the grasp of the Tswana, 
reference was made to a meeting between Batswana chiefs and headmen with the then 
Prime Minister, Henrik Verwoerd. A member of the BLA recalled Verwoerd's 
suggestion to the Tswana that 'Independence' or self-rule reflected 'maturation': 
'Black people I am going to give you government .. because you are grown and mature 
now. You are not chzldren. You are going to given the opportunity to serve your own 
people and build your own nation'. 
These sentiments represented the essence of 'national aspirations', the outgrowing of 
'trusteeship' and, by implication, an end to subordination to colonialism/apartheid. 
This sense of unfolding growth and maturity was well illustrated by the comments of 
Headman T. J Montsho in his address to the BLA. He likened Bophuthatswana's 
61 Ibid. 
69 Following extracts taken from Bophuthatswana Government ( 1977) Legislative 
Assembly, Special Session, 2nd Assembly, Report of the Committee on a 
Constitution for the Independent Bophuthatswana ts accepted by the house as 
amended and will be formally adopted on 6.12.1977. 
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progress to that of the development of a child: 
'I don't know what is going to happen to a child on his mother's back who is grown 
but refuses to leave the mother's back. What must the mother do to him. Or when he is 
grown and his father gives him a house and he refuses to go to his own house, 
because he does not want progress, he wants things to be done for him'." 
The 'mature' Batswana nation was considered as having outgrown its South African 
'parents'. With the drive to escape the ignobling experience of white domination, 
'Independence' was seen as a dynamic process preferable to the state of being static or 
'stagnant' and capable of restoring Batswana dignity through forward moving self-
rule. Minister Setlogelo stated: 
' ... what is the correct position for which to fight for land, when we were self-ruling 
or when we are under another Government . We have marked time for the past three 
hundred years. I do not know whether we could continue marking time for another 
300 years'." 
The imagery of 'nationhood' and 'sovereignty' was taken as self-evidently 
progressive. However, the six members of the opposition, most of whom boycotted 
the meeting, rejected the terms of this 'independence' by emphasising the limitations 
of the 'independence' being offered by South Africa. Mangope countered these 
criticisms by reiterating the almost autonomous power of development, whether 
elsewhere in southern Africa or in Bophuthatswana itself, to overcome such 
'technical' disadvantages: 
'From this small (opposition) group there is a statement which says that we agree 
with full independence only when it can be beneficial to the people. If this 
70 Headman T.J Montsho in Bophuthatswana, (1977.77). 
71 Minister M. Setloge1o, Bophuthatswana, ( 1977:81 &82). 
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independence was not beneficial to the people there would be no country in Africa 
which is self-governing and independent. That is why mention is made of 
underdeveloped countries. But some mention the fact that when Lesotho started to be 
independent, they had only one mile of tarred road The difference(s) which were 
there when Botswana became independent and what we see now are the evidence 
which is visible to every person of developments that can be achieved when a country 
becomes independent'.n 
As pointed out in chapter one, during the 1970s dependency theory had been applied 
to the Southern African context and especially to the bantustans in view of their 
'dumping ground' and labour reserves functions. However, the structural constraints 
associated with dependency upon South Africa were simply depoliticised by Mangope 
through his promotion of the conception of economic development through irresistible 
regional co-operation. Mangope stated that this inevitable economic interdependence 
would combine with a policy to prevent the outflow of Batswana citizens and income 
to South Africa. This ambiguous attitude towards regional co-operation whilst 
pursuing autonomous development, would remain a fundamental contradiction within 
Bophuthatswana during the 'independence' years (see following chapter on 
'modernisation'). Whilst Mangope believed in the ability of 'development' to 
overcome these contradictions, S. V. Sifora, another opposition spokesman, could 
only envisage a state of dependency resulting from the failure to achieve consolidation 
of territory: 
'We regret that in our independence that the South African Government should have 
seen it correctly, that the Motswana must always depend on him as he dzd yesterday, 
and as he does today, as he intends from doing tomorrow. This prime intention, if he 
had not had this intention, should have accepted the boundaries that were shown .. so 
that I have my kraal. I have a field I am able to feed my children, like any Motswana 
hates to ftel that he is being supported by another. We are not happy, not with 
72 Ibid., pp85:86. 
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independence, but with the manner in which we are given, in fact forced into it, I want 
to say'." 
Sifora voiced other sources of unhappiness with 'independence' including the 
Homeland Citizenship Bill which undermined confidence in the conception of an 
independent Bophuthatswana because Tswana citizenship was enforced upon all 
Batswana in or outside the territory. Furthermore, non-Tswana residents falling under 
Bophuthatswana jurisdiction, would still be required to carry the hated Identity Cards 
for the Bophuthatswana regime. Despite protestations, particularly from the 
opposition parties concerning land and respect for chieftaincy, and more generally 
blacks throughout South Africa as well as international opinion, the Report was 
accepted unanimously by the BLA. The official Bophuthatswana government 
justification was that it acted on behalf of the 'Tswana Nation'. However, two 
essential ingredients, namely people and territory, were required. On these criteria, the 
extent to which Bophuthatswana could be called viable was questionable. Any 
pretence of self-determination was seen as wholly fraudulent by most observers. 
Despite global condemnation, 'independence' was bestowed upon Bophuthatswana at 
midnight 6th December 1977. South Africa was the only country in the world 
officially to recognise Bophuthatswana. The Orgauisation of African Unity, 
epitomised the widespread international opposition to Bophuthatswana as: 
' .. the sham independence ... which amounts to nothing short of the balkanisation of 
the country '." 
The official South African position proposed to counter-act criticism by promoting 
'independence' as 'decolonisation' of black states which was supposedly achieved 
through non-violence." However, for some sections of both black and white South 
73 Ibid.,pp71. ,. 
RDM, 5.12.77. 
"RDM, 6.12.77. For example, Breytenbach, W. J. (1977) op. cit., was a typical 
pro-South African government position which promoted Bophuthatswana as the 
'52nd independent state in Africa'. A common ploy in these propaganda 
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African society it was clear that these events, although a 'sham', nonetheless were 
having a real impact and meaning. They were not merely borne of 'false 
consciousness'. The 'independence' ceremony itself reflected the incantation and 
rituals of 'nation-building' formation with flag-raising ceremonies, freedom songs, 
parades of the national guard. Bophuthatswana was following the standard 
'nation-building' formula and pretensions to nation-hood." Despite widespread 
disapproval, some ambiguity could be detected within the critical responses to 
'independence'. The 'independence' ceremony was generally described as 'Uhuru' 
(black liberation) devoid of real emotions, with frayed edges and boredom shining 
through this fraudulent 'nation-hood' .17 For all its criticisms, however, the liberal 
press, at times also suggested that the ceremony signified the 'real Africa': 
'A ruritanian operatta set on the fringes of the Kalahari with tinny march music, 
dignitaries and salutes and inspections. Top dignitaries lost their cars or walked out 
of the stadmm amid urgent pleas over loudspeakers for help such as "will the driver 
of the Commissioner-Generals car please please come forward'~ It was one sign that 
publications was to compare Bophuthatswana favorably, on the basis of quite 
dubious assumptions and data, to the other African states in terms of 
'development' indices. These methods were also used by government 
representatives during South African Parliamentary debates on the homelands in 
the mid-1970s. 
76 For an overview of national symbols in South Africa see for example, Maake, N. 
(1996) 'Inscribing Identity on the Landscape' in Darian-Smith, K. , Gunner, L. 
and Nuttall, S., Text theory, space. Land, literature and history in South Africa 
and Australia, Routledge. 
77 Shilhngton, K. (1985) op. cit., suggests that the ceremony and 'independence' 
ceremony was apathetic and met with an absence of popular nationalism. One 
newspaper suggested that the event bore the hall-marks of a Mangope 
stage-crafted perfection which combmed 'raw tribalism with twentieth century 
pizzazz- bare boobs, bands and some Barnum and Bailey'. The report attempted 
to dramatise events emphasising, for example, that the 'entire' stadium of 50 
000 supposedly rose m mass choruses with the Tswana national slogan 'Pula'. 
Star, 10.12.77. Other coverage of the ceremony itself was more forceful in its 
criticism suggesting that the master of ceremonies had to beg for applause and 
ululation's It was alleged that the crowd sang the wrong anthem, opting for 
Nkosi Sikelela, the banned black nationalist song. The 'anthem' was then 
followed by a feeble chant of the Batswana prayer 'Pula' with the failure of the 
crowd to draw upon the customary response of 'a ene', meaning 'let it rain'. By 
the time of Mangope's 'Presidential' address the stadium was half-full and 1t was 
claimed, people were rushing home to bed. RDM, 7.12.77. 
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the real Africa had returned to Bophuthatswana '. 71 
The report therefore portrayed the 'independence' celebration as a delayed return to 
the 'real' Africa, inadvertently reinforcing 'official' government discourse which 
promoted the distinctions between the apartheid definition of a 'white' Republic of 
South Africa and less developed 'black' South Africa. More critical views observed 
that without large scale black consent, homeland independence remained the white 
man's scheme and 'it is a backwards step, taking us away from the reality of our all 
being in SA together'. 79 
Although these pretensions of 'nation-hood' were rejected by the international 
community there was a specific sense in which the Bophuthatswana government was 
now thinking and acting as if a nation-state. Bophuthatswana represented 
'independence' as the reunification of the Tswana tribes and the reclamation of 
sovereignty denied by British colonialism. The Bophuthatswana regime's discourse 
delved into pseudo-ethnic accounts to justify 'independence' as stemming from the 
first major move towards 'reunion' in 1961 with the formation of the TTA. One 
author drew upon the symbolism of the 1968 opening of the TTA by Dr. P.G.J. 
Koomhot, then South African Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Education, and his presentation of a mace to the chairman of the TTA Executive 
Council, Chief John Serobatse. The gift of this bronze mace was interpreted as 
symbolising the destiny of the Batswana within South Africa. The gold ring 
surrounding the mace engraved with the name 'baTswana': 
' ... symbolises the unity of the Tswana nation. Above the ring rise two gold bands 
twined around the shaft, symbolising the two streams of Tswana who originally 
entered Tswana territory. The shaft is surmounted by rings of gold symbolically 
binding the two main Tswana streams together in one unit. From the rings rise 13 
ears of wheat, one of the main crops cultivated by the Tswana people. According to 
78 Star, 10.12.77. 
"RDM 5.12.77, emphasis added. 
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Tswana custom, at the end of the harvest one ear of wheat is always left on the field 
as a token of gratitude for the rich harvest gathered. The figure 13 also represents the 
13 regions which constitute the Tswana Territorial Authority ... '." 
This passage reflects the discourse surrounding the 'invention' of Tswana tradition. 
'Independence' fulfilled the historical destiny of the Tswana Nation, embodied in the 
phrase 'Tshwaraganang La Dzre Pula E Nie'- 'To come together for progress'." 
Under this coat of arms, the Bophuthatswana government set about the task of 
promoting Tswana distinctiveness and 'development'. Increasing resources and 
control over policy greatly enhanced the capacity for state structures to implement 
'nation-building' policies. 
3.4. The Cultural basis of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' 
Following 'independence' in 1977 the regime rapidly began to act as a 'nation-
state' and this section shows how Mangope sought to construct a Batswana ethnic 
identity around this 'nation-building' agenda. As Mangope's forced adherence to 
'Tswanaism' intensified, so did the denial of being 'South African': 
'Mangope therefore organised along tribal lznes and tried to portray that there was 
no better person in the world than a Motswana. He started with this strategy for the 
Tswana speaking people of South Africa by telling them that here is your home and 
your government. But I think as time went on he began to believe his own lies and 
propaganda. He became stubborn to acknowledge that "I am a South African'K ." 
Attempts to create this 'home and government' for the Tswana were centred upon 
emphasising the uniqueness of the Tswana in a range of contexts. Lawrence and 
Manson reiterate the important distinction made by Pieterse between the objective 
8° Campion, H. (1977·9) Bophuthatswana- where the Tswanas meet, Sandton, 
Valient, South Africa. 
81 Campion (1977:11) op. cit. 
82 Ephra•m Phlhardy Motoko, Secretary Mmabatho Branch ANC, interview, 
Mmabatho, March, 1995. 
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markers of an ethnic group (language, dress etc.), as opposed to the subjective 
identification within the group (ethnic consciousness). In this way it is important to 
separate Mangope's emphasis upon a desired Tswana 'community' which he sought to 
cement through ethnicity and ethno-nationalism, from merely shared commonalzties 
which could not be mobilised for a variety of reasons." The efforts to create a 
'national' identity for the Batswana ethnic group in Bophuthatswana rested upon the 
extent to which the regime could redefine the highly ambiguous relationship between 
Bophuthatswana and South Africa. Bophuthatswana's cultural, educational and urban 
design policies attempted to create commonality. However, these policies also had to 
accommodate administrative, economic and political modernisation. The 
contradictions and emerging tensions surrounding 'nation-building' and 
'modernisation' exacerbated the ambiguities of these contested loyalties. 
3.4.1. The Tswana and traditional structures 
An important feature of the regime was the appeal to Batswana identity 
anchored by the promotion of traditional authority. The commitment to traditional 
structures was reflected in the Constitution and in the 1978 Traditional Authorities 
Act. The Act sought to energise tribal authorities as a third tier of government, with 
administrative and judicial functions and tribal cnstom left to them and their sub-
structures. The official Bophuthatswana view of the tribe cast it within an idiom of 
timeless tradition: 
'The tribe is an autonomous community, inhabiting a specific territory and the 
members of the tr1be are bound by a common loyalty to a tr1bal chief whose status 
and authority are sanctioned by tradition'." 
A fundamental dichotomy therefore existed between the traditional role of the 'tribe' 
and its rapid transformation as a bureaucratic structure within the homeland system. 
The bantnstan policy had been shaped around preservation of traditional values within 
83 See Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit. 
84 Pioneer, July, 1982. 
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the rural tribal areas. As argued in the previous chapter, these ideas concerning 
African tradition had been subordinated to a European value system premised upon 
notions of 'civilisation' and 'progress'. Mangope consistently claimed that the 
Bophuthatswana government attitude towards the 'traditional' value system was based 
upon the critique of 'universal' Western values, whilst also seeking to modify and 
adapt Batswana 'tradition': 
'It is counter-productive arrogance for the European or any culture to claim that its 
value is invested with absolute and universal validity ... while we honour and respect 
culture and tradition, not only as a fact but as an asset and precious heritage, we also 
believe our traditions to be subject to dynamic evolutionary change ... '." 
These comments were made following the widespread condemnation of the deaths of 
three men, who, following the requests of 'traditional authorities' to incarcerate them, 
suffocated in the strong room of a school at Bapong in Bophuthatswana. The incident 
captured the ambiguity of 'tradition' in the context of 'nation-building'. Mangope 
insisted that his government 'has never shared some people's obsessive urge to freeze 
date' tradition ... On a later occasion Mangope in fact revered the adaptation of 
'tradition' to 'the wonders of the twentieth century': 
'We have not upset the traditional value system but have tried to enhance it and adapt 
it to the twentieth century. Indeed, the cultural value system of the Batswana people 
permeates our activities but this does not mean that we are unaware of or that we will 
turn away from the wonders of the twentieth century developed by other nations'." 
However, the terms and nature of the 'adaptation' was the central problem. Since 
colonial times the office of chieftainship had been manipulated and effectively 
85 Mangope m Pioneer, February, 1982. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Mangope to Bophuthatswana Institute of International Relations (1987:86) 
Quantum Leap, Craft Press, Mmabatho. 
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commandeered by colonial and then apartheid administrators. Both South African and 
bantustan officials had recognised the potential leverage that chiefs, as paid state 
functionaries, could provide over rural people on behalf of government. The tensions 
surrounding the administrative role of 'traditional' structures and their increasing 
alienation of the communities they were supposed to serve, was intensified by the 
Bantustan system. The policy imposed a prescriptive system of institutional 
arrangements rather than promotion of the 'process' of indigenous politics and 
government. With the gradual withdrawal of 'white' South African officials, the 
responsibility for maintaining these arrangements passed to the Bophuthatswana 
homeland structure itself: 
'As a result, the masterplan for Bophuthatswana was based upon a model of the 
'traditional' Tswana system which emphasized its dynamic administrative features 
and ignored its more complex political dynamics'." 
The effect was to promote the external bureaucratic features as opposed to the 
political accountability and local popularity of tribal councils and authorities." From 
'independence', traditional leaders were thrust into political positions which 
epitomised these contradictory functions of 'traditional' structures. A significant 
characteristic was the granting of authority and power to these structures not from 
their own communities but from a higher authority." During the Bophuthatswana 
'independence' years chiefs were 'expected' to belong to the BDP (later renamed the 
Christian Democratic Party of Bophuthatswana, CDP). This practice took place 
throughout Bophuthatswana and led to the undermining rather than strengthening of 
chieftaincy as an institution. Indeed, local residents, both chiefs and members of tribal 
authorities, held differing views and interpretations of the external control emanating 
from the Bophuthatswana government. Most looked upon Mafeking/Montshiwa (still 
88 Comaroff, J. L. (1974) "Chieftship in a South Afncan Homeland", JSAS, pp36-
51. 
89 Comaroff, ibid. 
90 Stephen Mos1ane, 'dialogue' in Matlhased1, July/Aug., 1995. 
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the seat of Bophuthatswana government) with suspicion and rejection. Those not part 
of these different tiers of government expressed little interest in them. To avoid 
outright confrontation and trouble, according to Comaroff, this rejection was 
diplomatically phrased as 'we cannot see it (the government of Bophuthatswana) ... we 
do not know their faces and until they show us what they are doing, we will not know 
them'." For those participating in these structures, however, their suspicion of the 
objectives of the Bophuthatswana government was restrained by the concern to not 
endanger patronage by arousing the wrath of central government. One local member 
of the Tshidi Tribal Authority, based in the Stadt, expressed these fears: 
'This thing here in Mafeking, it is trouble for us. In the end we have to listen. It's like 
that time when they (South African government) applied for a site for the Dutch 
Reformed Church We refused because we d1d not like that church. In the end the 
government did what they liked- and just because of us being troublesome. In the end 
we suffer if we don't do what they suggest, even though they pretend to ask us first'." 
A wedge was being driven between tribal structures, chiefs (although not all) and 
'their' people: 
'Our chiefs are working against the people they are supposed to serve. They are bemg 
used by the government to deprive us of what is rightfully ours'." 
In the early 1980s these administrative functions were further enhanced through the 
'Wiechers Commission' which promoted 'traditional structures' supposedly in the 
name of local democracy and development." However, the Commission had been 
established by the Bophuthatswana government to provide considerable powers for 
91 Comaroff, tbtd. 
92 Comaroff, ibid. pp45 
93 From Rogers, B. (1980:87) Divide and Rule, IDAF, London. 
94 Know by its proper title as Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Local and 
Regional Government, the activation of Traditional Authorities and political 
structures in the Republic of Bophuthatswana, 1982. 
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traditional structures and tribal councils within rural areas, including increased control 
over tribal levies, customary Jaw, as well as some aspects of Jaw and order (including 
power of arrest)." Perhaps the most important function of the chief concerned land 
allocation. With over 85% of Bophuthatswana's population classified as 'rural' 
dwellers, and with seventy tribal authorities, the promotion of traditional structures 
was an extremely significant feature of governance. However, the Bophuthatswana 
regime portrayed its system of government as 'forged by fusing African tribal 
traditions with principles drawn from the Westminster system of government and 
American Jaw'." The Bophuthatswana Constitution embodied this contradiction. On 
the one hand it provided scope for the revival and integration of tribal structures but 
on the other it presented the spectre of government and administrative intervention in 
the tribal affairs of the Dikgosi (Chief): 
'Dikgosi shall retain their status and the designation of dikgosi, acting dikgosi, 
headmen (of trzbes) vests in the president following confirmation by the executive 
council. Parliament shall not alter the boundarzes of any regional authority area for 
any purpose except after consultation wzth the regional authority concerned'!' 
Whilst 'statns' and 'boundaries' would be supposedly respected, the crucial wording 
concerned 'vests in the President'. Tribal councillors could only be appointed by the 
dikgosi or headman, whilst only the dikgosi themselves could become regional 
authority chairmen or vice-chairmen. This was particularly significant as the regional 
authorities nominated representatives to the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly. 
95 It is also interesting to note that in 1980 the South African Government 
attempted to extend the mandate of 'traditiOnal' law, including the kgotla tribal 
law and corporal punishment, into the urban areas of South Africa. Once agam, 
the justification was based upon the lack of 'modern values' amongst blacks who 
were considered to be not 'so soph1st1cated that we should now summarily 
dispense w1th this Customary Law that has developed over the years', Deputy 
Minister of Co-operation and Development, House of Assembly Debates, Laws 
on Co-operation and Development, 2nd Amendment Bill, South African 
Hansard, 5th June, 1980, col. 8673. The opposition replied that these measure 
would be another example of government 'enforcement' of policy. 
96 NatiOn on the March, (1987:51). 
97 Nat10n on the March, (1987:30). 
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There was also a clear gender dimension. This policy reinforced the subordination of 
women as they were not allowed to be representatives or hold office. This policy was 
replicated throughout 'national' level government structures, with no females in the 
Legislative Assembly. Ultimately the President himself was at the apex of this 
hierarchical structure. Furthermore, the precise definition of the 'traditional' 
dimension remained ambiguous and vague. These features suggest that not only could 
a version of 'tradition' play a Iegitimatory role but, more importantly, it was open to 
the President's arbitrary interpretation. Such ambiguity proved to have important local 
level manifestations. It also had wide implications for defining and inculcating 
'national' values. 
3.4.2. 'Nation-building': 'Independence' and Sites of Culture 
On many occasions when addressing 'his' people, Mangope manipulated 
history to represent the Batswana as fundamentally different from other 'nations'. 
Mangope fused these differences with religious imagery and began to represent 
himself as a Batswana messiah leading his people out of the darkness of colonialism 
and apartheid. The Batswana were represented as if the lost children of Israel, 
similarly scattered, but within a Southern Africa context. Bophuthatswana was 
portrayed as a refuge for the Batswana, their promised land. On one occasion, 
Mangope made a direct comparison between Israeli origins and that of 
Bophuthatswana: 
' ... Israel and Bophuthatswana share a great deal of very significant common ground 
in respect of our more recent histories. In both nations, it was the flame of freedom 
that rose against racism, discrimination and oppression by aliens, and to reach out 
for the promise of dignity and self-fulfilment. In both cases, it was this vision which 
fired our tenacious bid for political and cultural self-determination. Or to put it into 
the more concrete and harsh terms of our past experiences- it was in both cases, the 
bid to free ourselves and our children, for evermore, from the indignities, the 
restrictions and the humiliations of the ghetto. It is that unquenchable spirit, which 
- - -- ----------------------------------------------------
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led to Israel's ultzmate achievement of statehood in 1948, even as zt was the selfsame 
spirit, which led to Bophuthatswana 's statehood in 1977 '." 
Through the use of a Christian discourse and religiosity Mangope tried to win the 
hearts of Christians by saying 'he would take them (the Batswana) to Canaan'.99 
Bophuthatswana, then, was represented as the repository for Batswana aspirations in 
South Africa, a refuge and haven for peaceful co-existence, a way 'out of the ghetto'. 
As suggested, 'independence' was presented as the re-unification of previously 
destitute and scattered Batswana tribes and the return of the sovereignty and unity of 
pre-colonial times. The Tswana ethnic group was assigned origins, bounded in both 
time and space, 100 which sought to legitimise Bophuthatswana as the modem 
repository for ancients Batswana rights denied through colonialism. 
The Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' strategy emphasised the modem 
origins of the 'nation-state' through the rituals of the 'independence' ceremony. The 
founding of the 'nation' was celebrated annually on 6th December and was used as a 
tool to inculcate Bophuthatswana 'national identity' into popular consciousness. 
However, as seen in the previous section, the first ceremony in 1977 had met with 
little popular enthusiasm. These efforts to encourage the bonding of the nation 
extended to forcing people to attend. In one year circulars were sent to a school 
principal from central government instructing the teachers to attend a music 
competition at the 'celebration'. This principal and her entire staff refused because: 
'We could not see why we should take part in a celebration we did not recognzse '. 
98 Mangope, Seminar on the Development Needs of Bophuthatswana, 1980, Dept 
Foreign Affairs, Montshiwa. 
99 Gcinumkhonto, M., Deputy Secretary of the SACP, North West Province South 
Africa, personal communication, 1995. 
100 The Bophuthatswana regime's manipulation of pre-colonial relations, along with 
other Tswana nationalists was based upon a Tswana tradition which ascribed 
mythical origins to the group having arisen from a bed of reeds at Ntswana 
Tdatsi (Where the sun sets) ID Lawrence, M. and Manson, A., ibid. 
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Shortly afterwards she was dismissed."' Over the years the strategies used to enforce 
adherence to 'independence' became increasingly elaborate and coercive. In 1987, 
when a decade of 'independence' for Bophuthatswana was celebrated, principals were 
required to provide the names of teachers not attending the 'independence' 
celebrations. Civil servants and politicians were ordered to pay R5 towards the 
celebrations and register as voters or otherwise they would forfeit their salary. It was 
reported that a large amount of money had been set aside for gold coins and T-shirts 
to commemorate the tenth year of independence.'" Every year chiefs in the rural areas 
were recruited to 'encourage' people to attend the ceremonies at the 'independence' 
stadium. In 1992, for example, Chief Montshiwa broadcast an appeal on local 
Mmabatho Television in which he enthusiastically invited people from the 'Stadt' and 
surrounding villages to attend the ceremony. As an added incentive, Montshiwa used 
the promise made by Bophuthatswana officials, that free beer and meat would be 
provided."' Following his appeal, the camera focused on the fluttering 
Bophuthatswana flag, reflecting the extent to which 'tradition' was used as a political 
tool. With the head of a leopard situated in the upper left hand corner, the 'national' 
flag itself illustrated this conflation of 'tradition' with the 'nation', the leopard 
symbolising the prominent role given to the chieftaincy.'" 
As Bophuthatswana sought to build its nation, inevitably this 'traditionalism' 
permeated state structures and institutions. Efforts were made to harness the Batswana 
cultural landscape in many other ways. Editors of the government-owned Mail 
newspaper were instructed by ministers and the Bophuthatswana National News 
Agency (BOP ANA) deliberately to include cultural issues in their coverage.'" Even 
archaeological sites were harnessed in order to tap into the rich seam of Tswana 
culture. The Mail declared that the discovery in Bophuthatswana of the largest known 
Iron Age SeTswana settlements, three hundred years old, was: 
101 In Rogers, B. (1980:76) op. cit. 
102 New Nat1on, 25 6.87 
103 Translated from Setswana, Mmabatho TV News archives, 1992. 
104 Bophuthatswana Independence Souvenir Program, Mmabatho, 1977. 
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'ideal for communicating the rich tapestry of the Batswana people'."' 
Other cultural sites were harnessed by the Bophuthatswana Government in order to 
give the 'Nation' historical depth and hence legitimacy. These included 'Rock art 
engravings at Thaba Si on'."' Landmarks were appropriated for the 'national' cause 
with Thabantsho, for example, represented as a 'hallowed ground, a place of 
pilgrimage' and a national monument.'" Elsewhere, for the winning author of the 
'Hero ofSetswana Books' competition, for contributions to Tswana culture, a prize of 
Rl 000 was awarded from the University publishers.'" An annual 'Sol Plaatje' lecture 
was held at the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) to commemorate this 
'Batswana Hero' which represented the manipulation ofTswana history and culture to 
solidify the regime. The attempts to link the Batswana past with the present were 
symbolised by Mangope's appearance and speech at the funeral of a prominent 
Tswana historian. Whilst the scope for celebrating Batswana culture should not be 
seen as a particular problem in itself, inevitably, as has been seen, the regime shaped 
and moulded Batswana identity around the specific 'nation-building' agenda of the 
Bophuthatswana state. 
An Institute of African Studies was created at UNIBO, with the purpose of 
researching Batswana history and culture. One project involved the compilation of a 
Setswana language dictionary: 
'Shortly after mdependence the government of Bophuthatswana decided to compile a 
comprehensive Setswana dictionary as the preservation of its language was believed 
to be the most important heritage of the nation It was seen as the only essential 
identity by which the Batswana could be known'."' 
This scheme involved the collection of over 55,000 words many of which 'had lost 
106 The Ma1l, 12th September, 1986. 
107 P1oneer, July, 1982 
108 Ibid. 
109 The M01l, 31.3.86. 
110 Nation on the March (1987:141). 
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importance and meaning to the modern Batswana in the cities'. In order to oversee the 
revitalisation of Setswana, the Bureau for Setswana Language and Culture was 
established under the Department of Education: 
'Its jUnction is to encourage traditional culture and the retention of the purity of the 
Setswana language ', 111 
Extensive trips were made to rural areas and even into neighbouring Botswana to 
collect Setswana words and phrases which illustrated the deliberate remembering of a 
Setswana linguistic past. By protecting the Setswana language from 'foreign 
influence', the project's central importance was reflected seen as a struggle through 
which the 'task to preserve such a rich culture continues'."' These aims were also 
promoted through an educational policy which embraced Tswana identity. 
3.4.3. Tswana education 
In 1978, the Bophuthatswana National Education Commission presented 
considerable scope for the promotion of the concept known as Popagano. This was a 
Tswana principle now applied to the role of education in 'nation-building': 
'Our reading, research symposia and reflections have led us to decide that for the 
people of Bophuthatswana the educational ideology of Popagano is the most effictive 
clarion-call in this all-in effort for educational advancement in the country. Central to 
every aspect of the theory and practice of the educational system in Bophuthatswana 
should be this ideal of mutually, intensified moulding of person by person, of group by 
group, of community by community, and, in this way, by the nation as a whole, 
towards free, foil, creative and effictive living in an ever-changing world'.113 
This document gave substance to the values which Mangope wished to associate with 
111 Pioneer, July, 1982:3. 
112 lbtd. 
113 Republic of Bophuthatswana, National Education Commission, Report: 
Education for Popagano, Babelegi, 1978, foreword. 
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his 'liberal democracy', and, embodied in the Bill of Rights, voiced the rhetoric of 
equality and respect for individual, community and for the nation as a whole. 
However, a crucial component concerned the exact definition of the 'nation': 
'A further goal of our educational system is to nurture a strong sense of oneness of 
the Tswana nation'.'" 
This education system, modelled on the Kagiso system in Botswana, was shaped 
around the specific criterion of ethnicity. This was then promoted as the guiding 
philosophy for a range of influential Bophuthatswana documents: 
'The government has accepted the concept "Education for Popagano" as the ideal 
that has directed the highest activities of families, tribes and groups in the Tswana 
nation'."' 
Education for Popagano was seen as embracing four key objectives for the 
'development of the human potential': 
'- The creatzon of a new self-reliance and confidence for the individual. 
-Progress and development of all the country's resources (human and material) for 
the benefit of all its people. 
-The creation and building of a new nation. 
-The promotion of co-operation and interdependence between all the people of 
Bophuthatswana so that all are involved in its national life and share in its future'."' 
Although considerable prioritisation was given to economic development in this 
'white paper', this was accompanied by the reshaping of 'culture' for the stated aims 
of 'National cohesion, creative renewal and purposeful reconciliation'. Through 
114 Ibid. emphasis added 
'" Wh1te Paper on Development (1981:23). 
116 Ibid. 
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Popagano, Bophuthatswana citizens were to be produced in the Tswana idiom, for the: 
' ... moulding of the person for his physical, mental and moral and spiritual well-being 
from the infancy to the state of puberty and beyond has been uppermost in the family, 
the mophato (clan) and the nation '. 111 
Presented as a response to decades of humiliating treatment of blacks through colonial 
and then apartheid policy, Popagano was cast as a restoration of dignity and 
affrrmation of black people. Nonetheless this educational ideology celebrated Tswana 
differences, the unique and particular, for it was: 
' ... a national philosophy (located in) the proverbs, wise sayings and idioms of the 
Setswana language . the Motswana is an artist, a builder, a creator of images and 
models'. 
To reaffirm the centrality of this conception as the basis for creating model citizens, it 
was declared that Popagano is 'what is basic in the nature of the people of 
Bophuthatswana'. Bophuthatswana institutions were now seeking to possess the very 
nature and soul of the Batswana. This possession involved what the Commission itself 
identified as exploring 'those habits and customs in Tswana culture that are worthy of 
preservation' so as to 'sublimate and modernize them'. This selectivity in defining 
Batswana culture gave the Bophuthatswana government the power to defme what was 
'worthy' and to present these characteristics as if they were steeped in 'Batswana 
tradition'. 
The creation of the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) also illustrated 
the blending of modem bureaucratic and administrative functions with 
'traditionalism'. It provides a further example of the unstable basis of 'nation-
building'. Mangope had promoted the concept of a Tswana University as early as 
117 National Education Commission, op. cit. 
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1970."' With its establishment by the early 1980s, admissions reflected the ethnic 
'logic' ofBophuthatswana; they were dominated by an 80% Batswana student intake. 
Interestingly the composition of staff reflected Mangope's favouring of expatriates 
(and shortage of educated Batswana) with only 30% designated of Tswana origin.'" 
Its management structures, like many other institutions, reflected the state agenda and 
the constraints that this placed upon curriculum and teaching. At times of opposition 
the status quo was maintained within the University by asserting the irrefutability of 
'tradition': 
'Well a good example of this contradiction is seeing a senior management official 
sitting at the tip of the ivory tower and turning down alternative suggestions on the 
grounds that "according to Tswana culture this is the way we do things ... "'.'" 
Traditionalism was deployed as a political device in order to use powers to 
circumvent any potential challenges to structures of authority. This strategy even 
extended to a generational conflict, with parents required to sign a declaration on 
behalf of students through which they would abstain from politics: 
'There is in this the idea of traditional elders being used for political ends. In fact 
some students think that thezr parents have ganged up against them'."' 
In case of a challenge by alternative structures or politics, this ideology could be used 
to propagate a particular view of Tswana culture. UNIBO symbolised 
Bophuthatswana writ large with Mangope himself the ultimate Patriarch, the sole 
definer of Batswana 'tradition' in conflict with the modern management of a 
university. With no 'official' political opposition, Mangope was free to 'invent 
tradition'. Any state employee could be removed under Mangope' s self-defined 
118 Mangope had advocated a fund for a Tswana University in 1970, Mafekmg Mazl, 
1973. 
119 
"Discussion" m Matlhasedz, Vol. 10, No. I Dec, 69:1991. 
120 Teboho Moja in Matlhasedi, Nov/Dec, 68:1991. 
121 Ibid. 
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criteria of the 'proper' traditional etiquette for a chief, civil servant, worker, academic 
and politician. 
UNIBO embodied these contradictions of a modernising/western institution 
borne amidst the specifically ethnic and political criteria of separate development. The 
promotion of self-development and nation-building was also reflected in the high 
profile given to other National organisations and structures. These included the 
Bophuthatswana National Development Council, Bophuthatswana Housing 
Corporation, Bophuthatswana Building Society, Bophuthatswana Taxi Association, 
Agricultural Bank of Bophuthatswana, Bophuthatswana Nursing Council, 
Bophuthatswana Nursing Association, Bophuthatswana Family Planning Association, 
Bophuthatswana National Parks Board, Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund, 
Bophuthatswana Teachers Association, Bophuthatswana Water Supply, 
Bophuthatswana Recording Studio, Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation, 
Bophuthatswana Defence Force, and even a Bophuthatswana Parachute Club, 
amongst others. 
The cultural and political dimensions of 'nation-building' were also strongly 
influenced and juxtaposed with ideas and conceptions of modernisation in 
Bophuthatswana. 
Chapter Four 
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4. Discourses of Modernisation in Bophuthatswana 
'We have had to struggle and to sacrifice to develop infrastructure and all the 
physical attrzbutes of a state and nation that wishes to jump the gap from an African 
rural eighteenth century economy and way of life to join the respected nations of the 
world in the twenty first century- all this in the brief period of23 years from the start 
of our independence to the turn of the century'. Lucas Mangope.' 
4.1. Introduction 
Mangope's Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' project, in addition to its 
political and cultural dimensions, was also founded upon notions of 'development' or 
more precisely, modernisation. The regime presented the idea of development as if it 
were a formula 'to jump the gap' from rural Africa to the 'respected (developed) 
nations'. This view of modernisation led to emphases upon processes of grand 
physical transformation in the pursuit of sovereignty and nation-hood. This vision of 
modernisation produced profound changes in the Bophuthatswana landscape which 
are illustrated in the following themes. 
First, the legacy of economic and institutional features of dependency upon 
South Africa constrained and shaped the Bophuthatswana regime's responses to the 
condition of 'underdevelopment'. Bophuthatswana was represented as an 
'independent' and sovereign nation-state and as a Less Developed Country (LDC) 
pursuing the course of modernisation. Second, these responses were influenced by the 
litany of development discourses and structures aimed at engineering modernisation. 
Above all, a combination of anti-traditionalism, modernising zeal and desire for 
transformation characterised Bophuthatswana' s own 'development' structures and 
distorted the cultural basis of nation-building. 
1 Bophuthatswana (1987:47) A Nation on the March, op. cit. 
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In the great leap to join the 'respected nations of the world', the demands of 
National development were ultimately to become an insurmountable burden upon 
Bophuthatswana. 
4.2. The Bantustans as Less Developed Countries 
At 'independence' in 1977 South African officials compared Bophuthatswana 
to • other' independent African countries.1 It is also important to reflect upon the 
specific nature of the relationship between the bantustans and South Africa. 
Bophuthatswana's economy and state were indelibly marked by the racial and spatial 
logic of apartheid's objective of granting political rights followed later by economic 
entitlements for blacks within the bantustans as opposed to 'white' South Africa. Only 
in 1969 were industries allowed to locate within designated black areas. This 
remained minimal until the mid-1970s when a new developmental impetus attempted 
to direct South African government policy away from the historical control and 
reproduction of the labour functions of the reserves. This changing emphasis reflected 
the new ideological rift between traditional National Party attitudes towards the 
bantustans and the new 'developmentalists' such as the Bureau for Economic 
Development re Bantu Areas (Benbo) which sought to promote internal growth within 
these territories. 
The classic 'underdevelopment' scenario was applied by many observers to 
the bantustans. It was suggested that any semblance of 'developmental' change was 
merely an attempt to renegotiate the essential features of separate development-
maintenance of a supply of cheap labour to 'white' areas and denial of black political 
rights in a unitary South Africa. Influenced by dependency theorists the dominant 
critique represented the South Africa bantustan policy as 'anti-development'.' 
2 See for example the efforts to represent Bophuthatswana as merely reflecting the 
'normal' characteristics of the 'average' African country, particularly in 
comparison to Botswana (pp.4} in BANTU, "Focus: Bophuthatswana in Africa", 
July, 1977. Comparison was also made between the bantustans and the rest of 
Africa, particularly with the other former Protectorates, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
3 MoerdiJk, op. cit. Southall, R. op. cit. 
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Although inflected around the specific characteristics of apartheid policy, the new 
emphasis upon changing economic development within the bantustans was cast within 
the idiom of 'development'. The major developmental models for Bophuthatswana 
were heavily influenced by South African and, more general, ideas of transformation. 
From the early 1970s the South African government and its corporations, 
departments and other administrative structures had rapidly constructed the bantustans 
as Less Developed Countries (LDCs). The new imagery concurs with Tapscott's 
identification of a rapidly emerging (intellectual and institutional) developmentalist 
discourse within South Africa, linked to the crisis of South African society in the mid-
1970s.• As seen in the introductory chapter, these ideas rapidly gained momentum 
within South Africa. However, it is important to note how the concept of 
development, as a powerful historical idea, drew upon earlier associations with 
'trusteeship'. Its rapid deployment in the context of South Africa indicated the 
redefinition of the relationship between the black 'periphery' and white 'core' in 
terms of 'level' of development: 
'If the choice should be given to me between a primitive heathen Bantu and a 
Christian developed Bantu, then I have no choice in the matter if I wish to be true to 
the traditions which the Dutch and Huguenots brought to South Africa'.' 
Boshoff was Inspector of Schools in the Department of Bantu Education and also 
Secretary of Education in the Transkei bantustan. His views illustrate the central 
conflict being projected onto the bantustans between, on the one hand, what Boshoff 
and other apartheid ideologues considered the preservation of 'national traditions and 
aspirations' in the bantustans, and, on the other, the demands of the progressive litany 
of the European (Dutch and Huguenot) traditions. These concepts were centred upon 
the fundamental belief that: 
4 Tapscott, C. (1995) op. cit. 
' Boshoff, J. L. ( 1970) op. cit .. 
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'Development is growth, and there is nothing, literally nothing, which grows 
backwards, which gets smaller as it grows. The economic development of the 
homelands can only mean a growing economy, and it can only be beneficial '.• 
These ideas permeated official discourse and also began to appear in the South 
African establishment print media in the early and mid- 1970s. The bantustans were 
integral to both geographical and developmental definitions of South Africa' 
Empowering and developing the bantustans was now considered the moral 
responsibility of the more developed 'white' Republic which was represented as 
honestly and altruistically seeking to relocate these groups into their constituent 
historical homelands, over the border in • Africa' proper: 
'Historically anchored in this Republic there is a White Nation which, politically and 
socio-economically, is the dominant and most developed population group on the sub 
continent. As a result of a unique combination of historical factors, various separate 
Bantu peoples came under the political sphere of the Whites during the nineteenth 
century. From the outset, the latter felt themselves morally obliged to implement a 
policy of responsible trusteeship towards these Black peoples- a trusteeship based on 
creative self-withdrawal as the Bantu peoples became ripe for self-government to an 
6 Boshoff, J. L. (1970:31) op. cit. 
7 The South African situatton was related to 'a unique population composition'. 
The 'uniqueness' called for the differentiation between a geographical 
definttion of 'South Africa' as including a residual African population due to 
the vagaries of frontier and British colonialism, and the belief that the 
'Repubhc of South Africa'(RSA) itself was more specifically the creation and 
possession of 'whites': 'Those who do use these two names as mterchangeable 
terms, should bear m mmd that, in terms of the present Government's policy of 
separate development, the RSA 1s regarded as the geopolitically demarcated 
fatherland of the Wh1te South Afrtcan Nation and two established mmorities; 
the coloureds and As1ans. As opposed to th1s, SA, m the geographical sense of 
the word, also includes various embryomc national states, VIZ , the 
ethno-h1storical homelands of SA's princ1pal Bantu peoples', Ban tu Investment 
Corporation (1974&1975) Homelands· The Role of the Corporatwns in the 
Republic of South Africa, van Rensburg Publications, Johannesburg. As if by 
accident, Bantu population groups had been annexed within the geographical 
entity of' South Africa'. 
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increasing extent'. • 
A more suitable, less overtly racist discourse could be formed around white 
possession of 'development' in contrast to black 'deficiencies': 
'If we were to place them on a continuum showing economic and political status in 
order of sophistication, the one pole of the continuum would certainly be formed by 
the small Bushmel! minorities of the central desert areas of the subcontinent 
(probably the most primitive group of people in the world). When measured against 
the current criteria for development, the whites of the RSA (socially and economically 
undeniably the most sophisticated nation in Africa), form the other pole. All the other 
peoples can be arranged in order of socio-economic and political status between the 2 
poles of the continuum'.' 
There was an almost astonishing ease through which these terms, race and ethnicity 
were interchanged with classic 'developmental' notions of linear progress. This 
dominant paradigm was therefore centred upon progress and level of development 
with the bantustans portrayed as simply less developed ethnic entities needing to catch 
up with the developed mature white republic: 
'In truth, the South African Bantu, culturally and historically speaking, do not form a 
homogenous society but consist of nine clearly separate nations recognisable as main 
ethnic units. In general, these groups reveal significant differences in historical 
background, ethnic contextual language and social and cultural composition.. 
Politically, economically and educationally the Bantu peoples are the least 
developed of the four main demographic groups in the RSA and they reveal the 
characteristics of typical developing third world communities'." 
8 Bantu Investment Corporation (1974) op. cit. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ban tu Investment Corporation (1975) emphasis added. 
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Any association between the poverty and underdevelopment of these peripheral 
territories and apartheid policy was now recast as a problem intrinsic to the 'Third 
World' blockages to modernisation: 
'In this respect the RSA endorses what every real authority on the development 
problems of the Third World knows: the success of the development schemes in 
economically retarded communities is to a large extent dependent upon the capacity 
of these peoples to learn to help themselves ... (t)here is no room for any complacent or 
false belief in economic short cuts to higher living standards. Nor is there any room 
for any baseless optzmism as to how long it will take to raise the average standard of 
living of the Black peoples to the current level of the Whzte population '.11 
The role of the South African government was now represented as correcting the lack 
of development. The bantustans were nurtured as LDCs with traditional concepts and 
tools of regional economic development such as 'growth poles', 'comparative 
advantage' and encouragement of 'local markets' deployed." The bantustans were 
therefore portrayed as the 'other' and part of black Africa, situated over the white 
frontier of the advanced development of 'European' South Africa and contrasted with 
these underdeveloped 'black' spaces. A number of development agents were created 
in response to this shift in official discourse. The Department of Ban tu Administration 
was renamed with the suffix of Development and also established the Bantu 
Investment Corporation and Development Corporations. 'National self-realization' 
implied the creation of viable economic and political structures in the bantustans, in 
tandem with the 'development' needs of these entities." The bantustans were caught 
11 Bantu Investment Corporation (1975:9). 
12 Pickles and Woods. (1991) "South Africa's Qwa Qwa in the Age of Reform", No. 
15, AAAG, op. cit. 
13 This offtcial discourse overlapped with that of the print natiOnal prmt media in 
whtch the homelands became associated with issues of security, economy, 
development. Whilst the liberal Enghsh-speaking establishment press attacked 
the more blatant forms of race discrimination, nonetheless it was also drawn to 
idea that the bantustans 'needed' development, and that this was good in itself. 
One such headline, with reference to the industrial development of the 
bantustans, announced 'Lighten Our Darkness', Fznanc~al Ma1l, 1974. 
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Four: Modernising the Nation 148 
up in questions of economic viability requiring technical rather than painful political 
solutions." It is impossible to understand the course of 'nation-building' and how 
these ideas ofmodemisation were projected upon Bophuthatswana without examining 
the options open to and the constraints faced by the Mangope administration 
following 'independence'. 
4.2.1. Economic features 
From the late 1960s, Benbo, a South African state agency within the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development, was responsible for 
investigating development options for the homelands. Benbo' s 197 5 report on 
Bophuthatswana created widespread doubts throughout South Africa regarding the 
potential economic viability of this bantustan. These concerns were epitomised by the 
identification of two overwhelming and inter-related features of the Bophuthatswana 
economy. The first concerned the historical dependence upon the South African 
economy reflected in an extremely low proportion of the Gross National Product 
generated from Bophuthatswana's own internal sources. In 1975 Benbo estimated that 
80% of the GNP was created by commuters and migrant labourers from 
Bophuthatswana working in South Africa." This dynamic indicated the failure to 
consolidate Bophuthatswana territory, proximity to the PWV and dependence upon 
white towns. Approximately 60% of Bophuthatswana's economically active 
population were either migrants or daily commuters to workplaces inside South 
Africa. Bophuthatswana depended heavily upon the transfer of taxes and incomes, 
together with the customs duties paid on goods brought from South Africa into 
Bophuthatswana by these 'ethuic' citizens." After 'independence' the contributions of 
migrant and commuter workers to Bophuthatswana's economy was reflected in GDP 
14 Bophuthatswana was portrayed as following an evolutionary path represented as a 
'Long way to go for the homelands', RDM, 17.4.75. 
"Bophuthatswana, BENBO (1975). 
16 Schoeman, D. (1995) Director of the Directorate for Development Planning and 
Administration, North West Province, interview, Mmabatho, 28.3.95. 
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as a proportion of GNP equalling 55.3% in 1980 and 50% in 1985.17 This dependence 
upon outside sources was also reflected in South African government budgetary 
payments to Bophuthatswana. These were referred to in the official discourse as 
'development aid' and remained at approximately 25% of revenue during the 
'independence' era. 
The regime's internally produced revenue or 'own sources' included local 
taxes, licence fees, royalties and interest earned. Bophuthatswana's 'own sources' of 
revenue compared to total revenue was 23% in 1974/5, 65% in 1980/1, 46% in 1987/8 
and 71% in 1992." Furthermore, as suggested above, an important component of the 
revenue included as 'internal' was actually customs payments and taxation revenue 
transferred from South Africa. This category included the receipts from the Southern 
Africa Customs Union to which all the 'independent' TBVC states (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were members. Again throughout 
'independence' these customs payments were approximately another 25% of revenue. 
Therefore from 1977 to 1994 approximately 50% of Bophuthatswana's revenue 
should be considered as controlled and allocated from outside rather than under direct 
Bophuthatswana government control. 
A second prominent feature of Bophuthatswana's dependence upon South 
Africa's economy, obviously related to the limited internal sources of income, was 
reflected also in the territory's historical function as an exporter of labour to the 
mines, farms, industries and homes of the white 'core'. In 1980 Bophuthatswana's 
total economically active population consisted of 41.8% migrant workers and 30.9% 
commuters from Bophuthatswana towns into South Africa. By 1985 this had fallen 
slightly to 37% and 17.4% respectively but still confirmed the overwhelming pattern 
17 Development Bank of South Africa, SATBVC Statistical Abstracts (1987). In 
1985 for example, of a total GNP of R2 938 663 929, migrant earnings were RI 
246 649 515, commuter income R485 218 414 w1th the remaining GDP 
calculated at RI 206 796 000 i.e. less than half GNP, Ind1cator SA, 1988. 
18 All figures from Nattrass, N. and Nattrass, J. (1990) "South Africa, the 
homelands and rural development", Development Southern Afr~ca, Vol. 7, 
October, except 1992 from the Race Relatrons Survey 1993/4, SAIRR, 
Johannesburg. However, as with all calculations concerning Bophuthatswana, a 
degree of caut1on is required as to accuracy. Nonetheless, most analysts conftrm 
the overwhelming pattern of dependency. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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that outside sources contributed to 50-60% of the populations income during the 
'independence' era." At 'independence' in 1977 the level of average income derived 
from inside Bophuthatswana was described as 'extraordinarily low'." Academics and 
other observers focused upon additional features of dependency including the lack of 
infrastructure, small population, deterioration of subsistence agriculture and declining 
ecological basis. All these features detracted from Bophuthatswana' s potential 
viability and the claims of 'independence'. With no colonial economy to inherit, no 
fiscal, currency or tariff controls, Bophuthatswana was characterised as possessing an 
even worse economic position than pre-independence Africa." Many of these 
characteristics were also applicable to other countries and there was a tendency to 
generalise and stereotype the bantustans." 
Despite its dependent characteristics, in comparison to the other TVBC states, 
Bophuthatswana did have the considerable luxury of royalties from extensive mining 
operations, in addition to casino and gambling royalties and proximity to the 
industrialised PWV. The bantustan's territory formed part of the Bushveld Igneous 
Complex and by the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana was the world's third largest 
producer of Platinum Group Metals (9.1% of world output) and second largest 
producer for chrome (18.5% of world output)." Mining contributions therefore 
dominated Bophuthatswana's GDP and comprised between 30-50% of this between 
1977-1991." These earnings did provide Bophuthatswana with so-called 'free money' 
19 Development Bank of South Africa (1987) op. cit. 
20 Butler et al, op. ctt. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Adams makes an interesting economic comparison between the South African 
homelands and the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). However, 
he concluded that both groups differed in their degrees of economic dependency 
upon South Africa: 'It appears that the cumulative economic, political, and 
social disabilities of the homelands will make it impossible for them to match 
the growth rates of the BLS countries in the long run'. Moreover, the distorting 
effects of separate development and its restricted policies would work against 
the homelands, it was suggested. Adams, J. 1978, "Economic Development in 
the Small Economies of Southern Africa: Contrasting Currents in the BLS 
Countries and the Homelands", Journal of Asian and African Stud1es, XIII, 3-4. 
23 GENCOR presentation to BOPIIA, (1987) op. cit. 
24 Approximate calculation from SATVBC statishcs and Daphne, P. and de Clercq, 
F. (1992) "Bophuthatswana: From Independence to Regionalism", in SA Review 
6- From Red Friday to CODESA, (eds.) Moss, G. and Obery, I, Ravan Press, 
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that was 'free in the sense that control from the Republic of South Africa is limited'." 
This 'free money' was arguably one of the key factors which had convinced Mangope 
to pursue his 'independence' strategy. The efforts and strategies to reverse the chronic 
economic dependency upon South Africa were also conditioned by the inherited 
institutional features. 
4.2.2. Institutional features 
An integral component of the emerging developmental discourse were the 
white created administrative structures oriented towards black 'development'. By the 
mid- 1970s South African developmental structures were directed towards this change 
from control to 'development' of the bantustans. No overall plan for this development 
existed and, according to Butler et a!, there were signs of competition and rivalry 
between the fifteen different administrative structures responsible for 'development' 
in the bantustans." The most prominent characteristic and legacy of these structures 
for Bophuthatswana would be their heavily top-down attitude to the bantustans. 
Policy, decision-making and implementation were simply imposed upon homeland 
residents. Crucially, the only potential feed-back to these structures was the homeland 
leadership itself. Even here, the South African Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development was the ultimate decision maker. 
The lack of black participation was connected to an administrative and racial 
attitude shaped by ideas of 'trusteeship' of the Bantu. 27 The ease with which a 
development discourse diffused through South Africa" must be seen also within the 
context of the racial and 'progressive' ideas underpinning trusteeship. Administrative 
structures were exclusively white and in the day to day administration blacks were 
Jo'burg, and Magyar, K.P (1984). The contribution of mmmg fluctuated 
considerably, often depending upon the changmg world price for minerals and 
the value of the Rand. 
25 Nattrass, N. and Nattrass, J. (1990) op. cit. 
26 Butler et al, op. cit. 
27 Chapter two indicated the historical roots of white attitudes towards the 'native', 
termed as 'trusteeship', based upon a paternalistic control, interventiOn mto and 
management of 'native' affairs. 
28 Tapscott, op. cit. 
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simply out of site." The exclusion of blacks from the BIC and other institutions was 
justified by recourse to a modernising discourse. Through these ideas blacks were 
deemed as lacking the essential features needed to attain modernity and development. 
These white administrators, by implication, were entrusted with intervention in order 
to correct this deficit. In its most visible form, this deficit supposedly included black's 
lack of 'economic and entrepreneurial spirit', explored within the context of 
Bophuthatswana's own structures in the following section. These sentiments 
underpinned a range of practices introduced to bring about development. 
A new budgeting method and economic model were promoted to correct the 
lack of 'development' amongst homeland populations. From 1969 Benbo led the 
efforts to shift bantustan administrative policy from its bureaucratic and service-led 
orientation. A new budgeting method, the Planning Programming Budgeting (PPB) 
approach symbolised this changing emphasis. The PPB method was firstly, to identify 
developmental 'priorities' and 'objectives', and secondly to monitor the 'progress' of 
these. On this basis the PPB determined a per-centage allocation of the budget to each 
sector. The allocation replaced the previous line-item budgeting and became tied to 
specific planning and physical objectives." The PPB method reflected the growth of a 
technical discourse aimed at avoidance of 'wasteful' political questions by stressing 
the rationality of the technical argument. The emphasis upon physical delivery and 
growth reflected the central strategy of these developmental administrations to 
'encourage' blacks to relocate from white areas to the bantustans for economic 
reasons. The principal objective was regarded as employment creation in the 
bantustans. The 'multiplier effect' model was promoted as the solution to the 
bantustan's failure to internalise economic growth. It was aimed at stemming flows of 
labour into South Africa and lessening the import of goods by returning workers. 
These transfers were termed income 'leakages' from Bophuthatswana to South Africa. 
Employment creation and improved commercial facilities within the bantustans 
became dominant policy positions directed towards preventing the leakage. 
29 Butler et al, op. cit. The racist attitudes of the Bantu Investment Corporation 
towards Batswana business men was mentioned in chapter three. 
30 Ibid. 
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Both practices appeared full of contradictions and problems for the 
Bophutbatswana successors to these administrations. For example, the PPB method 
reflected the desires of the white administration rather than appropriate black needs. 
Furthermore, the PPB required a high level of expertise in management but as Butler 
suggested no training was underway for blacks prior to 'independence' in the mid-
I 970s." More generally there was the perception by certain academics that these 
strategies were simply shaped around the requirements of separate development rather 
than the promotion of the political and economic autonomy of the homelands: 
'The great tragedy is that time and resources are being devoted to programs to force 
black development into approved channels rather than allocated in response to 
communzty wishes and needs and to existing strengths'." 
These features passed over into the Bophutbatswana administration. A central 
ambivalence characterising this emerging 'development' strategy was whether 
Bophuthatswana was regarded as an economically integrated part of South Africa or 
autonomous. In response to its economic dependency, Bophuthatswana adopted a 
'national' attitude to 'development' to distance itself from any suggestion of 
dependency upon South Africa. In pursuit of 'national development', Bophutbatswana 
continued to be dependent upon inherited structures, whilst, at the same time 
internalising ideas of modernisation and transformation. 
31 According to BANTU, (July, 1977, op. cit.) the South African Government 
claimed that by 1977 'a few hundred Tswana state officials' were being trained 
by South Africa. Two points should be made about this. Firstly, the inadequate 
time-span; ' ... they rece<ved mtens1ve trammg m the management of the 
departments, including an eight hour sess1on on dec<swn-makmg', (emphasis 
added). It was therefore doubtful that the training involved the highly technical 
aspects of the PPB. Secondly, it is also interesting to note more generally the 
dominance of the 'South African' style of administration upon Bophuthatswana 
institutions. 
32 Butler et a! (1977:214). 
Chapter Four: Modernising the Nation 154 
4.2.3. Bophuthatswana Structures and Responses 
In 1973, in accordance with the new developmental objectives, Benbo 
introduced a Planning Committee into Bophuthatswana. The intention was that the 
Committee: 
' ... identifies and analyses problems hampering economic development in the 
territory, evaluates alternatives to solve problems and promote development'." 
Planning was regarded as the key to rapid transformation of Bophuthatswana, 
supposedly minimising 'painful' change and 'the minimal loss of those traditions and 
values which are highly prized by society'. The PPB method was also introduced into 
Bophuthatswana in the early 1970s. Prior to 'independence' as if to epitomise the 
influence of the South African model, the Bophuthatswana government requested the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development to produce a National 
Development Plan for Bophuthatswana." Benbo in particular had an important role in 
defining overall development strategy. Rather contradictorily the 'development 
philosophy' claimed to balance the impetus for 'development' with the cultural 
identity ethos of apartheid policy: 
'The development philosophy is one of modernisation without loss of cultural identity 
wherever possible and takes place within the framework of a Christian Tswana 
Society and free enterprise system'." 
This modernising impulse was, however, increasingly to come into direct conflict 
with both 'tradition' and cultural 'uniqueness'. 
33 Bophuthatswana at Independence, op. cit. van Rensburg, publications,. 
34 lb1d. 
" Ibid. 
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4.2.4. The Creation of the Bophuthatswana Development Council (BD C) 
The conception of transformation had deep seated emotional and material 
appeal for various factions within the Bophuthatswana state edifice. The reading of 
the Parliamentary Bill for the Bophuthatswana Development Council reflected the 
magical allure of the quest for 'development'. In 1979 in order to maximise and 
unleash the progressive dynamism of 'development', faith was vested in the creation 
of the Bophuthatswana Development Council (BDC). In conjunction with South 
African advisors in the Department of Economic Affairs, an overall co-ordinating 
structure for development planning was required. The BDC would be the organising 
body through which all government Departments and parastatals would liaise in order 
to have projects approved and budgetary parameters set. The BDC was seen as 
providing a one stop professional service co-ordinating planning, implementation of 
projects, statistics and a professional secretariat to relate these dimensions. This 
Council would also act in an advisory role to Bophuthatswana's President and 
Executive Council (Cabinet). 
During the reading of the Bill, Mangope quoted the views of Albert Watson of 
the World Bank. It was claimed that if planning was to be a high priority, then 
responsibility for this should rest ultimately with a central planning authority in 
association with the Chief Executive or Council of Ministers. Mangope voiced 
Watson's opinion that ' ... approval of plans and the setting of planning objectives and 
targets .. .' should not be delegated. It was argued that the BDC would embody the 
controlling functions needed for rapid change: 
'This Bill, the Development Council Bill, makes provision for the establishment of a 
Council with the objective to advise on the development of Bophuthatswana for the 
improvement of the material and social welfare of its population '.36 
36 Bophuthatswana Government, First National Assembly, 2nd Session, 13 
February-30 March, 1979:1067, emphasis added, Vol. 2, Bophuthatswana 
Development Bill, Second Reading. 
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The ability to improve 'material and social welfare' was directly related to the BDC 
and its adoption of a universal language of development. Furthermore, this discourse 
was interpreted as assisting in the efforts to receive recognition from the international 
community: 
'Another point is that Bophuthatswana was not taken cognizance of by the people 
because she was regarded as illegitimate but I feel if our objectives could be achieved 
through this council, Mr. Speaker, the world outside will start developing interests in 
Bophuthatswana '." 
The creation of the BDC was perceived as the embodiment of the ability to 'do 
development' and enhancing both international reputation and self-improvement of 
the Batswana: 
'We are happy that the time will not be wasted m showing the world outside that 
Bophuthatswana is able to maintain her own people, because it zs our belief that 
whatever land we have at our disposal we shall use effictively in order to maintain us 
and for the upkeep of ourselves and our children. Time has come, Mr. Speaker, that 
every Motswana should stand up and work hard so that the question of starvation and 
the lack of work opportunities should be solved'." 
The BDC was associated with increasing 'freedom' from South Africa and control 
over policy to eradicate poverty and realise the full potential of the land. The 
emerging discourse was therefore also a device to circumvent the political and 
economic dependency of Bophuthatswana upon South Africa. Member M.A. 
Tlhoaele's comments epitomised the belief in 'development' as if an irrepressible 
force of progress, as symbolised by the BDC: 
37 Ibtd. p1070. 
38 Ibid. 
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'Now that we are free in our thinking that we are free in our administration, let us 
now accept this Bill as it is. If we can have the Bophuthatswana Development Council 
as well as the Bophuthatswana Development Fund, I have no doubt to say that 
Bophuthatswana within ten years will be an economic giant ... Poverty will die in 
Bophuthatswana'." 
Once again 'independence' was associated with the control over 'development' and 
whilst also arresting the inertia that had characterised the pre-independence apartheid 
era. A parallel was drawn between the modernising impetus and Tswana communal 
development known as Lepasa. The developmental fruits of government support to 
the poor, orphans, women: with land, water, extension officers and grain, was 
considered as a form of capitalistic 'communalism', likened to '(l)he material and 
social promotion of the Motswana' through Lepasa: 
'Add to all that a Government tractor and other agricultural implements and grain to 
this picture ... and you have an insight into the old institution in Tswana 'Lepasa '.40 
A Directorate of Planning Co-ordination which had been established within the 
Department of Economic Affairs formed the nucleus for the establishment of the 
BDC. The BDC was therefore formed in 1979 and was the primary body responsible 
for defining departmental budgets, development planning and approval for projects in 
Bophuthatswana. The BDC consisted of 8-12 executives drawn from the major 
governmental departments, the Department of Planning Co-ordination and 
importantly, private sector involvement with members of the Rembrandt group (South 
African industrialists) amongst other 'experts'. The important role envisioned for the 
BDC was revealed in a memo from the chairman of the BDC 'to all departmental 
heads, chief executive officers and advisors to the Bophuthatswana Government'. It 
was stated that a development strategy was being devised for Bophuthatswana: 
39 pI 070& I 071. 
40 Ibid. pl071&1072 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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'When accepted this development strategy will become the development policy of the 
Bophuthatswana Government and will form the basis for a national action 
programme for the development of Bophuthatswana ... the document w1ll also be used 
in evaluating programmes and projects .. when budgeting proposals from all the 
different Departments and Public Corporations are d1scussed by the Bophuthatswana 
Development Council'." 
As the main defmer of development policy, the role of the BDC illustrated the 
predominance of seconded or 'outside' influences in Bophuthatswana. The chairman 
of the BDC himself, Mr. D. W. Schoeman, had been trained in the Pretoria based 
Benbo before being seconded as economic advisor to Bophuthatswana at Mangope's 
request." By the late 1970s in the absence of internal or local capacity to create 
development policy it is not surprising that seconded officials had a central role in 
creating Bophuthatswana developmental frameworks. 
In terms of organisational capacity the BDC was supposedly the principal 
planning institution for development: 
' ... (the) main jUnctions of this Council will be to 1) recommend development 
strategies, priorities, plans and programmes for approval by the Executive Council 
and 2) prepare budgets for appropriation of the fonds of the Bophuthatswana 
Development Fund (all fonds for development purposes appropriated by Parliament 
41 Memo from D. W. Schoeman, Chairman of the BDC, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Montshiwa, 8.16. 79. 
42 After University Schoeman joined BENBO and, according to him, BENBO, began 
to question the impact of apartheid pohcy on the viability of the homelands and 
therefore introduced Planning Councils into various homelands. Schoemn was 
seconded to Bophuthatswana in 1977 and finally joined the administration in 
1979. Most of Schoeman's career therefore spanned the existence of 
Bophuthatswana itself. Schoeman had been Chauman of the Bophuthatswana 
Development CorporatiOn ( 1979-1981) then project consultant for the 
Development Bank of South Africa (1983-89) before reJOining the 
Bophuthatswana Administration in 1991. Schoeman, D. (1995) Director of the 
Directorate of Development Planning and Administration, 
Bophuthatswana/North West Province, interview, Mmabatho, 28.3.95. 
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or obtained from any other source (e.g loans or gifts) should be paid into this 
source)." 
In addition to their regular functions, Government Departments would also carry out 
budget and work programmes developed by BDC and approved by the Executive 
Council. The BDC Annual Report of 1979 had formed the basis for the 1981 White 
Paper on Development. Both emphasised the need for a tightly balanced budget and 
reflected the predominance of economistic concerns centred upon achieving economic 
growth through prioritising development objectives. The BDC was the embodiment of 
the modernising zeal which underpinned the 'development discourse'. 
4.3. Modernising Zeal 
Development structures and the various branches of the Bophuthatswana government 
were supposedly connected by the White Paper on Development. The actual relation 
between the components of development policy was suggested more by what the 
White Paper omitted than by what it contained. This document symbolised the extent 
of 'externally' defmed ideas. In conjunction with other sources it revealed a striking 
contradiction between ideas of modernisation and Batswana 'tradition'. Given the 
intention of the BDC to be the key defmer and planner of 'development' it is 
necessary to scrutinise its vision of development by focusing on the Reports and 
White Paper on Development that it produced. The basic premise of policy was 
development as economic and physical growth: 
'The term development reftrs to all physical, social and financial actions required for 
economic growth and over-all economic development progress while policy is defined 
in the broader context to include policy measures, principles and objectives '.44 
43 Bophuthatswana Development Council (1979a) Draft Document on Development 
Strategy for Bophuthatswana. 
44 BDC (1979a:2). 
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To promote development the growth of basic production sectors and infrastructure 
was a key consideration ' ... to see how and when they should be developed to best suit 
needs of the econoruic sectors and the national goal(s)'. Those national goals or 
objectives were stated as: 
' ... to raise the standard of living of the total population; and to make the country 
economically and thus also politically viable'." 
There was a strong emphasis upon encouraging the role of the private sector and the 
creation of conditions conducive to foreign investment and large scale industry. 
Reinforcing the 'multiplier' theory was the reiteration of the importance of 
commercial facilities so as to enable the Batswana to buy goods within 
Bophuthatswana rather than South Africa. This large scale and commercial focus, 
given the low wages and small number of jobs being created, would not necessarily 
entail appropriate econoruic development policy (see chapter six). Large industries 
ruight be capital rather than labour intensive and externally owned, perhaps leading to 
the extraction of profits and very low industrial wages. With govermnent 
subsidisation of the commercial sector perhaps scarce funds would be diverted from 
job creation." The two most startling features of the White Paper were as follows. 
Firstly, despite the Tswana nationalist and cultural basis of the regime, the 'uuiversal' 
language of modernisation, efficiency, centralisation and optimal utilisation was 
strongly emphasised. Secondly, the ambivalence of policy concerning econoruic 
integration with South Africa or autonomous and 'national' development was not 
clarified. 
Regarding the discourse of modernisation, the White Paper, despite the fact 
that it was a Bophuthatswana govermnent publication, reflected deep-seated negative 
views of African capacity for 'development'. This bias was most noticeable in the 
overall perception of econoruic growth as development which stressed that the 
45 Ibid. pp3, emphasis added. 
46 In Magyar, K P. (1982a) Comments on the White Paper, unpubhshed document 
on behalf of the Bophuthatswana Government. 
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disruption of tribal traditions should be avoided. 'Popagano'" was therefore promoted 
as the philosophy to build a 'national identity', thereby 'building up, progress and 
development'. Even here with a strong emphasis upon nurturing culture and identity, a 
conflict with modernity was evident in that education should be a 'useful contributor 
to the economic development process' and preparation for the young 'faced with the 
problem of being pulled into the vortex of an urban culture'." An earlier draft of the 
White Paper, subsequently modified, strongly reflected the negative attitude towards 
tradition. Development would supposedly act as a catalyst: 
'. to motzvate the individuals and groups in the community to free themselves from 
the shackles of ignorance, idleness, superstition and stultifying cultural practices; and 
in this way to be forward looking, creative productive, relying on self and determined 
to play its special role in the development of the nation'." 
'Shackles of ignorance, idleness, superstition and stultifying cultural practices' 
reflected the historical view of trusteeship now shaped around 'development'. As 
suggested earlier, in conjunction with other sources, this modernising and racist 
discourse regarded the African generally as unfit for development purposes: 
'The country's economy is however characterised by the same problems facing other 
developmg countries: low productivity and under-employment. These problems are 
due to an inhibiting land tenure system; human attitudes which are not 
development-minded; a lack of motivation. ••• ,. 
Other prevalent themes common to the official development discourse centred upon 
attitudes to settlement patterns, entrepreneurs and agriculture. Agricultural 
47 Popagano was a Tswana oriented educational philosophy mentioned m the 
previous chapter. 
48 Bophuthatswana (1981·24&25) op. cit. 
49 BDC (1979a:ll) op. cit. 
'
0 BENBO (1977) op cit. Emphasis added. 
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performance in Bophuthatswana was regarded as 'beset by problems ... which have 
their origin in age-old practices and traditions'." Fortunately, it was claimed, earlier 
contact with the Voortrekkers had exposed the Tswana to 'more progressive farming 
methods and techniques'. Indeed, the degree of westernisation amongst the Tswana 
was deemed praiseworthy: 
'They were the first Black people to have substantial and sustained contact with the 
urban industrial civilisation of White South Africa'." 
Traditional settlements were considered an obstacle to 'progress' because they made 
the 'superimposing of modem infrastructure' on such large areas 'impossible'. The 
Institute for Regional Planning at the Afrikaner dominated Potchefstroom University 
for Christian Higher Education had suggestions for a National Plan for 
Bophuthatswana. Again the focus was upon assisting the transition to modernity with 
the labour dependency upon South Africa simply reflecting 'the willingness of the 
people of Bophuthatswana to adopt the way of life of a modem western economy'." 
Development was a means towards urbanising and industrialising the population of 
Bophuthatswana because traditional settlements had little to 'offer people who live in 
a modem economy'. Industry was suggested as the cornerstone of government policy. 
Again the multiplier effect was cited as the principal means to stem the outflow of 
buying power and to encourage people to 'buy Bophuthatswana'. The modernising 
impulse came crashing into traditional settlements, particularly those based upon 
agricultural subsistence: 
'It is a matter of conjecture whether the present dwelling patterns of the rural Tswana 
community can be reconciled with optimal farming practices. The traditional villages 
spreading as they do over large areas of rural/and, certainly do not promote optimal 
51 Ibid. 
'
2 Ibid. 
" Potgieter, F.J, (1977) Developing Bophuthatswana- Suggestions for a National 
Plan, op. cit. 
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land use. On the contrary they invarzably present examples of overgrazing'." 
These sentiments would have major importance for Bophuthatswana agricultural 
policy shaped as it was, around 'National' goals of self-sufficiency and increased 
production." All of these major reports emphasised optimal utilisation of land and 
centralisation of settlements through the creation of 'central magnets' with central 
functions."' This centralisation was presumably the inevitable consequence of 
progress: 
'Centralizatzon (of population) in various spheres, has shown to be essential as an 
innovative force in the early stages of development, to be followed in the later stages 
by a policy of carefully controlled decentralization'." 
The lack of infrastructure in Bophuthatswana hitherto was considered to be the result 
of 'the prevalence of traditional attitudes and practices and lack of entrepreneurial 
talent'." There was a common emphasis upon the need for entrepreneurs whose 
'almost complete absence ... creates one of the major difficulties for internal economic 
growth and development...'." This strategy was reflected in both Benbo reports and 
the Bophuthatswana White Paper. It was thought that a 'new technological class of 
workers and managers' would attract better paying industries and improve internal 
financing'."' 
As if not made obvious enough, urban bias was more emphatically stated with 
the allocation of resources dependent upon 'cities which promise to be the most viable 
in order to use their productive capacities in later stages of urbanization of other 
,. BDC, ( 1979a) op. ctt. pp 16. 
"See Drummond, J. (1990) "Land Use tn a Rural African Village- Dinokana", Geo-
Journal, 22.3, 335-343. 
'
6 Ibid. 
"BDC (1979a) op. cit. 
"Bophuthatswana (1977b) op. cit. 
'
9 Potgieter, op. cit. 
60 Magyar, K.P. (1982b) Socio-Economic Dimension in Planning for Mining and 
Industrial Development in Bophuthatswana, unpublished paper presented to the 
Pretoria Show, South Africa. 
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cities'." The moderniser's mission was finally captured by Potgieter who perceived 
development not only as growth and enlargement but also as a 'series of successive 
transformations occurring in the system itself: 
'In this way a predominantly rural community can develop into an industrial 
community with all the attributes of a modern economy. This is the primary object of 
the proposals which follow'." 
In the efforts to acquire the attributes of 'a modem economy' Bophuthatswana's 
relationship to South Africa still required clarification. 
4.3.1. Integration or Isolation 
The White Paper on Development represented a standard 'development 
administration model' similar to many of African plans and for some, a 'healthy' 
statement of modernising 'mixed economy ideology'." A former economic advisor to 
Mangope, Karl Magyar, suggested that the Paper was 'too ambitious' and ascribed to 
government 'unrealistic responsibility that will not be realized'. There appeared to be 
a lack of prioritisation of objectives and no temporal schedule for a long term 
development programmes. Given the enormity of South African economic and 
institutional influence, the most remarkable and crucial omission was the failure to 
recognise the high level of dependency which supposedly warranted a 'unique 
approach'." The Paper shifted emphasis from border industrialisation to economic 
development within the 'national states': 
'National Development of the countries of Southern Africa is regarded as the hzghest 
61 BDC (1979) op. cit. 
62 Potgteter, op. cit. p76. 
63 Bophuthatswana Development Council (1981) White Paper for Development, 
Bophuthatswana Government. Magyar, K.P. (1982a) op. c1t. and Magyar, K.P. 
(1984) "Planning for Economic Development in Bophuthatswana", Indicator 
SA,Vol. 2 No. I, 1984. 
64 Ibid. (1982). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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priority at all times. All forms of economic and social co-operation should be 
subordinate to this objective'." 
Karl Magyar suggested that this stress upon 'national' development and internal 
autonomy was denying recognition of and hence planning for Bophuthatswana as an 
economically integral part of South Africa. The fundamental dynamics of the 
relationship between the two economies depended upon an exchange of labour in the 
homeland for the capital, management and skills from South Africa: 
'As neither side will progress without such an exchange, most forther dzscussions 
about viability and classical conceptions of independence become inconsequential 
academic exercises'." 
The high level of migrant and commuter workers was a powerful indication of 
Bophuthatswana's economic integration with South Africa. Magyar suggested that 
this major feature could become an important issue for clarifying and promoting 
economic integration. The 'independent' status and political drive for sovereignty in 
Bophuthatswana was denying the 'logic' of economic ties: 
'The homelands are de facto a part of the South African political community and any 
increased economic integrative ties can not possibly proceed without the retention 
and intensification of political relations'." 
The political and economic contradictions of Bophuthatswana development would be 
exacerbated in the pursuit of separate, autonomous nation-hood. Bophuthatswana's 
infrastructure, development aid, capital and investments, key expatriate personnel, 
mines, tourism and extended geographical borders, were mainly if not entirely 
" Bophuthatswana, Development White Paper (1981 :3 8). 
66 Magyar, K.P (1983:156) "South Africa's Homelands· The Question of Viability", 
J Umv. Durban-Westvzlle, Vol. 4, No. 2. 
67 Magyar, K.P (1983:161) op. cit. 
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dependent upon South Africa." In the White Paper however, there was emphasis upon 
the desire for efficient utilisation of Bophuthatswana's own sources of income in 
order to lessen dependence upon aid from RSA and to 'ensure the internal political 
autonomy of Bophuthatswana'. It is therefore ironic that during the period of his 
involvement with Bophuthatswana, Magyar had the opinion that in the 'early stages' 
of a country's growth that government, as collectors of revenue, rather than the BDC, 
should ultimately be responsible for the allocation of funds for realising development 
plans. The BDC, White Paper and Directorate of Planning Co-ordination suffered 
from a lack of governmental input and these stmctures followed the pursuit of 'an 
inappropriate external model'." Governmental planning and administrative control 
had been stressed in the Paper but ultimately the President's office took all the crncial 
decisions concerning major expenditures. 
There was a gap of two years between Magyar's earlier view regarding 
governmental decision-making and an emerging pattern of Executive Council, 
particularly Mangope oriented, decision-making. Perhaps initially Magyar had too 
much faith in the Bophuthatswana regime as democratically elected representatives of 
the bantnstan, which he regarded as legitimised through General Elections.70 
Moreover, Magyar attributed 'the lack of political sophistication- so evident in 
Bophuthatswana' to a 'pervasive form of "democratic paternalism'" rather than a 
'dictatorial state of affairs'. The dominance of the President was also attributed to the 
lack of indigenous specialists within the government. It was claimed that young 
professional and educated Batswana left for South Africa and that by the late 1970s 
and early 1980s Mangope's principal support base included mainly traditionally 
oriented ministers." A development discourse had been embraced by an emerging 
indigenous elite in the Transkei" and it is particularly important to indicate the lack of 
such a developmental group in Bophuthatswana. 
68 Magyar, K.P (1984) op. cit. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 71 Personal communication with Karl Magyar, 1997. 
72 Tapscott, C. (1995) op. c1t. 
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The development discourse, such as it was in Bophuthatswana, was based 
upon the unlikely combination of Mangope's top black advisors who were not 
educated in development theory and a range of white South Africans (and 
Rhodesians), mainly free market industrialists seconded from South African 
industry." It could therefore be argued that because of the failure of the emergence of 
such an indigenous group within the upper echelous of the Bophuthatswana 
administration, the 'South African' model of development, as portrayed in the various 
reports, remained the major influence upon Bophuthatswana development. Mangope's 
own ambitions and drive for 'independence' and sovereignty were then superimposed 
upon this framework." The burden of 'nation-building' in Bophuthatswana was 
creating internal rifts within the various factious of its administration due to the 
vacillating and highly ambiguous stance on 'regional inter-dependence'." Mangope 
sharply shifted towards an embrace of 'autonomy' by the mid-1970s. However, a 
succession of white Bophuthatswana finance ministers, South African and English, 
attempted to keep the Bophuthatswana economy tied to South Africa in the interests 
of stability and therefore legitimacy. 
By 1979 the following parastatals existed in Bophuthatswana: 
1) The Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC), executive arm 
73 Personal communication with Magyar, 1997. 
74 Magyar suggested to the President that Bophuthatswana could never succeed as a 
fully independent country and worked towards building integration. However, 
Mangope was supposedly 'unrealistic' and became increasingly convinced of 
Bophuthatswana's viability, personal communication with Magyar, 1997. 
" Mangope's own attitude to Bophuthatswana's 'mtegration or isolation' approach 
had been highly ambiguous over the years. In the early and mid-1970s he had 
stated that 'inter-dependence' with South Africa and the homelands was the most 
appropriate policy. In a conference presentation m the mid-1970s Mangope 
suggested: 'F1rstly, we are one, we must rema1n one, because we are 
economically m/er-dependent. ThiS means that the stability and progress of our 
economy depends d.rectly on the rate at whzch full expression zs given, in sp.rzt, 
zn action, and m legzslatzon, to the fact of our economic inter-dependence. 
Secondly, we are one, and must remain one, because we depend on each other to 
an extent at present only vaguely dawnmg on the South Afrzcan public, 
especially in zts White range, in all matters concerning our polztical stabzlity 
and terrztorial integrity' (emphasis already added). Mangope at African Giant-
Conference 1, Symposium: The Emergent Homelands, The Economic Potential 
of the Homelands, Chief Lucas Mangope, undated, pp. 5. 
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of Economic Affairs. 
2) The Bophuthatswana Agricultural Development Corporation- (AGRICOR), 
executive of the Agricultural Department and agent of the Agricultural Development 
Board, and Agricultural Marketing Board in the Department of Agriculture. 
3)The Tswana Agricultural Company (TAC)- Formed between AGRICOR in 
Bophuthatswana, with 50% of shares and the Corporation for Economic Development 
in Southern Africa (CED) in the RSA, also with 50% of shares. Various projects had 
been taken over since independence by Bophuthatswana with AGRICOR also acting 
as Management Agent for some community projects. 
The major point concerning both the BNDC" and AGRICOR again involved 
the failure to integrate them into an overall development framework. These parastatals 
were therefore subject to directives from the President's Office and constrained by 
their limited budgets determined by government." There was also a Bophuthatswana 
Economic Development Committee within the Department of Economic Affairs. The 
extent of Executive and Presidential control upon 'development' strategy was 
reflected by Mangope's additional portfolio as Minister of Economic Affairs. 
Mangope's own conceptions of development, directed towards the appearance of a 
'nation-state', were beginning to have a distinctive imprint upon the Bophuthatswana 
landscape. 
76 Development corporations were established in each of the homelands to 
encourage mdustnal decentralisation of industry through government offers of 
incentives to businesses deciding to relocate or establish themselves near the 
bantustans. The creation of the Bophuthatswana National Development 
Corporation (BNDC) had been announced by the Minister of Bantu 
Adminutration and Development, Mr. M.C Botha, through which it would: 
' ... herald a new phase of economiC development in the homelands in which 
further expansion is given to underlymg princ1ple of greater mvolvement and 
self-determination of homeland governments', RDM, 20.11.75. Despite media 
allegations of malpracttce, fraud and theft, tt was clear that the allure of 
development was spreadmg and gammg momentum. The image of empowerment 
and 'Tswana take control' was reflected in the optimism of the launch of the 
BNDC with M.C Botha announcing simply that 'tt was a universal principle that 
every nation should be directly concerned with its own development', RDM, 
1.12.75. 
77 Magyar (1984) op. cit. 
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4.4. The Demise ofthe Bophuthatswana Development Council 
Initially the rubber stamping of projects and budgets by the BDC, prior to 
acceptance by the Executive Council (Bophuthatswana Cabinet), appeared to adhere 
to the BDC' s objectives and priorities. At the start of the 1980s the Bophuthatswana 
government relied on the BDC and foiiowed its recommendations." However, the 
control of the development process increasingly came into confrontation with the 
'Nation-Building' designs of President Mangope and the Bophuthatswana regime. 
Mangope's impression of 'development' envisioned transformation as linear progress 
mirroring western countries. Although it should be pointed out that scope was given 
in particular to education and other areas, the distribution of government expenditure 
indicated that these features were secondary to the physical transformation of 
Bophuthatswana itself. For Mangope, 'true' nation-hood was signified by particular 
physical attributes: 
'Independence and the liberation it implies are one thing on paper, but in reality is 
far more complex. A true state comprises inter alia a territory and a defined people 
but that territory has to be developed physically in order to give forth products and 
commodtties to satisfy the needs of people and it also has to feed the aspirations of the 
people '.19 
This statement, together with the remark by Mangope concerning 'jumping the gap' at 
the very beginning of the chapter, were made in a speech celebrating ten years of 
achievement since 'independence'. Mangope contrasted international non-recognition 
of Bophuthatswana with imagery of internal transition and change, supposedly 
delivered as the country was propeiled forward to the promised land of 
'development': 
78 Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
79 Mangope, in Nation on the March (1987). 
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'In a climate of so called "non-recognition" we have, with the blessing of God, had a 
good start on the road of achievement that will take us to our ultimate goal. Where 
there was nothmg we have built schools, hospitals, health clinics, community centres, 
sports stadia, an university, manpower centres, introduced our own television and 
radio stations, agricultural projects including irrigation schemes, dams, roads, 
thousands of homes and other buildings '.80 
In effect, Bophuthatswana had achieved a degree of 'development' 'on the road to 
achievement' reflected by physical attributes which met western criteria of 
development. By physical transformation Bophuthatswana was portrayed as good 
enough for recognition. The physical transition placed great emphasis upon the 
construction industry and Department of Works. The construction industry was 
making an increasingly important contribution to the GDP, 5.9% in 1980, reaching 
6.7% in 1985." Its potential contribution was highlighted by the Chairman of the 
BNDC who indicated the wide scope for construction in a 'developing country' and in 
particular, for local Batswana builders: 
'One of the features of a developing country, and especially that of Bophuthatswana 
is the high rate of construction. The acute shortage of housing, commercial facilities, 
industrial buildings and office accommodation in Bophuthatswana necessitates a high 
rate of construction. This is also the area where Batswana could really make their 
mark Presently about 9% of the economic(-ally) active population is employed in 
construction. Artisans needed in construction include bricklayers, plumbers, 
carpenters, electricians'." 
80 Mangope, in Nat1on on the March (1987:42). 
81 Bophuthatswana GDP: Factor Cost at Current Prices, by Economic sector, 
Statistics Branch, Department of Economic, Energy Affairs, Mines and 
Planning. 
82 Bophuthatswana Development Needs Seminar (1980:15) Department for 
Information, Montshiwa. 
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The growing importance of infrastructural development was reflected in the 
Department of Works' dominance of total yearly Bophuthatswana government 
expenditure. In 1979 this department accounted for over 26% and for 1980 26.3% of 
expenditure which between 1979 to 1985 averaged 18.3%." The BDC had argued for 
an annual per-centage of total 'national' revenue to be set aside exclusively for what it 
phrased 'development' investment. This 'development spending' averaged 
approximately 29.5% of 'national' revenue between 1979 and 1984, and 20% during 
the whole 'independence' era." More revealing was the allocation of this 
'development spending' to various departments. The development priorities were 
clearly indicated by the dominance again of the Department of Works which received 
on average between 1979 to 1985 54% of total development expenditure. The 
Department of Works, together with the Department of Economic Affairs, received 
approximately three quarters of total allocation for 'development spending' in the first 
half of the 1980s. 
With such a high level of expenditure and rapid rate of construction of various 
housing and infrastructural projects, particularly centred upon the rapidly growing 
urban areas of Bophuthatswana (see next chapter), the issue of tendering became a 
central issue. The BDC recommended provision and scope for such local input into 
development initiatives and especially construction itself: 
'In the allocation of tenders the government departments and development 
corporations must afford first choice, within reasonable price differences, to 
Bophuthatswana based industries and business undertakings'." 
The BNDC claimed to have initiated the development of Batswana constructors 
through its Small Industries Division. Batswana builders had been organised into one 
major group and given construction jobs by the BNDC. However, pointing out a 
83 Calculated as a percentage from North West Province Statistical information 
covering Bophuthatswana, 1977-1994. 
84 lb1d. 
"Bophuthatswana, 1981, White Paper on Development. 
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general concern with the lack of trained Batswana, even within the BNDC itself, the 
managing director commented on construction that: 
'In general the construction industry is in a very unsatisfactory state We do not get 
value for our money and our workers do not get the training they are entitled to'." 
With so much building development, the BDC's strict observance of tender procedure 
was intended to reinforce both prudent use of internal resources and local input. 
However, the BDC influence came under increasing pressure from Mangope's 
political and 'nation-building' considerations. In 1980 a final confrontation proved to 
be the undoing of the BDC. At a meeting to discuss the tender for the new Mmabatho 
High School, the chairman of the BDC disagreed strongly with Mangope's desire to 
award the contract to large constructors from outside of Bophuthatswana. Schoeman 
wanted to encourage local firms 'when appropriate' to generate local growth and, 
particularly in this instance, Mafikeng based companies." Mangope chose to 
circumvent the BDC wishes and in protest Schoeman resigned. 1bis issue became one 
of many concerning the award of government contracts to consultants and outside 
companies. A handful of South African companies and foreign individuals were 
favoured." The biggest, Stocks Construction, a South African company, won the 
majority oflarge governmental contracts. Throughout the 1980s the Bophuthatswana 
government appeared to have a preference towards Stocks who were the main 
contractor for the Civic Centre and Government Offices amongst other projects." 
There followed a direct correlation between the resignation of Schoeman, the 
confinement of the BDC to the shadows of the Department of Economic Affairs" and 
an unprecedented spending spree in Bophuthatswana on a range of prestige projects. 
Given both BDC and BNDC concern for internal viability how is it possible to 
86 Bophuthatswana, Development Needs, (1980:16) 
87 Schoeman (1995) ibid. 
88 See chapters five and six. 
89 J, Vlaming, of Vlaming Construction, interview, Mmabatho, 1995. 
90 According to Schoeman, the BDC then fell into disfavour and became a small 
branch of the Department of Economic Affaus between 1981 and 1990. 
Chapter Four: Modernising the Nation 173 
understand the growing predilection of Mangope for outside, large scale big business? 
Undoubtedly large-scale enterprises were seen as the harbinger of capitalist economic 
growth by the BDC and BNDC alike. In accordance with the 'multiplier effect' theory 
one strand of national economic development was aimed at stemming the outflow of 
both work force and particularly spending in South Africa through commercial 
development. This was to be done through job creation and construction of 
commercial shopping centres throughout Bophuthatswana. Mangope had a clear 
impression of how this was to be achieved; by combining 'western' know-how and 
capital a profound effort would be made to win acceptance from the world community 
of nations. The contract awards given to large constructors were interpreted as the 
'proper' manner of doing things and the expertise and knowledge worth paying for: 
' ... it is the policy of the Bophuthatswana government to encourage large companies 
and chain groups to establish enterprises in Bophuthatswana. Foreign money and 
knowhow are brought zn to the country and the outflow of buying power is further 
decreased'." 
Between 1977 to 1990 the number of shopping centres in Bophuthatswana increased 
from nil to 24." The BDC and the BNDC focused particular interest upon the capacity 
of projects to create labour intensive jobs as well as the promotion and encouragement 
of independent Batswana entrepreneurs. Dr. D.P. Moloto, Deputy Minister of 
Economic Affairs claimed that the Bophuthatswana development strategy was 
underwritten by an entrepreneurial class of which 5000 small traders formed the 
nucleus." The encouragement of entrepreneurs appeared to reflect the policy of 
creating a black petty bourgeoisie who could 'buy' into the bantustan system. A 
network of patronage controJled by government was the principal means of economic 
advancement and 'embourgeoisement' through the state." Therefore the criteria for 
91 Van der Berge, of the BNDC, in "Mmabatho" in SA Architecture, 1981. 
92 BNDC Video, Land of Opportumty, undated, Mmabatho. 
93 Pretoria News, 31.10.83 
94 Graff (1990) op. cit. 
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award oflicenses and loans were not merely economic but also politically motivated." 
Private sector involvement had been a key feature of the regime which based its claim 
to sovereignty upon Bophuthatswana's economic differentiation from the other TVBC 
states. The response to this high level of dependency was therefore to encourage 
capitalist development. Investment was welcomed by Mangope and powers were 
delegated to the BNDC to encourage business and commercial ventures. It can be 
argued that the Bophuthatswana Executive Council saw investment and access to 
international capital as a necessary assertion of its independence from South Africa, 
particularly through high profile uses of this capital. Mangope's 'Nation-building' 
aspirations had usurped the strict econornism of the BDC and exploited economic 
initiatives for political gain. When development initiatives involved government itself, 
these schemes had to reflect 'high standard and quality' which in turn became 
unaffordable to most residents." A simpler explanation for the award of contracts was 
that they possibly reflected the large economic benefits to various individuals and 
groups in return for their loyalty to Mangope. 
Mangope's commitment to 'development' as modernisation became imprinted 
upon his decision making. Mangope demanded action and therefore saw the 
expansion of governmental structures as the principal means to achieve this. In just a 
few years from 1980 the number government Departments grew to twenty two 
structures and with a number of parastatal corporations. This growth of bureaucracy 
was perceived as the engine of action-oriented growth and 'development'. With 
Mangope's forceful dominance and lack of opposition the President's own particular 
vision was stamped upon the Bophuthatswana landscape. Mangope's influence was 
reflected in his demands which advisors likened to 'Dream Lists'. These structures 
were regarded as the means to achieving the 'Dream Lists': 
'The underlying philosophy was that the President wanted action He wanted every 
•• Its most visible manifestation was government ministers themselves being 
awarded business licenses despite the competition from a large number of 
applicants, see next chapter. 
96 Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
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year to see things happening. I think he got frustrated with the Public Sector. Public 
servants remain public servants, they are very happy when they get their pay but not 
very dynamic or with initiative. They (the Bophuthatswana state) were in a kind of 
spree that psychologically opened the flood gates for many people, not only from the 
private sector but even clever public sector officials, who said that you can not 
achieve your objectives without parastatals and boards and so on. They said "we wzll 
build houses if you have a Housing Corporation" and so on. This was an ulterior 
motive for building empires (within these structures) and to throw money after the 
problem. But the solution is not necessarily money but getting the people's 
commitment and involvement in the process'." 
When Mangope focused upon a particular project it was claimed that other members 
of these structures then simply kept their opinions to themselves." The former 
chairman of the BDC suggested that from 1981: 
'I would say that for five to six years the development policy was probably steered by 
Mangope himself He was agitated there was no development and he wanted this 
development badly'.'" 
Policy making revolved around a small clique at the pinnacle of the Bophuthatswana 
state. The 'development' strategies that had been implemented had been directed from 
this lofty height with the cabinet acting in isolation and in a very top down manner in 
weekly meetings."• Mangope's combination of the 'tribal custom' of the chief with 
Presidential and constitutional powers undoubtedly exacerbated his dominance and 
'right' to implement and control policy-making. This dominance also depended upon 
and influenced the extent to which the civil service was involved and interested in 
97 Ibid. 
91 Personal communication with Magyar, 1997. 
99 Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
100 Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
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policy or, moreover, in maintaining patronage and power structures.'" 
In these efforts to promote Bophuthatswana's claims for legitimacy and 
recognition, projects were conceived as huge public relations exercises. During the 
1980s the emerging pattern was therefore that these projects were designed to reflect 
'style', and 'prestige' and with a multi-racial emphasis. Without an integrated 
development plan linking structures with the Executive Council, the Presidential elite 
dominated decision-making. The Bophuthatswana state resembled a commercial 
conglomerate: 
' ... a partner in business ventures often enjoying the marginal level of competitive 
advantage afforded by the right to engage in activities not tolerated in South 
Africa'.'"' 
Mmabatho, proposed as the capital of Bophuthatswana in 1976, was the most 
important 'national' project of all. Its conception and development by planners and 
government symbolised the cultural and 'developmental' ambiguities of 
Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building'. 
101 See conclusionary chapter. 
102 Magyar (1984:14) op. cit. 
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5. An Appropriate Capital for the Nation 
5.1. Introduction 
~ new name, a new flag, a new government ... Bophuthatswana could lead the way 
forward showing that two cultures can exist and prosper side by side if the objective 
is unity... The orange dzagonal bar on the National flag of Bophuthatswana 
symbolises the golden path along which we must travel towards the fUlfilment of 
development '.• 
By 1978 the design and planning proposals for the 'national' capital, 
Mmabatho, were accepted by the Bophuthatswana government. Previous studies of 
Maflkeng-Mmabatho have focused upon the city's shifting political economy and the 
processes associated with the creation of a 'post-colonial' city. These processes 
include the effects of rapid population growth and the state's dominant role and 
imprint upon the urban fabric.' Other studies have focused upon Maflkeng's racial 
zoning during the apartheid era and the impact of the transitional 'decolonisation' 
phase associated with the incorporation of Maflkeng into Bophuthatswana.' These 
1 Ma[1keng Mail, 17.10.80. The Ma1l concluded that: 'The newspaper is in accord 
with that aspiratton and will be consctous of any mcident or matter that brings 
with it damage to the Nations future'. 
2 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (1991) "Maftkeng-Mmabatho" in Lemon, A. Home's 
Apart; South Africa's segregated c1ties, Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
Parnell, S. (1986) "From Mafeking to Mafikeng; the transformation of a South 
African town", Geo Journal, 12.2, pp203-210. 
3 Ibid. Plus, Ptckard-Cambridge, C. (1988) Sharmg the C1t1es, SAIRR, compares 
Mafikeng's desegregation to Windhoek and Harare's transitional phases. Louw, 
A. D. (1986) looked at the impact of desegregation on the attitudes of whole 
property owners in Mafikeng, "The Attitudes of white owners of fixed property 
in Mafikeng towards local mtergroup relations four years after mcorporation 
into Bophuthatswana" Plural Soc1et1es, XVI. Badenhorst, M S. (1980) 
Maftkeng: The Attitudes of White Residents in respect of Aspects that relate to 
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approaches represent racial and ethnic categorisations, and the urban form itself, as 
'given' and structurally predetermined.' This chapter argues that the contradictions of 
Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' can be more fully understood by examining the 
competing motivations underpinning the creation of the capital city of this bantustan. 
The quotation, above, an editorial by the local (soon to be 'national') 
newspaper following the incorporation of Mafeking,' professes to embrace 
modernisation by government, planners, and many local black and white residents in 
order to reverse the marginality of the area. Mmabatho was initially intended by 
Mangope as a powerful symbol and icon which would promote Batswana identity and 
announce sovereignty. The capital epitomised the efforts made to express 'unifying 
gestures' for the Bophuthatswana 'nation' and embodied the features regarded as 
essential for creating 'national' identity. Paradoxically, Mafikeng's close proximity 
and eventual incorporation into Mmabatho, continued to reflect the ambiguities of 
local ethnic and race identities. Mafikeng crossed the frontier into Bophuthatswana 
and, in order to appeal to international 'norms', the regime used the town's 
incorporation to promote racial 'unity', as pursued along the 'golden path to the 
fulfilment of development'. There was, however, a sense in which Bophuthatswana 
itself was being incorporated into a system of language and practice which involved 
constructing the 'Nation-State' and the 'Capital City' as distinctively modem. 
Under the rubric of 'modernisation', the capital and social relations therein, 
the Proposed Incorporation of the Town into the Republic of Bophuthatswana, 
Untverstty of Pretona. See also the interesting comparison between the 
incorporation of Port St. John's mto the Transkei and Maftkeng into 
Bophuthatswana, in Napier, C. J. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) Broken Promises 
and lost opportunities, Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences, University of Natal. 
4 For example, Drummond and Parnell (199I·I67)refer to the decision on the 
location of Mmabatho as 'the Bophuthatswana legislature decided to establish a 
"capital c1ty", called Mmabatho, 7 kilometres north-west of Mafekmg', with no 
suggestion of the cultural, spatial and political motivations underpinning the 
decision. 
' Following the incorporation of the former British colonial town, Mafeking, into 
Bophuthatswana in 1980, the name of the town reverted to the area's older 
Tswana name, Mafikeng. 
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were supposedly a vivid icon for Bophuthatswana' s claims to be distanced from South 
Africa. It was a particular attempt to assert the appearance of 'independence' and 
convey the impression of viability through this capital city. Mmabatho's design, 
motivated by Mangope's ethno-nationalist concerns, conflicted with the 
representation of the city as if created 'from nothing'. Bophuthatswana's 'nation-
building' therefore failed to transcend the universalism implicit in modernist 
practices. This failure was most visible in the developmental bias towards Mmabatho. 
The conflicts and debilitating contradictions underpinning Bophuthatswana are 
demonstrated by the following issues. First, the intrigue and debate determining the 
geographical location of the new 'national' capital city was intimately connected to 
the complex matrix of cultural and racial purity, territorial boundaries and the 
practicalities of 'nation-hood', pursued by both Bophuthatswana and South Africa. 
Second, in part an outcome of the location, the creation of the capital was motivated 
by the efforts to produce an 'anti-western' Tswana city. Third, the incorporation of 
white Maflkeng into Bophuthatswana was integral to President Mangope's promotion 
of a cosmopolitan, non-racial 'place for all'. Bophuthatswana was regarded by various 
groups as 'mature enough' to incorporate the white town. Fourth, the revised Master 
Plan anticipated Mafeking's incorporation and, together with Mmabatho's Five Year 
Plan, reflected the increasing faith in modernisation to develop the area. These efforts 
and conflicts were reflected in the huge amount of resources used for the capital and 
the conspicuous inequality between Mmabatho and its environs. The cultural and 
political motives of the regime, coupled with the aesthetic functions defmed by the 
architects and planners, reflected the ambiguities implicit in modernising the urban 
landscape. 
5.2. Locating the Capital City 
In the 1970s both the South African and Bophuthatswana governments were 
locked into negotiations concerning a new 'national' capital for Bophuthatswana, 
arguably the most potent symbol and icon of any 'nation-building' exercise. In the 
-----------------------------------
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early 1970s the Bophuthatswana administration was negotiating with the South 
African government for a loan of R5 million in order to build a new capital. Mangope 
had described the existing administrative capital at Mafeking (in fact, as will be seen 
more clearly, the township at Montshiwa) as 'totally inadequate' and it was proposed 
that: 
'The intention is to build this new capital at Heystekrand, and with a character of zts 
own, which to us is an immensely important consideration'.' 
The South African government had originally offered the Trust Land site (land 
designated as 'black' but held 'on trust' by the South African government) 48 km 
north of Rustenburg, called Heystekrand, as the permanent capital. By 1972 the 
Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had agreed to this.' However, by 1975 and still 
prior to fmal planning decisions, the Bophuthatswana administration had expressed 
concerns regarding Heystekrand as a suitable location. The reconsideration of the 
capital's geographical location took on wider symbolism, illustrating the complex 
matrix of territory, ethnicity and racial separation underpinning Bophuthatswana. 
The Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had delegated a committee to 
investigate the suitability of Heystekrand in the early 1970s. Following the 
recommendations of this committee and with 'expert advice' issued from Pretoria, 8 
out of 12 regional authorities agreed that the capital of the Bophuthatswana 'nation' 
should be built at Heystekrand.' There were clearly high stakes involved in becoming 
the future capital. For example, even the residents of Montshiwa township near 
Mafeking were demanding the infrastructure to befit a seat of government: 
6 Mangope's speech on the occasion of the Peter Kruger Memorial Lecture, 9.8. 72, 
in Van der Merwe et al (1978:502) op. cit. 
7 BANTU, 1972. 
8 Bophuthatswana Government (1975:63), a lot of this section refers to the Debate 
on the Capital, Special Session of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, 
Fust Assembly, November, 1975. 
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'Let us make this, our beloved township worth living in. Let it be a pride to stay in 
Montshiwa Township. Let every visitor be struck by an air of progress in Montshiwa 
Let Montshiwa Township assume its rightfUl status as the present seat of the 
Bophuthatswana government by providzng most needed daily amenities'.' 
There were urges from residents that the Bophuthatswana government should correct 
the Mafeking Council's neglect of this black township and electrify Montshiwa for 
domestic purposes and the prevention of crime." In a similar vein the president of the 
YMCA attacked the Montshiwa Township Town Council for not erecting desperately 
needed recreational facilities, 'necessities of life', and again for neglecting 
Montshiwa's importance and 'civilising' influence as a 'capital town': 
'We feel that it is about time that the Town Council did something to save this 
situation. Montshiwa is the capital town of Bophuthatswana. It is supposed to be the 
centre of civzlisation in this area' 11 
The location of the capital was therefore a very real issue for local residents within 
Bophuthatswana. As a 'centre of civilisation' a fitting capital was deemed by local 
residents, including Mafeking, and the Bophuthatswana government to require 
commensurate benefits and resources. 
5.2.1. Mafeking and Consolidation 
In 1973 the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had proposals to 
consolidate its territory by including a number of white towns," implying that one 
9 Mr. Tlhoale, who latter became a local councillor, letter to Tswana Ma1l, 
13.9.1974. 
10 A. E. Molamu, Mayor ofMontshiwa, Tswana Ma1l, 31.8.1973. 
11 Letter to the Tswana Mail, 15.6.1973. 
12 For Bophuthatswana's consolidation proposals see 'Bophuthatswana land issue: 
Batswana want their fair share of historical land occupied during the fust few 
centunes of the millennium' in Pwneer, December, 1984. 
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would be designated as 'capital'. For historical reasons, Mafeking had been suggested 
as the desired capital by the Bophuthatswana regime." However, the South African 
government declined the attempts by Bophuthatswana to incorporate a large swathe of 
land, including towns considered 'white'. By the early 1970s the fragility of 
Mafeking's economic base, still dominated by retail and agriculture, remained a grave 
concern for the local white community." The town had eagerly awaited the decision 
on Bophuthatswana's capital and was disappointed by the 'consolidation plan that 
nobody wants- with not a single town to be incorporated'." Mafeking was surrounded 
by Bophuthatswana on three sides which had created a high level of confusion in this 
'virtually isolated urban island in a foreign rural sea'." Over the next two years, 1974-
1975, the local council and business community sought to convince the 
Bophuthatswana government to locate their 'national' capital near to the town." Land 
consolidation negotiations were veiled in secrecy because of the sensitivity of the 
consolidation debate and the capital issue was no exception. By 1975, with the 
prospect of 'independence' becoming increasingly likely, the capital issue became 
integral to the struggles, shape and direction of the Bophuthatswana nation-building 
vision. One of the most emotive issue for white and black communities centred upon 
territory. The reconsideration of Heystekrand was related to the Bophuthatswana 
Legislative Assembly's strongly desired territorial definition and consolidation plans. 
The mainstream South African press indicated that the issue of land 
consolidation would indeed dominate 'independence' negotiations. In 1975 as the 
basis for consolidation of the various fragments of Bophuthatswana into a territorial 
entity which resembled the borders of the old British Bechnanaland, Mangope, along 
with the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, once again demanded the acquisition 
13 The historical relationship between Mafekmg and the Batswana was examined in 
Chapter two. White, colomal, Mafeking symbolised Batswana land 
dispossession and, after 1948, apartheid division. 
14 Cowley, J. (1985) op. cit. 
"Mafeking Mall, 8.6.1973. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Pobrey, 1. (1994) op. cit. 
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of the white towns of Kuruman, Taung, Warrenton, Vryburg, De la Reyville, 
Lichtenburg, Mafeking, Zeerust, Rustenburg, Brits and Swartruggens. Mangope 
insisted that: 
'there must be made a fair and just sharzng of the land.. we reject outright the 
present attempts to make the 1936 Land Act the basis of settling this issue'." 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 
ALTERNATE PROPOSALS 
Proposals of the Western Transvaal Bantu 
Affatrs Admm1strat10n Board 
(Rand Dady Mad. t 7th April 1973) 
Proposals of the Bophuthatswana 
Government 
(Rand Dally Mad, I Oth Apnl 1973) 
Bophuthatswana 1974 
Figure 5.1 Bophuthatswana Consolidation Proposals" 
However, with a plan conceived by the South African government itself approved, no 
white towns were to be incorporated into Bophuthatswana. This decision therefore 
18 Sunday Express, 30.3.15. 
19 Adapted from Hattingh, P. Homeland Consolidation: the case of Bophuthatswana, 
in Smith, D. (conveynor) Apartheid and South Africa, University College 
London, 1976. 
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seemed to force the issue with the capital having to move to Heystekrand." The 
concern over land allocation had been a long term concern of the Bophuthatswana 
regime and the argument with Pretoria 'appeared' to derail the independence process 
and by implication the bigger projects of bantustan nation-building and separate 
development itself. 
A second committee was commissioned to investigate an alternative to 
Heystekrand, should Mafeking once again be rejected. Despite the parameters of 
consolidation having been set by the South African government, with the BLA for all 
its protestations largely endorsing Pretoria's edicts, the debate on the capital 
nonetheless indicated the deep-seated anxieties which existed and the textured nature 
of the disputed location for the capital. 
Mangope was fully aware of the symbolism that a national capital afforded his 
regime and drew upon international comparison and experience through reference to 
the difficulties that the capital 'question' had caused Germany, Malawi and even 
South Africa itself: 
'It does not surprise me if this question of the capital in Bophuthatswana is the same. 
I want it known as it is repeated here that the capital will really be the city of the 
whole nation, that is true'. 21 
This international experience was drawn upon to embolden the Bophuthatswana 
'nation-building' project. The capital issue for Bophuthatswana coincided with the 
decision taken in Malawi to relocate the capital from Lilongwe to the more central 
Zomba and a parallel drawn with 'nation-building' in Bophuthatswana· 
'I want this House to think of tomorrow. The voice of the unborn Tswana child is 
crying over thefoture. We must not get emotional. We must be cool and face the facts 
20 Mafekmg Ma1l, 8.6.1973. 
21 Bophuthatswana (1975.69). 
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before us. Today Malawi is building a new capital. I don't w1sh this parliament, this 
nation, the Tswana nation in future to decide to change the capital because this 
House made a wrong decision and chose a wrong spot for their capital'." 
Other members of the Bophuthatswana Legislature were similarly aware of the 
unifying potential which a capital city could provide. The chairman of the Conunittee, 
D. C Mokale, presented the findings which called for a new location for the capital as 
firstly, an affirmation of independence from the whites and secondly, a symbol for 
Batswana identification. The decision on the capital could present an opportunity for 
the Batswana to conduct their own affairs and to distance themselves from the whites 
who were characterised as 'strangling' black towns because, it was claimed, 'Whites 
persistently approach us, in order to suck our money'." Another conunittee member 
associated the opportunity to build a new capital city with Tswana empowerment, as a 
conduit for 'their own people who can lead our development'." 
The South African govermnent also had reservations about Heystekrand. 
These were based on political considerations that the proximity to Pretoria and the 
industrialised and more militant heartland of South Africa, could become a security 
concern. In addition the region was heavily urbanised and had attracted black migrants 
from all over South Africa and this ethnic mixing was incompatible with a separate 
development vision which promoted ethnic division. These factors prompted South 
Africa to 'encourage' the decision to locate a 'national' capital further away from the 
turbulent townships which were, according to South African govermnent terminology, 
'detribalised' and synonymous with black 'agitators' or 'nationalists'." The 
'etlmological' composition of the homelands therefore attracted attention from various 
academics investigating the viability of the bantustan policy. The diagram (Figure 5.2) 
is taken from a University ofPotchefstroom study which expressed concern regarding 
22 Member, D. C Mokale, ibid. pp44 
23 Bophuthatswana (1975:42). 
24 Bophuthatswana, (1975:52). 
25 Schoeman (1995) Border, (1995). 
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the extent of non-Tswana population groups in Bophuthatswana. Based on the 
population census of the mid-1970s the diagram shows that in the heavily populated 
eastern areas of Bophuthatswana, the Tswana groups, in comparison to the non-
Tswana population, are mainly in the minority." The urbanised eastern districts were a 
source of consistent resistance to the Bophuthatswana regime. These political 
considerations were perhaps another important factor for Mangope's decision to 
establish the 'capital' in more Tswana-oriented and rural areas (it is also interesting to 
note, however, that the other proposed locations for the capital also had substantial 
minority groups). As the contradictions of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' grew in 
the 1980s, the geographical location of the capital became an important feature of 
Mangope's attempts to contain unrest within the territory." 
The Heystekrand location was particularly scrutinised because it was 
perceived as representing the spectre of ethnic mixing, and by implication, the social 
problems related to this. During the 'capital debate' in the Bophutbatswana 
Legislative Assembly the purity of Batswana culture was regarded by some members 
as jeopardised, contaminated and impure. This sense and fear of the erosion of 
identity formed the basis for the underlying rejection of Heystekrand: 
'If you take (the) history- let's take the place where there are many people- towns like 
Soweto, the problems of shebeens and others will crop up in Bophuthatswana, and 
these will not be Tswana people'." 
A number of pro-government members pursued this theme of the undesirability of 
high population density of urban areas and the unavoidability of ethnic mixing. This 
26 Heystekrand (later renamed Mogwase) was in-between the sparsely populated 
Mankwe region and the 'platinum belt' in the Bafokeng/Odi regions, whose main 
population concentrations are shown as the three medium sized circles adjacent 
to the largest cucle denoting the heavily urbanised Odi I and Moretele I 
regions just north of Pretoria. 
27 See chapter six. 
28 Bophuthatswana (1975:42). 
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mixing was seen as undermining and eroding the cultural bed-rock of the nation and 
leading to ethnic suicide. It was claimed that this cultural decline had already affected 
the Batswana in urbanised areas, particularly the Bafokeng tribe through their 
proximity to platinum mines: 
' ... the most important factor for any nation anywhere is culture. We can not deny the 
fact that the Tswana spoken from Rustenburg to the north-east is so impure that it 
afficts the culture. The Bafokeng have done all in their power with regard to the 
impact of their mines but without much success. The Central government has tried to 
control influx into urban areas, Johannesburg, Rustenburg, but they are beaten. In 
view of these factors if the capital is situated there, the matter will be worsened'." 
The eastern regions of Bophuthatswana were therefore considered as 
denigrating Batswana language and culture due to the thousands of non-Tswana 
migrants. These 'other' ethnic groups were also characterised as underdeveloping 
these areas because 'our money is siphoned of by foreign people to their different 
homelands ... ' .30 The alternative site at Ramotsogo, in the more distant and rural 
Lehurutshe district (slightly north east of the Molopo region and also bordering 
Botswana) was therefore proposed as the location to accommodate these wider ethnic 
ideals. This alternative site was also promoted under the pretext of spreading 
economic development to other less industrialised areas of Bophuthatswana. Above 
all, Ramotsogo was supposedly more geographically central and, by implication, a 
symbolically accessible centre through which to unify the diffuse fragments of 
Bophuthatswana. The handful of opposition members within the BLA fiercely 
contested the committee's decision and provided the sub-text for the wider conflict for 
those Batswana intent on 'nation-building'. There was criticism that the Ruling Party 
had already pre-determined the Ramotsogo option, as three out of six regional 
29 Bophuthatswana, (1975:43). 
30 Ibid. 
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authorities approached had still once again suggested Heystekrand. The initial 
committee was considered more democratic, having consulted a larger number of 
people, with 8 from 12 Regional Authorities approving Heystekrand. There was 
concern that the BDP was interfering in tribal affairs, after the chiefs in both the 
Lehurutshe and Mafeking areas 'agreed' to release land for a proposed capital without 
a tribal resolution. Chief Maseloane suggested that 'tradition' was under threat from 
Mangope and, in response to the ruling party's jeers that he was acting childishly, 
Maseloane replied: 
'It is the Montshiwa Chieftaincy that you refer (to) as little boys. You have done so all 
the years'." 
It is highly significant that although these opposition members would later reject 
'independence' there was nonetheless a detectable common emphasis on debating the 
desired condition of the Tswana. For Maseloane and others, the addition of land to 
consolidate national territory was considered an absolute pre-requisite in the pursuit of 
independence. With land so unequally distributed, to take tribal land for a capital was 
considered an affront to tribal tradition and betrayal of the 'true' aims of Tswana 
nationalism: 
'It was the decision of this House here that our capztal should not be built upon land 
that belongs to a tribe, rather on trust land, because we do not want that in foture 
there must be hitches between a tribe and a government because we have n 't really 
got the money or the right to expropriate people ... I heard one of the speakers who in 
fact was in favour of Heystekrand saying repeatedly, the sozl, the soil. I do not know 
what bearing the soil has upon a site for a capital because what is really required is 
the place that belongs to me or us. I was lucky enough to be one of the counczllors in 
the old government and there was talk then, and we all know that we can not deny 
32 Ibid. 
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that such talks did take place We used to say this land is ours. Even though the 
Barolong were compensated by being given other land (in return for the proclaimed 
site of Montshiwa township), the sentiment to this land is so strong that they continue 
to say the land is theirs'." 
The consolidation issue was a fundamental dividing line between the BDP and 
opposition BNSP. The decision to relocate the capital on tribal land that circumvented 
white areas was so strongly rejected by the opposition that another opposition leader, 
ChiefPilane, was sent out of the House during the 'capital debate'. A crucial issue for 
the opposition remained their concern that 'independence' would become nothing 
more than a mirage if it meant continually fleeing from the whites, as the retreat to 
Ramotsogo indicated to them. For the opposition, the capital decision was therefore 
integral to achieving consolidation: 
' ... this thing of running away from here to another place is caused by one difficulty 
only, and as soon as our land an be consolidated we will have removed the 
difficulty ... / am saying that the difficulty of having to run away from these whites here 
can only be obviated if our land could be consolidated into one then we choose a spot 
right in the centre where we wzll be away from our boundaries'," 
Chiefs Pilane and Maseloane had been representatives in the old ITA. Their views 
did not contain the level of fear and concern regarding ethnic or racial mixing as the 
ruling party. Nor did they disregard the vision of a Batswana 'Nation'. Their 
judgement on the capital issue and hence the future of Bophuthatswana itself, was 
shaped by the paramount consideration ofland. The opposition promoted Heystekrand 
with their intention that this should act as a prelude to the later incorporation of 
'white' Rustenburg. However, the BDP's negative impression of the eastern regions 
33 Chief Maseloane, ibid., pp66, emphasis added. 
34 Bophuthatswana (1975:65). 
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had also been motivated through their perception that 'the opposition had already 
established its capital in Heystekrand' ." Clearly, although the weight of the Tswana 
population was situated in these eastern areas, they were associated with a political 
threat to the ruling party, particularly as Heystekrand was situated next to 
Maseloane's home region ofMadikwe. Mangope claimed that he wanted the capital to 
be far removed from both whites and ethnic mixing but the opposition pointed out that 
Rarnatsogo was closer to the white town of Zeerust then was Heystekrand to 
Rustenburg and, in addition, that the government's preferred site was totally Jacking 
in infrastructure. 
Attempting to avoid the central issue concerning land consolidation, Mangope 
confused the distinction between the unsuccessful incorporation of Mafeking as a 
white town, and the possibility of locating in the tribal reserve based at Montshiwa 
Stadt (adjacent to the white town). It was claimed that permission had been granted by 
ChiefMontshiwa and that this offer depended upon the Assembly's wish. According 
to the opposition spokesman, Chief Maseloane, the South African Commissioner-
General for the Tswana, Dr. I. S Kloppers, had previously promised Mafeking's 
incorporation into Bophuthatswana. Maseloane regarded Mangope's remark that 
Mafeking was merely a 'second hand' capital as responsible for Bophuthatswana's 
failure to acquire the town." During the 'capital debate' Chief Maseloane demanded 
to know why the negotiations to secure Mafeking had broken down: 
'I wish the Chief Minister could tell us the cause of our failure to get white Mafeking. 
We want the white town We are not talking of the backyard of Mafeking. You must 
give us an explanation of that one. You are running away from the facts'." 
Mangope could only fall back on the 'will' of the House as representative of the 
35 In the 1972 elections the opposition SP had won in two eastern districts which 
had given them four members of the BLA, the majority of their own MPs 
36 Mafekzng Ma1l, 29.3.1974. 
37 Bophuthatswana (1975. 71). 
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'nation', a convenient ploy due to the numerically superior BDP. Once again the 
shadow of Pretoria was cast over the BLA as the opposition demanded to know if the 
white officials, who had been at the official inspection of Ramotsogo the day before, 
had been invited by the House. Mangope replied: 
'I thought that we could rely on experts as we have done at all times, and even if 
officials from Pretoria were there and listened to our deliberations and heard which 
way we inclmed, I shall not debar them from going along. If press reporters can sit 
there and listen and learn what we are going to do, I shall not debar them from going 
if they can go, I take it that they went there in that manner'." 
lbis comment clearly demonstrated that the South African government was 
influencing Bophuthatswana' s decision-making. Nonetheless, it has been illustrated 
that within the BLA, different interpretations existed as to the means of reaching the 
goals, rather than the goal itself, Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'. 
The motion to rescind the decision to build at Heystekrand was taken 
unanimously and Ramotsogo was declared the new site. The reasons for the fmal 
decisions are uncertain. They appeared to be the decree of the BDP. However, all 
other options were probably at the time ruled out." Ramatsogo itself was already 
being questioned as too distant and failing to possess the commercial and 
transportation linkages of Mafeking. The decision on locating the Bophuthatswana 
capital in the Lehurutshe region was regretted by the white town and pleas were made 
that Mangope might reconsider in 'harsh light of practice and economics'." There 
were also the strong historical sentiments surrounding Mafeking which the regime 
wished to exploit in order to overshadow the relic of Empire, 'colonial Mafeking'. 
Montshiwa Stadt, adjacent to Mafeking, was one of the oldest Tswana settlements in 
38 Ibid. pp74. 
39 By 21.11.75 the Mafeking Ma1l proclaimed 'No to Mafeking- Yes to Lehurutshe' 
(i.e. Ramatsogo). 
•• Mafekmg M a~ I, 21.11.1975. 
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Southern Africa which could be harnessed for 'national aspirations'. The fmal 
decision on the location was announced in April 1976, with the decision not to build 
in Lehurutshe but instead just outside Mafeking on Chief Montshiwa's land." It is 
possible that the final decision to locate there was also a product of 'real-politik' with 
the South African government, in order to keep Bophuthatswana's 'independence' on 
course, making a tacit agreement for Mafeking's eventual incorporation into 
Bophuthatswana" In the year immediately after the decision, however, the South 
African government were once again adamantly denying the incorporation of the 
white town in Bophuthatswana. This denial fmally prompted a furious reaction from 
Mangope who was determined in 1978 to build a capital city which would completely 
obliterate Mafeking. The capital was to be called Mmabatho- 'Mother of the People'. 
It was intended as a truly 'national' capital once 'independence' had been attained. 
5.3. The Tswana City 
5.3.1. Government Intentions and Mmabatho's City Plans: The 'Kgotla' and 
the symbiosis of tradition and modernity. 
It has been suggested that the construction of a capital city represented an 
opportunity for Mangope to promote a sense of Batswana identity as a unifying step 
towards 'Nation-Building'. By 1978, the possibility of Mafeking's incorporation was 
denied by the South African government with its refusal to allow a white town to be 
governed by a black state. Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister for Bantu Affairs and 
Development, had 'flatly' refused Mangope the option of Mafeking as this would be 
unacceptable racial mixing." This decision provided the context within which the 
41 Mafeking Mail, 7.3.1976. However, even the South Africa, 1976 Official Year 
Book of the RSA was caught out by the protracted affair, as it still mentioned 
that: 'The future cap1tal of Bophuthatswana will be developed at Welbedacht, m 
the Zeerust (1.e Lehurutshe) district', pp.253. 
42 Schoeman (1995) 
43 Bophuthatswana (1979). 
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direction and vision of Mmabatho's urban development took place. The initial 
intention was to make Mmabatho viable by counteracting the economic influence of 
Mafeking, so that the capital would not be just another 'dormitory town' supplying 
white areas with labour. In order for Mangope to succeed, he could not build the 
capital half-heartedly and the planners hired for the job drew inspiration from the 
Malawi experience. There a new capital was built at Lilongwe to counter-balance the 
dominance of Zomba that had skewed development around the Southern part of the 
country. Parallels existed with Mafeking's dominance." A firm of consultants, 
Mallows, Louw and Hoffe (MLH), were hired from South Africa, to design the new 
capital. In conjunction with a range of Bophuthatswana government Departments, 
most notably Works and the Department of Urban Land Tenure and Local 
Government, MLH drew up the Master Plan for Mmabatho in July 1978. 
Significantly, Professor Mallows, the head of the team of consultants, met constantly 
with Mangope and the President's own desires would be strongly imprinted upon 
Mmabatho's urban design. The rejection of Mafeking provided the impetus for 
Mangope's 'brief to the planners and determined two reactions. First, Mmabatho was 
to be explicitly a Tswana City and second, it was also directed towards 
overshadowing colonial Mafeking: 
'Mangope knew he would get Mafikeng. He wouldn't tell me then (when it was being 
planned the white town was excluded from the original site), but he got it ... he knew he 
had to swallow up Mafikeng for historical reasons, because Montshiwastadt was 
older than Mafikeng'." 
The first town plan which Mallows produced for Mmabatho had been based upon a 
grid-iron pattern that was rejected by Mangope. Mmabatho's morphology was 
44 Schoeman (1995) 
45 Professor Mallows, in Boden, R., (1992:294) "The Influence of Tradttional 
Values and Historic Symbolism on Urban Design", Journal of Architectural and 
Planning Research, 9:4 (Winter, 1992). 
- - - - --------------------------------- ---
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therefore based upon a radically different approach to the ideas which had influenced 
Mafeking's colonial layout: 
'Autocracy is always rectangular. It was associated with white dommance- so 
Mangope said "I want a Tswana town so my children won't loose their sense of 
identity .. I do not want a white town. I want a Tswana town. Tswana build like 
this ... (and he held up his hands indicating a circular, embracing form)." 
Contradictions were noticeable from Mangope's 'brief: 
' ... in June 1978, on seeing the first plans for the Capital City and its Central Area, he 
stated that he wished the City to be a Tswana City, which would incorporate, as far 
as modern conditions and technology would permit, the Tswana traditions of urban 
living and urban forms and so assist the Tswana nation, in their Capital City to retain 
for their foture a sense ofTswana identity'." 
MLH based their Mmabatho Residential, Government and Business Centre 
Development Plans upon a design that promoted tradition in order to: 
'reflect elements of the structure and form of traditional kgotla relationships that has 
always existed between the people and their chief at each level of tribal authority'." 
The 'kgotla' is the semi-circular shaped open meeting place at the centre of the 
traditional Tswana village. It is the space in which tribal affairs are debated and 
around which the chiefs dwelling is located. The 'Malwapa', which are clusters of 
46 Ibid. 
47 Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners, (1979a: I) Mmabatho, The New Cap1tal 
of Bophuthatswana, Residential Area No. I, Ref. 79/526, emphasis added. 
48 In Kamstra M. F. (1984:41) "A celebration of sovereignty, the government 
buildings at Mmabatho", Architecture SA May/June. 
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houses belonging to one extended family, are also shaped around the kgotla to form 
one ward. This circular pattern, particularly evident amongst the long tradition of 
Tswana town building, is illustrative of the differentiation between 'traditional 
African worldviews and culture from the secularized calculating rationality of a 
society based upon science and technology'." 'Die Stad' was identified as the major 
historical example of 'Tswana town development since 450 AD to the present' and it 
was characterised by its: 
' ... cellular conglomeration of 'oval spaces' surrounded by dwelling units. The main 
'space' is called the Place of the Stones (Mafikeng), from where Mafikeng gets its 
name '.50 
The relationship between the capital and Batswana culture was depicted as a 
self-explanatory continuum, which for consultants had a powerful cultural allure: 
' ... the long association that the Tswana people have had with Mafikeng .(which) 
together w1th Serowe in Botswana, are the two oldest traditional Tswana urban 
settlements which have been continuously occupied from long before the white man 
arrived'." 
49 Leistner, E. (1994) "Comment: Symbiosis of African and Western culture", 
Afrzca Inszght, vol. 24. 
50 The architects for the Government Buildings at Garona, Britz, B. and Scholes, M. 
(1984) "Government Square, Mmabatho", in Architecture SA, May/June. 
51 Archztecture SA, 1981. 
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Plate 5.1: The Old 'Stadt"' 
The consultants were therefore referred to the oldest parts of the Stadt and to Serowe 
'where the traditional grouping offamilies and clans into wards and tribes is reflected 
in the strong urban form of the town(s)' ." MLH suggested ways to adapt Tswana 
architectural forms to 'modem' conditions: 
'By combining aspects of formal baroque planning with ethnic Tswana architectural 
forms and village structures, a modern government structure is being developed that 
will reflect the strength, tradition and essential humanism of the Bophuthatswana 
nation' ... 
The conception of a kgotla-style central space at the heart of Mmabatho is returned to 
in the discussion of the Government Buildings. 
'
2 Overhead photos reproduced from Cowley, J., Department of Geography, 
University of Bophuthatswana. 
"Martin Hutton-Squue of MLH and partners, Archztecture SA, Autumn, 1981. 
,. Hutton-Squire (1981 :41). 
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Mangope wished to harness the urban form in a way that would convey what it 
was to be Tswana although the parameters for this application of Tswana culture were 
set by 'modem conditions and technology'. The relationship between these features 
exemplified the fundamental clash underpinning the Bophuthatswana edifice. The 
tensions between the two would increase during the 'independence' era. At the 
planning stage, Mmabatho was intended to symbolise Tswana values which, 
according to the residential planning report, would attempt to off-set 'western' 
development principles: 
'To provide the framework around which a town can develop which will embody the 
elements of a traditional Tswana town as opposed to a modern western 
development'." 
It was intended that the design, planning and construction would therefore incorporate 
local social customs and that the architecture itself would reflect this 'uniqueness'." 
The architects and planners approach to Mmabatho sought to promote local context 
and the qualities of traditional settlements: 
~prime consideration for the architects and planners has been to recognise that they 
must design specifically for Africa, and make concessions specific to the location and 
environment- such as local materials and low technology buildings'." 
The diagram, below, depicts the consultants genealogy of 'rural vernacular 
"MLH, (1979a:2). 
'
6 The Residential report, for example, was based upon the following core points: 
'A new type of physical design which will create that sense of enclosure which 
the traditional Tswana town always had. A type of planning, particularly in the 
residential areas which would permit a wide range of choice in types of housing 
layouts and house types. The social customs of the Tswana must be permitted to 
have expression but these must not exclude other options ... local labour and 
local materials .. local industries ... on wh1ch flexible building procedure (is) 
based'. MLH, ibid. 
"MLH m Architecture SA (1981) 
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architecture', in which the evolution ofhousing types from cave dwellings to modem 
houses are shown. The end result showed a choice of two houses. The one called the 
'Soweto 5116' model was associated with modernisation and westernisation 
reflecting: 
'white dominated architecture- suburbia and loss of identity, social breakdown'." 
However, the other was a modern idiom of South African Rural Vernacular 
architecture which was an outcome of changing traditional styles in relation to modern 
requirements to 'meet(ing) social and economic realities'. The consultants implied 
that this evolution to the Soweto model reflected direct western 'white' influence 
which disregarded tradition and led to the erosion of ethnic identity. Interestingly, the 
focus was on disrupting the linearity of the influence of modernisation, as symbolised 
by the Soweto type house. The lack of availability of traditional resources, particularly 
thatched roofing, was a further impetus for rethinking architectural design. 
One manner in which the linearity could be disrupted was through 
emphasising that: 
'Tswanas have traditionally led an outdoor-type of life as much as the cooking, eating 
and recreation takes place out of doors. This has considerable advantages in terms of 
the use of space and permits a smaller house to be used effectively while taking 
advantage of the country's mild climate'." 
"MLH (1979a). 
59 Ibid. pp5. 
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Figure 5.3: 'Typological Genealogy of South African Rural Vernacular 
Architecture' ... 
60 Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners, (1979) Mmabatho, The New Capital of 
Bophuthatswana, Residential Area No. I, Ref. 79/526. 
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The overall residential plan had been determined by a number of factors which 
emphasised Tswana culture: 
'l)The tradztions of Tswana urban forms, suitable(y) adjusted which reflect the 
cultural traditions of the Tswanas and which will provide a sense of identity'. 2) The 
accommodation of both the traditional and western style of life and housing so that 
both may co-exist in the residential area'. 3) also flexibility for social and financial 
requirements of those wishing to live in new residential area." 
To these ends, the planners proposed that the main residential area should be based 
upon Tswana residential groupings, namely, modernised 'wards', with adaptation 
made easier through regulations with a 'skeleton of control' and above-all 
'flexibility'." 
These ideas represented admirable efforts to remove vestiges of 
'westernisation', which, for the time, appeared to be innovative. However, the 
'Tswana' cultural component was not defmed within the report, the implication being 
that it was fixed and incontestable. There is no mention of consultation or discussion. 
Due to the 'static' portrayal of Batswana culture, these absences gave the impression 
of a controlled process with no reference made to what 'the people' would want other 
than the 'goodness' of Tswana culture. As a result, the unquestioned traditional 
element appeared as an afterthought of modernisation and did not appear to address 
why a modem idiom of the traditional wards was desired." 
The consultants' conclusion reiterated the marriage of ethnicity and 
modernity: 
61 Ibid., MLH, (1979a). 
62 MLH, (1979a:6) Consideration would also be supposedly given to the 
availability of houses for all income groups, assisted through 'self-help' 
schemes· 'it (self-help) can operate side by side with the more conventional 
contractual home building approach and so attract all types of residents to the 
new City, and ensure the new City can absorb them'. MLH, ibid. pp7. 
63 Furthermore, concessions appeared to be made for the anticipated influx of 
migrants. 
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' .it is possible to design a new residential area with Tswana character, which can be 
adapted to modern conditions and changing demand .. '." 
The crucial phrasing concerns, once again. the 'adaptation' of culture and tradition to 
'modem' conditions. MLH also had a particular influence on the architectural form of 
Mmabatho because they were considered as 'aesthetic advisors as well as town 
plarmers' ." Whilst a Tswana conception of 'space' was accommodated and, indeed, 
integral to Mmabatho' s urban design, the fundamental question is whose 'space' was 
this and what was its purpose? The modem 'aesthetic' of planning and urban design 
was increasingly overlapping with Mangope' s own political considerations and 
discourse or ideology of modernisation of the landscape. The cultural and social 
characteristics of the city, and indeed Bophuthatswana itself, were rapidly superseded 
by the impetus for modernisation. The Bophuthatswana regime, orchestrated by 
Mangope, sought to created a political symbol for Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'. 
This was confirmed with the approval of the urban plans for the whole city as drawn 
up by MLH. Considerable attention was subsequently given to the housing of the 
three functions of government and to commercial projects. Whilst these adopted 
impressive Tswana style layout, they reflected a static conception of Batswana 
heritage. 
5.3.2. Mmabatho: 'Mushrooming from nothing but barren bush'. 
The creation ofMmabatho as the capital city ofBophuthatswana was intended 
by the regime to herald the dawning of a new age, a new 'nation', a 'leap' into the 
future, characterised as modernisation. The great 'leap' implied a desired and elusive 
endpoint characterised as being 'developed'. Mangope's view of Mmabatho's 
64 MLH (1979:8). 
6
' Martin Hutton-Squire of MLH, SA Architecture, Autumn, (1981) op. cit. 
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intended role in this process was as a catalyst to skip a stage of development. The 
advance towards the shimmering lights of the modernist city was perceived as the 
means to create social transformation and engender a new society. Transformation 
implied that certain values would be eroded to make way for the new. Mmabatho city 
was hailed as the means to reach that developed end point. Government proclaimed 
the sensational 'Development of a futuristic City takes shape: Mmabatho City 
becomes reality'." There was the impression of transformation of the landscape with 
movement and mobilisation away from a pedestrian, plodding past. These sentiments 
were captured by the focus upon a shovel wielding President initiating the beginnings 
of the government complex, Garona. Transformation and change were recorded with: 
'the historic beginning in February 1979, when President Mangope turned the first 
sod on bare veld towards development'." 
The impetus for transformation came from harnessing the 'wilderness' of the 'bare' 
veld. Mmabatho would embody the central contradiction between reifying Tswana 
tradition and the deep seated modernising objectives of government and planners: 
'The ultra-modern Mmabatho business centre, part of the new city of Mmabatho the 
capital of Bophuthatswana now under construction, is fast changing the skyline of this 
once quiet area. Work is progressing according to schedule on this R3,5 million 
centre which should be completed by July 1980 '." 
The wheels of change were supposedly beginning to affect a previously 'quiet' area, 
implying that stagnation had reigned supreme. The planners also captured the sense of 
transformation: 
66 P1oneer, January, 1980. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Pioneer, January, 1980. 
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'All around is evidence of vast construction projects, with cranes the only really high 
rise foatures in the flat dry landscape '." 
This implied that the bigger the construction the greater the development delivered, 
progress had arrived in the wilderness. However, the green-belt area designated for the 
construction of the capital had been inhabited and cultivated by Batswana residents. 
Their removal was to be but a minor footnote relegated to the imperatives of the 
modernising machinery of the Bophuthatswana state. 
By defining the litany of development problems, as seen in the last chapter, 
solutions were therefore implied for the 'correct' development strategy. A sense of 
creation and progress pervaded planners, government and print media. The following 
quotation from a tourist brochure illustrated the wonders of implacable 'progress' and 
conversion of the wilderness of the 'veldt', with 'Mrnabatho-Out of nothingness': 
'Mushrooming from nothing but barren bush in only a fow years, Bophuthatswana 
has given birth to Mmabatho, ''Mother of the People"- its new capital city and its 
spintual home ... heart and soul of the Nation'. 70 
The capital embodied the pre-requisite for social development, which according to 
Mangope, was identified as the 'will to develop' expressed in positive self-images, 
self-respect, self-reliance. These efforts could be focused upon some central unifying 
symbol: 
'to achieve this, you need a visible symbol, like a lighthouse which will become the 
focal point for the awakening will to develop with Mmabatho itself reflecting the 
unbroken and living link with the life-style of Bophuthatswana 's forefathers'. " 
69 Architecture South Afr~ca (1981). 
70 BopTour Tourist Brochure, 12:19871 
71 Pzoneer, December 1980. 
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It was claimed the Batswana felt they needed a 'defmite measure of dignity' provided 
by the architectural statement which the new capital made.72 The fundamental 
difference between many modem cities and Mmabatho was also supposedly the 
emphasis upon historical and cultural experience expressed through the urban form. In 
order to modernise, certain features of Tswana culture were dismissed because 
transformation entailed the creation of something from nothing. Mmabatho was 
constructed as a monument to the Batswana ancestors whilst stressing its functions in 
a modem world. This Tswanaism was articulated in the capital as a modem idiom of 
the Kgotla, appealing to history and narrative myths yet combined with 'modem' 
functions: 
'This Tswana- style complex and distinctive with rounded lines and lama-style design 
circular style and distinctive octagonal tower office blocks encompasses a full range 
of business facilities such as a super-market, furniture store, bakery restaurant, 
chemist shop, a bank agency, butcher, and boutiques and fashion shops and many 
more Trading rights for all these undertakings have already been advertised'. 73 
Mmabatho would be a beacon of modernity overlooking and transforming the 'quiet' 
hinterland and 'radiating sovereignty'." Mmabatho was akin to a latter day 'civilising 
agent', echoing the role given to the historical precedent of Mafeking as the 'Last 
Civilised Stop on the Long Trek to the North'. At the opening of a range of projects 
throughout the capital, Mangope suggested the catalytic role that Mmabatho could 
play in Bophuthatswana development through its maternal role: 
'Just as the bond between mother and child is the strongest and most beautiful bond 
of caring which we know of, in that same way do I pray, that the quality of human 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 This function of the 'modernist' city has been described in the context of Brasi11a 
by Holston, J. (1989) The Modernist City, University of Chicago Press. 
----------------------------------------
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caring, which emanates from Mmabatho, will grow and mature, so as to be worthy of 
such a great name'." 
'A wave of enlightenment and reformation is spreading over the country' the 
President declared and it was claimed that this motion had 'begun in the Capital 
Mmabatho where today we fmd a city and not just the open veldt of seven years 
ago'." The capital was suggested as the heart of the nation: 
'We had to have a capital, since you can not have a successful state and country 
without the heart from which to pump out life's blood Our heart, the place that is 
ours and that is the mother of the people has always been ready and willing to spread 
its influence to the rest of the country and this has been done'." 
All this proposed development was only 7km from Mafeking. The way in which the 
white town, historically on the margins of South African society, interpreted and 
responded to these events illustrates the contradictions of Bophuthatswana's local and 
national development. The debate surrounding Mafeking's incorporation in 
Mmabatho influenced the revised Master Plan for Mmabatho (1979) and subsequently 
shaped the Five Year Plan (1980). 
5.4. Mafeking, the Tswana City and Bophuthatswana Nation-Building. 
The fmal decision to locate the capital at Mmabatho had stimulated much 
interest from Mafeking residents. Within twenty four hours of the announcement, the 
town's business community was invited to a meeting with the South African 
Commissioner-General." Sol Kerzner, the managing director of Southern Sun Hotels, 
"Mangope in P1oneer, December, 1982:2. 
76 Pioneer, June, 1985:2. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Mafektng Ma1l, 7.3.76. 
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announced the development of a new hotel in the capital. Furthermore, personal loans 
of up to one hundred per cent were available for black home ownership in 'approved' 
townships, particularly local Montshiwa. There were additional promises of a new 
four star hotel and construction of over sixty houses for white personnel in Mafeking, 
an enlargement of the Commissioner-General's complex and accommodation for 
diplomatic purposes, including a diplomatic village. A further early indication of the 
potential benefits to Mafeking of Bophuthatswana 'independence' were the plans to 
build quarters for military and police personnel and the enlargement of the local 
aerodrome. Mafeking had already embarked on a R2,3 million water scheme and a 
tender for a new abattoir had been expected. The local newspaper claimed that the 
new status of the region would result in an influx of people leading to a growth in the 
towns services." 
Despite these indications of rejuvenation and prosperity for the town, there 
was also concern that the abolition of sales tax within Bophuthatswana would attract 
business to Mmabatho rather than to Mafeking." By 1979 Mafeking's vulnerable 
position was revealed by a drop in secondary and primary school enrolment figures 
which caused alarm amongst residents and was attributed to the departure, in the 
1960s, of over 150 families and officials of the Bechuanaland Administration. The 
relocation of the Protectorate capital to Gaborones had occurred over ten years 
earlier." However, even in 1979 'a gap' continued to be 'felt in all Mafeking's 
79 See the Mafekmg Ma1/ during March, 1976. The town's new founded optimism 
reached a peak With the first ever visit of a South African Prime Minister to 
open the Bophuthatswana Leg1slat1ve Assembly. In order to commemorate the 
event a special photographic news sheet of Pnme Minister Vorster's vis1t was 
prepared With the mayor of Mafeking presenting the Prime Minister with a 
statuette of a white dove to symbolise his 'peace efforts'. Contrary to these 
'peace efforts' the photograph's also showed signs of local black opposition to 
the visit. The historical desire of Mafeking's residents for recognition and 
economic viability was apparently met with the announcement of the discovery 
of gold some fifteen kilometres south of Mafeking. It was later revealed as a 
cruel hoax. See Mafeking Mail, 29.8. 76. 
80 See Mafeking Mail for most of 1979. 
81 Mafeking ceased to be the administrative centre for Bechuanaland when the latter 
became independent as Botswana in 1966. 
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institutions and organisations' and constituted the 'missing generation of babies' for 
Mafeking." Another indication of the fragility of Mafeking was the cancellation, due 
to drought, of the annual Mafeking Agricultural and Industrial Show described as 'the 
only shop window to the country at large and our neighbouring states, district, public, 
farmers and business men of Bophuthatswana and Botswana'." It was within this 
context that the question of incorporation became a major issue for Mafeking and 
President Mangope. Local and 'natioual' identities were manipulated and recast for 
contemporary objectives. 
Given South Africa's continued strict racial segregation, Mangope was aware 
of the positive publicity that the incorporation of a white town into Bophuthatswana 
would create for his regime's attempts to win international recognition. Similarly, 
local white residents increasingly regarded their future as bound up with 
Bophuthatswana. By 1979 the South African government itself was also considering 
the town's incorporation, as a gesture of 'goodwill' to black Africa. After numerous 
demands from the Bophuthatswana regime for the acquisition of some white towns, 
including Mafeking, fmally in April 1979 the South African government set up a 
commission to investigate the possibilities for Mafeking's incorporation. 
5.4.1. Race Relations 
For President Mangope and the local white population of Mafeking the 
possibility of incorporation was seized upon as a unique opportunity to promote the 
image of a non-racial society to the rest of Africa and the world. Mangope suggested 
that the Tswana should be accommodative towards this white town: 
'I am speaking as my spirit moves me and I am saying what I believe in. If my people 
82 Mafeking Mazl, 19.1.1979. It was suggested that the town's location had been an 
accident of history having fallen under Cape and not Transvaal admmistration, 
the Mafekzng Mail, 30.4.76. 
83 Mafekzng M01l, 2.2.1979. 
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reject to accept other people then I am prepared to restgn; if we can not accept one 
another. . on this I stake my foll career. Because Africa must see that we in 
Bophuthatswana can live together. I feel it is a miracle that the South African 
government should be thinking of incorporation of Mafeking into Bophuthatswana 
because I have always wished for the opportunity to show that we can live together 
and respect one another and work together and feel we are one people'." 
In order to convey the appearance of 'non-racialism' as a symbol of white and black 
co-operation, the history of race relations in the town was manipulated to reflect these 
sentiments and to win the confidence of the white population: 
'We as Tswana have a long tradition of co-operation with the whites of Mafeking ... I 
would like to show that this is not the type of black government that is drunk with 
power, that is throwing its weight about. that is going to interfere with people. I 
would (/tke) to show the world that together we can plan, that we can do things 
together, that we can be happy. I would be terribly disappointed if Mafeking were not 
incorporated because then a golden opportunity would be lost to show the world what 
can be done '." 
The local newspaper, in particular, argued that despite enforced residential 
segregation and the advent of apartheid, a measure of social integration was apparent 
in Mafeking. Being a colonial capital, with British and Batswana civil servants, the 
claim was that the town was very different in character, in certain attitudes such as 
race relations, from neighbouring Afrikaner 'dorps' like Lichtenburg and Zeerust." 
84 Mafekmg Ma1l, 30.3.1979. 
" Mafeking Ma1l, 7.9.1979 Napier, C. 1. and Sch1emmer, L. (1985) op. cit., 
suggested: 'from hearsay evidence that the wh1tes of Maf1keng regarded the 
leadership of the already independent state of Bophuthatswana m a far more 
posit1ve light than was the case (for example) m the Transke1 or C1ske1'. 
86 As late as 1966 and Botswana's independence it was proposed that Mafeking 
was:' ... more cosmopolitan than any other c1ty or town m the Republic. One of 
1ts outstandmg v~rtues 1s that here mult1-rac1sm IS an accepted fact It works 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The presence of the Protectorate staff had prevented the National Party from 
controlling the local council until the 1970s but it was claimed that overall, the town's 
attitude to the Tswana had remained similar under both Nationalist and United Party 
control." As incorporation became a realistic possibility, and the survival of the town 
dependent upon the outcome, race relations were reinvented as harmonious, 
understanding and accommodative: 
'The people of Mafeking have not in the past ignored the sufferings ofTswana people 
and will certainly not do so now, if as seems likely, the need arises. It has always been 
the practice of the towns people to feed as many as they could, and we do not doubt 
that we will do so again in the hard winter of 1979 '." 
Mangope made many more efforts to assuage the fears of white residents regarding 
rule under a black government. A banquet given by the local Mafeking Chamber of 
Commerce (MCC) in Mangope's honour provided one such example. His speech 
emphasised that incorporation demonstrated how 'different nationalities could live 
together'. Residents responded positively suggesting that the banquet rekindled the 
glorious days of the MCC and ' ... we all get on so fabulously together, why on earth 
wzthout problems, without conscious effort It is so common place that few find 
it worthy of mentzon' Mafekzng Mazl, 25 .2.66. The Anglican priest of Zeerust 
noted that in Mafeking mixed congregations 'worshipped together w1thout 
friction' which, it was suggested, was unthinkable m Zeerust, in Parnell, S. and 
Drummond, J. (1991) op. c1t. However, it should also be noted that the Dutch 
Reformed Churches in Mafikeng, to th1s day, are still segregated. For the owner 
and editor of the local newspaper, this cosmopolitan outlook 'amidst a sea of 
Calvinism', was attributed rather less to the Bechuanaland officials, many of 
whom were described as racist South Africans, than to the composition of the 
town itself, Pobrey, J. (1996) personal commumcation. 
87 The only substantial difference between UP and NP councils, it was claimed, was 
that in the pre-National Party councils, the Indian population were not forced to 
leave the town under the Group Areas Act. However, they were not permitted to 
move or dispose of their properties to another Indian but could only sell to a 
white (often purchased at a scandalously low price) Pobrey, J. (1995) op. cit. 
Furthermore, the NP were responsible for the introduction of a curfew on the 
black population from 9pm. The curfew ended when the township was 
transferred to Bophuthatswana. 
88 Mafeking Mall, 30.3.79. 
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have n't we ever done this before?'. Other evidence of an increasing emphasis upon 
non-racialism included demands to remove the legacy of racism in Mafeking's own 
institutions: 
'There can almost certainly be no room on the governmg boards of the clubs and 
associations of Mafeking for the dyed in the wool racialists and devotees of enforced 
segregation. Mafeking will be practising what the rest of the country is so busy 
preaching'." 
As suggested, the most important promotional event for the town was the annual 
Mafeking Agricultural and Industrial Show. Prior to its cancellation due to drought, 
the local newspaper called upon the town to pledge to remove racial bars that had 
marred previous events." Efforts to promote non-racialism, at least publicly and at the 
level of relations between the local whites and Bophuthatswana elite, were 
strengthened by appeals to Mafeking' s unique ties to Botswana. The historical 
relationship between the two was emphasised during the incorporation debate, when 
Botswana was praised for its success as a black democracy and its progress since 
independence in 1966: 
'For Botswana is one of the very few countries in Africa that stzll enjoys the benefit of 
universal sujfrage, non-racial participation at all levels of government and a genuine 
parliamentary opposition'." 
Such expressions of admiration for Botswana represented the continuing ambiguity 
that had characterised relations between this white town and the Batswana. In an 
89 Mafekmg M01l, 7.9.79. A financial contribution from the MCC to Mangope's 
Bophuthatswana Democratic Party was an indication of the MCC's enthusiasm 
for incorporation and, with it, future Bophuthatswana government contracts. 
90 Mafeking Ma1l, 20.7.1979. 
91 Mafekmg Ma1l, 19.10.1979. 
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effort to depart from the 'white' Republic, the town re-oriented itself to an older deep-
seated paternalistic concern for Batswana welfare." These ideas underpinned the 
momentum for incorporation which was surely easier for the white population to 
accept when connected to the appropriate 'guidance' that Mafeking could provide for 
the Batswana within Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana government had already 
approached Mafeking Town Council to request their services in order to administer 
Mmabatho and Montshiwa on an agency basis and the benefits of 'white' skills were 
increasingly emphasised by the Bophuthatswana regime." An older historical theme 
addressing the maturation and growth of the Batswana through modernisation and 
western knowledge was superimposed upon the bantustan 'infant': 
' ... (the) creation of Bophuthatswana, even if an infant, the fact that it exists at al11s a 
very significant improvement'." 
Bophuthatswana was represented as mature enough, responsible and worthy of 
incorporating a town of seven thousand white inhabitants. However, not all of the 
local residents had a similar perception. 
5.4.2. Incorporation 
The impression should not be given that the population of Mafeking was 
homogenous or that English speaking South Africans and Afrikaners, Indians and 
Coloureds were united in their support for incorporation. Nevertheless, among 
advocates of incorporation, besides the local newspaper, arguably the most important 
92 The second chapter demonstrated the emergence of an 'evolutionary ideology' at 
the turn of the century, which charactensed the relationship between Mafeking 
and the Stadt. This ideology was based on 'trusteeship' and 'safeguarding' the 
'native' until considered mature enough to control their own affairs. 
93 House of Assembly Debates, Mafekmg's incorporation into Bophuthatswana, 
Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Bill, South African 
Hansard, Monday, 9 June 1980. 
94 Ibid. 
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were the MCC. Sid Gordon, the chairman of the MCC suggested that the majority of 
residents had voted for incorporation for economic reasons, 'I would say that more 
than 80% ofMafeking's customers are from Bophuthatswana' and that 'since the new 
state was established, trade in Mafeking has increased. We want to follow the trend 
and maintain the status quo'." However, since the 1960s in particular, the town had 
become increasingly Afrikaner in character. Over 60% of the local white population 
were Afrikaans speaking, a majority reflected in the National Party control of the 
Town Council." In 1977 the Mayor of Mafeking, Andries Bloem, declared the 
intention that: 
~s far as we are concerned, Mafeking wzll remain white'." 
Within the context of these divergent opinions on incorporation, the Du Plessis 
Commission was established in 1979 by the South African government under the 
jurisdiction of the Department for Plural Affairs. It met in Mafeking and listened to 
views on incorporation from white residents. Councillor Bloem, previously mayor of 
Mafeking, expressed support for a qualified incorporation, advocating certain 
guarantees to the residents. These guarantees included a transitional period for public 
services under white control and the maintenance of whites only schooling. Both 
guarantees were accepted by the Bophuthatswana and South African governments." 
Members of the Agricultural Union gave evidence, along with farmers and 
businessmen. Notwithstanding some emotional outbursts, overall the Commission 
was pleased with the findings in support of incorporation." Representatives of the 
9
' Star 25.7.79 
96 The NP, amongst other measures, also introduced a curfew for all blacks in 
Mafeking to be off the streets and home by 9pm. 
97 Star, 3.12.77 
98 Other guarantees included; the Victoria hosp1tal for whites was to remain 
segregated but for a transition period of five years. Local Government was to 
stay relatively unchanged with only those moving to a Maf1keng untied from the 
Group Areas Act and entitled to vote in local elections, represented by whites 
only. 
99 Mafeking Mail, 24.7.1979. 
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coloured and Asian communities also gave evidence and although these communities 
were largely apathetic about incorporation, some were drawn to Mangope's promises 
of equal voting rights and economic development."' Others were less happy, such as 
the local National Party MP, Hannes Du Toit, who personally deplored the attitude of 
the local business people in pressing for the 'take over of the town' .101 There appeared 
to be a reluctance amongst some residents to enter the 'unknown' across the white 
frontier. 
Residents who opposed incorporation were mainly Afrikaners, such as the 
headmaster of the local white only secondary school."' The Afrikaner churches also 
disputed the merits of racial integration. No 'official' poll was taken on preference for 
incorporation and there was a great deal of uncertainty and disapproval of Central 
government handling of the affair. However, the assurances given by both the South 
African and Bophuthatswana governments on safe guarding certain 'white' rights 
appeared to persuade these dissenters, including the Town Council, that incorporation 
was agreeable. The indecision and secrecy on the part of the South African 
government must be placed in the context of the symbolism that a white town's 
voluntary incorporation into a black state would have in a racially segregated country. 
Only one other white town had been incorporated into a black homeland. Port. St. 
Johns had been annexed by the Transkei in 1976 but this occurred under very different 
circumstances and 90 per cent of the whites had left the town."' 
The South African government was now aware that for separate development 
100 Interview with Raymond Roberts, formerly of Danville Coloured Management 
Committee, and Mafekmg Mat/, Mmabatho, 1995. 
101 Mafeking Mat/, 22 6.1979. 
102 Personal communication with the headmaster of Maftkeng High School, Mr. S. 
Geldenhuys, Mafikeng, January, 1995. 
103 Comparison of the two towns undergoing incorporation revealed key differences 
such as the age and property owning composition of the two towns and different 
economic structures. 40% of Port St. Johns population were pensioners, whilst 
in Maftkeng the comparable figure was just 11%, whilst 90% of people in Port 
St. Johns were property owners compared to 50% in Maftkeng. Port St. 1 ohns 
lacked even hght industry and was a poor farming area dependent upon tourism. 
In comparison Mafeking's economy was 'booming' following incorporation, in 
Napier, C. 1. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) op. cit. 
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to be maintained further efforts to consolidate homeland territory were necessary. 
Mafeking was intended as an indication of the South African government's co-
operation with the 'independent' black states and by implication a gesture to black 
Africa."' South African Members of Parliament debated the merits of incorporation 
and government representatives suggested that Mafeking's incorporation would 
promote the 'confidence' of black Africans in the South African policy: 
' ... just as in past history, Mafeking must also keep its place in the history of the foture, 
and Mafeking must remain a symbol of South Africa's confidence in Africa. Allow me 
therefore to express the hope that Africa will betray neither our confidence nor 
Mafeking'."' 
The softening ideological position was revealed by the comments of the South African 
Minister for Co-operation and Development who described the 'transfer as a 
milestone in the history of the country' •1" The national press began to reflect the 
desires of the residents of Mafeking by reporting that the majority favoured 
incorporation and that 'South Africa should accept the possible incorporation of white 
towns into black spots', 107 especially as the government was prepared to protect house 
prices, pensions and citizenship for whites in Mafeking. Given a choice between Dr. 
Verwoerd's 'better poor but racially separate' and 'better rich and integrated', 
104 House of Assembly Debates, Mafeking's incorporation into Bophuthatswana, 
Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Bill, Hansard, 
(1980:8398) op. cit. 
105 Dr. W. D Kotze, Ibid. pp. 8395. 
106 Ibid. The South African Government's support for incorporation was reflected in 
certain guarantees, particularly intervention to stabilise the property market: 
'the population of Maj1keng is urged to remam there, and there are no s1gns of 
a general intention to leave, but there w1ll be no d~rect or md1rect pressure 
upon them to remain. An undertakmg IS therefore g1ven that properties will be 
bought by the RSA •f the owner can not find a buyer 1n the free market at a 
reasonable price Market value IS determined according to current pr1ces of 
comparable properties, also in surroundmg towns and not be fllr:ed h1gher or 
lower by reason of mcorporation'. In effect the South African Development 
Trust sheltered the property market. In P1ckard-Cambridge (1988) op. cit. 
107 Various SA national newspapers mcluding Rand Daily Mall and Star. 
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Mafeking's businessmen were portrayed as supporting integration.'" The majority of 
local residents and the Bophuthatswana government also appeared enthusiastic about 
incorporation. A study shortly before incorporation indicated that seven out of ten of 
Mafeking' s whites indicated a willingness to accept incorporation.'" However, the 
imagery of a white town's incorporation into a black state remained powerful. Central 
government would allow Mafeking's incorporation but only after having qualified the 
town's reasons for voluntarily leaving the 'white' Republic. 
In order to explain this 'unusual' decision, national images began to 
manipulate Mafeking's difference from the rest of South Africa by representing the 
town as an imperial residue, a Victorian relic on the landscape with a 'proud 
aristocratic attitude (which) still lives on in the town of Mafeking'."' Tales from the 
siege days were applied to the contemporary situation with all its uncertainty and the 
image was of an eccentric Mafeking."' The South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC), not renown for its subtleties, produced a programme on Mafeking and the 
incorporation issue. There was an angry response from the Mafeking Council and 
residents for its portrayal of the town: 
' .. which had nothing to recommend it save slums, filth and donkey carts ... what we 
may ask ourselves was the purpose of this doctored vision of Mafoking's image to the 
world. .. '."' 
108 Ibid. 109 However, amongst a sample of 103 house owners this support decreased to 
54.4% for, against 28% and 6% who did not know, in Badenhorst, M. S. (1980) 
op. c1t. A poll conducted by Pretoria school students, not released until 
incorporation had taken place, indicated 66% support for incorporation 
(Mafzkeng Mazl, 3.10.1980). 
110 RDM, 8.9.79. 
111 Therefore, focus upon characters like the 88 year old granny Crew, the oldest 
living Mafeking resident, indicated the recasting of Pioneering charactenst1cs to 
adjust to the changing times just as the siege residents had done. 
112 According to the Mafekzng Mazl the documentary focused 'on the derelict 
pavilion on Recreation Ground, not used for a decade, even the Victoria 
Hospital received this. Half the old wmg (was) in camera with only the name 
'Victoria' appearing, looking for all the world like some ancient and deserted 
railway siding. Talk about slanted journalism!'. Mafekzng Mazl, 4.7.79. 
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The locals claimed that the programme's portrayal of Mafeking as a 'dorp' was 
attributed to either bad film making or more sinisterly: 
'If we reject that (bad journalism), then the only explanation is sinister, to say the 
least; that the picture of Mafeking as it is today was deliberately distorted so that 
anyone seeing it would immedzately come to the conclusion that if that is what 
Mafeking looks like, then the sooner we hand zt over to the nearest black homeland 
the better. Could this really be the explanation/ Surely not!'."' 
For many in the town, the programme appeared to epitomise the years of neglect by 
central governments, the failure and perhaps lack of will to encourage the provision of 
facilities, services and industries to Mafeking: 
'We have had a good reason in the past to regard ourselves as a stepchild among 
towns in this country Too often have we been passed over when communal largesse 
was being distributed by beneficent Authority; army camps, railway workshops, 
industries- these have almost always gone to others ... we are not to be treated as cattle 
waiting/or the auctioneers hammer to descend'."' 
This neglect had often been attributed to unforgiving Afrikaner administrations who 
113 Mafeking Mail, 4.7.79. 
114 The sense of marginality was captured in the following headlines: 'Let there be 
an end to this indecision', Mafeking Ma1l, 22.6.1979 and 'We have been 
teetering on the edge of the Cape Province, so to speak, for a number of years 
and it only requires the scratch of a bureaucratic pen to send us over the top', 
Mafekmg Ma1l, 9.2.1979 and 'Its cold comfort that the much vaunted Border 
industry pol1cy has now officially been labelled a failure. For us 1t was a 
failure years ago and as it brought us nothing, we have lost nothmg in the 
process . . when Mafekmg had been deSignated a growth pomt the (news) paper 
had tried its best to get some benefit for the town.. d1rect to interested 
entrepreneurs and also indirect (ly) v1a government pressure but w1th negat1ve 
results .. '. Mafekmg Ma1l, 13.7.79. 
' 
' 
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regarded Mafeking as a vivid symbol of 'Engelse Imperialisme'.115 Mafeking was 
portrayed as curious, strange, possibly a one-off, and this perception of 'difference' 
legitimised its incorporation in the eyes of white South Africa. It was even suggested 
that South Africa 'gladly' handed Mafeking over to Bophuthatswana.'" For residents 
it was a celebration of the pioneering spirit of the frontier.'" 
The South Africa government finally agreed to incorporation on March 26th 
1980 but it was not until September 18th that a fmal date was given. Mafeking's name 
was to revert, significantly, to the original Tswana spelling of Mafikeng and 
'Mafekingians' hearts were sore but rejoiced that after 95 years, (they would) rejoin a 
proper spelling'. After 95 years of searching for an identity it had supposedly been 
discovered in 'black' Africa as 'a matter of historic justice that simultaneously the 
town is returning to its original destiny' .111 
Mafeking's incorporation can be interpreted in a number of ways. It can be 
claimed that it was mere opportunism on the part of the business community.'" For 
the majority of Bophuthatswana' s black residents it was a non-event, regarded as a 
token gesture, since they opposed the enforced balkanisation of South Africa through 
the bantustan system anyway. For white residents support for incorporation can only 
be properly explained, in contrast to the incorporation of Port St. Johns into Transkei, 
by the guarantees given by the Bophuthatswana and South African governments: 
"' This Empire tag had been a product of Mafeking's earlier history and 
particularly the S1ege of the Boer War, wh1ch in addition to the resistance of the 
town and Stadt, included the burial of hundreds of Afrikaner women and 
children who had died in concentration camps erected by the British just outside 
the town. 
116 Pobrey, J, personal communication, 1996. 
117 
' •• Mafeking would be unique m South Afnca as an entire community of wh1tes 
and blacks stretchmg out the1r hand to each other. Mafekzng w1ll be 95 years 
old next year. If 1t ceases to ex 1st under 1ts own name, 1t w1ll at least have made 
a whoppzng great contnbut1on to the chequered history of South Afnca', RDM, 
1.10.1979. 
118 Mafekzng Mail, 16.9.1980. 
119 The local newspaper itself, With its extensive printing works, was one of the 
largest businesses in town. This partly explains the editors promotion of 
incorporation. 
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'If clear declarations had been issued m the case of Port St. Johns as was the case in 
Mafikeng concerning property rights and political rights, then uncertainties and fears 
about the future might be reduced and the Port St. Johns white community saved'."' 
These important guarantees should also be seen in the context of Mafeking' s 
exceptional location. Arguably, the proximity to black Africans although often 
producing friction also produced a tolerance bred by familiarity and in comparison to 
other towns, relatively more benign race relations. The reconciliation to being part of 
rather than in Africa was nonetheless remarkable for a 'white' town within racially 
separated South Africa. This was a function of characteristics of the town which over 
one hundred years of frontier experience had pushed Mafeking into joining a black 
'state'. 
Following incorporation, Mangope continued to appeal to common efforts to 
modernise and 'develop' Bophuthatswana and to reverse its marginality. Prominent 
white and black groups adhered to discourses of transformation. Incorporation rapidly 
symbolised Bophuthatswana's own subordination to powerful ideas, practices and for 
some, the opportunities associated with modernisation. 
5.5. Uniting the Diversity 
By 1979, with the incorporation ofMafeking an increasing possibility, a new 
planning report for Mmabatho had been demanded by Mangope. The overall objective 
was to unify the urban components, referred to as the Mafikeng-Mmabatho-
Montshiwa complex (MMM): 
'To weld such diverse elements into one organic whole'.'" 
120 Napier, C.]. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) op. c1t. 
121 From Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners (1979b:l) Mmabatho New Capital 
of Bophuthatswana, 'Revised Development Plan if Mafekmg incorporated into 
Bophuthats~ana', September, Ref. 80/511, which this section draws upon. 
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 220 
In order to link the urban centres of Mafikeng and Mmabatho, the planning approach 
shifted from a unifocal to a bifocal emphasis. As a result, a conflict began to emerge 
between the increasing emphasis, particularly contained in the Five Year Plan, upon 
'national requirements' and local level needs. The overall thrust of the reports paid 
significantly less attention to the Tswana dimension that had characterised Mangope's 
specific requests in the 1978 plan. Instead a distinct modernising impulse was 
detected which ignored Tswana culture and emphasised the control and 'proper 
development' of the urban and surrounding rural areas: 
'A glance of the map shows that if the municipal area of Mafeking is incorporated 
and becomes part of the capital city, other contiguous areas must also be considered 
for inclusion .. if the total potential of the urban area around Mafeking and 
Mmabatho is to be properly developed and economically and efficiently planned and 
admznistered '."' 
This 'potential urban area', shown by the diagram, included the diverse settlements of 
the 'white' town of Mafeking, the new capital, Mmabatho, the Barolong Tribal 
Authority area known as MontshiwaStadt (the 'Stadt'), the Imperial Reserve, and the 
apartheid townships of Montshiwa Town (black township) and Danville (coloured 
township). It also included an area of settlement immediately north east of Mafeking, 
previously a farm, 'Lonely Park', which was characterised as a potential slum area. 
Incorporation represented the opportunity to control and develop urban land 
economically and efficiently. 
122 MLH {1979b). 
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Whereas the approach of previous reports was one of flexibility, this changed to 
emphasise 'some form of regulatory control of the surrounding sub-region as well as 
the City ... to control urban sprawl'.'" To that end, the 'Stadt' was identified as 'the 
real problem for planning Mmabatho': 
'it becomes as time passes more and more difficult to distinguish its boundaries from 
123 Stewart Scott, Plan Assoctates: Mmabatho, Structure Plan 2000, Report One, 
Working Document, December, 1992. 
124 MLH, (19'79b:l). 
- - ----------------------
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the remainder of the urban area'."' 
5.5.1. The Stadt and Mmabatho 
From 'independence' in 1977 the Mafikeng area's population had rapidly 
increased from approximately 35,000 in 1976 to over 85,000 in 1985."' The 
population and growth rate of the MMM complex is shown by suburb in the tables. 
Whilst the Mmabatho suburb increased rapidly, as would be expected of a new city, at 
over 30% between 1980 and 1985, another significant feature was the dramatic 
growth of the surrounding tribal areas, approximately 60,000 or 60% of the capital 
area's total population in 1985."' 
This rapid growth of 'informal' areas was related to the capital's economic 
boom and the migration of those seeking employment."' Most people found 
accommodation on tribal land following the payment of a fee to the local chief. The 
chief, along with the Tribal Authority, derived power from the control over land 
allocation. This feature of the Stadt therefore greatly complicated the proposals for the 
local government structure of the capital. Despite the town planners who advocated 
the Stadt' s incorporation into the municipal boundaries, this was never done. The 
most common explanation given by a number of interviewees was simply in terms of 
the Stadt's status as a 'tribal area'. As seen in section 3.4.1, Mangope had preserved 
and enhanced traditional authority which had given chiefs and tribal authorities 
control over land allocation, tribal levies and certain legal matters. However, the 
acceptance of chieftaincy as the basis of rural local government did not mean that 
Mangope was reluctant to intervene in tribal matters. It should be remembered that 
Mangope had taken tribal land for the construction ofMmabatho, without recourse to 
""Ibid. pp3. 
126 Cowley's estimates in Drummond and Parnell (1991) Parnell (1986) also noted 
the existence of several large resettlement vtllages in a 25 kilometre radius of 
Mmabatho. 
121 MLH (1980b). By 1991 this percentage of the total population of the 'mformal 
areas' was 68% or 90,000 out of the 133,000 total. Stewart Scott, Plan 
Associates, Mmabatho, Structure Plan 2000, Report One, Working Document, 
December, 1992. 
128 Drummond and Parnell (1991). 
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the normal procedure of a tnbal resolution or compensation for the local tribal 
authority. 
1980-1985 1985-1990 
% % 
Suburb per annum per annum 
Danville 2.00. 2.00. 
Mafikeng 0,97 -2,47 
Mmabatho 32,75 I 17.69 
. i 
Montshiwa 4,13 I -0.09 
TOTAL 7,49 6,01 
Population 
Estimate 
SUburb 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1001 •• 
Danvill<! 2269 • 2494 2644 • 2696 • 2647 • 2700 • 2764 • 2809 
Mafllceng 7176 7529 7343 7161 6984 6811 6643 6479 
Mmabatho 1914 7892 9288 10931 12866 16141 17822 20978 
Montshiwa 7709 9438 9430 9422 9414 9406 9397 9388 
TOTAL 19058 27363 28605 30109 31910 34068 36616 39664 
Table 5.1 Mmabatho's population increase by suburb."' 
129 From Stewart Scott ( 1992) op. cit. 
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The strict control of land through a single tier local authority was considered 
to have a negative impact upon the Stadt and instead local characteristics were 
thought to require careful consideration: 
'This special treatment of Montshiwa Stadt is intended to recognise its special 
circumstances and to provide a means of ensuring its improvement without imposing 
alien regulations which could seriously retard economic development'.'" 
The Stadt was identified by the planners as capable of providing a number of uses, 
with cheap land available for new migrants to the area, which could complement 
Mmabatho's development. Rigid control of land was considered as 'inappropriate' 
and Brasilia was cited as an example of the problems arising with 'urban development 
springing up beyond the city limits'."' The emphasis upon this 'special treatment' was 
directed towards avoidance of an urban landscape spoiled by squatters. The inclusion 
of Mafeking was an opportunity to cement the modernist vision for Greater 
Mmabatho that could develop the 'entire urban area ... as a whole rather than as 
fragmented individual entities'. There was the impression in this report that the 
respect for 'tradition' occupied a highly ambiguous position. The planners' main 
concern, ultimately, was somewhat different: 
'To weld together communities with such widely differing past backgrounds . present 
and future ambitions will be a matter requzring special skills... the Consultants 
strongly recommend a specialist be asked to report on this who has both Southern 
African and International experience'."' 
This exercise in welding the diffuse fragments together drew upon the professional 
services of Dr. L. P. Green, formerly advisor to Johannesburg City Council and also 
130 Ibid. pp. 28. 
131 Ibid. pp29 
132 Ibid. 
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an international consultant on Lagos, Calcutta and Istanbul, and, more recently, the 
Newtown area of Johannesburg. This appointment tended to reinforce the view that 
Mmabatho was being shaped by internationally applicable principles and 'laws' of 
urban development. 
The conflict between the local traditional authorities and government officials, 
who considered the 'informal' areas as a 'blot' on the landscape of the 'national' 
capital, symbolised the friction between maintaining respect for local conditions and 
promoting the 'national' vision. The question of whether or not to include the Stadt 
within the municipal boundaries would remain a feature of the 'independence' years 
and these conflicts were built into the urban fabric. Indeed, the boundary between the 
two, the width of a tarred road, was the stark perimeter separating the 'rural and pen-
urban' from 'urban' settlements. 
The dependence of the 'national' capital upon government functions and 
resources was considered as natural, particularly when Mmabatho was compared to 
three other 'modern' capitals: 
'The primary sources of revenue for Mmabatho are derived from areas outside of the 
new city complex as would be expected in any national capital. Washington, Brazilia 
and Canberra being noteworthy examples'."' 
The emphasis upon the expectations of 'any national capital' ignored cultural 
and socio-economic differences between all four cities and neglected local detail. At 
best local particularisrns needed to be modified and at worst were merely adjuncts to 
the project of creating a modern city. The huge level of developmental bias towards 
Mmabatho was revealed in the Five Year Plan. 
133 Ibid. pp22. 
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5.5.2. The Five Year Plan for Mmabatho: 'The basic assumptions as regards the 
nature and requirements of a Capital City'. 
The development objectives of the Five Year Plan for Mmabatho were derived 
by MLH from a combination of what were considered 'national and local goals and 
objectives'. These goals and objectives evolved from the 1979 BDC (Bophuthatswana 
Development Council) Annual Report, Cabinet Policy statements, agreed priorities of 
the Mmabatho Technical Planning Committee and the investigations of the planning 
team itself, MLH. The brief of the Five Year Plan from July 1980 set out the basis for 
the Mmabatho Development Programme and sought to promote the: 
'harmonious development of the new capztal city of Mmabatho, including the newly 
incorporated town of Mafeking, the existing Montshiwa town, Montshiwa Stadt, and 
other settlements such as Lonely Park, forming part of the total urban area '.134 
The report"' was intended as an impetus towards implementation of 'inunediate' 
requirements and to 'structure the large capital investment programmes that are 
presently underway'. The plan was supposedly 'to ensure that they are being best 
directed to meet the real needs of both the growing population at all income levels and 
134 Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners; July, 1980a:l, Proposed brief for the 5· 
year Plan to integrate Mmabatho, Montshiwa, Mafeking and the Adjoining 
Settlements to form the New Capital city, Ref. 81/508. 
"' The framework for the plan was based upon both the brief and the preliminary 
report wh1ch stated the following more specific objectives: 'To promote job 
creation through encouragement of labour mtensive industries; To ensure that 
all areas of the MMM complex enjoy reasonable access to employment 
opportumtles; To ensure the equitable spread of investment throughout all seven 
areas in relation to their needs; To provide a variety of housing and social 
facilities in relation to the needs, preferences and ability to pay of the 
population; To ensure the most economic and productive use of all capital 
investment funds by means of, accepting and upgrading existing settlements, 
inf1lling and expandmg all developed and/or serviced areas, increasing 
densities, reviewing des1gn standards of roads and services; To make provision 
for the expected influx of migrants to the developing complex; To ensure that 
education and training are available to the whole population'. Mallows, Louw 
and Hoffe and Partners, October, 1980b:54&55, Mmabatho, Montshiwa, 
Mafikeng, 5 Year Development Plan 1981-1985, Preliminary report. 
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of the various government departments'.136 The framework to co-ordinate the urban 
development of Mmabatho reflected the technical language and modernist methods of 
control. This methods were reflected in the complex procedure for planning based 
upon the 'Mmabatho Planning Framework: Schematic Description' which was 
proposed as a guide by the Departments of Economic Affairs and Urban Affairs and 
Land Tenure for the 'functioning of the Mmabatho Technical Planning Committee'."' 
The service and infrastructural requirements of these areas were devised through what 
was called a 'component breakdown' which the consultants suggested 'acts as a check 
list for all the actions needed for urban development'."' The method used to guide 
urban development and to provide the basis for calculating priorities, allocation of 
funds and budget control was the 'well-known "Planning Programming Budgeting 
System" or P.P.B.S'. This system reflected the adoption at local level planning of the 
technical language of the PPB previously seen at the 'national' level: 
' . . defined as the functional schedule for the sequential carrying out of stipulated 
plans and programmes and providing, as an essential part of the system, constant 
feed-back and monitoring provisions'."' 
In other words 'needs' were derived from calculating 'data assessment' based upon 
the population for each area of the overall complex and commensurate provision of 
services and infrastructure. However, the shape and pattern of urban development also 
rested upon the assumptions that formed the basis of the 'Identification of Basic 
Objectives'. The definition of 'priorities' centred upon: 
'The basic assumptions as regards the nature and the requzrements of a Capital City, 
the seat of Natzonal government,.. its position in the National Economy... the 
136 Ibid. pp I. 
137 MLH (1980b)Figure One. 
138 MLH (!980a:l) 
139 Ibid. 
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consequent appropriate development policy'.'" 
The exact definition and weighting given to these 'basic assumptions' was related to 
international definitions and government pressures. Bophuthatswana National 
Priorities were recommended by the BDC Annual Report of 1979.'" The 'national' 
priorities of the BDC were clearly with industry, government, infrastructure, housing 
and not services. It was also clear that Mmabatho itself was given highest profile as a 
'special regional project' with a 22% rating. The top priorities for the Mmabatho 
development progranune were housing, serviced sites, industrial sites and ancillary 
infrastructure. The Central Business complex, police station and local government 
buildings were all prominent concerns. These priorities were applied to the MMM 
complex on the basis that 'development objectives' determined allocation of funds . 
However, MLH were critical of these priorities: 
'It would appear from the preceding analysis however, that the Mmabatho 
development programme has to date paid insufficient attention to lower income 
housing, educational facilities, the provision of employment opportunities and 
community faczlities. It is considered essential that the priorities for the Mmabatho 
Five Year Development Programme take into account these specific areas of 
concern '.141 
In addition to those projects listed the government had a range of other projects 
waiting for approval, supposedly directed towards 'national' prestige, which had not 
even been costed into the existing framework. MLH pointed out that the local 
allocation had no relation to the BDC National priority rating, such as 'economic 
sector' development and 'health and social welfare'. In Mmabatho just four projects 
received 72% of all funds: Housing 25%, Government Buildings 23%, 
140 MLH (1980a:2) 
141 Bophuthatswana Development Council (1979b·S2&53) Annual Report. 
142 MLH (1980b:54) 
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Communications 14%, Law and Order 10% and Mmabatho itself 90.5% of the total 
budget. Although R41 million was allocated to Mmabatho, despite containing 60% of 
the population for the entire area, the 'Stadt' and 'Lonely Park' areas would receive 
less than 2% of total funding. After deducting costs of projects underway and of those 
already tendered, only a fraction of the total sum would then be available for other 
projects. 
It was clear that MLH considered national priorities to be outstripping local 
needs. The consultants proposed that some of the 'national' projects be deferred until 
the local level gained higher priority: 
'Wh1le it is recognised that Mmabatho as the Capital City of Bophuthatswana has an 
important national role to fulfil, and as such money must be available for prestigious 
national projects, it is felt that this has been occurring to the neglect of other 
important aspects of new town development. It is recommended that the emphasis of 
the development programme be switched for at least a number of years from national 
projects to more local projects so as to reinforce the social and economic base of the 
Mmabatho Montsh1wa Mafikeng complex'.'" 
An alternative proposal was suggested by MLH on the basis of these fmdings. 
Together with the following objectives, these alternative proposals formed the basis of 
the planning principles underpinning the Five Year Plan: 
'National goals and objectives should be reflected' 
'The real needs of the whole population sl?ould determine future development' 
'A balance between national and local needs and between the component planning 
areas and different needs should be aimed at'.'" 
143 MLH (1980b:61) 
144 Ibid. 
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However, MLH had themselves been the principal planners for both Mmabatho and 
the grandiose Government Buildings which dominated the budget expenditure. 
Although they emphasised local 'needs', how these were derived was open to 
interpretation, compounded by an almost total neglect of participation. MLH's revised 
distribution of funds to each area revealed only a slight improvement to an otherwise 
overwhelming 'urban bias' towards Mmabatho, itself receiving 87.7%. MLH 
suggested that their proposals be accepted in principle as the five year plan. 
The Bophuthatswana government maintained its rhetorical position of 'a very 
heavy emphasis upon rural people'"' despite the leading role given to Mmabatho as 
the catalyst of development. These pro-rural claims were hard to substantiate given 
that the capital received a large proportion of the National 'development fund'. In 
1980 for example, of a total development budget of R107 million, the Mmabatho 
Development Project received 27 million or 22% of the National Development 
Budget."' This proportion increased through the 1980s to approximately 30-40% of 
the 'Development' Budget.'" 
The fault lines within the Bophuthatswana nation-building structure were 
becoming pronounced and manifested themselves over the Five Year Plan. 
Mmabatho's infrastructure was entirely newly built and could therefore be expected to 
cost a considerable amount. The 'priorities', however, were deeply influenced by the 
manipulation of Mmabatho as a powerful national symbol by the Bophuthatswana 
government, in addition to the planners, architects, engineers and consultants who saw 
the fmancial benefits of such projects. The MLH report was critically received even 
by those actively promoting the economic development of the bantustans. It was 
claimed by a leading business publication that MLH had assisted Bophuthatswana in 
promoting 'image building' projects at a much higher level of priority than the 
145 Pioneer, 1981. 
146 See de Clercq in Graaf de V, J F. (1986) The Present State of Urbanisation in the 
South African homelands and some future scenario's, Department of Sociology, 
Occasional paper, No. 11, University of Stellenbosch. See also Pioneer, 198 I. 
147 Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
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'immediate needs of a developing nation'."' Interestingly this dilemma was portrayed 
as the typical 'Third World Sin'."' The 'National' ambitions of the Bophuthatswana 
regime were regarded as detrimental to the welfare of the majority in the Stadt 
because Mmabatho was being promoted as a 'national' capital rather than a regional 
centre. Nonetheless, these characteristics were used to differentiate Bophuthatswana 
from 'developed' countries and the bantustan was represented in official circles as a 
country considered as having a set of problems common to the third world: 
'As Bophuthatswana falls into the category of a Third World, or rather Less 
Developed Country, zt faces a host of additional problems ... ''" 
The consultants responded to the criticisms of their Five Year Plan by simply 
emphasising the importance of 'modem' symbols for nation-building: 
'When a nation is trying to exert independence, they want visible symbols. 
Psychologically, this is very important. The buildings are designed to express that 
nation-hood through a united capital city'.'" 
Mangope strenuously denied that Bophuthatswana had fallen into 'the wide-spread 
Third-World practice' of supplying top politicians with 'new houses that are the last 
word in luxury and extravagance' .1" In the same speech to Parliament the capital was 
presented as if the embodiment of Bophuthatswana' s achievements which forced the 
critics to concede that 'the Batswana have something special'. Mmabatho's Mayor 
suggested that the city's facilities were necessary in order for Mmabatho to 'live up to 
its name': 
148 Fmancial Mail, 6.3.1981. 
149 Ibid. 
150 MLH in SA Architecture ( 1981) op. ctt. 
"'A spokesperson for MLH, ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
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'The city lives up to its name which means mother-of-the-nation because as the 
Republic of Bophuthatswana's first 'city' and capital, it is home to the seat of 
government and its accompanying admmistrative departments. It is home to our 
national university, the University of Bophuthatswana ... all of the nation's parastatal 
bodies, such as the Agricultural Corporation, Bophuthatswana National Provident 
Fund, Bop TV and Radio Service'.'" 
These projects reflected the considerable government expenditure benefiting 
Mmabatho and those able to live within the municipality. For most of its 'own' 
projects, the Mmabatho Council had raised loans from the Bophuthatswana 
government and particularly, when upgrading infrastructure, from the Development 
Bank of South Africa."' Generally, it was claimed by the Town Engineer, the 
municipality's own projects were economically viable."' The Bophuthatswana 
government financed a sewer system in the Mmabatho CBD at cost of approximately 
R8 million and the main stormwater drainage system at approximately R5 million.'" 
In these cases the city and Mmabatho Council received the benefit from the 
Bophuthatswana government's expenditure, whilst liaison between the two was 
reduced to a formality. These are only two examples of the lavish government funds 
made available for such schemes. 
In 1984 the amalgamation of the urban areas of Mafikeng, Mmabatho and 
Montshiwa township into a common municipality was heavily publicised as an 
'"Mayoral Report, 1987-1988, Mmabatho City Council. 
154 For example, for sewage systems in Mafikeng/Danville and Montshiwa costing 
over RI! Million. Smit, H. (1995) Mmabatho City Engmeer, interview, 
Mmabatho. 
155 The Mmabatho Council, when possible, recovered the cost of Its loans through 
service charges with a uniform tanff structure. These projects were financed in 
various ratios, between the Bophuthatswana Government, the Development Bank 
and the local authonty, for example, the Mmabatho Disposal Works costing R7 
million, was financed by each body providmg a third of costs. Sm1t (1995) op. 
cit. 
"
6 According to Smit, op. cit. 
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indication of the creation of an 'alternative' non-racial society by the Bophuthatswana 
government. Whilst blacks could be elected onto the Municipal Council for the first 
time, Pickard-Cambridge has suggested that the creation of a unified local authority 
was not popularly sought amongst blacks. Instead the amalgamation was instigated by 
the Bophuthatswana government in order to impress the world that a desegregated 
'South African' city had been created.'" The prominent positions within the 
Mrnabatho Municipal Town Council were dominated by whites, formerly of the 
Mafeking Town Council and also seconded officials from South Africa.'" By 1987 
there were five African and four white Councillors and one coloured Councillor."' To 
cope with the rapid expansion and demand on services' .. the Council's personnel 
strength grew to 967 by 1988. Strong links to the ruling BDP secured positions within 
the Council.'" By 1983, of Bophuthatswana's eighteen towns, only Mafikeng was a 
municipality, seven had town councils, whilst ten were administered by government 
officials 'without assistance from the local cornmunity'.'"Local politics in Mrnabatho, 
such as it existed, was an extension of the 'national' level authoritarianism."' 
157 Ptckard-Cambridge (1988). 
,. For instance by 1992 the Town Clerk, City Secretary and Chtef Engineer, 
amongst others, were whtte South Africans. 
159 Pickard-Cambndge, C. (1988) op. cit. 
160 Mmabatho's total property valuations increased from over R493 milhon to over 
RI 661 million by 1994 (estimates) Mayoral Report, Mmabatho Municipahty, 
1992/1993. 
161 M. Gcinumkhonto, personal communication, May, 1996. Chapter Six indicates 
that opposttion political parties were banned by 1987. It is interesttng to note, 
as shown in chapters seven and eight, that some Mmabatho Local Authority 
officials became involved in the 'SATSWA' regional coalition of conservative 
forces whose proposals were centered upon devolution of power to Mmabatho in 
post-apartheid regional dispensation. Furthermore, in the final days of the 
Bophuthatswana Administration, several Mmabatho Municipal officials aided 
the invasion of Mmabatho by white neo-fasctst extremists of the A WB. 
162 Minister of Local Government and Housing, S.L.L. Rathebe, Pioneer, August, 
1983. 
163 This is not to suggest that there was total harmony between Central 
Government/Parastatal structures and Mmabatho. Despite the heavy bias of 
expenditure towards the capttal area there was a continuing shortage of housing, 
especially at lower income levels. The Housing Committee of Mmabatho 
Council claimed that this was due to the Bophuthatswana Housing Corporation 
(BHC) being 'out of touch with the community' with no community 
representatives sitting on the BHC board. Minutes of Committee Meeting, 1992. 
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With the incorporation ofMafikeng and the creation of a unified municipality, 
Mmabatho was increasingly represented as a multi-racial melting-pot reflecting 
national sovereignty and therefore distance from apartheid South Africa. To reinforce 
the government's representation of a non-racial society, the Group Areas Act was 
removed from Mafeking and other apartheid legislation was repealed. The Tswana 
nationalist position of the government conflicted with the portrayal of the capital as 
the meeting place of both the western world and African cultural heritage, through 
which the 'children will blend the best of both worlds together and a new and 
wondrous national culture will develop'.'" The city was consistently represented as a 
racially harmonious settlement amidst the turbulence of South Africa: 
'To the prospective resident, Mmabatho offers you the chance to live within one of the 
most peacefUl, harmonious and folly integrated societies in Southern Africa'."' 
Since 'independence' residential segregation has broken down with small movements 
of middle-class African, coloured and Indian residents into previously whites-only 
areas.'" By 1987 Pickard-Cambridge has calculated that about one in six residents in 
formerly white suburbs were black. The slow pace of desegregation, comparable to 
Windhoek, reflected that there was no 'significant' white exodus from Maflkeng and 
that housing opportunities in the white suburbs were limited. Some factors for this 
slow movement included the significant move to 'home-ownership' in Montshiwa. 
However, 1t does suggest that both local and central government structures were 
predominantly 'top-down'. 
164 Ibid. 165 Mayoral Report, 1990-1991, Mmabatho City Council. By the mid-1980s, 
according to Louw's study, 75.5% of local whites suggested that incorporation 
had been 'the right dec1sion' and only 9 3% disagreed. 64.3% suggested that 
race relations were 'good', 13% 'excellent', and 22% 'sometimes good/bad'. It 
was significant that almost 40% of respondents had been living in Maf1keng for 
less than a year, suggesting a changing population composition amongst white 
residents. Of those resident in Mafikeng for over five years, 65.8% favoured 
incorporation, whilst for those resident between 1-5 years this rate increased to 
81.1%. In Louw, A. D. (1986) op. cit. 
166 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (1991) op. cit 
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Furthermore, prior to the 1984 amalgamation, residents of Montshiwa and Mrnabatho 
had been exempt from local taxation whereas Mafikeng had not. The key difference 
between the post-independence urban transformation of Harare and Windhoek and 
that of Maflkeng, was the creation of Mrnabatho as a new capital city with the 
construction and availability of non-racial suburbs. Residents who wished, and who 
could afford, to move from the townships would also be closer to facilities and places 
of employment within Mrnabatho itself: 
'It is thus movement to Mmabatho, rather than to formerly white Mafikeng, which 
provides the most accurate guide to settlement patterns after desegregation and in 
fact many Montshiwa residents moved to the capital, whose suburbs are 
predominantly black, but with a significant proportion of white residents'."' 
The major effect of the removal of the Group Areas Act was to 'inflll' buffer zones 
that had previously separated segregated areas. The barriers between suburbs had been 
eroded, if not relatively unchanged internally, to give the impression of a 'common' 
city. Whites had been shown to accept residential desegregation ahead of opening 
'white' schools to all races. Within the context of a polarised and politicised South 
African society, Mrnabatho and even the 'Stadt' were portrayed as peaceful in contrast 
to South Africa and the eastern parts of Bophuthatswana. With political upheaval 
throughout South Africa there was evidence that, to some extent at least, people had 
sought to escape this by coming to the capital area itself."' Migrant workers leaving 
Bophuthatswana for work in South Africa also placed their families in the Stadt due to 
its relative safety .169 
167 Pickard-Cambridge, C. (1988) op. c1t. 
168 One resident m Mmabatho commented that his mothers house in Klerksdorp had 
been the target of political violence and burnt by ANC 'comrades'. The family 
fled to 'Lonely Park' squatter camp, adjacent to Mmabatho, in order to avoid 
being caught in further violence, personnel communication, Mmabatho, 1995. 
169 Border, T. (1995) Director, Huff, Border, Smith and Associates, Consulting 
Engineers and Project Managers, and formerly Manager of Mmabatho Technical 
Planning Committee, interview, Mmabatho, 23.3.95. interview. 
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The other predominant pattern structuring the entire city, particularly the 
residential areas, was the 'hierarchical organisation of the civil service and other state 
organisations' .110 Although over 6,000 formal housing units had been built in 
Mmabatho since 'independence', these were primarily, if not exclusively, for state 
employees. There has also been a significant level of immigration of South African 
whites and other expatriates, including a large number of Africans from outside of 
South Africa to Mmabatho.171 However, the Stadt and other 'informal' areas were not 
incorporated into the Mmabatho municipality. The failure to do so, for a variety of 
reasons, principally cited as the complexity of tradition and opposition from the Tribal 
Authorities, would serve to exacerbate the rapidly growing material rift between 
Mmabatho and its peri-urban hinterland. 
5.5.3. The Bureaucratic Castle 
As seen earlier, the first MLH plans in 1978 and the 1979 Business Centre 
Development Plan had been guided by Mangope's desire to create a 'living 
monument' for the Batswana. Whereas many of the great capitals of the world 
occupied a commanding hill or vantage point, Mmabatho lacked these features. 
According to one engineer, 'to create a focus for the nation, you had to do it with your 
buildings in conjunction with the landscape' .172 The government building complex 
called Garona, or 'at our place', had been intended as the focus of the entire city. The 
architectural team responsible for Garona described the essence of the project: 
'It was folt that the buzlding in its immediate urban context should recognise the 
history and identity of its inhabitants, but that it should function at the same time in 
170 Drummond and Parnell (1991) op. cit. 
171 Drummond and Parnell (1991) draw parallels between the number of expatriates, 
concerned with aid and development issues, in Mafikeng and other cities such as 
Harare and Windhoek. The dominance of expatriates withtn administrative 
positions within Bophuthatswana structures created serious conflicts by the mid-
1980s (chapter six). 
172 Border, T. (1995) op. cit. 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 237 
the modern world'.113 
The architects envisioned Garona as a modem idiom of the kgotla, considered by 
Mangope to be the core essence of Tswana architecture.'" In order to incorporate 
aspects of 'tradition', the architects proposed Baroque planning with monumental 
boulevards, formal geometric spaces and imposing buildings, particularly as it was 
stated, to counteract the featureless landscape.'" Mangope's own conception of the 
intended role for Garona was stated at the official opening of the buildings in 1983: 
'My government felt that here, where the nerve fibres from all over our country 
converge, where the heartbeat of the whole nation is monitored, and where policies 
are shaped that determine the course of the ship of state, here it would be an 
everlasting gesture of respect and tribute to our forebears, if visible expression is 
given to a Setswana cultural feature, which would set our Government Buildings 
unmistakably aside from all others in the world'."' 
Garona was represented as a 'modernised' and 'sophisticated' version of 'our people's 
ancient kgotla or council meeting place' built to serve the nation. The history of 
173 A major influence upon the architects 'celebration' of traditional settlements was 
epitomised through the work of Prof. Revil Mason, whose summary of such 
qualities is reproduced from Britz and Scholes (1984) as possessing:'(!) A clear 
hierarchy of spaces, controlling public and private spaces, and the relationship 
between the two; (2) a success1ve layering of space as created by walls Within 
walls, With different realms of enclosure; (3) a clearly expressed circulation 
system'. Britz, B and Scholes, M. (1984:34) op. cit. 
174 Ibid. The inspiration behind this transformation of Tswana culture drew upon the 
wider architectural influence of both Herzberger and Louis Khan. Britz and 
Scholes were regarded as representmg a new generation of Afrikaner architects 
descnbed as whose work in the bantustans was considered by Lange (in 
Kamstra) as a new form of 'colonial' architecture, yet superior to the 
government monuments in Pretoria. 
175 Britz and Scholes gained inspiration from looking at 'Classical' historical 
precedents such as Piranesi's plan of Rome (in Kamstra, 1984·40) and 
particularly the Colosseum where the classical orders 'are used to articulate and 
humanize a large building mass', Britz and Scholes (1984:36). 176 Mangope on the occasion of the opening of Garona in Pwneer, 1983. 
------------------------- -
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 238 
Garona was, however, of three buildings. The first plan proposed was never built, 
although it received an award from the South African Institute of Architects. The 
initial plan had sought to position the government buildings on one side of the square 
with the unity of the square maintained by overlapping ovals and circles, defined by 
colonnades or 'screen walls'. According to Boden, the first plan for Garona, along 
with the design of the residential areas, were characterised as externally imposed 
'cross-cultural blunders'. Boden attributed these mistakes to the architects dependence 
on interpretations of secondary sources, such as photographs, and to the failure of the 
architects and planners to pay attention to cultural and 'anthropological cues'.177 
The extent to which Garona can be categorised as specifically 'Tswana' or 
vernacular architecture is open to interpretation. The Bophuthatswana administration 
did not have a Department of Town Planning at the time of the project's conception 
and the consultants therefore wielded disproportionate power over design, planning 
and execution."' Garona represented the influence and interpretation of Batswana 
culture by external South African professionals and not the Tswana themselves. 
Whilst in theory there was an attempt to fuse tradition and modernity, a number of 
engineers, architects and planners interviewed claimed that the government buildings 
were entirely 'First World' rather than ethnic. An engineering consultant, who had 
been chairman of the Mmabatho Technical Committee in the early 1980s suggested: 
' ... it's not ethnic in any way, it's certainly first world as far as the whole concept is 
concerned. The only thing they kept was the Kgotla'.'19 
A Batswana Town Planner in the Department of Local Government and Housing 
dismissed the suggestion that the buildings were overtly Tswana influenced.' .. 
171 Boden's, op. cit., own methodology suggests that there was an 'inadequate 
exploration of cultural factors' in reaching these planning decisions. 
178 Town Planning in Bophuthatswana remained under the directorship of a white 
South African, even by 1992. 
179 Border, T. (1995) op. cit. 
180 Mr. Mosothoane, Town Planner, Department of Local Government and Housing, 
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However, the Chief Town Planner, also a Batswana, Mr. Mpobole, expressed the 
opinion that all the buildings designed and constructed during the early 1980s adapted 
the original Tswana-oriented concept. These ideas, however, according to Mpobole, 
were then rapidly superceded: 
' ... making a place unique sounds a very good idea but in practice economics and 
resources determine the route and that's what happened with Mmabatho '.'" 
The architect's intentions must be seen in the context of translating Mangope's 
'ethnic' brief into a workable 'modem' format. This combination led to an 
architectural style identified as early post-modem."'However, in addition to Boden's 
important critique of functionalist designs and modem aesthetics there was also an 
important political issue which related to the rejection of the first plan. The principal 
function of the first plan was expressed by the architects': 
'The importance of bureaucracy would be thereby de-emphasised and the significance 
of the heart of the city as bemg multi-fimctional, would be highlighted'.'" 
Mangope wanted this central space at the heart of the government buildings rather 
than as a more general urban space."' By appropriating this central space for the 
bureaucratic machine, Mangope was also seeking to commandeer aspects of Tswana 
tradition which he believed would legitimate his regime. The modem kgotla was now 
Bophuthatswana/North West Province, interview, Garona, 1995. 
181 Mr. K. Mpobole, Chief Town Planner, Department of Local Government and 
Housing, Bophuthatswana/North West Province, interview, Garona, 1995. 
182 
'In keeping wtth the now considered passe post-modern phenomenon of the I970s 
and I980s, the younger genera/ton of architects chose not to pursue thts 
regtonalist avenue of exploration The milia/ post-modern enthusiasm to extend 
the somewhat limtted modernist design vocabulary, resulted m an often 
misdirected formalism wtth occastona/ or blatant ethmc reference'. Joubert, 0. 
(1994:254) "Afro-pean symbiosis", Africa InSight, vol. 24, no.4. 
183 Britz and Scholes (1984). 
184 Kamstra (1984:40). 
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equated with the functions of the Bophuthatswana state (see overhead photograph of 
Garona). 
A diagrammatic plan is also shown (Figure 5.5) with the building consisting of 
four stories in the form of a giant horseshoe of 40,000 square metres. The outer ring 
(A, B, C, D and F) represents the general office accommodation for the various 
government departments. The ministries occupied two separate but linked buildings 
(C and G). The focus of the square, however, was the building occupied by the 
President himself (D) which was situated on the north side and was the symbolic front 
entrance to the complex. The formal facades of the ministries defmed the square with 
a formal terraced garden also contributing to the defmition. 
Garona can be seen in relation to the rest of the town centre from the diagram 
and photographs. 
The Kgotla and Malwapa influence can be seen throughout this centre (Figure 
5.5 and Plate 5.2). For example, another key building was the Civic Centre (No.6) the 
outer wall of which within Garona displayed a facebrick mural of the Bophuthatswana 
coat of arms, with a Kgotla to the front of it. The major buildings in the city centre 
included the Magistrates Court, Mmabatho Business Centre, Development House 
(Head Office of the BNDC), and GPO amongst others, all of which in one way or 
another, displayed similar characteristics to the Kgotla. The diagram also shows the 
original intention to make the square accessible to the public via two carefully 
landscaped diagonal walkways. Symbolically, shortly after the opening ceremony the 
walkways were closed off and these entrances chained. Kamstra suggested that the 
walkways were the biggest failure of all at Garona because they were regarded as 
badly landscaped and perceived as detracting from original MLH plan."' 
Notwithstanding these problems it was concluded that Garona was a fitting 
celebration of sovereignty: 
'" Kamstra, ibid. 
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Figure 5.5 Diagrams ofGarona (a) and (b) Mmabatlio''s Town ·c~ntre' .. 
186 MLH in SA Archrtecture (1981) op. c1t. 
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• 
Plate 5.2. Overhead Photographs of Garona and Mmabatho Town Centre'" 
187 Reproduced from Cowley, J., Geography Dept., University of Bophuthatswana. 
- ----------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 243 
'I have no doubt that, with all it faults, it is an important building of many great 
moments and qualities. It is worthy of standing in the company of the Union Buildings 
in Pretoria; it is a building larger than life'.'" 
The architects and Mangope had portrayed the buildings as Bophuthatswana's 
symbolic centre. By 1984 the barbed wire and army presence in response to political 
opposition to the regime siguified a dramatic subversion of the original intentions. A 
statue of Mangope was erected on the east side of Garona which, together with the 
barbed wire fences around the perimeter, symbolised the increasing detachment of 
government from the 'people' and the perception that Garona was the President's 
possession."' 
• 
Plate 5.3 Mangope and Garona'90 
The bureaucracy and patronage within the elite echelons of the Bophuthatswana state 
188 Ibid. 
189 See photograph. 
190 Taken by a11thor, Jones, P. S. (1995). 
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 244 
were, as if, a core that was becoming increasingly detached from its peri-urban 
'periphery'. Garona embodied the growth of bureaucracy and the significant, although 
ultimately disloyal, expansion of the regime's support base. By the mid-1980s about 
16,000 civil servants were employed at Garona.1" 
The dependence of Mmabatho upon Bophuthatswana state resources was 
exacerbated by the city's limited industrial base. Being 287km from Johannesburg, 
Mmabatho was considered too far from the PWV for serious industrial development. 
Water supply was considered another adverse factor for industrial location in 
Mmabatho.1" Mmabatho was in the Molopo district of Bophuthatswana and other 
regions were considered to have more potential for economic development: 
'It is therefore important to accept that the role of Mmabatho in the development will 
not be in the supply of local infrastructure but rather in the supply of a supporting 
function for Industrial Development in other areas which have a higher potential. The 
major need experienced at this pomt in time is the supply of capital for development 
purposes. This need can be fulfilled by Mmabatho, as large sums of capital are 
needed in order to supply expansion needs of the 250 companies that has already 
been established in Bophuthatswana '. 193 
The following diagram shows Mmabatho's population in relation to Greater 
Mmabatho, the Molopo Region, the Development Region J, Bophuthatswana and 
fmally, South Africa itself. The Molopo Region's economic base clearly reflected the 
dominance of Mmabatho within the district. By 1985 almost half of the district's 
industry was centred upon 'services' and only 5.1% was based on manufacturing. 
With almost three times more activity than the South African average, the 
191 Nation on the March (1987). 
192 
'Unfortunately water intensive industries can not be encouraged but should the 
need arise concessions could be made', H.J Smit, City Engineer in Economic 
Development of the Molopo Area, Seminar, Mmabatho Sun Hotel, 11.11.87. 
193 Roberts, W. (1987), of the BNDC, presentation, ibid. 
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construction industry was also a highly significant sector.'" Mmabatho's economy 
therefore reflected the dependence upon Bophuthatswana government resources. 
During the 'independence' era the ratio of government to private spending in 
Mmabatho was 40:1. The local economy was directly dependent upon the 
government, parastatals and local authority for between 45-50% of all jobs in the 
capital.'" Mmabatho would offer mainly service functions for industrial development 
of which most located near the PWV. Attempts were made to reinvigorate the region's 
historical role as gateway to the African interior: 
'However, another market which we believe has not been exploited is the African 
market north of Bophuthatswana We believe that the Botswana market as well as 
countries further north lying on the extended rail line offers tremendous potential. 
The distance to Gaborone is only+ 150Km '."' 
This focus reflected older regional concerns for Mafeking's origins as a spring board 
into the interior. Similarly, Mmabatho was increasingly looking across the border to 
Africa. The bias towards Mmabatho had been justified in terms of meeting the 
necessary attributes of a 'national' capital city. Mmabatho was the focus of a strategy 
which, more generally, sought to locate Bophuthatswana in the world community of 
'nation-states'. 
194 See Figure 6.1, next chapter. 
195 By 1991 the state and parastatals provided 32.6% of jobs in Mmabatho. In 
addition, the municipal council and defence force contributed 3.3% each, 
educational jobs provided 5.7%, transport, social and community services 6.5%. 
Mmabatho Structure Plan 2000, Working Document, December, 1992, Stewart 
Scott Plan Associates, Pretona. 
196 Roberts, W. (1987)op. cit. 
- ---- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation 
0,040 
0,126 
0,165 
(0,129) 
0,76 
(0,63) 
1,83 
(1,10) 
38,0 
(2,86) 
'Mmabatho 
32% 
Greater 
Mmabatho 
76% 
Molopo 
Magisterial District 
22% 
(20%) 
39% 
Bophuthatswana (48%) 
in Region J -
42'1-
(57%) 
Region J 
5% 
(38%) 
South Africa 
(RSA & TBVC) 
Bophuthatswana 
5% 
(46%) 
246 
1,97 
(1,32) 
Note Figures W!thout/w•thm brackets represent totalffswana populatiOn of an area m nulhons (next 
to boxes), or as a percentage of total!Tswana population of the area in the succeedmg box (next to 
arrows) 
Figure 5.6: Scales of Population.'" 
197 Source, Stewart Scott Plan Associates (I 992) 
Chapter Six 
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 247 
6. 'An exemplary showpiece for separate development': Locating 
Bophuthatswana in the World. 
'Because our independence was not the result of a bloody war of liberation we have 
not received as yet, the recognition we deserve. But no matter, we will eventually earn 
this since our challenge continues and we will continue to wage our own particular 
war in order to acquire even more in the fields of education, agriculture, housing and 
other modern facilities- all of which are necessary to enable us to attain our major 
objective of raismg the quality of live of our people. When recognition comes to us, it 
will be recognition with great respect- the respect that is afforded to a nation that is 
capable of standing on its own feet. For this we are prepared to work and wait'. 
Lucas Mangope, President ofBophuthatswana' 
6.1. Introduction 
The construction of Mrnabatho, opening of Garona and modernisation of the 
landscape, were key moments in Mangope's promotion ofBophuthatswana as a 'Place 
for All'.' This range of strategies were used to represent Bophuthatswana as a liberal 
democracy, not least with the incorporation of 'white' (and coloured and Asian) 
Mafeking into this bantustan. Mangope's promotion of his 'alternative society' with its 
modernising, non-racial and liberal discourse, was directed at local, 'national' and 
international audiences. These different scales were, however, fused through the 
common notion of modernisation. Crucially the ethnic and political basis of the 
Bophuthatswana regime was shaped around the quest for respect 'afforded to a nation 
1 Natwn on the March, (1987:43) op.cit. 
2 Mangope, L, 1978. 'Bophuthatswana- A Place for All', Via Afrika. 
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capable of standing on its own feet'. The Bophuthatswana government attempted to 
engage with the 'West' by promoting its modem and developed image abroad. This 
chapter illustrates the extent to which internal nation-building efforts were dominated 
by the paramount concern to locate Bophuthatswana's place in the world. 
Bophuthatswana's concern for international prestige and recognition was based on 
three inter-related 'outward' strategies. 
The first concerned the representation of Bophuthatswana's economic 
differentiation from the other homelands, and black Africa. A multi-purpose capitalist 
and modernising discourse was directed at attracting local and foreign capital to 
Bophuthatswana through the image of an investor-friendly rapidly 'developing' 
country. Policies and imagery of the economic transformation of the region were 
directed towards providing international kudos. They were also intended to provide a 
conduit for particular regional groups and social classes to establish themselves in 
bantustan structures as agents of 'development'. Co-ordinated from Mmabatho, this 
strategy formed the cornerstone of vigorous efforts to take the message of 
Bophuthatswana beyond its borders and into the capitals of the world. 
Secondly, these economic initiatives were closely related to political and 
diplomatic efforts to enhance recognition. 'Diplomatic' and 'trade' missions were 
established in major European, American and Asian cities. Networks were established 
to promote Bophuthatswana's image as capitalist, democratic, and non-racial. The 
diplomatic efforts were underpinned by the creation of the Bophuthatswana Institute 
of International Affairs. Attempts to gain recognition from the international 
community and to legitimise its 'nation-building' were underpinned by the 
reconstruction of Bophuthatswana's historical origins. One particular 'nation-building' 
argument taken to the capitals of the world, particularly during the efforts to receive 
recognition in the late 1980s, involved Bophuthatswana's definition of itself as an 
overtly ethnic Batswana nation-state whose fragmentation was a product of British 
colonialism in the nineteenth century. The Bophuthatswana regime reinforced this 
strategy by promoting Pan-Tswana association with Botswana. 
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Thirdly, the regime's complex interaction between the 'national' and 
international scales is illustrated through the politics and economics of the 'prestige' 
project. These efforts involved middle men or 'Uhuru Hoppers' who in return for 
personal reward promised international recognition through a range of often 
clandestine schemes and projects. Translating Mangope's nation-building ideals into 
tangible projects and schemes also involved reliance upon the skills and knowledge of 
a numerous expatriates. The high profile given to the Sun City tourist resort, and an 
infamous power plant project, was soon followed by the creation of a media network 
centred on the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (Bop TV). Bop TV reveals 
the links, and conflicts, between international 'norms' and Bophuthatswana's 
modernisation. The creation of this broadcasting network also shows that 
Bophuthatswana nation-building was overshadowed by the complex regional relations 
of dependency with South Africa. 
These energetic efforts served to highlight the conflicts and tensions between 
externally-orientated development and the manipulation of 'nation-building' 
characteristics in the context of modernisation of Bophuthatswana. In pursuit of 
'nation-hood' Bophuthatswana was pulled in different directions with a debilitating 
impact upon the economic, political and cultural basis of the regime. 
6.2. 'The Tswana have no shoe' - Stable and Free-Market Oriented 
Whilst tacitly recognising the high degree of dependency upon South Africa, 
Bophuthatswana's national economic strategy nonetheless sought to further political 
sovereignty through enhancing economic viability.' The attainment of economic 
viability was based upon free market policies which were underpinned by energetic 
and concerted efforts to attract foreign investment and foreign loans to 
Bophuthatswana. The objective behind these promotional efforts can be best 
3 Bophuthatswana White Paper on Development, op cit. 
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understood with the context of Bophuthatswana's dependence upon fmancial flows 
from Pretoria • 
Almost from its inception, Bophuthatswana had been avowedly oriented 
towards a 'free-market' economy. Mangope had often compared Batswana 'traditional' 
organisation to a form of capitalism. He also combined this with a Christian stance 
against communism with pronouncements such as '(l)t was better to a streetcleaner in 
a christian state than Prime Minister of a communist country•.' The 1981 White Paper 
on Development emphasised the capitalist orientation. It was intended to: 
'give all people in Bophuthatswana the opportunity to develop their foll potential 
within the framework of a free enterprise system'. 6 
The promotion of capitalism and liberal democracy was the basis of the 
Bophuthatswana regime's claims for legitimacy. This discourse sought to combine 
and adapt Bophuthatswana's 'differences' to the language of multi-racialism which had 
become increasingly vocal following the incorporation of Mafeking.' Capitalism was 
also perceived as the key language to make headway into the international 
community. If there was one strategy which Mangope pursued above all in order to 
differentiate his regime from other homelands then it was his multi-racial emphasis in 
combination with 'sound' economic policy: 
'One of the distinctive features of the Government of President Mangope has been its 
emphasis on economic growth and free enterprise, rather than on political slogans. 
As President Mangope has repeatedly stated, "lffoll independence does not improve 
the quality of life of my people, it IS a useless independence" '.8 
4 Chapter three indicated the high level of economic dependency of 
Bophuthatswana on South Africa. 
' Mafekmg Mazl, 15.5.1970. 
6 Bophuthatswana, White Paper (1981 :1) op cit. 
7 Chapter Ftve detailed Mafeking's incorporation into Bophuthatswana in 1980. 
8 P1oneer, Vol. 2, 1980. 
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These sentiments were directed at foreign investors in order to promote an image of 
stability and administrative competence. Indeed, the Pioneer was a monthly magazine 
aimed at an international audience and produced by the Bophuthatswana Department 
of Information and was important in publicising the region. The BNDC 
(Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation) Development Bulletin was 
directed more specifically at the business community in South Africa and abroad. In 
another publication aimed at investors, Bophuthatswana was represented as a 'fully 
independent parliamentary democracy'. Significantly, the territory was characterised 
as 'ethnically homogeneous', where this was considered as modem rather than 
primitive, divided and conflictual.' This capitalist discourse was preached to Batswana 
residents themselves. Mangope attempted to legitimise these ideas by manipulating 
Batswana identity in order to suggest its compatibility with capitalism. One example 
involved the adaptation of a Batswana proverb which described their hardship and 
poverty as 'the Batswana never wear a proper shoe'. Mangope used this to suggest that 
it was imperative for the Batswana to be industrious to transform themselves and 
hence the region.10 The Bophuthatswana regime was defining the essence ofBatswana 
culture and character, which was shaped around and embracing economic 
modernisation. In order to attract foreign investment the Batswana were characterised 
as accommodating and peaceful: 
'They are not militant and industrial strife is relatively unknown'." 
Batswana tradition was invested with authorial meaning by the Bophuthatswana 
regime. 'Traditional' characteristics were therefore defmed as unproblematically eo-
9 
'Bophuthatswana, Africa's Land of Investment Opportunities', BNDC, Mmabatho, 
1984:2&10) and BNDC Labour Legislation m Bophuthatswana, An Outline, 
undated. 
10 Mkhokedi Gcinumkhonto, North West Deputy Provincial Secretary of the SACP, 
interview Mmabatho, 1995. 
11 BNDC, Land of Opportunity, op.cit. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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existing with modernisation. Mangope and the BNDC used the image of a vast labour 
reserve as a positive feature for potential investors. Bophuthatswana would 
supposedly 'suit the mentality' of the industrialist in their search for cheap labour 
through the availability of the Tswana people, 'particularly women'.12 
The relationship between 'tradition' and 'modernisation' which was presented 
to industrialists and developmentalists was most graphically illustrated in the BNDC 
promotional video 'Land of Opportunity'. Tradition and Tswana culture were 
portrayed as stoic in the face of the beneficial onslaught of progress and modernity. 
Culture was represented as a curious timeless entity, as if'natural' and complementary 
to the irresistible developmental impulse: 
'There is a land where a modern world exists comfortably with nature and 
development moves with the eternal cycles of the seasons. Where an extensive 
infrastructure serves thriving metropolitan areas that do not dzsturb the age old 
rhythm of rural settlements. Where economic growth has enriched the lives of the 
people and sparkling resorts provide recreation and revenue'." 
'Development' was portrayed as an unstoppable force and as coterminous with 
infrastructure and economic growth. This progressive tide with its construction 
projects, engineers and infrastructure was interspersed with pictures of dancing, 
smiling villagers. Then alongside all of this evidence of progress were glistening 
swimming pools and that most potent symbol of Bophuthatswana- the casino. It 
suggested a positive co-existence of tradition with modernity, rather than the 
contradictions: 
'Nothing is meagre in this land. A place where time keeps place with creation and 
12 Mangope in Afncan Bus mess, September, 1977. 
13 
'Bophuthatswana, Land of Opportunity', BNDC, video, 199? 
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 253 
there is space to pursue such a dream- Bophuthatswana is such a land'. 14 
The image presented to overseas investors was of smiling multi-racial school children 
and industrious Batswana who were apparently: 
'willing to learn ... acquire new skills ... wanting to enhance the equality of their lives 
without sacrificing their traditional values'." 
Bophuthatswana was legitimised as steeped in time whilst as 'modem as today'. 
Tradition certainly was not seen as an obstacle to modernisation but neither was its 
role discussed other than offering dignity and a source of strength for the Batswana. 
Alternative conceptions of 'tradition' were closed off and the Bophuthatswana 
regime's interpretation of a 'true' Batswana tradition should be understood as 
performing a legitimatory function. The BNDC portrayed Bophuthatswana as a land 
waiting for that dynamic entrepreneur who could 'uuleash its power' and whose 
resources were waiting to be harnessed: 
~ .. to make a dream come true, a spirit that has a vision of development and 
enrichment, of growth and prosperity, to share with the people A spirit that respects 
the dignity of tradition and understands the importance of economic expansion'." 
6.2.1. 'Trickle-down' as Development 
Despite the rhetoric of 'development' within the BNDC and other sources, this 
appeared to be synonymous with economic growth. The efforts to mature the 
'nation's' economy were directed towards increasing productivity and output. Once 
14 BNDC, Land of Opportumty, op. cit. 
" Emphasis added, BNDC, ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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growth had been achieved, economic and social benefits would then supposedly 
accrue to the masses. Bophuthatswana lacked the usual parade of international aid 
organisations common to many third world countries. Furthermore Bophuthatswana-
based NGOs were virtually non-existent. Taken together with the demise of the BDC 
without a commensurate new propagator of 'development' policy, the BNDC 
interpretation of national development- as economic expansion and increased output, 
reflected a 'trickle down' approach. In the late 1980s the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Mr. E. Keikelame, gave a presentation addressing 'Bophuthatswana's 
Development- A Forecast', which appeared to reinforce these ideas. Although 
suggesting that 'development' 'apparently lacks a specific universally accepted 
definition', nonetheless, Keikelame still promoted the 'National Objectives and 
Guiding Principles for the Development of Bophuthatswana', which had been 
stipulated in the 1981 White Paper, as the guiding development philosophy in 
Bophuthatswana,: 
'Well, let us not get involved in this argument and just say that the term 
"development" refers to the actual physical, social and financial actions required to 
create economic growth and improve the quality of life of the population .. The 
national objectives are: 1. to make the country economically mature; and 2. to raise 
the standard of living of the total population'. 17 
Keikelame provided evidence that Bophuthatswana was supposedly 'definitely on the 
right path' towards meeting these objectives. Despite the self-promotion of 
Bophuthatswana through a number of health and education indicators, the Minister's 
presentation was evidence that 'development' policy was based upon maturing the 
national economy by promoting capitalist growth first, followed by 'trickle down' 
later. Modernisation would provide for the nation through the creation of jobs and 
17 Keikelame, E. "Bophuthatswana's Development- A Forecast", Quantum Leap, 
Bophuthatswana Institute of International Affairs, Seminar, (1988.93&96) Craft 
Press, Mmabatho. 
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local business as if Bophuthatswana was to be a 'little Japan in Africa' .18 This 
conception was reflected in another publication by the BNDC which forcefully 
reiterated its commitment to 'encouraging free enterprise and the profit motive, 
maintaining an open-door policy with regard to foreign investors, with their know-
how, capital and integrity, no nationalisation of industry and, no direct government 
participation in private undertakings'. 19 
The private sector had been represented on both the BDC committee and on 
the board of the BNDC. Mangope continued to promote private capitalist involvement 
in building his 'nation'. This policy was reflected in the regime's increasing 
involvement in fmancial projects in the money and stock exchange markets. Various 
companies were floated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) such as 
Bodisatswana Investments. This company operated a network vehicle dealership and 
service stations in which a Rl million worth of shares were offered.20 This policy was 
described within the South African print media as the 'Bophuthatswana Fruits of 
Capitalism' and, with another company, the Yabeng Investment Holding Company, 
illustrating how floatation could raise funds. In this particular scheme, 70% of shares 
in Yabeng were held by the BNDC with the remaining 30% once again open to 
citizens and those wishing to 'shape Bophuthatswana's future'. 
21 
During the floatation 
of Yabeng Mangope reiterated the Bophuthatswana stance on capitalism, stating that 
it: 
'has borne out our faith in the free enterprise system to which Bophuthatswana is fully 
committed. It has put within reach of the people of our country the fruits of 
capitalism As from now they have the opportunity to share in the prosperity of a 
18 Gcinumkhonto, M, 1995, op cit. 
19 Profitable mdustrial investment in Bophuthatswana, Industrial Advisor, BNDC, 
page I. 
20 According to the Sunday Times (SA) 30.5.82, 50% were held by Bromain 
Holdings and the remainder by the Bophuthatswana Government and citizens of 
Bophuthatswana. 
21 Financwl Ma~/24.6.83. 
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number of companies they have supported with their purchasing power'.22 
Mangope harnessed the private sector to give his regime a semblance of 
'independence'. Economic viability, Mangope claimed, was not necessarily a 
requirement for nation-hood, but was 'reassuring'." State officials and members of the 
ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party joined the private sector to access these 
fmancial 'fruits'. This reflected the development and growth of a petty-bourgeoisie in 
Bophuthatswana. 
The differentiation of Tswana society and social identity increased on many 
levels. Even in Mmabatho, somewhat distant from the PWV, an industrial site was 
created and indicated that some limited industrialisation had taken place." An 
increasing number of Tswana were absorbed into the industrial base of the capital but 
in much fewer numbers than those absorbed into the state sector and industries in the 
eastern districts. For example, Sebowana Mill was sited at Mafikeng on a newly 
zoned area specially allocated for agro-industry. The Mill cost R4.5 million with 85 
employees, with another project, Agric-Chicks, costing R46 million, with 
approximately 360 workers. Also created was Mmabatho Foods with 150 people, PC 
Dairy with 50 workers costing R2.5 million and NCD Diary at R4 million. With rapid 
industrialisation of Bophuthatswana this economic change was, however, producing 
another seam of contradiction between the mobilisation of organised labour and 
capital (next chapter). 
To preach this modernising litany Bophuthatswana officials ventured abroad 
with the intention of recruiting investors through the BNDC's generous incentive 
schemes and to acquire loans for Bophuthatswana. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Sunday Times (SA) 30.5.82 
24 By 1987 20 industries had been established in Mmabatho and 1,200 people 
employed within them, NatiOn on the March, 1987:97, op.cit. 
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6.2.2. The BNDC and 'Booming Lands' 
The chief agent to spearhead investment and economic development was the 
BNDC. This parastatal was founded in 1975 under the supervision of the South 
African Department of Bantu Affairs and Development 'Promotion of the Economic 
Development of the Homelands' 1968 Act. According to the BNDC's mission 
statement the path to improvement of the 'quality of life' would be through 
'developing Industry, Commerce, Small Business and Human Resources•" with the: 
'purpose of the Corporation (being) to improve the quality of lift in Bophuthatswana 
by promoting economic development throughout the country•.'• 
As previously mentioned, one strategy used to promote economic development was to 
encourage commercial development in Bophuthatswana. The other principle 
economic strategy was directed at industrial development: 
'The Government is convinced of the important stimulus mdustrial development can 
provide to economic development by means of job creation and income generation 
within the borders of the country and determines that this potential should be utilized 
purposefUlly to its optimum~21 
As the economic development arm of the government, it was intended that planning 
and co-ordination should be undertaken on a regional basis together with the supply of 
information. The emphasis was upon encouraging industrial and commercial 
investment. This latter function was divided into two sectors, firstly that dealing with 
large scale industry and secondly, tourism and small industry. All sectors dealing with 
operations, property and administration were further sub-divided into, managerial, 
" BNDC, Annual Report, 1990: I. 
26 P1oneer, Vol. 3, 1981. 
21 Ib1d. (1981:18) 
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building contracts and administration back-up services. The BNDC's specific 
objectives were to involve Tswana and foreign entrepreneurs in building up the 
country's economic resources through industrial development. The BNDC would also 
provide the necessary infrastructure within the industrial area at declared growth 
points, establish better business facilities in Bophuthatswana and 'build up a viable 
and stable economy based on agricultural, mining, industrial and commercial 
28 
sectors'. 
In the early 1980s the BNDC Managing Director, W. van Graan, together with 
a small group of key figures, had particular responsibility for creating business 
opportunities for the regime. Van Graan involved the BNDC in smaller scale projects 
rather than the government's prestige projects. Furthermore, Van Graan would not 
tolerate any government interference and concentrated solely upon projects, although 
at times the two overlapped.29 The focus upon 'national' development was symbolised 
by the relocation of the BNDC's headquarters from Pretoria to Mmabatho, intended to 
influence and direct the co-ordination and management of industrialisation of the 
territory from within its own borders. The BNDC's new Head Office was symbolically 
called 'Development House'. High profile effort was given to gaining access to foreign 
money markets in the form of loans and investors. By 1981 the Bophuthatswana 
Finance Minister had clearly indicated these intentions: 
'Up to now, Bophuthatswana has been an under-bo"owed country. In the next phase 
we expect to become a more extensive borrower as the tempo of our development 
mounts, but we shall do so in the knowledge that we have already provided a sound 
foundation for all our expandmg activzties '." 
In addition to contributions from the South African government and 'own sources', a 
28 The BNDC, Its role and functions, Liaison Manager, BNDC. 
29 Personal communtcat10n with Magyar, 1997. 
30 Hatty, in Pzoneer, May, 1981. 
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 259 
third category comprising Bophuthatswana revenue was apparent in the breakdown of 
the 198617 sources of revenue. Own sources amounted to approximately 33% and 
grants from South Africa another 33%. However, the third category, loans, accounted 
for the fmal 34%.31 These loans were raised on both the local and foreign capital 
markets, guaranteed by the Bophuthatswana government and for certain loans, the 
South African government. The sojourn into these money markets was thought to 
provide leverage away from South African government domination of the homeland 
economic and hence political policies. Such a level of dependence also influenced the 
more mundane fiscal planning within Bophuthatswana, contingent upon the yearly 
budgetary allocation from South Africa. The Bophuthatswana regime therefore 
envisaged access to the private sector as integral to its quest for independence from 
South Africa. 
On an earlier trip to Europe V an Graan 'seemed highly successful' in securing 
R9 million loans from four central European banks, with projects under discussion 
worth R80 million. Van Graan claimed this success was due to Bophuthatswana's 
contrasting system of government to 'other' independent African states." The BNDC 
finally acquired its own first foreign loan of Rl2 million in 1983 and the second of 
R20 million in 1986.33 The Commercial director of the BNDC also embarked on more 
overseas trips which were described as follows: 
'These trips are aimed at attracting more overseas investment. We find that business 
leaders and opinion makers like to listen to us'. 34 
Foreign loans secured in the 1980s were made direct to the BNDC and amounted to 
R34 million with the first repayment from 1988. The purpose being that: 
" lndzcator SA, 1988, op.cit. Note that 'own sources' is conSiderably smaller than 
the other estimate of 47% if customs union and Rand monetary area payments 
are considered as South African derived sources. See chapter three. 
32 RDM 19.6.82 
33 Natzon on the March, 1987:105, op.c1t. 
34 Financial Mail, March, 1985. 
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'The loans were razsed to provide capital for development programmes and 
repayment is guaranteed by financial institutions'." 
Whilst a significant addition to the BNDC budget these foreign loans should be seen 
against the total being loaned from both the Bophuthatswana government and the 
DBSA. These amounted to ten loans from each, totalling R63 426 Million and R107 
709 million respectively. The government loans were for 'the purpose of development 
and working capital'. All were guaranteed by the Bophuthatswana government. 
Another R42 million worth of loans were raised through stock issues on the capital 
market by the BNDC from 1981. These outside loans reflected the efforts to 
circumvent Pretoria and also supposedly made BNDC more independent of the 
Bophuthatswana government." However, in addition to the BNDC, many other 
projects were financed through loans made to the government itself. This suggested 
that the total debt accruing to the Bophuthatswana government was increasing rapidly 
throughout the 1980s. 
Regarding international investment, Mangope claimed that responses had been 
so great that R65 million had to be put on a waiting list because homeland 
infrastructure had been surpassed by the level of investment." For some observers the 
success of Bophuthatswana's industrial strategy depended upon the success of 
attracting such investment. With the initiation of these 'internal' efforts to industrialise 
Bophuthatswana in the early 1980s, one academic, with an interest in 
Bophuthatswana's economic development policy, suggested: 
'The extent to which the terrztory is able to avail itself of this favourable economic 
climate will ultimately depend upon the success of its industrial strategy zn attracting 
" BNDC, Annual Report, op.c1t. 
36 Nation on the March, 1987:105, op.cit. 
37 RDM 27.8.82. 
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and retaining foreign investors and industrialists This remains the sine qua non for 
the accelerated creation of job opportunittes for mdtgenous job seekers. Success in 
this area will most surely enhance Bophuthatswana's prospects of ensuring political 
stability through peaceful economic development; after all, political stability and 
economic development are like Siamese twins, irrevocably joined together, the one 
unable to exist without the other'." 
These comments were made by one of a growing number of South African economic 
developmentalists clearly impressed with the modernising discourse and efforts to 
industrialise in Bophuthatswana. With foreign investment and job creation 'peaceful 
economic development' would be conducive to political stability. Such views 
illustrated the enthusiasm which was underpinning Bophuthatswana's construction as 
a 'nation-state'. 
Titis 'imminent industrialisation',. was also encouraged through incentive 
schemes aimed at overseas investors. An Industrial Development Board (IDB) was 
established within Bophuthatswana with its executive council consisting of five 
members each representing the BNDC, CED, Bophuthatswana government and the 
private sector. Whilst applications for new industries were processed by the BNDC, 
the IDB also considered such applications. Moreover, besides an advisory function the 
IDB had the power to 'grant generous incentives for industrial development'.40 By 
1987, these incentives focused upon the growth points located at Babelegi, Ga-
Rankuwa, Mogwase, Mmabatho and Thaba 'Nchu. Babelegi was represented as ' ... the 
sprawling industrial growth point in Bophuthatswana. Industrialists from Germany, 
England, Italy, America and France have invested R54 million in this area'." The level 
of concessions depended upon which of these locations was selected. The eastern 
38 Palm er, P. N. "Industrialising the National States: The Bophuthatswana 
Example", Fmance and Trade Revrew, 118-34, 1981, Vol. 14 number 3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Bophuthatswana Development Bulletm, No. 40, 8:1980, in Palmer, PN, 
op.ctt. 
41 Proneer, 1987. 
1981. 
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districts of Bophuthatswana, centred upon Babelegi, were easily the most 
industrialised in view of their proximity to the economic hub of the PWV. As a result 
these districts received slightly fewer incentive schemes than other areas including 
Mmabatho. Subsidies were given for interest rates and rental, wage bills, relocation 
costs, transport, housing and training costs.42 There was also a considerable range of 
individual incentives shaped around a generous tax package with car and house 
subsidies and low rates of income tax. These generous tax packages meant that the 
overall rate of income tax was well below levels in South Africa. As such the 
incentives, particularly for professionals, reflected another significant and costly 
feature of 'urban bias' in Bophuthatswana. In addition the BNDC was able to provide 
loans of up to 50% of the venture (35% excluding land and buildings): 
'Under special circumstances (e g. if the project is in the national interest) the BNDC 
will participate in joint ventures~" 
These circumstances included the provision of infrastructure and risk capital. The 
latter was particularly important for the construction of the tourist resort at Sun City 
and the shopping centre schemes known as Megacities." The BNDC also had a 
number of investments in associated compauies and subsidiary compauies." 
42 For example, Mmabatho was m category 11 of IV categories, with I bemg the 
eastern districts. To attract a firm to Mmabatho concessions were divided 
between long term and short term. A buildtng costing 300, 000 US dollars 
would receive a short term concession (10 years) for a rental subsidy of 45% of 
the MRIR. If the latter was 15%, rental subsidy would therefore be 6.75% of 
300, 000= 20, 250. 80% of total wage bill would paid in the form of a cash 
grant upto seven years. Furthermore, relocation costs of 500, 000 were offered 
with up to 20% more for 'unquantifiable costs'. Long term concessions included 
125% of training costs deducted for tax purposes, 40% transport rebate for 
goods manufactured in area and in exceptional ctrcumstances even for raw 
materials. 40% of applicable bond rate for housing subsidy and electricity 
subsidy and also road transport permits and price preferences for government 
tenders. (All in BNDC, 'Bophuthatswana, Land of Opportunity', 1984, op.cit.). 
43 BNDC Annual Report, 1990. 
44 Maree, J. 1988, Managing Director of the BNDC, BOPIIA Seminar, Craft Press, 
op. cit. 
45 Sun International Bophuthatswana Holdmgs (Pty) Ltd. had 44,90% of its shares 
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The thrust of the BNDC's promotional strategy stressed the wider sub-
continental context with South Africa as 'powerhouse of the continent', followed by 
Bophuthatswana itself.46 With 90% of Bophuthatswana's products sold on the South 
African market this strategy showed the extent of Bophuthatswana's economic 
integration." Bophuthatswana's access to the whole of southern Africa together with 
its own merits were then promoted to potential investors. Indeed, the basis of 
Bophuthatswana's industrial strategy was its role as a base of supply for South Africa 
Inevitably, as the sanctions debate became increasingly important, Bophuthatswana 
could no longer rely on the South African market: 
'In the last decade the fact that we were not recognised did not play a major role to 
most of the investors here, as they were looking at marketing their products mainly in 
the RSA or, if exporting, South Africa was the country of origin for their exports•:' 
This statement implied that non-recognition had not previously been an economic 
problem for Bophuthatswana. However, although there was an increasing level of 
investment in Bophuthatswana throughout the 1980s, by the late 1980s the sanctions 
issue was beginning to add pressure to Bophuthatswana's industrial policy. 
Nevertheless, by 1987 it was claimed that investment by the BNDC itself, mainly in 
providing infrastructure and buildings totalled R170 Million." This investment had 
apparently shown 'tremendous increase from abroad': 
controlled by the BNDC, wtth loans of RS million to this company in 1990 
alone, BNDC Annual Report, 1990. 
46 Maree, op cit. 
47 Roberts, W. (1987) Industrial Development in the Molopo Region, The 
Economic Development of the Molopo Area, conference, Mmabatho, 11.8.1987. 
48 Maree, J. op. cit. 
49 The BNDC budget mcreased over the year 1980/81 to 1981/82 from R52 million 
to Rl06 million. By 1981/82 it was claimed that the number of expatnate staff 
had decreased by 70% to 130 and the number of Tswana increased by 9% to 
1400, reflecting it suggested the encouragement of localisation. Pioneer, 1982. 
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'Presently 40 foreign investors are operating manufacturing concerns in 
Bophuthatswana. The total investment in these are estimated to be in the region of 
RI 00 million of which +I- 70% contributed by foreigners (South African industrialists 
,. 
excluded). 
Total investment was in fact in the region of R750 million to R1000 million. 
The total number of factories had increased from 81 in 1977, to 250 in 1987 and 422 
by 1990. It was estimated that the number of jobs in manufacturing increased from 
8,500 in 1977 to 28,000 in 1987, to 41,000 in 1990." Manufacturing contributed 
10.7% to Bophuthatswana's GDP in 1980, 15.2% in 1985 before reaching a high of 
>2 16.1% by 1990. These changes were evidence of Bophuthatswana's industrial 
transformation, although the huge cost did not necessarily imply job creation, 
education and training and increased standard of living for the bulk of the population. 
By 1990 the BNDC had produced 12 publications aimed at investors, seven of which 
were available in foreign languages. A video was also available entitled 'Invest in 
Bophuthatswana' with soundtracks available in English, German, French and even 
Mandarin. In fact the attraction of Chinese investors had been the most significant of 
all overseas investment. By 1988, 55 Chinese industrialists were present in 
Bophuthatswana with school teachers recruited from Taiwan and a mandarin speaking 
staff member employed at the BNDC.53 Commenting on the origin of foreign 
investment into Bophuthatswana, the Managing Director pointed out: 
'I have spoken of our success with foreign investors from the Far East but, apart from 
a handfUl of industrialists from such countries as the USA, the U.K. West Germany, 
Italy and Israel, our success in other parts of the world has been negligible up to 
'
0 Roberts, W. 1987, op. cit. Although 'Nat1on on the March' places the figures at 
22 and R70 mil11on respectively, possible for previous year. 
'
1 BNDC, Land of Opportunity video and Roberts, W. 1987, op.cit. 
52 Statistics Branch, Bophuthatswana Department of Economic, Energy Affairs, 
Mines and Planning, I 991. 
" Maree, J. I 988, op.cit. 
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now~ 
Nonetheless, the attraction of overseas investment had been a key strategy designed to 
create economic growth whilst reinforcing the image of a capitalistic modernising 
Bophuthatswana. This imagery permeated the commentaries of South African 
observers and was also aimed at gaining acceptance from the wider world. 
During this early phase of 'modernisation' the South African press praised 
Bophuthatswana's economic policy which illustrated the extent to which 'sound 
economics' were synominous with development. These efforts increased 
manufacturing's contribution to GDP from a pre-independence level of under 10% to 
over 16% by the late 1980s." Between 1980-1985 GDP growth at current prices was 
17.4% and 34.3% between 1985-1989 (in real terms this was 18.5%)." GDP was still, 
however, dominated by mining. By 1987 Bophuthatswana had six platinum mines 
which employed 57,000 people and by 1989 they contributed 45% ofGDP. However, 
it remained doubtful as to whether mining had fulfilled Magyar' s desired objectives, 
as stated in 1982, 'to ensure that they serve the social development of 
Bophuthatswana and not the needs of the volatile and fluctuating international 
minerals market ... '." 
54 The South African mining corporation, GENCOR, described Bophuthatswana's 
mining legislation as the most enlightened in the whole of Africa, '1f not the 
world', in BOPIIA presentatiOn (1988) op. cit. 
" Daphne and de Clerq, op. cit., make the important point that growth in GDP does 
not necessarily expansion of productive industrial or agricultural capacity. 
56 Magyar, K. P. (1982) op. cit. 
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 
Nnl d.ustlialole) ~~. 
A&ocultun= ll,6% 
""""" 11% ------- .... IVII:(S ol) )% 
Manu(KCunn& 5,1% 
Cledr!CLlJ' 0 4% --l---.:::::"1 
Molope Mag1stenal D1stnct 
Mtnll\& IS 4% MIIIIIIC 10,1% 
Mam.ll&tunnc 19,1% 
Bophuthatswana' 
Reg•onJ 
266 
Fmanc:c I 9% 
Transpon l 0% 
Tndc9.,2% 
Futancc: S,O% 
South Africa (RSA & TB VC) 
Figure 6.1 Molopo Magisterial District, Region J, Bophuthatswana and South 
Africa: Nature of Industry 1985." 
" In Stewart Scott, 1992. 
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The economic performance supposedly symbolised the maturing of the 
Bophuthatswana economy and provided opportunities to promote Bophuthatswana as 
appearing to be economically different from the other bantustans. For example, in 
1983 on the basis of its economic performance, Bophuthatswana was invited to appear 
at the South Africa-Britain Trade Association. On behalf of Mangope, Rowan Cronje 
was able to promote Bophuthatswana's achievements by stressing its economic 
'success'. The BNDC budget was supposedly nearly 80% funded by 'our' shareholders, 
the government of Bophuthatswana, which supposedly 'reflects a sound financial 
structure'". Cronje praised Bophuthatswana's development: 
' ... the development of economic infrastructure and the development of the 
agriculture of the country IS an amazing feature when compared with the development 
trends elsewhere in Africa'." 
Of the twenty three best known companies in Bophuthatswana, the BNDC 
controlled 50% shares.60 This optimism was expressed by most of the establishment 
press and the Bophuthatswana regime, which applauded the arrival of 'development', 
captured in the headline 'Bophuthatswana's once barren lands booming'.61 This 
economic transformation was described as a genesis with its roots in 'independence': 
'Resisting the temptation to go for glamour, President Mangope established the 
priority (to) feed the people of this developing land and its natural resources'." 
The other Bophuthatswana development corporation, an agricultural parastatal, 
" The total assets of the BNDC had mcreased by R62.3 million to R260.5 million 
that year, Cronje to SA-British Trade Association, The Star, 29.8.83. 
•• Cronje m Pioneer, December, 1984. 
60 RDM, 30.8 83. 
61 Star, 12.12 83. 
62 Ibid. 
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AGRICOR, was taken to reflect these sound policies 'due to professional staff 
surrounding Mangope, (and) community development as the prime objective'. The 
Dinokana agricultural project was the pioneering agricultural model and showed the 
Israeli influence based upon the Moshav system adapted to the Tswana Temisano 
strategy (literally farming together). This project complemented the joint venture with 
the Israeli government on a huge dairy scheme costing R50 million, based in 
Mmabatho and again modelled on Temisano." The modernising dynamic was 
connected to this capitalist, large scale approach aimed at individual self-
advancement. It was summarised in the soundbite of the head of AGRICOR: 
64 
'we hope to supply the boots and laces for the people'. 
Development was supposedly delivered through the provision of physical structures to 
achieve increased output and economic growth. The implication was that 'The people' 
could then haul themselves up as a result of the infrastructure and knowledge 
provided. In the example of the project at Dinokana, the huge cost of this should be 
weighed against the actual benefit to local small scale farmers whose water supply 
was diverted and local, indigenous farming practices disregarded.•' For the South 
African taxpayer and press, development in Bophuthatswana: 
'if it can survive the standard plagues of SA's "Natzonal States"- endemic poverty and 
debts which have to be bailed out by SA, then it could become an exemplary 
showpiece for separate development'. 66 
This rosy expanding outlook was reflected in a profile of Wyand van Graan, who 
emphasised the bigger and better BNDC budget for 1984 of over R80 million. The 
63 Pioneer, December 1981. 
64 Star 12.12.83. 
6
' Drummond, J. (1991) op.cit. See next chapter. 
66 Financial Mazl, 23.3.84, emphasis added. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bulk of this budget was raised on capital markets (except when the Corporation was 
called on to supply infrastructure, then it got soft loans from the Bophuthatswana and 
SA governments), some 33% from overseas and the balance from SA. This kind of 
coverage illustrated the manner in which Bophuthatswana's dependent characteristics 
of fragmentation, poverty and illegitimacy were manipulated and concealed under the 
'visible' technical development projects. The BNDC, in conjunction with AGRICOR, 
cited industry, economic growth and increased levels of output as the panacea for the 
Bophuthatswana development 'problem'. 
High profile was given to white advisors that dominated the management 
structures of the BNDC and AGRICOR, including their heads, respectively, Van 
Graan and Beuster. Influential individuals also included the chairman of the BNDC, 
J.B Sutherland, chairman of Africa Oxygen and director of other companies." White 
advisors were also influential in the government departments responsible for 
economic development. Rowan Cronje was appointed as Director of Development 
Co-operation and key advisor to Mangope. Cronje was an ex-Rhodesian previously in 
Ian Smith's UDI government and sacked from his previous position as advisor to the 
Ciskei regime after only weeks. Cronje was responsible to Mangope for all state and 
semi-state organisations involved in the economic development of Bophuthatswana:' 
Furthermore, into this motley group was added Leslie Young, Minister of Finance, a 
Y orkshireman, also previously employed in Rhodesia. The dependence upon 
expatriate skills and knowledge is pursued in the context of the prestige project and 
BopTV. 
In addition to the promotion of economic development, the other key strategy 
was to promote Bophuthatswana abroad through diplomatic initiatives. 
67 RDM, 23.2.82. 
68 BBC radio, 17.5.82. 
----- - -- ------------------------------
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6.3. Bophuthatswana Abroad 
Bophuthatswana attempted to create a range of overseas networks aimed at 
economic and political lobbying. At 'independence' in 1977 Bophuthatswana had not 
received 'official' diplomatic status from any country other than South Africa. The 
regime therefore fluctuated between 'formal' contacts and clandestine operations. 
Bophuthatswana offices, particularly 'trade missions', were set up in Tel Aviv, Paris, 
Frankfurt, Bremen, London, Rome and Washington, Hong Kong and China. These 
structures were buttressed by the Bophuthatswana National Commercial Corporation 
based in London under the guidance of another ex-Rhodesian, Ian Findlay. 
Bophuthatswana's international ambitions were symbolised by the creation of a 
Bophuthatswana Institute of International Affairs (BOPIIA) in the early 1980s. 
BOPIIA was compared to its 'sister institutions' such as Smuts House in South Africa 
and Chatham House in the United Kingdom: 
'Similar institutions have existed in other parts of the world for many years and we 
felt that, wzth Bophuthatswana's emerging place in the world, it was proper for there 
to be in our country an independent, non-governmental organisation able to open up 
unofficial two-way international traffic•."• 
Bophuthatswana's 'emerging place in the world' was however greatly restricted by the 
international community's continuing non-recognition. BOPIIA marshalled the 
frenetic efforts made by Mangope to cultivate a range of relationships geared towards 
enhancing Bophuthatswana's reputation abroad. A BOPIIA conference in 1988 
attracted a range of Bophuthatswana representatives, American and South African 
journalists, academics and businessmen. The occasion provided Mangope with an 
69 C.C Milton, Chairman of BOPIIA, in BOPIIA, (1988.83) op cit The nucleus of 
BOPIIA was established one year after 'independence': 'The underlymg thrust 
was to be whether, when and how Bophuthatswana would rece1ve her a1m of 
acceptance and recogmtion, in her own r~ght, by the nations of the world', 
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opportunity to reiterate his country's 'commitment' to a range of principles based upon 
the themes identified earlier as Christianity, Capitalism and the 'fundamental freedoms 
of the individual' based upon a Bill of Rights and Liberal Democracy: 
'We are living proof that the people of Southern Africa can live together in peace, 
harmony and prosperity irrespective of their race, ethnic roots or religious 
persuasion, under a democratic government that adheres to and respects the basic 
tenets of Christianity, the equality of all people and the free enterprise system'.70 
Claims for recognition were therefore based upon clearly distinguishing 
Bophuthatswana's characteristics and origins from both apartheid South Africa and the 
economic and political problems of black Africa. Representations of 
Bophuthatswana's supposed differentiation was directed at 'white' South Africa and 
overseas. However, by the mid- 1980s, the pretence of being a 'liberal democracy' 
were undermined internally by two factors. The 'international' liberal democratic 
discourse foundered upon firstly, the regime's encouragement of ethnic conflict in 
Bophuthatswana and, secondly, the level of political intolerance that the Bill of Rights 
could not conceal. These contradictions are examined in more detail in the next 
chapter. However, in relation to efforts to gain recognition the decreasing emphasis 
placed upon 'liberal democracy' within Bophuthatswana represented a significant shift 
in image presented to the international community. 
Manson and Lawrence show that by the late 1980s Mangope's political 
discourse changed emphasis to embrace a conception of Pan-Tswanaism with 
Botswana. The purpose in doing so was for Mangope to divert attention away from 
Bophuthatswana's origins in the context of reproducing the apartheid system. It was 
also linked to Mangope's search for a clearly distinguishable and emotive discourse to 
appeal to various international fora, regional groups and also to deflect internal 
op.cit, (1988:iii). 
70 Mangope in BOPIIA, (1988:92) op.cit. 
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opposition." Rather than being a product of apartheid policy, Bophuthatswana was 
represented as the indirect outcome of British colonial rule and the legacy of the 
British decision in 1885 to split the Tswana 'nation' in two.72 The emphasis upon 
British colonialism also reflected the official South African government position of 
the 1970s which sought to distingnish between a 'white' Republic and 'black' Southern 
Africa. The bantustans and by implication black South Africans, were represented as 
an 'ethnic' overspill from British colonialism's creation of the Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (the BLS states)." A parallel was therefore drawn between the BLS 
independence from Britain and bantustan 'independence' from South Africa. At the 
BOPIIA seminar the South African ambassador to Bophuthatswana made the 
association between Britain and the bantustans clearer: 
'These so-called "homelands" were, in any case, created by the virtue of Brztish policy 
and I say this neither as an excuse or reproach, nor to point a finger at the present 
British Government- it is a statement offact'.14 
An increasing focus of attention in the late 1980s, Bophuthatswana's rhetorical 
position on unification with Botswana had also been a tactical device in the 'pre-
independence' era." By the 1980s the Bophuthatswana government recognised the 
advantages to be gained by presenting British colonial policy as responsible for 
71 Ibid. 
72 Chapter three indicated the British decision whereby BaTswana territory south 
of the Molopo river became the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, which 
became part of South Africa, whilst land north of the Molopo became the 
northern Bechnanaland Protectorate (Botswana m 1966). 
73 The implication was that black South Africans and the bantustans belonged to 
black Africa rather than 'white' South Africa. See chapter two. 
74 Kotze, W.D in BOPIIA (1988:16) op.cit. The ambassador went on to suggest 
that 1t had been the British who 'fragmented great parts of th1s southern portion 
of Bechuanaland, by allocating farms to their km and thereby leaving an almost 
tmposstble task to future governments of reconsoltdatmg the land'. 
" Chapter Three indicated that as early as 1973 Mangope ' .. might prefer an 
association with Botswana' rather than domination by other white or ethnic 
groups. 
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Tswana 'ethnic' division.76 There was a more concerted effort to link British 
colonialism's denial of Tswana birthright to Bophuthatswana as a modem repository 
for restoring these lost ancient rights. Moreover, the 1895 decision to annex British 
Bechuanaland to the Cape Province despite widespread Tswana opposition, whilst the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate remained under British jurisdiction, was cited as British 
betrayal of the 'southern Tswana'. The incorporation of the southern Tswana into 
South Africa had resulted in decades of racial oppression and dispossession which by 
a quirk of colonial fate their ethnic kin in Botswana largely avoided. The implication 
was that Bophuthatswana's 'independence' in 1977 was represented as a restoration of 
the 'independence' the British had denied them through colonialism: 
77 
'According to this line of reasoning Bophuthatswana was not a child of apartheid but 
rather the bastard offspring of British colonial rule in SouthernAfrica'.18 
The Bophuthatswana regime's efforts to promote Pan-Tswanaism also centred upon 
'encouraging' Botswana to recognise its Tswana neighbour politically. To this end, 
Bophuthatswana manipulated its geo-political position, the common border with 
Botswana. Throughout the 1980s there was conflict concerning security measures, 
water rights and transport between the two. In 1986/7 the decision to enforce visa 
requirements and transport controls upon visitors and trade from Botswana reflected 
these efforts to force Botswana to negotiate with Bophuthatswana and open 
diplomatic channels." In his speech to the Bophuthatswana Parliament in 1988, 
76 See for example Pioneer, 1984. 
77 Lawrence and Manson make the important point that 'while the British had laid 
down a arbttrary border it did not in fact divide a "Nation" though it certamly 
did divide certain chiefdoms, such as the Hurutshe and Rolong, their kinsfolk'. 
78 Drummond, J. 1991, "Reincorporating the Bantustans into South Africa: The 
Question of Bophuthatswana", Geography, 76, pp373-396. 
79 See Dale, R. 1991, Botswana's Relations with Bophuthatswana- Blending High 
and Low Politics in Southern Africa, paper at the 34th Annual Meeting of the 
African Studies Association, St. Louis, 23-26 November, 1991 and Drummond, 
J. and Manson, A. 1991, "The Evolution and Contemporary Signtftcance of the 
Bophuthatswana-Botswana Border Landscape" in The Geography of Border 
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Mangope suggested that co-existence with Botswana could be made 'difficult' in 
'quite a few areas ... to the extreme discomfort of Botswana'." This mounting pressure 
was intended by Mangope to force recognition from the 'Front-line States' which 
Bophuthatswana's President linked with ethnic association with Botswana: 
'We share a common heritage and culture with our brothers across the border in 
Botswana. Politics aside as brothers we love each other- would the frontline states 
ignore this brotherhood? I doubt that the Batswana of our Republic would actively 
" associate with any country hostile to Botswana'. 
However, Botswana remained adamant in its refusal to recognise anything beyond 
linguistic and cultural links between groups either side of the border. According to 
Drummond and Manson, the increased politicisation of the common border greatly 
surpassed Mangope's appeals to culture and ethnicity. Yet Dale has also indicated the 
significance of cultural flows across the border and that the escalation of 'the low 
politics of transport into the high politics of diplomatic recognition should not blot out 
the long-term cultural matter of ethnic merger'." 
The pressures upon Botswana only served to highlight the contradictions of 
Bophuthatswana's promotion of itself as a Tswana country whilst one already existed 
across the border. Drummond and Manson indicate the OAU's firm stance on 
inviolable boundaries and also point to the fact that parts of Bophuthatswana were 
Landscapes, Rumely. D, and Minghi, J. (eds.) Routledge. Hundreds of Botswana 
citizens were turned back from the Ramatlabama border post, described as 
agony for Botswana, with the suggestion that South Africa itself was behind the 
'diplomatic chess' and pressure on Botswana to recognise Bophuthatswana, see 
the Sunday Star, 18.1.87 and 15.2.87. 
80 Mangope, L. (1988) Mandatory sanctions: Bophuthatswana and Front/me OAU 
natwns, Emmcon (TWORF) Books, Third World Opinion Research Foundation, 
Lagos. 
81 Mangope's address to Bophuthatswana Parliament, 1989, op. cit. 
82 Dale, R. 1991, op. cit. He cites evidence of fam1ly, educational and media t1es 
across the border to suggest the heightening significance this could take on, for 
example, Dale mentions that by the late 1980s over 250 copies of the Mail were 
sent to readers in Botswana (as well as transmission of Bop TV). 
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outside the original demarcations of British Bechuanaland and instead within the 
Transvaal and even Orange Free State. There were also more practical concerns 
regarding the scattered nature of Bophuthatswana and evidence of Botswana fearing 
domination by these other Tswana groups." Above all Mangope clearly enjoyed his 
own grasp on power within Bophuthatswana and did not appear to want to relinquish 
this. 
The rhetoric of ethnic association with Botswana was placed alongside other 
diplomatic efforts to gain recognition for Bophuthatswana. It provided considerable 
leverage for 'networking' throughout the 1980s and attracted media interest. For 
example, in 1982 there was 'circumstantial evidence' surrounding a possible merger 
between Bophuthatswana and Botswana. President Masire of Botswana had 
apparently discussed the issue with French politicians, whilst it had also been a factor 
influencing Mangope's invitation to an Inter-African Socialist meeting by ex-President 
of Senegal Leopold Senghor." Elsewhere it was declared that 'There's Pressure for 
Tswana link-Despite Denials' with Bophuthatswana and Botswana also likened to the 
'two Germanies'." Notwithstanding these rumours and speculation, even when 
pressured by Bophuthatswana to negotiate the Botswana government consistently 
refused to recognise Mangope's regime. 
The concept of Batswana ethnic association was most keenly promoted by 
Bophuthatswana within Britain. In 1982 Bophuthatswana House was opened in 
London and a 'Friends of Bophuthatswana' association established to gain influence 
and credibility within British circles." It was claimed that in the mid 1980s 20-30 
Conservative MPs were members of 'Friends of Bophuthatswana'. The extent of this 
influence was reflected in the ability of these MPs to table a debate on 
83 Africa Confidential, Vol. 23, 1982. 
84 ibid. 
85 Sunday Express, 20.6.1982 and Cape T1mes, 20.5.1990. 
86 
'Friends of Bophuthatswana have made 11 their duty to enl1ghten fellow MPs m 
the Brrtish Parliament about the realities of Bophuthatswana and also 
encouraged Parliamentarians to visit our country and experience 1ts climate of 
peace, harmony and prosperity', Sid Gordon, Mayor of Mmabatho, introduction 
to BOPJIA conference, 1988, op.cit. 
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Bophuthatswana's recognition in the House of Commons in 1986. Elements of 
Mangope's discourse and its representation ofBophuthatswana surfaced in the debate, 
including the praise of non-racialism, particularly at Sun City. The colonial angst of 
Conservative MPs was supposedly reflected by Keith Best, MP for Ynys Mon, who 
claimed that although Botswana and Bophuthatswana were the same only Botswana 
was internationally recognised: 
'This is one of the great injustices of history that confront Bophuthatswana. We have 
consistently turned our back on the Batswana people of Bophuthatswana and that can 
not be right in today's world'." 
MP for Basingstoke, Andrew Hunter, was a particularly strong supporter of 
Bophuthatswana's efforts to attract recognition and indeed an ally of apartheid South 
Africa more generally. During the debate Hunter attempted to distinguish between 
Bophuthatswana's apartheid and alleged British origins: 
'Some people say that Bophuthatswana is the child of apartheid, but that is only 
partially true because it is the adopted child of apartheid It is the real child of British 
.. 
colonial and foreign policy over the best part of a century'. 
In 1988 Hunter produced a paper at the request of the Bophuthatswana office in 
London in order to provide advice on furthering Bophuthatswana's international 
profile. Hunter's main suggestions concerned 'a unilateral declaration of annexation' of 
South African territory in order to consolidate Bophuthatswana. Hunter also proposed 
that Bophuthatswana adopt its own currency, make a unilateral declaration of 
affiliation to the Commonwealth and that Mangope be 'seen and heard to participate 
87 See British Parliamentary Debates on Bophuthatswana, in Hansard, 1986, and 
also Nat1on on the March, (1987:33) op. cit. 
88 Nation on the March, op. cit. 
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more in the search for justice in Southern Africa'. 89 These steps were seen as a pre-
requisite for the 'ultimate aim of uniting the whole Tswana nation'. 
The greatest reflection of Bophuthatswana's influence within the Conservative 
Party was the decision to allow the 'Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana' 
to submit evidence for its rightful existence to a British Foreign Affairs Committee in 
1987. The four Bophuthatswana representatives, Mangope, Findlay, Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Keikelame and Minister of Manpower (and soon to become 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), Rathebe were able to put Bophuthatswana's case for 
legitimacy and recognition directly to the Committee. A letter from the 
Bophuthatswana Foreign Minister, T.M. Molatlhwa accompanied the delegation, 
through which the theme of colonial betrayal and affinity with Botswana was 
reiterated: 
'We seek a closer association with our kith and kin in Botswana who have been 
separated from us through enforced arbitrary division of our land by colonial 
90 powers'. 
Once again Bophuthatswana was represented as a 'democratic, free enterprise, 
capitalist society, free from apartheid and non-racial in all its activities'. As only 'a 
minority of the Batswana enjoy international recognition and generous educational 
aid' Bophuthatswana appealed to Britain's Overseas Development Administration and 
the British Council for assistance. These attempts to acquire aid, particularly for 
educational matters, was a strategy to enhance recognition. Mangope compared the 
plight of the Tswana to east and west Germany, promoted Bophuthatswana's peaceful, 
democratic and non-racial image and record of development. Bophuthatswana's 
history was emphasised to differentiate the homeland from other bantustans. Mangope 
89 In Afnca ConfldentlOI, Vol. 30, No 16, 1989. 
90 British Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1986-87, 11.5 1987, Minutes of 
Evidence from the Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana. 
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appealed ultimately to the Committee to recognise the British legacy within the 
region: 
'Nevertheless, the British Government was responsible for our plight and 1t now 
seems reasonable to us that they should be the first to recognise us as an independent 
d . . ••• an sovereign nat1on . 
The ethnic character of Bophuthatswana and the importance of history and culture 
was compared to the relations between England, Wales, Scotland and especially 'your 
experience of Ireland is proof enough of this'. The Bophuthatswana delegation 
claimed that the Batswana would 'never again ... be dominated by either a white or 
black ethnic group': 
~. people will always be Batswanas before, or Zulu's before, then South Africans 
92 later'. 
This specific 'ethnic' focus would form another major strategy in the 1990s context of 
the resurgence of 'Global Nationalism'." Other tactics, were suggested during a 
BOPIIA presentation by the South Africa Foundations Director General, K. von 
Schirning. He located Bophuthatswana's problem of non-recognition within the 
broader context of the 'political expedience' of recognition and 'east-west politics'. von 
Schirning compared Bophuthatswana to Pakistan's partition, micro-state dependency 
upon foreign aid and export of labour, and to Taiwan's performance, despite non-
recognition. Above all, although stating recognition depended ultimately upon 'South 
Africa ending its pariah status', von Schirning suggested that Bophuthatswana was a 
better example than the rest of Africa:' 
91 Mangope, Ibid. 
92 ibid. 
93 See chapter eight. 
94 Von Schirning, K. 1988, BOPIIA, 1988:49. 
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The British Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledged Bophuthatswana's 
relative success in promoting multi-racialism at Sun City, of which Mafikeng was also 
considered an important example. One member of the Committee inquired as to 
whether the white population of Mafikeng, incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 
1980, was 'fitting well into the structure of your society' to which Mangope replied 
'that is so'." Ironically, given the thrust of Bophuthatswana's argument concerning 
British culpability in Tswana partition, the Committee responded that the weakness of 
the argument for recognition by the United Kingdom was indeed the emphasis placed 
upon a colonial past considered as 'out of date'. The Bophuthatswana representatives 
replied that Britain had to rectify these historical wrongs and the mistakes through 
which Bophuthatswana should have been part of a sovereign and independently 
recognised Botswana. The 'guilt tripping' of Britain's colonial history seemed to have 
little influence with the Committee. Bophuthatswana was criticised in a number of 
areas including its collusion with forced removals from South Africa, lack of a strong 
nationalist movement and dependency upon South Africa. Ultimately the Foreign 
Affairs Committee distinguished between historical British Bechuanaland and 
apartheid created Bophuthatswana. The Committee's conclusion was that 
Bophuthatswana therefore formed an integral part of South Africa. 
Despite continuing non-recognition Mangope's promotion of Pan-Tswanaism 
had enabled the regime to blur the association between Bophuthatswana and apartheid 
South Africa. This emphasis did provide the regime with the opportunity to mobilise 
some support within Britain. The Bophuthatswana regime also used similar tactics in 
Germany and France, although with less 'official' success.96 The greatest indicator of 
international 'success' was the stream of foreign visitors to Bophuthatswana in the 
1980s and 1990s. An assorted array of foreign business people, entertainers, 
journalists and politicians were entertained in Sun City and Mmabatho. They included 
95 British Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1986-87, op. cit. 
96 See regarding Germany, 'Favourable Visit for Bop', Sunday Tzmes, 
Johannesburg, 9.8 1987 and for France 'No Joy for Mangope in France', The 
Star, 27.2.1985. 
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a mixture of Bavarian politicians, French and Israeli mayors, ex-prime ministers, 
American, French and Dutch journalists, business people. These delegations were 
often made under the pre-text of 'fact fmding missions'. The capital city formed the 
focus of visits to Bophuthatswana. Foreign visitors were shown Mrnabatho's 
splendour in order to be impressed with 'development' efforts whilst the poor, rural 
slums and settlements were ignored.97 On one occasion the deputy mayor of Paris, 
Pierre Bas, quoted the French writer Max Jalade in saying 'For a state whose existence 
is not recognised, Bophuthatswana seems strangely real!':' Bas compared 
Bophuthatswana favourably to other African countries. He also suggested that the 
presence of thousands of Tswana outside Bophuthatswana was parallel to the 
hundreds of thousands of Czechs living in Vienna, which had not prevented the 
existence of Bohemia (Czechoslovakia). United Nations and UNESCO non-
recognition of Bophuthatswana was linked by Bas and other 'Friends of 
Bophuthatswana' to the peril of communist influence world wide. Indeed in the 
context of France itselfBas stated: 
'When France votes again and the Marxists are replaced by men of sense, we must 
remember Bophuthatswana, this beautifUl country which wishes, and deserves, to join 
the ranks of sovereign nations'. 99 
Such publicity given to these observations represented the desperate attempts to win 
supporters to the Bophuthatswana cause. It was noticeable that Bophuthatswana was 
placed within the context of the cold war with some observers suggesting that it acted 
as a buffer to communist inspired Africa. Bophuthatswana was therefore regarded as 
providing a moderate and reformist perspective within Southern Africa. The West was 
encouraged to respond to these positive features of Bophuthatswana (and Kwa-
97 Gcinumkhonto, M. op.cit. 
98 Pioneer, April, 1985. 
99 Ibid. 
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Zulu).100 
American support was sought in the United States, particularly during the anti-
sanctions and pro 'constructive engagement' eras of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. The Bophuthatswana strategy was to encourage visits to Mmabatho 
and reciprocal trips to Washington in order to build up a network of allies. This 
network, according to a prominent US businessman, was to be established through 
meetings with Congressional Staff members, forming a nucleus for a US 'Friends of 
Bophuthatswana' group. The US media was also targeted: 
'We need to work through the media and have already started to do this. For example, 
Ministers Rathebe and Ke1kelame met with editorial writers for the Washington 
Times, a conservative newspaper. In the months ahead, we will be in touch with 
carefUlly chosen conservative med1a outlets to make sure they are aware of 
B h h d . . . ,IOI op ut atswana an 1ts asp1rat1ons . 
In 1983 about 100 members of the Americans concerned about South Africa group 
(ACSA), consisting mainly of investors and industrialists, visited Sun City to 'educate 
Americans about the complex racial situation in South Africa'.
102 
In 1987 a fact 
finding delegation of Republican Party Legislators had also visited 
Bophuthatswana.103 These visits were further evidence of the support from a number 
of factions for Bophuthatswana. However, the top level diplomatic recognition eluded 
Bophuthatswana. 
Throughout the 'independence' era a particular source of support was from 
Israel. As seen in chapter three, Mangope compared the Batswana to the lost children 
of Israel, similarly scattered, but throughout Southern Africa. Mangope manipulated 
100 For example see Coker, C. (1983) "Bophuthatswana and the South African 
homelands", The World Today, June. 
101 Denson, J., Executive Director of All Points International Limited, presentation 
to BOPIIA conference (1988) op. cit. 
102 P1oneer, March, 1983. 
103 P1oneer, April, 1987. 
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the conception of Batswana ethnic struggle by comparing it with Jewish efforts to 
forge 'nation-hood'.104 There was considerable Israeli influence in agricultural projects 
and through construction companies. A number of Israeli citizens were resident in 
Bophuthatswana and various economic and cultural exchanges were made between 
Tel Aviv and Mmabatho."' One product of these exchanges included the creation of 
the Mmabana Cultural Centre in Mmabatho, with other centres throughout 
Bophuthatswana. These centres were built at great cost and modelled upon Israeli 
institutions.106 It was claimed that by 1991 the Israel-Bophuthatswana Friendship 
Society had 130 Israeli members 'currently active within the Society'. These Israeli's 
were attracted 'by the non-racial and anti-discriminatory attitude of Bophuthatswana 
and the shared humanities of enabling people to work to their optimal capabilities' .
107 
The regime also coveted Taiwanese assistance. In 1981 six agricultural 
extension officials from the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture were invited 
by the Taiwanese government to study methods of rice and vegetable production. The 
intentions behind this programme, as suggested by the Minister of Agriculture, Chief 
Mokgoko, reflected the regime's overall objective, which was to expose 
Bophuthatswana to international ideas and techniques of development: 
' ... the infUsion of different ideas and other minds from outside is absolutely necessary 
104 Mangope had made a direct comparison between Israeli ongins and that of 
Bophuthatswana: ' ... Israel and Bophuthatswana share a great deal of very 
significant common ground m respect of our more recent histories. In both 
nations, 1t was the flame of freedom that rose agamst raciSm, d1Scr1mmation 
and oppress1on by aliens, and to reach out for the promise of dignity and self-
fulflllment .. .' etc. See chapter three. 
10
' The United Nations voiced concerns about the extent of these exchanges during 
the 1970 and 1980s. It was also noted in 1991 by a UN Special Committee that a 
senior delegation from the BNDC visited Israel 'to promote investment in the 
Bantustan by offering various incentives especially to attract high technology 
commerce' Umted Nations Year Book, 1991:119, Vol. 45. 
106 Interview with Patncia Boikanyo, Public Relations Manger, Mmabana Cultural 
Centre, Mmabatho, March, 1995. It is also interesting to note that the Mmabana 
Centre in Mmabatho would be the target of particular mob fury during the 1994 
collapse of the regime, see last chapter. 
107 Bophuthatswana's representative in Israel, Ms Tova Maori, P1oneer, Autumn 
ISSUe, 1991. 
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to broaden our minds and to keep us in touch and abreast of developments elsewhere 
in the world ... (to) seek advice from other knowledgeable countries ... '."' 
In any one year during the 'independence' celebrations each of these various groups 
and interests were represented. For example, overseas visitors during 
Bophuthatswana's fifth 'independence' celebrations included Austrians, Americans, 
Israelis, French, Italians, Germans and South Africans.'09 There were also student 
exchanges and visits by Members of the European Parliament. The efforts to secure 
the elusive recognition heavily influenced the pattern of development, symbolised 
through the concept of the prestige project. These projects appeared to embody the 
political, economic, and to some extent cultural, dimensions of Bophuthatswana 
nation-building. The regime was dependent upon a large number of expatriates from 
'knowledgeable countries' and also unscrupulous individuals who exploited 
Bophuthatswana's chronic need for acceptance within the international community. 
6.4. Uhuru Hoppers and the 'Prestige Project' 
'We have learnt that it is the people that matter in the first place. Whatever we 
undertake in the development of our agricultural, mineral, industrial and other 
physical resources, it must always clearly take second place to the development of our 
human potential'.110 
108 Pzoneer, April, 1981. 
109 Pzoneer, January, 1983. 
110 Mangope, Pzoneer, May 1980 
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6.4.1. Prestige as announcing 'nation-hood' 
The economic and political objectives set out in the previous sections were 
promoted through the conception and implementation of 'prestige projects'. These 
large and expensive projects, which straddled the international and national scales, 
were supposedly an illustration of Bophuthatswana's ability to 'do development' and 
were intended as a reflection of sovereignty and nation-hood. There were many 
schemes which required the services and skills of international 'experts' and 
expatriates. These expatriates are to be differentiated from the more unscrupulous 
individuals, whom the Bophuthatswana regime often depended upon due to the 
illegality of the regime, in order to create some leverage within the international 
community. 
So-called 'Uhuru Hoppers' were individuals who promised the tantalising prize 
of international recognition in return for personal power, prestige and economic 
benefit. Sol Kerzner, who established the multi-million rand Sun International Hotel 
network, was the archetypal example. Kerzner had calculated the capacity for these 
hotels and casinos to cater for the whites in SA, where gambling was outlawed, as 
well as North American and European tourists. The huge leisure complex of Sun City 
was built by Sol Kerzner as a recreational playground for South Africa's whites and 
increasingly Bophuthatswana's emergent middle class. The Sun International Empire 
formed the basis of Kerzner's fortune which had depended upon the initial foothold 
that Mangope decided to give him in Bophuthatswana. Sun City had been an 
influential attempt to attract white South Africans and to generate important revenue 
for Bophuthatswana. It was also one of Mangope's most influential projects used to 
'normalise' non-racialism and to enhance prestige for his regime by attracting world ' 
famous entertainment stars.111 For example, Frank Sinatra's tour of 1981 was claimed 
111 Showbusiness and sports personalities were enticed to play there. A wide range 
of overseas politicians and guests were entertained at Sun City by the 
Bophuthatswana regime. The resort proved very popular with white South 
Africans but also an increasing number of wealthy blacks, particularly to bypass 
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to have 'put Bophuthatswana on the map in the US like nothing before'.112 A band of 
reporters travelling with Sinatra praised Bophuthatswana 'where segregation was 
unknown' and 'marvelled at the wonders of Sun City'. The following quotations from 
the mass circulation magazine, 'People', reflected the ability of the regime to raise its 
profile through its association with such 'developments': 
'For 2 mzllzon Dollars, A South African homeland gets Frank Sinatra and some 
priceless credzbility. The article said "Sun City is surely the world's unlikeliest tourist 
mecca. But in three years, Sol Kerzner has transformed this impoverished 
backwater- where the annual per capita income averages 700 Dollars- into the Las 
Vegas of the dark continent'. 113 
These sentiments captured the appeal of the modernising language, based as it was 
upon the comparison and contrast of'opposites'. Before Sun City there had been only 
poverty and darkness, i.e. Africa but now Bophuthatswana's answer to Las Vegas 
represented modernity. This supposed transformation was also noted by Sinatra 
himself, seemingly impressed by black 'equality': 
The whole Government is black, and is an equal partner of Sol Kerzner. 
Bophuthatswana gets 50cs on every rand that goes into a Sun City slot machine or 
roulette game. Furthermore, Sol has gzven much needed employment to 3000 black 
Tswana tribesmen~ 114 
the outlawing of gambling in SA. Hence it was dubbed 'Sin City'. Therefore 
alongside the creation of Mmabatho and all Its grandeur, Sun City represented 
another high prof1Ie adventure. All were displayed with maximum publicity by 
the regime and the Pioneer gleefully announced the acquisition at Sun City of 
celebrities as d1verse as golfer Sevvy Ballesteros, tennis players !van Lend! and 
Jimmy Connors, as well as Cliff Richard, Kiss, Queen, Olivia Newton John and 
Frank Sinatra, Pioneer, 1986. 
112 Sunday Tzmes, 9.8.1981. 
113 Ibid., emphasis added. 
114 Ibid. 
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Kerzner was given exclusive rights to the gaming industry in Bophuthatswana and 
together with business ventures in the Transkei, his activities had been the source of 
rumour and speculation for many years."' In the Bophuthatswana regime's 
desperation to gain influence and the ultimate goal of recognition, figures such as 
Kerzner took on great prominence. Due to the illegal nature of the regime a 
bewildering number of more clandestine projects were put into motion in order to 
heighten Bophuthatswana's image in the international arena. 
One of the most publicised 'Uhuru-Hoppers' was Shabtai Kalmanovitz, a 
Soviet Israeli, whose considerable influence in Bophuthatswana state circles and 
closeness to Mangope earned him the title the 'White President' and also 'Rasputin'.116 
In addition to his official post as 'economic advisor' Kalmanovitz was given many 
'perks' including exclusive award of the government contract for the beacon of 
national development, the Bophuthatswana 'Independence' Stadium. It was 
constructed by his Liat Finance Trade and Construction company at considerable cost 
and, significantly, without entering the tendering process. 117 The building of another 
hotel in Mmabatho, costing R30 million, also reflected these intricate clandestine 
webs. It was again designed and constructed by Kalmanovitz's company and a South 
African architect, whose tenders were well above those of a number of South African 
companies. The intrigue surrounding this development was heightened as the hotel 
was to be owned by the BNDC but leased by Sun International, Kerzner's company. 
The scheme was typical of an increasing number which attracted criticism and claims 
of corruption. 
There did appear to be some rationale for the Bophuthatswana regime's 
behaviour. The regime attempted to use these dubious contacts as a leverage for 
possible diplomatic recognition and economic support. For example, the Liat 
Company had substantial financial interests in Sierra Leone and worked closely with a 
"' The allegations will form the basis of an impendmg court case suspecting fraud 
and corruption. Weekly Ma1l &Guard10n, 17.11.95. 
116 Star, 11.2.88. 
117 Due to hasty planning and construction only 60% of the stadium's seats had a 
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major figure in the secretive world of 'sanctions busting'. Liat had connections with 
Marc Rich who had earned a reputation for defying international embargoes on the 
import of crude oil supplies to South Africa."' Kalmanovitz himself was the official 
Bophuthatswana trade representative to Tel Aviv, at least until his arrest in Israel over 
charges of spying on behalf of the KGB. Whilst a Bophuthatswana government 
statement claimed that relations with Kalmanovitz had been ended in November 1987, 
it appears that Mangope had been afraid of ostracising this shadowy figure for fear 
that very sensitive information would be used against the regime.' 19 Other influential 
individuals included the German millionaire, Henry Landschaft, who was awarded the 
multi-million rand government contract to build the Ga-Rankuwa shopping 
complex.'20 In collaboration with the Talia company, Landschaft was later awarded a 
R65 million Bophuthatswana Government Housing Contract. 121 The award of 
contracts to some extent reflected diplomatic initiatives. Landschaft was integral to 
the Bophuthatswana regime's efforts to covet support from a number of Bavarian 
politicians, whilst Kalmanovitz established links with a range of Israeli figures. 
Prestige projects included the multi-million rand Bophuthatswana International 
Airport, with trainer aircraft and an airline, new government buildings, a convention 
centre, a new parliament costing R90 million, a multi-million Rand opera house and a 
R60 million international school.122 
These projects must be seen in relation to the actual mechanism of state and 
the discourse of nation-building. In other words what exactly was Mangope hoping to 
achieve through this excessive and inappropriate expenditure? On one level this 
reflected mismanagement of funds rather than overt corruption.123 On another level an 
direct view onto the p1tch. V1aming, J. op. cit. 
118 Africa Confidential, January, 1987. 
119 Star 11 2.88 120 Pioneer, December, 1982. 
121 Pioneer, 1986. 122 Daphne, P. and de C1erq, F. (1992) "Bophutbatswana: From Independence to 
Regionalism", in SA Revzew 6- From Red Friday to CODESA, eds., Moss, G. and 
Obery, I, Ravan Press, Jo'burg. 
123 In the context of Transkei, Dona1dson has suggested that poor public polictes 
and mismanagement of pubhc resources were more important failures of the 
------- -----------------------
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 288 
important interpretation of these projects was that they were supposedly conceived as 
symbolising 'nation-hood'. The regime was obsessive about its ability to enact 
'development': 
'I think that it was the sudden power, not relying on South Africa. The usual influx of 
fly-by-night- people with all kinds of crazy schemes. The country went through a 
phase of saying "we are not children anymore and can do our own thing". The way to 
prove that they were independent was then exploited by these fly-by-nights to make 
use of export credzt. That's when Bophuthatswana and the Secretary of Finances 
started this process ofborrowing'.124 
The most notorious example of the extent to which Mangope was determined 
to push this mantle of 'independence' involved the infamous construction of a huge 
power station from 1982. Another feature of the 1981 White Paper had been the need 
to avoid duplicating services that could already be provided by South Africa. These 
services included the generation of electricity by ESKOM, the South African 
Electricity parastatal. In 1982 the idea of a Bophuthatswana constructed power plant 
was circulated although the supply of electricity had not been problematic. It has since 
emerged that even the Bophuthatswana Cabinet were kept in the dark about 
Mangope's decision to go ahead with the project. His Minister of Finance, Leslie 
Young, whilst initially strenuously objecting to the scheme, nonetheless could not 
prevent a signing of contract between the Bophuthatswana government and an Italian 
company called Gie.12.1 
The scheme was totally lacking in viability with no research or project 
'independence' experiment than dishonesty or fraud in Donaldson, A. (1992) 
"Dependent Transkei: The Economics of a Labour Reserve and a Caretaker 
Regime", JCAS, Vol. 11, No. 2. 
124 Schoeman, D. 1995, op.cit. 
12.5 The whole saga has since been described and invest1gated in detail by the 
Skewyiya Commission appointed in 1995 by the North West Province 
government under powers granted by Central government. 
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planning done or independent consultancy.'26 The only evaluation was through a 
company called General Consultants of Bophuthatswana which included the Minister 
of Economics, Mr. Keikelame, and Robert Scio an Italian. Scio had also been granted 
sole rights to sell and market coal mined in Bophuthatswana and had also sold a house 
to Mangope for a considerable reduction in its market price. A range of these 
'fly-by-nights' exploited Bophuthatswana's quest for political legitimacy by offering 
recognition in exchange for considerable state expenditure. There was also the 
culpability of the Bophuthatswana state's centripetal diffusion of power, exacerbated 
by Mangope himself. Mangope had taken this decision unilaterally which indicated 
the degree of control he enjoyed. One of the most disturbing features of the whole 
scheme was the lack of checks that could have prevented such extravagant projects. 
Perhaps Mangope's decision to build the plant had been assuaged by promises 
of potential economic and political support in Italy. Not without coincidence, Scio 
was also the BNDC representative in Italy.127 Alternative financial sources were 
sought in South Africa and Italy. The plant was to be built in stages and although unit 
one was completed, the construction of two additional units was required before 
generation could commence. The plant cost R78 million which, after the collapse of 
the rand in the mid-1980s,'" rose to Rl77 million. However, the plant was never 
completed and failed to generate a single watt of electricity. It is currently being sold 
for scrap metal. The plant epitomised the concept of the prestige project and was 
intended to demonstrate Bophuthatswana's capacity to generate electricity 
independently of South Africa. This badly misplaced and flawed effort can be 
interpreted as misguided and driven by ideological considerations. An alternative 
explanation suggests possible mass fraud by the three signatories, Mangope, Scio and 
Keikelame, together with a range of other people involved in the scheme.129 
126 On many occasiOns Magyar had requested that President Mangope hire outside 
consultants but this was 'usually refused'. Personal communication, op cit. 
127 BNDC Annual Report, I 990. op.ctt. 
128 See the following chapter for details of Bophuthatswana's fmancial crisis in the 
mtd-1980. 
129 It has been suggested by the Skewyiya Commission that criminal prosecution 
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The creation of Bop TV provides a more detailed example of how 'national 
development' in Bophuthatswana was overshadowed by the 'prestige project' and 
dependency upon South Africa. 
6.5. Binding Bophuthatswana: Bop TV, National and International scales of 
modernisation. 
This section assesses the role of the media, more particularly Bop TV, as a 
central pillar of the regime's efforts to disseminate positive imagery of 
Bophuthatswana. Whilst the media was arguably the most important source for the 
dissemination of information, it must be placed alongside other 'nation-building' 
structures and institutions detailed earlier, including Mrnabatho itself. The delivery of 
a sophisticated media infrastructure was interpreted as prestigious and modern. It was 
perceived as the prerequisite for Bophuthatswana's acceptance into the community of 
nations. This was directed not only at the disciples of modernity but also towards 
nurturing a regional identity in the context of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'. Far 
from being an exhaustive study of the media, this is used to illustrate the inter-twined 
nature of the national and international scales of modernisation in Bophuthatswana. 
More importantly, the regime was acting as if a nation-state and was creating the 
attributes of modernity for international approval. 
Prior to and following 'independence', the Bophuthatswana regime had been 
acutely aware of the fragmentary nature of its territory. As Moerdijk noted, there was 
also a 'cultural' dependency which was exacerbated in the bantustans by the closely 
interlocked nature of the South African media's 'White ownership, management and 
take place against the three and with other figures to be mvestigated. It is 
interesting to note that in order to maximise the damage, the release of the 
Commission's report was timed by the ANC to coincide with the relaunch of 
Mangope's North West Christian Democratic Party pnor to the Local 
Government Elections in South Africa. See the Weekly Ma1l & Guardian, 
15.9.1995. 
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expertise' .130 However, the author also indicated the potential for local intermediaries, 
or internal structures, to redefine cultural policy in the bantustans. As early as 1978 
the regime expressed interest in developing a communications network that would 
bind the disparate fragments of the 'nation' together.'" Mangope perceived the 
important role of communications in 'nation-building', particularly with its ability to 
transcend political boundaries and link 'ethnic' citizens to Bophuthatswana: 
'Bophuthatswana comprises seven isolated pieces of land Consequently her people 
are widely scattered, not only over the seven different units of land but also in the 
neighbouring South Africa. It is therefore necessary that communication links be 
maintained between these people so that they should be informed of events and 
developments in their fatherland'. 132 
The different mediums were intended to provide a highway through which to 
advertise Bophuthatswana's 'alternative society'. The theme of transformation, both 
economic and cultural, was now directed at creating a national media. 
In addition to radio,'" the second major feature of media development 
130 Previous analysis of communications and cultural production in Bophuthatswana 
and the bantustans more generally has emphasised their high level of 
'dependency' upon South Africa: 'Cultural pol1c1es in the Bantustans themselves 
can best be understood by examinmg the role m these terr~tor1es of the Wh1te 
racist metropolitan culture. As m most peripheral reg1ons, the modern 
communications system of the Bantustans IS characterised by its heteronomous 
structure, and by the weakness of 1ts articulation w1th the 'trad1t10nal' system 
Newspapers, rad1o, television (where 11 exists) like the roads, ra1/ways, airlines, 
and postal and bankmg services, are m the 'homelands' all s1mply peripheral 
termini of the metropolitan networks. The flow of mformation IS one-way. from 
the cities to the rural areas The latter are passive receivers of messages 
composed m the centres of the networks. Even mformation about the peripheries 
1s selected according to the cr1terw of the centres; the peripheries' own 1mage 
of themselves is thus m fact fabr~cated by the centres'. Moerdijk, D. (1981:116 
& 117) Anti-Development, South Afr~ca and its Bantustans, UNESCO. 
131 Nat1on on the March, 1987. 
132 P1oneer, January, 1984. 
133 Radio Bophuthatswana was launched from Mmabatho m 1978 'as a service to the 
people and as a means of communication with government'. By 1980 it was 
relaunched as the more ambitious 'Channel 702' which aimed at capturing the 
commercial radio market throughout Bophuthatswana but also significantly, the 
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concerned the print media. Besides providing general news items and coverage, the 
paper had a number of specific functions. The Mail was a conduit for positive 
representations of Bophuthatswana. The new editor in the early 1980s, Ron Talkien, 
had been involved with both the Zambian and Swazi Times Newspapers and now 
applied these 'nation-building' skills to Bophuthatswana.134 The Mail's role was 
defmed by Ministers and the President himself. It entailed a mandate to generate 
positive images of 'sovereignty' and 'self-development' within Bophuthatswana."' The 
Mail would focus on 'national events', official opening ceremonies of projects, 
Mangope's speeches and the important role of the Bophuthatswana security forces."' 
There was a close correlation between the erosion of Bophuthatswana's liberal 
democracy and increased intervention in and subordination of the press by the regime. 
6.5.1. Bop Television: Modernisation, Expatriates and Nation-Building 
The most innovative scheme in the creation of a Bophuthatswana media 
network was the development of a 'National' Television Corporation. From the rnid-
1970s the programme content of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
was increasingly controlled and used for the most blatant propaganda by South 
African govemments.137 With the flow of information considered a key political tool 
PWV region. In 1986, Radio Mmabatho was created, known as 'Lentswe la 
setshaba'- the voice of the nation, which catered for a Setswana speaking 
audience. Nation on the March, 130:1987. 
134 Talkien had been described by one journalist at the Mail, as 'a friend of 
authority'. 
"'SIB' au , . op.c1t. 
136 General pubhc exposure to print media in Bophuthatswana was considerably less 
than radio. A category answering as 'Never' reading a newspaper or Magazine, 
was placed at 71% and 70% respectively. Those reading 'Once a week' was only 
5% and 4%, again respectively. Findings from a Survey to Establish Baseline 
Data, pp I 0 I, op.cit. 
137 Although on display at the Johannesburg Exhibition Show as long ago as the 
1940s, South Africa (SA) had only begun broadcasting televisiOn in 1976. One 
interpretation of the slow development of broadcasting in SA has focused upon 
the cultural power that television was perceived as possessing by successive SA 
Governments. Television was considered as constituting a threat to moral and 
- - ---------------
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an alternative TV corporation was potentially a highly charged political issue within 
South Africa The issue of Bop TV brings together a number of strands surrounding 
the regime's attempts to appeal to different groups and at different scales of 
'development'. Both 'modernisers' and the western world were targeted. The 
relationship between Bop TV and the SABC also symbolises the constraints placed 
upon Bophuthatswana's efforts to lessen its dependency upon South Africa. The 
question of economic competition for the state monopoly SABC must also be placed 
in the context of the broader exposure of a hermetically sealed white and black South 
African society to banned persons and 'subversive' progranunes. 
Mangope recognised the value of television in buttressing his regime in the 
eyes of the world. Only a year after 'independence' Mangope 'expressed a deep desire' 
to have a television service."' Mangope regarded television as a particularly important 
tool to marshal his ethnic subjects and to create national 'unity': 
'One of the great blessings of the modern world is the miracle of electronic media, 
and I am confident that the introduction of television and sound broadcasting will 
help to elzminate the vast dzstances that divide our people on this subcontinent. The 
bonds that hold us together will strengthen us as a new era of understanding and 
unity dawns'. 139 
Mangope also indicated that Bop TV could convey the 'traditional' dimension 
involved in Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' : 
'the Cultural role that TV must play should be regarded as one of its most important 
racial order and even a potential 'evil' by the guardians of Afrikaner ethnic 
natiOnalism. Pinnock, R. (1988) South Africa: The Press and Popular Struggles, 
paper to the Societies of Southern Africa, December 2nd, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London. 
138 Mr. H.J .Howell, Chairman of the Bophuthatswana Advisory Broadcasting Board, 
in Pioneer, January, 1984. 
139 Mangope in Pzoneer, January, 1984. 
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tasks. It must reflect on the highly cherished traditions of the people zt is supposed to 
serve and contribute in the advancement of the diversified traditional values of that 
people'."" 
Bop TV could function as a vocational guide nurturing religious values, respect and 
love for Bophuthatswana. Bop TV was therefore of central importance for cultural 
production and inculcating a notion of 'tradition' in Bophuthatswana: 
'It reflects the traditional values of the Batswana and projects these to a large 
audience within and beyond the country's borders~ 141 
The service would have the 'pick of the programmes the world has to offer' whilst also 
producing 'more and more programmes that will reflect the life, culture and 
aspirations of our people'.'" Mangope had consistently maintained that 
Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' embodied respect for local 'tradition' whilst 
adapting to and embracing the modem 'wonders of the twentieth century'.'" A range 
of high profile projects combined these notions and provided visible icons for 
international exposure of Mangope's efforts: 
'Another example is to be found in our BBC, Bop. Broadcasting, which has brought 
radio and Television to our people and, in doing so, has respected and promoted 
tradztzonal ethnic values without neglecting that which the modern world has to 
offer'.'" 
The role of 'non-Tswana' advisors in Bop TV reflected their wider role in delivering 
140 Pioneer, January, 1984. 
141 Nation on the March, 130:1987. 
142 Mangope in P1oneer, January, 1984. 
143 See chapter three. 
144 Mangope to BOPIIA seminar, (1988) op.cit. 
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and co-ordinating Bophuthatswana 'development'. The appearance was of 
all-knowing, prudent, rational advisors bestowing their skills and knowledge upon the 
'unenlightened' mass of Tswana. These and key 'white' advisors dominated the upper 
echelons of Bophuthatswana's most influential structures, including significantly the 
Bophuthatswana Defence Force. Mangope, clearly based the development of 
Bophuthatswana upon the ability of these individuals to harness the power of 
modernisation and development His faith in them surely reflected his belief in this 
strategy to win acceptability for the regime by transforming the region. 
A feature of Bophuthatswana's independence was the consistent policy of 
attracting expatriates to Bophuthatswana. There were a number of overseas 
recruitment drives during the independence era. This policy not only extended to 
South African whites but also to a number of European expatriates in the educatioual 
sector (including Teacher Training Colleges, an International School and UNIBO) 
plus a large number of African expatriates, Ugandans in particular. In 1981 and 1982 
the Department of Works intended to recruit technicians and engineers from the 
United Kingdom and other professional staff from neighbouring countries.'" In the 
mid 1980s a large team of British geologists and educationalists were also recruited. 146 
Mangope conceived of development as a path along which Bophuthatswana was 
advancing assisted by the employment of able 'experts'. Speaking in the context of the 
establishment of an 'International School' in 1989, much reference was made to 
'experts', 'higher standards' and the 'services of a man from Cambridge', the 
headmaster. Mangope's conception of development was therefore based upon the wide 
scope given to expatriates whose involvement was more generally interpreted as 
follows: 
'Mr. Speaker, Sir, we go out of our way to encourage foreigners who have special 
talents to come here, and if possible to put down roots, because we know that our 
145 Chief Motsatsi, Minister of Works budget speech, Ptoneer, May, 1981. 
146 Mail, 1986. 
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children and our people will be enriched We have always followed this policy and we 
still do this and what is more th1s Government will continue to do so .. We believe that 
in this quest, that is to encourage people of goodwill and expertise to throw their lot 
in with us, and to help develop our people, even if this is simply by way of example, 
we are creating a climate of healthy development and competition•."' 
The President therefore justified reliance upon 'outside' experts through evocation of 
'universally accepted' criteria for selection and merit, as delivering 'development'. 
However, such clamour for the wisdom and skills of the expatriate also contradicted 
the Tswana basis of 'independence'. The presence of a large number of high profile 
whites was seen as enhancing Bophuthatswana's efforts to differentiate itself from 
other homelands and black Africa. 
The Bop TV project illustrated the role given to 'Uhuru Hoppers' or 
'middle-men', such as Bophuthatswana's authorised representative in Israel, Shabtai 
Kalmonowitz. Along with Cronje, both of these close advisors to Mangope had been 
in Israel to encourage Israeli assistance in developing Bop TV. Several advertisements 
for personnel were placed in the Israeli press, again indicating the peculiar network of 
connections that the Bophuthatswana regime fostered. Whilst in Israel, 
Bophuthatswana officials had met and recruited American TV consultant Stanley 
Moss, who had assisted in setting up Kenya TV."' Substantial scope was given to 
high profile expatriates in Bophuthatswana' s structures. Bop TV's expatriates 
included Tim Ellis and Russel Kay, formerly of the SABC. The head ofBop TV was 
Mr. J. Neill previously responsible for Rhodesian TV during the period of Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence and therefore familiar with the problem of 'illegal' 
regimes. Neill had stayed on under Mugabe's new regime in Zimbabwe until the 
147 Commenting of the International School itself. 'Higher slandards and more 
relevant curricula will be des1gned and implemented and the high standards 
practised at the international school w1ll thus (be) a veh1cle w1th which to 
travel throughout our country', Mangope at opening Bophuthatswana 
Parliament, 2nd Session of 3rd Parliament, Mmabatho, 18.4.89. 
148 Financial Mall21.5.83, RDM 18.5.83, Daily D1spatch 27.5.83. 
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opportunity to establish Bop. TV beckoned.149 Richard Roy Minton was the American 
head of Bop TV news. Minton claimed to recognise the awkwardness of Bop TV's 
unique mandate and operating treaty, in conjunction with South Africa (see following 
section), which raised a number of 'prickly' issues. Minton reiterated 
Bophuthatswana's official position on the agreement that 'neither side will run stories 
that will embarrass the other'."0 Ironically, this expatriate also stated that: 
'Our product has to be the product of the culture of this society'.'" 
The friction between the Bophuthatswana regime's interpretation of Batswana culture 
and modernisation would have debilitating effects and contradictions. The impact 
upon Batswana 'tradition and culture' was most devastating when subordinated and 
adapted to 'nation-building' in the context of modernisation. 
Amidst great fanfare and intense controversy Bop TV began its transmissions 
in December 1983. The first broadcast took place shortly after the 'independence' 
celebrations in order to maximise the publicity of Bophuthatswana's 'progress'. In the 
1980s the hype concerning Bop TV was directed like many aspects of 
Bophuthatswana nation-building towards raising international profile. 152 Sections of 
both the South African and international press were full of praise for Bophuthatswana 
and its 'sound leadership of Mangope'. Projects such as Bop TV, were portrayed as 
decreasing dependence upon South Africa and appeared to signify the dramatic steps 
towards 'nation-hood' for Bophuthatswana."' Many observers considered 
149 Sunday T1mes, 12.2.84. 
10° Fmanclal Ma1l, 9.12.83. 
"'Ibid. 
152 Household exposure to television within Bophuthatswana, with television sets in 
dwellings, was placed at 22%. The potential modernising and cultural role of 
broadcasting m Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' was reflected in the growing 
number of households having access to broadcasting. Within the Molopo district 
television ownership rose to 33% of households due to the wealth of the capital, 
Mmabatho Even if not in a range from 'every day' or even 'week', if calculated 
as total exposure with some sort of access to television the figure reached 30% 
of all households. Survey to Establish Base Line Data, op.cit. 
"'Cape Times, 1.5.84. 
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Bophuthatswana's success as contingent upon providing evidence of progress and 
modernity. Bophuthatswana was represented as if a previously arid desert now 
'blooming'. Once again, South African newspapers utilised these binary images of 
'modernisation' and 'tradition' when reflecting upon the creation ofBop TV: 
'Dust settles in every pore and the sun scalds. Cattle roam unattended in search of 
grazing spots close to the giant satellite d1sh, a shimmering space ship in harsh light. 
Colour- splattered clay huts cluster near this new oasis and naked children play on 
the dirt tracks near the fence encircling the makeshift new headquarters of Bop. 
TV'."' 
Bop TV and by implication Bophuthatswana itself was analogous with an oasis, a 
desert which appeared to be blooming, assisted naturally by the wisdom of expatriates 
and technology. Bop TV was interpreted as symbolising transformation of the barren 
lands of the bantustans. The arrival of the station and its director were as if latter day 
pioneers and prior to their arrival: 
'That building was not there. Nor was that studio. And who would of dreamed that 
outside broadcast vehicle possible? This should go down in the Guinness Book of 
Records'. 155 
Once again there was a sense of transformation and change, with cattle grazing 
lands now colonised by the virtues of technology and modernisation. The satellite dish 
symbolised and indeed was portrayed as constituting change. This modem-technical 
realm was contrasted to the naked, childlike, innocent, 'tradition' of the African, to be 
adapted to Eurocentric conceptions of progress. This transformation would be 
underpinned by huge amounts of investment and provision of infrastructure. Other 
"'Sunday Times Magazine, 12.2.84. 
155 Ibid. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana 299 
seemingly essential prerequisites for modernisation besides 'experienced staff' were 
suggested as a sound proof studio, a R1.25 million outside broadcasting vehicle flown 
from England and the 'best video equipment in the world'. Cameramen required 
training, at that time Bop TV only had six trained cameramen. There were three studio 
cameras, LBK 14's, each costing R70,000, plus three Hawk-eye portable cameras 
costing R35,000 and forty-fifty members of staff many of whom were expensive 
expatriates. This quite ambitious project, given the dominance of the SABC, required 
significant resources fmanced by international capital."6 At no point was the 
'appropriateness' of this investment questioned, only assumed to be inherently 
beneficial. The budget was described as 'reasonable' but many of the staff claimed that 
it was a 'wealthy little station'. Many former SABC staff members were attracted to 
Bop TV's opulence with salaries often twice that of the SABC and even three times 
the amount. Additional 'perks' included brand new three bedroomed houses in 
Mmabatho, with other members of staff provided with 'spacious' three bedroomed 
flats.'" Altogether it was estimated that in order to become fully operational Bop TV 
required R72 million/" reflecting Bophuthatswana's rapidly increasing financial 
borrowing. 
Representations of Bop TV therefore provided a graphic illustration of 
Eurocentric virtues replacing seemingly 'child-like' characteristics of the Tswana. 
Once part of the Mmabatho elite, some Tswana internalised these perceptions. The 
magazine article again reflected the image of the Tswana as if rapidly maturing or 
developing: 
The Batswana are proud of his achievements. They would prefer it if we did not 
photograph primitive huts near the station. They were keen that we helped to project a 
positive image by photographing the big houses that were erected in the past 
"
6 Sh D . c oeman, . op. ctt. 
"'Sunday T1mes Magazine, 12.2.84. op.cit. 
"' RDM, 29.12.83. 
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months~ 159 
To assist in this process the skills and knowledge of additional South African experts 
and other expatriates was required, suggesting that 'learning and training scope for 
staff (eventually 103 people) is limitless and at present most double up on jobs'. The 
station eventually employed over 750 people and therefore became an important pillar 
of the state-oriented patronage network. Another staffer claimed that it was incredible 
that such a small station could cause major intrigue, having got the 'SABC hopping' in 
addition to BBC and UPI interest with others having visited Bop TV. Bophuthatswana 
ministers and the Bophuthatswana National News Agency encouraged positive 
representations by pumping Bop TV with 'relevant' items."' Mangope was aware that 
it was necessary to provide a viable alternative to the SABC in order for Bop TV, and 
hence Bophuthatswana itself, to succeed and be seen as a separate entity from 
Pretoria. Bop TV therefore sought a deal with the British Broadcasting Corporation 
which, through the Equity Union, had placed bans upon the SABC purchasing popular 
BBC series except documentaries and some other material. Bop TV clinched a 
separate deal with the BBC along similar lines but 'independently' of SABC. The deal 
with the BBC was regarded as 'highly significant' and supposedly reflected some 
degree of success for the regime.••• 
159 Sunday Times Magazine, op.cit. 
160 The Bophuthatswana Government tried to promote something everyday with 
bulletins and extras carrymg Bophuthatswana-oriented stories. Even if only the 
opening of a borehole by a Bophuthatswana mimster the event would be 
transformed into a feature length news item with speeches of government 
officials often broadcast for over twenty mmutes at a time. Bophuthatswana 
government propaganda was losing viewers from Bop TV but such images of 
'nation-building' were also directed towards producing positive coverage 
overseas. Solly Pitwe, op. cit. 
161 RDM, 14.10.83. Furthermore, Bop TV's schedule would emphasize educational 
programming with the da1Iy schedule showing 8 hours during the day, With 
another four hours addressing children and in the evening: 
I) 6.30pm to 7 30pm local light entertainment. 
2) 7.30pm to 8.30pm family programme. 
3) 8.30pm to 8.40pm News. 
4) 8.40pm to IOpm feature programme, occasionally to be replaced by current 
affairs. 
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There were also political motivations, with Bop TV able to go beyond 
Bophuthatswana's borders, in order to try and attract the support ofBatswana in South 
Africa."' In Soweto, 20% of its residents were categorised as Bophuthatswana citizens 
and therefore 300,000 people could have voted. Instead a staggering stay away from 
the polls saw only 480 register and only 135 of these actually cast their vote. It was a 
firm and obvious rebuff by urban Batswana to separate development and enforced 
ethnicity.'" Nonetheless, the media could function as an increasingly important 
conduit for positive publicity for Mangope's promotion of both 'non-racialism' and 
Tswana ethnicity. Broadcasting Bophuthatswana's version of civil liberties, bill of 
rights and the repeal of race discrimination would still represent an undermining of 
the status quo of South Africa political life. 
The developmental vision of Bophuthatswana, symbolised by Bop TV, 
continued to engage many disciples internationally. In the United Kingdom one 
journalist praised Mangope's success by contrasting Soweto with the development of 
Mmabatho- the 'Great White Hope'.164 A 'patriotic staffer', however, suggested that 
I62 The capacity for an 'independent' Bophuthatswana to win electoral support, 
particularly in the urban areas of SA was always unlikely. In the 1982 
Bophuthatswana general election the ruling BDP won all 72 seats at a very low 
poll turnout. The figure was placed at only 200,000 turnout, m Jeffrey, A. 
(1993) op.cit. As a proportion of eligible voters in Bophuthatswana this was 
less than a quarter. Mangope attempted to counter these hard facts by 
associating the poor turn out with the general apathy amongst black South 
Africans towards electiOns, reflected he claimed by a total turnout of only 6% m 
the 1977 Soweto Community Counc1l vote. Whereas Mangope chose to blame 
blacks for the poor turn out it is obvious that the elections were used by blacks 
as a vehicle to protest against apartheid social engineering. 
I63 The Soweto Civic Association's Dr. Motlana commented on the result: 'It means 
that no mad planners m Pretoria are gomg to foreignise us by drawmg lmes on 
a map It means Tswanas m Soweto remain f!Fm m their v1ew of themselves as 
South Africans m spite of f•ve years of propaganda'. GN, 21.1.82. The 
opposition to ethnic balkanization was reiterated by Mrs. Ell en Khuzwayo of the 
Soweto Committee of 10: "The Tswana people have displayed m no uncertain 
terms that they regard themselves as South Africans as much as Afnkaner and 
Engl1sh people', RDM, 21.10.82. 
I6< The success was supposedly reflected by Bop TV 'forcing' SA to spend 18 
million pounds in efforts attemptmg to block the SA public from its average 
daily viewing of 3.37 hours of Bop TV, compared to only 1.13 hours of SABC. 
Res1dents in Johannesburg and the West Rand were paymg 200 pounds to obtain 
aerials for Bop TV and 58,300 people had s1gned a petition opposing the 
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through all the activity, Mangope was: 
'doing all this for his people. It is just part of the development of the country~ 165 
Projects such as Bop TV were now regarded as if national benefits to the Tswana, 
whereas they were rooted politically and geographically within a web of patronage.166 
Bophuthatswana nation-building was therefore associated with Mangope's 
'benevolent' authoritarianism. It was claimed that Mangope was 'probably an autocrat 
but nonetheless expressed concern for Tswana in SA'.167 Mangope's authoritarianism 
was overlooked due to the benefits his paternalism was creating. Mangope was 
portrayed as a firm, no nonsense, paternalistic leader protecting his people: 
'In an unashamedly paternalistic fashion President Mangope is concerned, even 
obsessed with the welfare of his people. While he pays lip service to concepts of 
freedom and independence, he mcreasingly tries to shield them from ideas he believes 
to be harmfUl to them at this point of their development'. 168 
Bop TV was taken by some observers as just one example that Mangope was moving 
his people on from 'this point of their development'. The Telegraph's conclusion 
represented the perfect endorsement for the Bophuthatswana and South African 
government strategies concerning the bantustans. With deep resonance for would be 
modernisers it was boldly stated: 
blocking of Bop-TV: 'All I can say 1s that a country IS independent when 1t 
starts acting that way' This journalist also appreciated Bophuthatswana as an 
apparently non-racial haven where one could also shop in complexes full of 
goods without racial friction Da1ly Telegraph, 14.12.84. 
165 Sunday Times Magazine, op.cit. 
166 One Bop TV journalist expressed the view that positions and status within the 
organisation bad depended upon either being white or having a Tswana surname, 
one preferably related to Mangope. Personal communication, Mmabatho, 1995. 
167 Da1ly Telegraph, op.cit. 
168 Nat1on on the March, 204:1987. 
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'Don't deride the idea of the homelands'.'69 
The launch of Bop TV epitomised the direction and pattern of Bophuthatswana 
development, designed to maximise political capital for the regime and to generate 
sources of revenue for those part of this patronage system. For those not part of such 
grandiose high profile projects their 'realities' and life experiences were a million 
miles away. By the mid 1980s all of these contradictions with regards to the 'prestige' 
model of development 'national' and regional economic relations, labour-capital 
relations, urban-rural, white 'advisors', corruption, and relations between Tswana and 
other ethnic groups, were mounting within Bophuthatswana. Above all, Mangope's 
dream oflegitimacy and Bophuthatswana nation-building was thoroughly undermined 
by the residents of Bophuthatswana themselves. 
169 Da1ly Telegraph 14.12.84, op.cit. 
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7. The Contradictions and Crisis of Bophuthatswana Nation-
Building 1985-1988. 
7.1. Introduction 
Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' project had placed great emphasis upon the 
outward quest for international recognition and investment. Within the territory, 
however, Bophuthatswana's edifice of state and economy was fracturing along several 
axes. By the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana became riven by a range of contradictory 
forces manifested as pronounced economic, political and cultural crises. These 
intemal crises, heightened by the contradictions of the apartheid system and the 
overspill of resistance from South African anti-apartheid organisations into 
Bophuthatswana, led to widespread unrest. The Mangope regime increasingly relied 
upon the Bophuthatswana security apparatus in order to maintain control. By 1988 
Bophuthatswana's claims for 'national' legitimacy and international recognition were 
shattered from within Mangope's own institutions. An attempted coup d'etat was a 
strong indication of the unpopularity of the regime. Briefly deposed, Mangope 
depended upon South Africa's direct military intervention in order to regain power. 
The conflicts undermining Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' are discussed through 
the following themes. 
Firstly, in the early 1980s the South African government's creation of 
economic 'development regions' and the Development Bank of South Africa (DB SA) 
was an admission of the failure of economic development to take root in the 
bantustans. The development regions were supposedly based upon economic 'logic' 
rather than determined, as previously, by the 'national' boundaries of the bantustans. 
The new approach to regional development in South Africa (SA) contradicted 
Bophuthatswana's pretence of autonomous 'national' development. In 1985/1986 the 
portrayal of credible and sovereign 'development' was dealt a devastating blow as 
Bophuthatswana faced a serious economic crisis with revenue unable to meet the debt 
-------
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repayments of the 'prestige' projects. 
Secondly, the economic crisis was illustrative of the uneven and irregular 
benefits of Bophuthatswana's economic modernisation. Benefits were linked to the 
regime's grip on political power, patronage and priorities. The pattern was indicative 
of the wider political and economic context of the continuing problems of regional 
and homeland development in South Africa. The majority of Bophuthatswana's 
population were by-passed by the model of 'development' which was regarded by 
critics as servicing the needs of 'white' South Africa. Bophuthatswana's own internal 
contradictions included the industrialisation policy and increasing conflict with trade 
union movements considered by the regime as an economic and political threat. The 
continuing dominance of a number of high profile whites within 'national' structures 
caused resentment from Batswana officials, most siguificantly, within the 
Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BD F). 
Thirdly, Bophuthatswana's claims to uphold its Bill of Rights and liberal 
democracy were undermined by widespread political conflict and community 
resistance in Bophuthatswana and South Africa more generally. The regime was 
highly intolerant of dissent and political opposition was consistently driven out of 
Bophuthatswana. Traditional structures such as chieftaincy were incorporated, ever 
more forcefully, into 'national' political structures as tools of political and 
developmental control. The Bophuthatswana authorities focused the force of 
oppression particularly on marginalised non-Tswana communities living precariously 
on the borders between Bophuthatswana and South Africa. 
Lastly, the crisis in Bophuthatswana resulted in a coup in 1988 led by a faction 
within the BDF. The coup reflected the erosion ofMangope's institutional support and 
dependency upon South Africa for survival. From 1988 Bophuthatswana became 
increasingly out of step with the pace of political change and reform in South Africa 
itself. 
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7.2. Economic Crisis 
A former economic advisor to Mangope was highly critical of 
Bophuthatswana's use of its revenue. Karl Magyar claimed that the Bophuthatswana 
elite siphoned off this revenue exclusively for themselves. Images of 
Bophuthatswana's work force living in clusters of tin shacks within sight of the 
spectacular new government offices and shopping centres in Mmabatho were evoked: 
'This type of investment is aimed at the white South African spender in 
Bophuthatswana and provides relatively few jobs for the labour force in menial 
staffing capacities'.' 
Magyar once again attributed this misdirected investment not so much to the existence 
of Bophuthatswana per se but to its confused economic relationship with SA. The 
basis of Magyar's criticism was that Mang~pe's pursuit of 'independence' was 
jeopardising Bophuthatswana's development potential by not recognising that its 
productive sector formed an integral part of SA. This criticism was indicative of the 
more general shortcomings of the existing relations between South Africa and the 
homelands. By the early 1980s a fundamental reassessment of South Africa's regional 
development policy was prompted by the limited economic gains of the homelands 
and their continued dependency upon Pretoria. The reconceptualisation of homeland 
development was situated within the broader context of South Africa's crisis of 'white 
hegemony'. SA's military and business sectors in particular called for alternative 
strategies to deal with economic and political crisis in South Africa. The emerging 
community of South African 'developmentalists' enacted and defmed the new 
strategies as largely a 'developmental' problem. 2 
1 Magyar in The Star, 10.9.84. 
2 Tapscott, C. (1992&1995) op.c1t. 
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7.2.1. Development Regions and the Development Bank of South Mrica 
By 1980 concerted efforts were being made to discover a new development 
paradigm in South Africa.' The basis of this ideological transformation concerned the 
role of the homelands. These territories became rapidly associated with technical and 
developmental problems akin to other 'third world countries'. A development 
discourse which sought to redefine the relationship between white South Africa and 
its black periphery diffused throughout the South African state, academia and print 
media. This ideological change was integral to PW Botha's early period of reformism 
and his enhancement of the concept of a Constellation of Southern African states. The 
South African government claimed that 'Constellation' would encourage economic 
co-operation between South Africa and the bantustans or 'national states', whilst 
maintaining political sovereignty and with it the basis of apartheid policy, 'multi-
nationalism'. The political aspirations of the bantustans were now linked to economic 
inter-dependence with SA 
'Processes have been set in motion to ensure an equitable say for all population 
groups so that each one may satisfy his national aspirations, and thus help pave the 
way for co-operation between contented, self-governing and economically viable and 
self-reliant states, joined together in one large constellation to defend Southern Africa 
against the arch-enemies of equitable nationalism' .• 
'Multi-nationalism' was better known through its earlier formulation as 
separate development. In addition to the ethnic and racial basis of apartheid policy 
signified through the black 'states'(homelands), new regional initiatives for economic 
development were proposed. The principle impetus for the new regional initiatives 
was based upon enhancing 'development' in the homelands 
3 Ibid. 
4 PW Botha address to the Kwa-Zulu Leg1slat1ve Assembly, in INFORMA, March, 
1981. 
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'Referring to the economic status of the national states, the Prime Minister 
acknowledged that in recent years the development of the national states had not been 
adequate or sufficient to meet the challenges facing the country in the 'eighties. Ways 
and means would have to be found whereby the developing Black states could be more 
closely associated with the dynamic economy of the developed regions of South 
Africa, thereby promoting a more eqwtable distribution of economic activity... the 
development of the national states would have to be broadened and accelerated if the 
concept of economic inter-dependence was not to become increasingly suspect and 
perhaps even unacceptable to the Black peoples of the country'.' 
In order to bring the 'dynamic economy of the developed regions' to the black 
'states' the map of South Africa was redrawn. Following meetings in 1981 and 1982 
between Pretoria and the homelands, South Africa was divided into initially eight and 
then nine new 'development' regions. The desire for economic co-operation was 
reflected in these new demarcations which cut across the political boundaries of the 
'national states' and South African territory. Ideological and political differences could 
be subordinated to the imperative of development and economic co-operation. The 
effects of apartheid policy would be concealed and labelled instead as 'development 
needs'. In 1983 this new technical, economistic and developmentalist approach was 
put into practice with the creation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DB SA). 
The DBSA became 'the most influential development institution in South 
Africa and played a major role in the propagation of "development" thinking'.' The 
DBSA raised loans for the 'national states' through the capital markets and with South 
African government funding. Shares were owned by participating 'states' (in addition 
to the homelands Lesotho would also be involved). The DBSA declared its political 
'PW Botha, address to private sector audience, Carlton Hotel, JNFORMA, ibid. 
• Tapscott, C. (1995) op.ctt. 
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independence and significantly, coveted the private sector. The new thinking was 
supposedly symbolised by the location of its headquarters in Johannesburg, the 'hub of 
the country's fmancial sector', rather than Pretoria.' The DBSA was the central pivot 
streamlining other development institutions. BENSO (previously BENBO) was in 
effect absorbed into the DBSA and the former Corporation for Economic 
Development was no longer considered relevant by government. The Bank's overall 
objective was to promote regional economic development policy 'transcending 
national borders, to which all the participating governments had previously 
subscribed'.' The DBSA's mission statement reiterated these intentions: 
'to promote economic development in its broadest sense, mcreasing productivity and 
thus raising the standard of living of the people in the less-developed areas of the 
Southern African economic region '.• 
The barely concealed racism which had previously characterised South African 
government policy and attitude towards the black periphery was now substituted by a 
'development' problem: 
~. to reduce imbalances in levels of economic development between the less-developed 
and the more developed areas of the region ... promote the investment of public and 
private capital ... provide finance to meet important developmental requirements of 
participating governments... and provide technical assistance and training in the 
identification, preparation, evaluation, financing, implementation of development 
programmes'." 
7 JNFORMA, November, 1983. 
8 Annual Report, 1984/85, DBSA. 
9 Emphasis added, DBSA 1bid. 
10 DBSA, ibid. 
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A significant feature of the emerging policy was the provision of project-based loans 
rather than, as previously, a one off payment from the South Africa government to 
assist the bantustan economies more generally. The intention was to scrutinise 
allocation of resources and to acquire more control of the developmental process. By 
1985/6 the DBSA financed 74 projects within Bophuthatswana alone. The projects 
had an expected investment of around R635 million of which the Bank loaned R337 
11 Source: Stewart Scott Plan Associates (1992) op. cit. 
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million." The DBSA loans financed mainly a range of infrastructural projects. The 
DBSA co-operated with the BNDC on three 'Industrial Development' phases which 
comprised well over half of the total DBSA amount of R 107 709 million loaned to 
the BNDC." The controlling hand of the DBSA was resented by Bophuthatswana 
officials intent on pursuing 'national' development. One local government official 
criticised the time Jag between the project proposal and its appraisal by the DBSA 
who often took up to five years to screen the project proposal: 
'I think in the last 2-3 years the whole approach changed but in the old days it was 
really bad. I think that they were scared of white elephants. But I think that our Ctty 
projects were very sustainable'." 
The time Jag was related to the armies of consultants checking if each project 
was in line with so-called 'acceptable norms and standards'. The excessive nature of 
the elaborate project appraisal and implementation was intended to protect the client 
(the Bophuthatswana government) from over-design and exploitation. Another 
indication of the DBSA's cautious approach was that the total amount loaned was 
never advanced but released at each new stage of the project 
The role of the DBSA and South African authorities in promoting bantustan 
development was criticised more generally. Firstly, the wisdom of forcing the fragile 
economies of the bantustan's to repay debts and loans was questioned. Secondly, the 
emphasis upon project appraisal suggested that these institutious were less concerned 
with democratic accountability and participation than with winning approval for the 
project from the director of the DBSA. Furthermore, the DBSA had to allow for 
'goodwill' diplomacy and certain projects were sanctioned in order to keep the 
11 Makanjee, V. (1988) "Bophuthatswana, bordering on No-man's Land", Jndzcator 
SA, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring. 
13 Annual Report, 1990, BNDC. 
14 It was also suggested that DBSA delegations to Mmabatho were often heavily 
over-staffed, HJ Smit, Mmabatho City Engmeer, op.cit. 
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homeland regime's faith in the system. This approach was often described as both 
'patronising' and wasteful: 
'We cannot afford to let public sector fonds be wasted on inappropriate projects for 
the sake of diplomatic goodwill'." 
The DBSA's capital was welcomed but the failure to involve communities at 
all stages of development was another basic criticism. The problems of the lack of 
participation was expressed by the former chairman of the Bophuthatswana 
Development Council who was employed by the DBSA between 1983 to 1991: 
'My basic problem with the Development Bank was that they were a lot of theory and 
little action. I was confronted with the practical issues and problems and then had to 
go back to the ivory tower of the Development Bank where you spend months and 
months crossmg the 't' and dotting the 'i~ You generate paper for Africa. With 
appraisal report after appraisal report, in the end it became a case of beating the 
system, you would write an appraisal report to get acceptance from the director. The 
appraisal and the project then became totally divorced from what was happening on 
the ground and by the time the board approved the project it was totally dzffirent 
from the actual project on the ground The ideas were not even discussed with the 
people on the ground To me it just became a farce with no idea of reality. The sole 
objective was getting the project appraisal, after that what ever happened with the 
damn project no one was concerned about. It could have been a failure from the 
start'." 
15 Nkuhlu, W.L, (1987:40) Towards a more effective regional development strategy 
for Southern Africa, Development Southern Africa, Vol. 4, No. I, February, 
1987. The previous chapter discussed Bophuthatswana's disastrous power plant 
project. Despite the lack of VIability and negligible consultancy it is interesting 
to note that the DBSA, under political pressure, nonetheless initially sanctioned 
the project. 
16 Schoeman, D. (1995) op cit. 
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These critical interpretations of the DBSA concerned its organisation and 
bureaucracy. For all the DBSA's increased role in promoting economic 'development' 
in South Africa the conflict between Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' objectives and 
the 'development region' logic remained unresolved. A vast network of 'multilateral' 
structures, which at one point numbered over 100 committees or subcommittees, 
would link South Africa to the TVBC states. These were described as an 
'extraordinarily weak vehicle'" for controlling fmancial in the bantustans and also, 
following Bophuthatswana's fmancial crisis, the joint planning initiatives. The upward 
pressure on Bophuthatswana's expenditure could not be curbed. 
Despite the new conceptualisation given to economic development in South 
Africa there were further problems. The new regional strategy and the DBSA were 
constrained by South African government political objectives. There was the hope and 
rhetoric of economic regions whilst these lacked an empowered administrative 
structure. By the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana's 'national' priorities were still 
paramount and Bophuthatswana had been able to raise its own additional investment 
funds. Mangope's drive for examples of prestigious development projects were 
supported by access to these alternative finances. Schoeman, who was DBSA regional 
co-ordinator in Mmabatho observed that by the mid-1980s: 
'We could see the whole thmg deteriorate, what with stadiums, power stations. There 
were a few sorry instances when literally the cabinet was taken to the cleaners for the 
cost of millions'." 
7.2.2. Economic Crisis 
By 1985 the funding of extravagant projects began to outstrip available 
17 Dona1dson, A. (1991) op cit. 
18 Schoeman, D. (1995) op.cit. 
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revenue. The Bophuthatswana regime was plunged into debt with South Africa (SA), 
overseas banks and finance houses. The Financial Mail had been an influential 
publication for the South African business community. By 1985 it continued to praise 
what it called 'Booming Bop.' with evidence for this supposedly based upon the 
projects financed by over R2 billion since 'independence'." However, the warning 
signs for a looming economic crisis were provided by the former economic advisor to 
Bophuthatswana, Karl Magyar. With an article entitled 'How not to develop Bop.' 
Magyar demolished Bophuthatswana's tenuous claims for economic and 
developmental credibility. Bophuthatswana's economic function's were no more than 
in providing a dormitory and training ground for the PWV's labour needs. Magyar 
suggested that there was a 'failure to implement, enforce and supervise and monitor 
development progress'." Bophuthatswana's model of development was merely 
benefiting a privileged few in the elite and Magyar concluded that: 
'(there is a need to) Recognise that development can not take place in a political 
vacuum and until this is resolved, scarce fonds will certainly be wasted. 
Bophuthatswana is not a private corporation'." 
The regime was heavily indebted and the South African press declared that the 
'honeymoon' period for Bophuthatswana 'development' and public relations was over. 
Bophuthatswana's economic malaise was lamented as 'the jewel in apartheid's crown 
is headed for disastrous economic crunch' and 'Big Spending Bop. is broke'." The 
fmancial situation was considered critical with the expected deficit placed at between 
R575 million and R875 million or 50-85% of the following year's R1 billion budget. 
In the 1985 budget presentation to the Bophuthatswana Parliament, just months before 
the extent of the crisis became known to the public, the Finance Minister, Leslie 
19 Flnanczal Mazl, March, 1985. 
2
° Karl Magyar, in The Star, 10.9.84. 
21 Fmancial Mazl, 1.11.85. 
22 Sunday Times, 24.11.85. 
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Young, described the forthcoming budget as merely reflecting the need for 'the 
elimination of unnecessary expense and the tighter control of necessary expense'." 
The only indication of fmancial difficulty was the estimated reduction in revenue 
allocated for development expenditure from 22% to 14% of total budget due to 
'limited financial resources'." 
However, the South African government expressed particular concern about a 
number of projects. These included a R21 million Game Park Reserve at Pilanesburg, 
a R17 million soccer stadium in Mmabatho, a R20 million Olympic Sports stadium in 
Mmabatho, a R25 million international airport and over R40 million in local hotels. 
There was also speculation about interest payment on a loan ofR67 million from four 
banks and that Bophuthatswana was being sued for breach of contract for R366 
million." The critical factor had been that unlike the other TVBC states, 
Bophuthatswana's major developments such as the 'National' stadium and Bop TV 
were fmanced primarily through dollars gained from South African and international 
money markets and export credit. The Bophuthatswana government had previously 
repaid R1,60 for every dollar loaned but with the rand sharply devalued in the mid-
1980s this increased dramatically overnight to R3 per dollar. The debt of government 
was supposedly manageable when it was 20-30% of current budget but those debt 
ratios doubled to between 60-70%. The Bophuthatswana regime could no longer carry 
the large government structures that had been developed and could not even pay 
government salaries.26 By 1986 the economic crisis was particularly acute with the 
Bophuthatswana government allocating 36% of total national revenue to the 
Department of Finance in order to meet debt repayments. In 1987 this allocation was 
still approximately 27.2%.17 Actual development expenditure decreased from 24% of 
national revenue in 1984, to 9.6% in 1985, whilst still barely 10% in 1986." The 
23 Pioneer, June, 1985. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Sunday Times, 24.11.85. 
26 Schoeman, D. (1995) op.cit. 
27 Calculated from North West figures, op.cit. 
28 Ibid. Although rising to just under 20% during the end of the 1980s and Start of 
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Bophuthatswana government encountered serious fmancial problems in late 
1986/1987 and by June 1987 the regime approached SA for assistance. 
Deeply embarrassed, President Mangope and the Bophuthatswana government 
reluctantly 'agreed' to the DB SA's Joint Financial Programmes. These were devised by 
the DBSA to control finances and to 'lay down the line on spending in the TVBC 
states'." The Bophuthatswana government defended the South African media's 
accusations of an absolute crisis but did admit to a debt of R300 million. The regime 
also claimed that SA taxpayers only contributed 3% of Bophuthatswana's budget. 
With a good measure of irony these denials were made whilst Bophuthatswana was 
reportedly in a hurry to complete its new stadium in time for the 1987 'independence' 
celebrations. Even the Financial Mail recognised the severity of Bophuthatswana's 
fmancial crisis and the previously gushing enthusiasm for Bophuthatswana's 
economic development from certain South African sectors evaporated: 
'Certainly if separate development were to be measured in terms of monetary cost, it 
can now be said to be a dismal failure, as Bop. is the richest of the demarcated South 
African States'." 
The conditionalities imposed by the DBSA represented the end ofMangope's relative 
autonomy in economic decision making which had spanned the first half of the 1980s. 
Bophuthatswana's economic crisis had heightened concerns throughout South Africa 
about the effectiveness of regional economic strategy and homeland pursuit of 
'national' and 'independent' policies. 
the 1990s, the amount allocated for development expenditure never regained 
previous levels. 
29 Cape Tzmes, 24.9.87. The comparison between the DBSA and the World Bank 
became more pronounced as the form of these JFP's resembled the World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Policy. Engelbrecht, W, The World Bank and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa: A comparison, Development Southern 
Africa, Vol. 3, No. I, 1986. 
30 
'Bop. bust on all counts', Fznanczal Mazl, 29.11.85. 
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7.3. The continued failure of Regional and Bophuthatswana 'national' 
development. 
The hopes of government, the business community and 'development' 
scientists for improved regional development continued to be disappointed. In 1987 
the regional initiatives were presented by a member of the Institute of Development 
Research during a seminar investigating the Economic Development of 
Bophuthatswana's Molopo Region. In order to address the particular problem of 
unemployment it was emphasised that the economic function of this Bophuthatswana 
district had to be situated in the wider South African economy within Region 'J'. 
Economic regions were defmed according to the presence of a 'natural node' of a city 
or town serving a 'hinterland': 
The major part of each national state is often characterised by traditional agriculture 
and the absence of a nodal hierarchy worth mentioning. Occupants of regional 
hinter lands and dormitory towns near the borders of national states are, for the most 
part, served by nearby cities and towns. The occupants of dormitory towns in turn 
supply their labour. The whole hinterland of such a city or town is thus a nodal 
region'." 
The nodes within region J were identified as Mmabatho and also Rustenberg 
and Klerksdorp/Potchefstroom in South Africa The implication was that 
Bophuthatswana's 'national' boundaries were to be subordinated to 'economic Jaws': 
'The economic laws which form the basis of this structure, necessarily imply the 
development of a national state can not be planned in isolation, but only as part of a 
31 S. J. H. Louw, Region 'J' as an Economic Development Unit, The Economic 
Development of the Molopo Area, Mmabatho Sun, 11.11.87. 
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bigger planning region'." 
A number of South Africa's emerging academic 'developmentalists' suggested 
that the existing regional economic strategy was doing little for poverty and 
unemployment in the homelands more generally. Bophuthatswana's economic 
development was not benefiting the Batswana themselves. From 1977-1985 the real 
increase in household income had been only 4%, considered 'insignificant': 
'The general picture for the people living in these districts of Bophuthatswana, in 
terms of employment and income, is not too encouragmg. Prospects of finding 
employment outside Bophuthatswana are slowly diminishing and employment 
opportunities inside the country are mcreasing at a very low rate'. " 
The 'insignificance' of economic development for the majority of 
Bophuthatswana's residents became even more pronounced when placed within the 
context of South Africa as a whole. Bophuthatswana's per capita geographic product 
had been the highest of all the homelands but remained only 13% that of main South 
Africa (South Africa minus the homelands). In 1987 the Vice-Principal of the 
University ofTranskei and future chairman of the DBSA, Mr. W L Nkuhlu, captured 
South Africa's 'developmentalists' disenchantment with the approach to regional 
development. Nkuhlu highlighted the failure of regional policy to reduce 
unemployment and poverty in the homelands due to inequality not only between 
regions but within regions. The areas which received labour flows developed whilst 
those from which labour was drawn, mainly homeland border towns, lacked 
infrastructure, social services, and also with constraints placed upon local 
entrepreneurs and small businesses. The major factor stifling endogenous economic 
development in these 'dormitory' areas was identified as the pervasive system of 
32 Ibid. (1987:2). 
33 Ibid. ( 1987: 8). 
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institutional and state control based upon central government and metropolitan 
dominance." 
Many of the developmentalists focused mainly upon 'socio-economic' and 
sectoral imbalances. Others were more vocal in identifying the predominant force 
shaping the pattern of economic development as territorial apartheid and the enforced 
political boundaries aimed at reversing black urbanisation in South Africa. The huge 
waste of resources in maintaining this system was condemned. It was estimated that 
for every job made in the 'periphery' (homelands) nine in the metropolitan areas could 
have been created." The homelands were simply not deriving any autonomous 
benefits and were still dependent upon transfers of labour to South Africa By the 
mid-1980s the homelands accounted for only 4-5% of South Africa's economic value 
added although containing 42% of the total population of South Africa" 
Within Bophuthatswana it was doubtful if sectors previously identified as 
areas of potential economic growth and as capable of increasing local Batswana 
participation had achieved this. Magyar claimed that Bophuthatswana's impressive 
economic growth figures were misleading because only a fraction of local residents 
received any increased wages or profits. A large proportion of GDP went to foreign 
shareholders and economic development was based upon increasing GNP and output 
rather than providing any tangible benefit to the masses." Industry in Bophuthatswana 
was regarded as limited; what did exist was dominated by foreigners (including South 
Africans). The industrial decentralisation programme was the main promoter of 
industrial development. However, this programme was principally concerned with 
relocating entrepreneurs from outside to inside Bophuthatswana The result was that: 
The local entrepreneur is often not sufficiently assisted and as a result Batswana 
34 Nkuhlu, W.L, (1987) op.cit. 
" in Halbach, A. J, (1988) The South African homeland policy and its 
consequences: An evaluation of separate development, Development Southern 
Afrzca, Vol. 5, No. 4, November 1988. 
36 Halbach, ibid. 
37 Magyar. K. (1984) op.cit. 
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entrepreneurs are not seen as participants in the development process' .. ,. 
Foreign investment was either considered as 'dubious' or as locating only to 
receive the very generous incentives which enabled the industrialist some degree of 
profit." The only possibilities for self-sustaining growth were Bophuthatswana's 
industries in close proximity to the PWV which reflected the extension of 'white' 
controlled industry rather than Batswana controlled industry. The number of jobs 
created and the absence of backward and forward linkages with the surrounding 
economy therefore hardly justified the huge level of concessions needed to keep most 
industries functioning ... 
The failure of the construction industry's 'trickle down' to local residents in 
Bophuthatswana was an indication ofNkhulu's observation that small businesses were 
constrained by large scale operations. Given the earlier optimism about the role of 
construction in the economic development of Bophuthatswana discrimination against 
Batswana builders was of particular concern 
'Most of the projects are large, most of the contracts usually go to the more 
experienced and stronger construction businesses. The result is that often the 
Botswana builder and contractor are discriminated against'." 
The widespread use of large scale outside contractors and consultants, usually 
South African, had the impact of inflating prices due to 'kick-backs'. Most 
significantly the heavy dependence upon 'outsiders' failed to create local internal 
capacity.42 Business licenses were extremely difficult to obtain and even if granted, 
government contracts were dominated by the large constructors. Some Batswana 
38 Louw, S.J. (1987) op.cit. 
39 Magyar, K. m the Star, 9.6.1988. 
"'Nkuh1u, W.L, op.cit. 
41 S. J. H. Louw, (1987:8) op. cit. 
42 Mosothoane (1995) op cit. 
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builders had to wait years for business licences, the approval of which was linked to 
patronage, particularly for BDP members or 'favourites' of the government. One 
Batswana builder put it as follows: 
'I left school early, with no employment opportunities and so I helped my 
grandfather's brick making business I wanted to get my own business but it was 
never allowed by Mangope. It took me more than two years to finally get a licence. 
Small builders were always ignored in Bophuthatswana'." 
The pattern of patronage was also indicated by the appointment of Eddie 
Mangope, one of the President's sons, as General Manager of the Small Business 
Division of the BNDC. This appointment was made despite the incumbent's failure to 
prove the existence of his alleged MBA certificate and without any prior business or 
management experience." There were also concerns regarding the performance of the 
Agricultural Development Corporation (AGRICOR) which had losses of more than 
R79 million and the Agri-chicks scheme which owed R50 million and had monthly 
losses running at Rl million. Rural co-operatives aimed at the development of peasant 
agriculture were also questionable with no profit being made and limited peasant 
contribution to GDP." Overall the Bophuthatswana economic surplus from the mines 
and casinos had been an important source of revenue for the government but, 
however, Daphne and de Clerq allude to the consolidation of a small elite through the 
modernising 'prestige' projects at the sake of the rural masses. It was a reflection of the 
wider tendency within Bophuthatswana leading to a privileged minority dominating 
the upper echelons of government structures. 
Notoriously low wages within industries located in Bophuthatswana was used 
by the regime as a deliberate policy to attract investors. This strategy had formed the 
43 Member of the Ditsobotla Artisans Committee affthated to the North West 
Builders Federation representing, small black builders, personal communication, 
Mmabatho, March, 1995. 
44 Gcinumkhonto, M, (1995) op. cit . 
., Ibid. 
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basis for other economic and political conflicts involving South African based trade 
unions and the Bophuthatswana regime. 
7.3.1. Trade Unions and the Bophuthatswana regime. 
Prior to independence in 1977 the opposition Seoposengwe Party had 
condemned the appallingly low level of wages within Bophuthatswana. Wages as low 
as seven rand per week were revealed by a South African newspaper investigating the 
opposition's claims concerning factories within Bophuthatswana. The 
Bophuthatswana government defended the accusations of'slave wages' and stated that 
it would 'not stand by and let any industrialists take advantage of our country and 
people'." Despite these claims the Bophuthatswana government's gagging orders on 
the Babelegi Labour Office not to release any information on wages to the press 
indicated the regime's true feelings." By the mid-1980s Magyar estimated that 69 8% 
of Bophuthatswana's workers were migrants or commuters to South Africa Most of 
the remaining 30% of the economically active age group within the homeland were 
'unemployed, underemployed or very poorly paid if employed'. Wages of only R117 
per week were discovered at Babelegi, for which people travelled up to six hours a 
day to and from work." The Bophuthatswana government's hostility to trade union 
(TU) activity must therefore be seen in the context of this economic policy centred 
upon cheap labour. 
In addition to the economic conflict, because TUs ignored the political 
boundaries of the 'national' states they were considered by the Bophuthatswana regime 
as a potentially hostile political force. Many workers lived in Bophuthatswana but 
worked within South Africa and there was a great deal of ambiguity as to whether the 
South African Labour Relations Acts of the early 1970s applied to the homelands and 
adjacent industrial zones. In 1981, this ambiguity was tested in when members of the 
46 See the Post, 7.2.77 
47 h T e Post, 30.1.77. 
48 Magyar, K. (1985) How not to develop Bop, Fmanczal Mail, I November. 
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National Automobile and Allied Workers Union attempted to meet at the BMW 
factory in Garankuwa, Bophuthatswana. On that occasion the Internal Security Act 
was invoked by the Bophuthatswana regime to break up the meeting with the arrest of 
three TU members." Furthermore, meetings of more than twenty people required 
permission from the Minister of Internal Security through the local magistrate. Some 
craft unions were tolerated but ironically for a 'multi-racial' society these were often 
exclusively white workers' unions. The major Bophutbatswana legislation covering 
union organisation within its territory clearly indicated that black unions were 
discouraged. The Bophutbatswana Indnstrial Conciliation Act, No. 52 of 1984 
removed much of the previous ambiguity: 
'one of the Act's main requirements is that all unions, including unregistered unions, 
organising in Bophuthatswana must have their head office there, while union officials 
must be employees there. Even before the Act was passed this requirement was laid 
down to a number of unions to prevent their operating in Bophuthatswana'." 
As SA unions did not recognise the legality of Bophutbatswana they did not wish to 
register within this territory as it would imply recognition. The regime argued that 
because these South African unions were 'foreign' their activities could not be 
tolerated by another sovereign state. The Act removed some negative clauses and 
discriminatory practices that had existed in SA, for example the obsolete clause in the 
SA Mine and Works Act which had previously prevented blacks from holding 
blasting certificates, but over all it was utilised as a control mechanism. Some 
observers thought that the draconian measures were worse than even within SA itself. 
By outlawing South African TU organisation Bophuthatswana was also attempting to 
'seal its borders ideologically'." Country wide strikes between branches of the same 
industry but in different parts of SA and Bophuthatswana would be prevented. Other 
49 Cooper, C, SAIRR Topical Brieftng, 16 7.84. 
'° Cooper, ibid., 1984·4 
" RDM, 2.3 .84. 
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clauses covering registration and collective bargaining effectively ruled out strike 
action. TU activity was discouraged through Mangope's fantasy of hermetically 
sealing territories. 
Conditions for TU activity were described as better in the PWV and marginal 
areas of Bophuthatswana. Workers could organise meetings within SA, for example, 
at Rustenberg or closer to Mmabatho at Sehuba, but these were often violently 
disrupted within Bophuthatswana. TU organisation was therefore particularly 
problematic for workers who commuted into South Africa. There would be less 
' 
opportunity to organise within the factory and upon returning across the border to 
Bophuthatswana, police roadblocks would be in place and documents often 
confiscated." Bophuthatswana workers criticised the regime's economic and 
development policy which, as Magyar has indicated, was skewed towards 'white' 
industrialists and the provision of servicing for mainly 'white' South African sectors. 
7.3.2. The Casino Economy 
The South African and Bophuthatswana governments and sections of the 
media had attempted to conceal these negative features of Bophuthatswana's 
economic development behind the facade of 'progress'. More issues undermined the 
cosmetic window dressing and questioned whether this 'development' was reaching 
the mass of Bophuthatswana residents. For example the idea of Bophuthatswana's 
self-sufficiency in agricultural production was another acclaimed feature of 
development strategy. The Minister of Agriculture, Chief E.M Mokgoto had 
previously declared: 
'Throughout the world, about 500 million people are in fact suffering from 
malnutrition or lack of food to the point of actual starvation. .. (Bophuthatswana) 
52 Gcinumkhonto, M. (1995) op.c1t. 
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stresses agricultural development in order to be able to feed herself." 
A very revealing indication of this 'self-sufficiency' and Bophuthatswana's 
development priorities was suggested in the same speech. The Minister claimed that 
the pattern of productivity and self-sufficiency was illustrated through the supply of 
R99 000 worth of meat to Sun City per month and also R130 000 of vegetables to 
cater for the demand from holiday resorts." Increased productive output and catering 
for the needs of mainly white holiday resorts did not mean that marginalised rural 
communities received the benefits of 'self-sufficiency'. State agricultural production 
was geared towards production of cash crops with little assistance provided for 
growing vegetables and other crops for household consumption'." 
Indeed the glamour and prestige of Sol Kerzner's Sun City itself was 
contrasted rather chillingly with the discovery of a number of 'Dead babies in Sun 
City sewers', dumped by a number of young girls following sexual relations with 
visitors at the hotel resort." Furthermore, another academic, Professor Keenan of the 
University of Witswatersrand, had conducted research into the conditions of 
employees at Sun City. Keenan found that black employees were disadvantaged in 
many ways relating to salary and working conditions compared to white staff." 
Keenan also discovered that the area surrounding Sun City had unemployment levels 
greater than anywhere else in Bophuthatswana. These findings led Magyar to suggest 
that Sun City (and tourism and gambling) provided less than 10% of 
Bophuthatswana's revenue but 90% of its publicity." The 'non-racial' society was 
particularly rewarding for white groups. Even in Mafikeng, a symbol supposedly of 
integration and non-racialism, a study by the Human Sciences Research Council 
50 Pioneer, Apnl, 1980 
54 Ibid. 
"MakanJee, V (1988) op cit. MakanJee points out that in 1984/85 the value of 
maize productiOn was R8 million whilst vegetables were only R40 000. 
56 Sunday Star, 12.7.85. 
51 Sunday Star, 2.3.86. 
" Magyar, K (1985) op.cit. 
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found that many whites would leave if the Bophuthatswana government removed its 
guarantees on segregated religion and education. Four years after incorporation into 
Bophuthatswana there had been no cultural integration between black and white 
residents in Maflkeng, although a 'reasonable' degree of economic and residential 
integration." 
The progressive and multi-racial complexion of Bophuthatswana was 
unmasked as particularly beneficial to whites and certain black 'immigrants'. This 
tendency was reflected in the 1985 employment figures for the Molopo region 
obviously dominated by the capital Mmabatho. Those classified as 'immigrants' 
formed 3 8% of the administrative, managerial and professional occupations in the 
Molopo region. On the other hand over 83% of the total number ofMolopo residents 
were not 'officially' economically active with 75% classified as not receiving any 
income." Many Batswana within government and parastatals felt discriminated 
against. The credibility of Mangope's Batswana discourse was undermined by 
pronouncements by figures such as ex-Rhodesian Rowan Cronje who referred to 
Batswana characteristics as 'our' uniqueness.•• 
The pattern of development had been directed towards visible 'progressive' 
icons of development. For Magyar, this policy had simply exacerbated the illogical 
basis of the homeland's economic strategy and was particularly beneficial to whites: 
'When reviewing the nature of the government's economic planning strategies, a 
distinct corporate pattern emerges. Revenues are collected from sources which the 
Tswana population had little to do with (for example, mines, hotels, gambling, TV; 
and so on) and these scarce profits are "invested" in showpzece projects which will 
offir status and wages to only the few. Whites have introduced these projects, some 
long before "independence': and they are intended to make money primarily from 
'
9 The Star, 17.3.86. 
60 Secretary of Economic Affairs (1987) Demographic Profile of the Molopo 
Region, in Economic Development of the Molopo Region, op. cit. 
61 P•oneer, 1983. 
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other whites'. 62 
Bophuthatswana's interpretation of 'national' development was most clearly 
illustrated by communities being uprooted to make way for game parks and resorts. 
The settlements at Groothook and Morokashoek were removed to make way for a 
game park and the Thaba Nchu Sun hotel.63 People had also been removed from tribal 
land in order to make way for Mmabatho itself and a range of projects including a 
luxury suburb called 'Leopard Park'." In Hanunanskraal, the suburb of Morokolong 
was levelled in order to make way for an BNDC industrial site." The costs and 
benefits of Bophuthatswana 'development' were disproportionately felt by different 
groups and communities. A minority of Batswana, ex-Rhodesians and Afrikaners 
have accumulated substantial wealth from the civil service, commercial and retailing 
sectors.66 A large number of British, South African and other African expatriates also 
enjoyed lucrative Bophuthatswana government contracts and tax packages. In 
addition, the large number of South African consultant engineers, planners and 
architects profited from the regime. Certain residents of Mafikeng also benefited 
greatly from these developments and became important contract suppliers to the 
Bophuthatswana government, for cars, fuel, and the like. The benefits that may have 
accrued to the masses have not been gained by the rural majority, over 85% of total 
population. 
The Bantustans were increasingly criticised by the SA media which continued 
to express what it called the 'taxpayers terror'. This criticism followed the disclosure 
that the TVBC finances estimated for the fiscal year to the end of March 1987, 
totalled R4.5 billion. 36%, or R1.6 billion, was to be used for the salaries of more than 
150,000, probably closer to 200,000, bantustan public servants." 'Apartheid has 
62 Magyar, K. (1985) op cit. 
63 See Murray, C. (1994) op.cit. 
64 Mr. Mosothoane (1995) op.cit. 
65 Shepard, A. (1993) Problem Child, Africa Report, Vol. 38. 
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caused economic shambles in homelands' rang headlines and a PFP spokesman 
captured the concerns of the white South Africans in suggesting that ultimately it was 
they who would foot the bill. Even South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs 
which dealt with the TBVC 'independent' states admitted that many of the problems 
were created by 'independence'. The economic situation was described as critical 
because in addition to 'aid', loans to the homelands had to be guaranteed by the SA 
government." The SA press publicised the extent of economic crisis in the homelands 
as 'SA props TBVC states"' and the 'Crippling cost of the homelands'.70 However, the 
poor internal revenues of the homelands had perhaps meant that they would never be 
in a position to ever repay their debts: 
'Having offered a Faustian bargain to ludicrously unequal partners, Pretoria has had 
to pay the bills for the undzsciplined indulgences of opportunistic homeland 
administrations~ 71 
Despite the set back of the economic crisis, the business community's Financial Mail 
maintained that 'black homelands (are) still lynchpins of apartheid' and hoped for 
better leaders."' However the economic crisis was also underpinned and compounded 
by the political and cultural conflicts ofBophuthatswana's 'nation-building'. 
7.4. Political and Cultural Control 
The emerging pattern of conflation of tradition with Bophuthatswana's 
political structures was suggested in chapter three. Permission was required from the 
chiefs and headmen for meetings and any self-help activities in tribal areas and 
elsewhere from the Bophuthatswana police. Both of these parties were entitled to 
68 The Star, 3.10.87. 
69 Sowetan, 2.10.87. 
70 New Nat1on, 1.10 88. 
71 Donaldson, A. ( 1991) op cit. 
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attend these meetings. The chiefs were also given the power of arrest, ability to levy 
taxes and could even pass sentence for particular offences." Chiefs could therefore 
exert a considerable influence upon rural politics and development particularly 
through their control over land and administrative role in Bophuthatswana's national 
political structures. Mangope himself was at the pinnacle of these structures. When 
opposition was encountered from traditional figures not willing to conform, Chiefs, 
such as Mmankurwane in Phokeng, as well as Chief Lebone Molatlegi, were deposed. 
Molatlegi's wife was also exiled by Mangope. Despite the profile given to traditional 
structures in Bophuthatswana their potentially valuable role in development was 
overshadowed by their functions as control mechanisms: 
'With some outstanding exceptions in every homeland, the general picture is one of 
lack of concern for the welfare of the community and the corrupt use of power for 
personal enrichment and aggrandisement'." 
The subordination of chieftaincy to a government agenda was reflected upon 
by an ANC activist with a long experience of involvement in rural areas of 
Bophuthatswana. Chieftaincy was regarded as particularly significant in preventing 
any alternative education or development efforts: 
'Village chieftainship as a political structure is a major thorn in the flesh. It is one 
impediment to change and development. It has kept many VIllagers from engaging 
more deeply in their own change In our villages chiefs are paid servants of the 
Bantustan state. This is enshrined in law. They are not always made accountable. In 
some cases they are simply removed if they do not share the ruling government party's 
views of development. I have known some to spy on any alternative education and 
73 Black Sash (1990) Graspmg the Pnckly Pear: The Bophuthatswana Story, A 
Black Sash Publication. 
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development attempts to improve the lot of villagers~" 
These features of rural governance therefore had an intimidating and 
demoralising impact upon any alternative local grass roots structures or community 
development workers." Villagers were dependent upon chiefs, headman and patronage 
for services and resources which has left an enduring legacy in these areas (see last 
chapter). Communities' dependency was also exacerbated in Bophuthatswana by the 
limited availability of training facilities for community administration, book keeping, 
fmancial planning and construction skills. Communities were also often suspicious 
and distrustful of the authorities and each other. 
The previous chapter indicated the erosion of liberal democracy in 
Bophuthatswana by the mid-1980s. The regime perceived itself as under threat from a 
range of political forces. Traditional structures and promotion of Batswana ethnic 
nationalism were activated as key control mechanisms. From 'Independence' 90% of 
the Bophuthatswana Legislative members were representatives of the ruling political 
party. A number of constitutional changes were simply made to prevent challenges to 
the regime's authority. The government's paramount concern, even obsession, was for 
state security with individual liberties and the Rule of Law such as the much 
publicised Bill of Rights of secondary consideration.'' Unrest was closely monitored 
by Mangope and the Bophuthatswana Intelligence Service with many ex-Rhodesian 
and South African intelligence personnel recruited for their 'expertise'. 
Bophuthatswana was undoubtedly increasingly underpinned by authoritarianism and 
the fear factor and rapidly developed the characteristics of a police state. Mangope 
instilled a climate of fear and oppression which his heavy-handed security forces 
reinforced. The Bophuthatswana Police Headquarters in Mmabatho, with its Lucas 
"Phi! Mathole, in Matlhasedi, N ov/Dec 1991. 
76 See FitzGerald, M. (1993) "Participatory community development m 
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Mangope Hall and numerous patrol cars, was built opposite the main road entering the 
'Stadt' as testimony to this desire for control and surveillance. 
The Mail newspaper covered a meeting between Mangope and residents in the 
Taung district following Chief Mmankurwane's enforced exile by Mangope. As the 
meeting began Mangope attempted to speak but was prevented from doing so by a 
woman who produced a placard demanding, 'We want our chief back'. The reaction of 
the security forces epitomised the insecurity of the regime and its heavy handed 
response to opposition. Police attempted to arrest old and young alike and sjamboked 
many of the residents, condemning them as the ANC, whilst Mangope took flight. An 
obvious target of control was information and the media itself. The Taung story was 
put together by the current News Editor at the Mail and presented to the previous 
editor, Leslie Sehume. Fearing retribution from Mangope, Sehume appeared reluctant 
to sanction publication of the story." Following persuasion from his reporters the 
story fmally won acceptance for publication by Sehume, as a front page story in the 
following Friday's edition. Sehume was summoned to the President's office on the 
same morning that the Mail was on sale and given a severe reprimand for printing the 
story, one of several such occasions." These 'national' structures were made 
accountable to Mangope himself and the President ritually summoned a range of 
office-holders before him, delivering fierce dressing-downs and verbal warnings. 
Mangope's wrath was reserved in particular for non-Tswana communities who were 
scape-goated for the problems ofBophuthatswana 'nation-building'. 
7.4.1. Batswana ethno-nationalism 
The ethnic basis of the regime posed considerable problems for the 
large number of non-Tswana within Bophuthatswana. Tswana nationalism had been a 
long term political tool used by the Bophuthatswana regime to enhance a semblance 
of 'nation-hood'. Non-Tswana in the bantustan were represented by the 
78 The Mail had been bought on behalf of the Bophuthatswana Government by the 
Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund m 1982. 
79 Mokagi, S. (1995) op.cit. 
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Bophuthatswana state as squatters. The ethno-nationalist impulses from state 
structures also appealed to various Tswana communities. As the weight of 
Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' contradictions intensified, according to Manson 
and Lawrence 'non-racialism' and 'liberal democracy' had: 
'little relevance for the masses, who desperate for jobs and security, viewed outsiders 
or "foreigners" as competitors and were more likely to buy the notion of exclusive 
ethnic nationalism~" 
Bophuthatswana presented the facade ofliberalism to the outside world whilst 
internally there was the denial of work permits, citizenship and pensions to 
non-Tswana within the bantustan." Mangope encouraged harassment of non-Tswana 
groups who were vilified as the ethnic 'other' and ordered to conform to 
Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' policies. During the economic crisis of the mid-
1980s and with the austerity measures imposed by South Africa, the Bophuthatswana 
regime appeared even more reluctant to use resources on non-Tswana settlements. 
Ethnic outsiders had been criticised for many years by the Bophuthatswana and South 
African authorities for siphoning Bophuthatswana's precious resources. During the 
economic crisis non-Tswana communities were blamed and victimised. 'Squatters' 
were also regarded as the cause of Bophuthatswana's political difficulties in 
cementing 'nation-hood' and for distilling the 'purity' ofBatswana nationalism. 
From 1980 to 1985 Bophuthatswana's de facto population grew at a rate of 
almost 13.2% to 1 740 600 people. Much of this increase was accounted for by the 
rapid growth of a number of remote settlements on the fringes of Bophuthatswana. 
These were formed by people removed or relocated to the homeland from SA.s2 Far 
removed from the glitz and glamour of Mmabatho, were a huge number of people 
living in vast squatter camps. Murray has termed this process 'displaced urbanisation' 
80 Mans on A. and Lawrence, M. (1994) op.cit. 
81 Gcinumkhonto, M, (1995) op.ctt. 
82 Makanjee, V. (1988) op cit. 
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whereby in the 1970s and particularly the 1980s black South Africans were relocated 
to sites politically within the bantustans but geographically on the peripheries of the 
established metropolitan labour markets." This resettlement policy led to a rapid 
increase in rural slum settlements of urban density but rural in respect of infrastructure 
and services. 
For example in 1979 Botshabelo in Bophuthatswana was bare veld but by 
1986 it formed a settlement of around 500 000 people. Throughout the 1970s this 
process of relocation was also taking place on the highveld in Winterveld, Qwa Qwa 
and KwaNdebele. Hundreds of people were relocated to resettlement villages at 
Ramatlabama, in the Molopo region, near to Mmabatho itself. The macro-level 
structural pressures of apartheid policy were then exacerbated by the enforcement of 
the bantustans as 'ethno-national units'." Botshabelo (formerly Onverwacht) consisted 
mainly of Basotho residents but initially fell under Bophuthatswana control. This 
jurisdiction was used by Bophuthatswana to foment and mobilise ethnic differences. 
Murray observed that in the 1950s and 1960s the Seleka Barolong branch of the 
Batswana ethnic group in the Thaba Nchu region had been riven by internal political 
cleavage. Following the formation ofOnverwacht, consisting of thousands of refugees 
discarded from white farm land, there was a policy to represent the area as the 'land of 
the Barolong' and as peaceful prior to the 1970s and rapid increase of non-Tswana 
population ('squatter invasion'). The internal differences within the Seleka were 
rapidly projected onto the Basotho and the foundations of an inter-ethnic conflict were 
laid." As early as 1974 Mangope had made his government's vehicles available to the 
South African authorities in order to remove Basotho from Thaba Nchu. Mangope 
justified this ethnic cleansing by referring to the characteristics of the Basotho as 
'those people who live like animals'." From 1977 the non-Tswana population were 
threatened with deportation from Bophuthatswana if they refused to take out 
83 Murray, C. (1994) op.cit. 
84 Ibid. 
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86 Rogers, B. (1980:75) op cit. 
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Bophuthatswana citizenship. However, the Bophuthatswana authorities often refused 
or ignored applications for citizenship from these groups. Threats were made that 
pensions and salaries would cease to be paid unless opposition to Bophuthatswana 
was dropped. There was widespread discrimination against non-Tswana groups until 
Botshabelo's incorporation into Qwa Qwa in the 1980s. 
Winterveld was another huge settlement 40 kilometres north west of Pretoria. 
By the late 1970s it was suggested that: 
'The deportations and associated violence around Winterveld are among the worst 
examples of South African removals, complicated by the issue of Bophuthatswana 
citizenship, loss of South African citizenship and the involvement of the 
BophuthaTswana Government in the forefront of the official attack on squatters'." 
Winterveld was a particular focus of Bophuthatswana's enforced nation-hood 
campaign in the 1980s and early 1990s." Access to land, jobs and pensions have been 
denied to this vast community, of over 90% non-Tswana composition. The 
Bophuthatswana authorities were apparently always reluctant to take responsibility for 
this non-Tswana community. In 1986 the Bophuthatswana police opened fire on a 
crowd of squatters in Winterveld killing eleven people which epitomised the attitude 
of the Bophuthatswana regime to such communities. The Bophuthatswana police 
commander at the time, who apparently called the meeting at which the people were 
shot, showed his contempt for the 'squatters' by suggesting 'I will leave them lying all 
over like ants'. The commander was promoted to Brigadier and the findings of the 
official Bophuthatswana investigation into the incident withheld by the regime." 
Given the degree of hostility from the Bophuthatswana government this inevitably 
81 Rogers, B. (1980:32) op.cit. 
88 de Clercq, F. (1994) "Putting community participation into development work: 
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affected any attempt to implement 'development'. 
The Bophuthatswana and Central South African governments implemented the 
Winterveld Development Programme. With hostility on both sides and governments' 
'minimalist' approach to community participation it was concluded that: 
' ... the government-controlled development programme did not attempt to address the 
urgent socio-political priorities ofWinterveld residents. Instead, it focused on some of 
the physical and economic programmes of the Inter-Governmental Agreement by 
upgrading some infrastructural faczlities, and this without consulting the community 
and their needs~"' 
Phase two of the programme still encountered the problem of participation, 
controversial selection of community representatives and institutional problems of the 
DBSA and other parastatals. Another sub-progranune concerned the Education 
investigation project and identified residents' objection to the imposition of the 
compulsory use of Setswana in Bophuthatswana primary and secondary schools. 
Despite the millions of rand for the entire programme residents declared that it felt 
like 'apartheid money'." Once again given such features, development was hindered 
by the absence of grass-roots organisation and community participation, the legacy of 
dependency and lack of community organisations. 
The Hammanskraal area, also not far from Pretoria, was incorporated into 
Bophuthatswana in 1977. Many of the inhabitants are Ndebele and were the focus of 
vicious Bophuthatswana police brutality. The government claimed that their actions, 
demolishing homes and forcing 600 families to flee, as recently as 1993, have been 
necessary to discourage 'squatting'." 
These brief examples indicate the fierce battles that went on against 
incorporation into Bophuthatswana and discrimination once transferred to the 
90 de Clercq, F. (1994) op.cit. 
91 de Clercq, F. ibid. 
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bantustan. Non-Tswana and Tswana communities alike, such as the communities of 
Braklaagte and Leeuwonfontein, bitterly resisted incorporation into Bophuthatswana. 
In the 1980s more generally, opposition to apartheid and the bantustans intensified 
throughout South Africa. With the formation of the United Democratic Front (VD F) 
in 1983 the organisation of boycotts and creation of civic organisations mushroomed. 
The proximity of the eastern Bophuthatswana districts to the PWV region meant that 
Bophuthatswana itself was also subject to opposition. However, it should be pointed 
out that, significantly, these civic organisations and the UDF were almost non-existent 
within Bophuthatswana. In the words of the present Secretary of the ANC Mmabatho 
Branch, to have organised in the Mmabatho region in the 1980s 'it took a brave person 
to do so'." Bophuthatswana was racked by conflict with hand grenade attacks against 
the bantustan police force and torture and illegal imprisonment of civilians. In 1986 
the Archbishop of Pretoria sent an urgent Supreme Court Order to prevent the 
Bophuthatswana police from 'waging a war' on the local population of Ga-Rankuwa. 
Mangope himself faced jail for contempt of court in a number of serious cases in and 
around Ga-Rankuwa. In 1986 a state of emergency was declared in Bophuthatswana 
and political activity was banned. Riots also swept Odi, Moretele and Bafokeng 
districts with vehicle hijackings, abductions and widespread damage to property." In 
the ten years from independence the number of prisoners had increased from 645 in 
1978 to 2,677 in 1987." The Mmabatho and Molopo region was considered 'quiet' in 
the 1980s and indeed Mangope contrasted its relative tranquillity with the unrest in 
the eastern areas blamed upon 'South African aggressors'." Nonetheless, although 
Mmabatho was the base ofMangope's key institutional support this evaporated during 
the coup of 1988. 
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7.5. Elite Disquiet and the Coup of 1988 
The Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' crisis exacerbated conflicts within 
Mangope's ruling power block. There was concern within certain sections of the 
Bophuthatswana state with the activities of the 'Uhuru Hoppers'. There was disquiet 
concerning the considerable powers given to figures such as Kalmanovitz with claims 
of corruption, fraudulent tendering procedures and misuse of state funds." Following 
the strong appeal by a number of construction companies against the award of one 
particular contract involving Kalmanovitz, an investigation was promised by the 
Finance Minister." However, the investigation was never initiated and the inaction 
indicative of Kalmanovitz's power. Officials who openly expressed disquiet about 
Kalmanovitz's dealings often endangered there own positions. Magyar himself was 
forced to leave Bophuthatswana following his attempts to convince Mangope to 
remove Kalmanovitz." Other dubious schemes included the proposals for 
Bophuthatswana to purchase Romanian tractors (Kalrnanovitz was a confidante of 
Ceaucescu), gefillte fish, fraudulent securities, football stadia and suspect 
'technological' purchases.'" Mangope's apparent infatuation with Kalmanovitz and 
favouritism of others alienated numerous civil servants by subordinating their civil 
servant ethic to his own political ends. Even those close to Mangope admitted that the 
President was extremely unpopular."' 
As mentioned, despite the Bill of Rights, Bophuthatswana was a de facto one 
party state dominated by the BDP. The controversy and allegations of fraud 
97 The Previous chapter indicated Kalmanov1tz's considerable powers and role in 
promoting Bophuthatswana abroad. 
98 This concerned the contract for a poultry factory but followed the earlier award 
of a R96 million contract to Kalmonovitch's Liat company, to bUild houses and 
the 'Independence' stadium, amongst others. There was also a court case 
involving another Israeli company and allegations of payments to Swiss Bank 
accounts and bribes to Bophuthatswana officials in order to secure contracts. 
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99 Magyar in the Sunday Times, 1988. 
100 Ibid. Kalmanovitz was eventually arrested in London in connection with 
allegedly passing 2.3 million dollars of counterfeit checks. Although cleared of 
these charges he was then arrested in Israel for spying for the KGB. 
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concerning the 1987 General Elections was another major catalyst to popular 
resentment, especially from within elements of the Bophuthatswana elite."' Rocky 
Malebane-Metsing was leader of the opposition Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) 
formed in 1985 from his power base in the Bafokeng region. Following his departure 
from the BDP in 1984, Malebane-Metsing had been the only independent Member of 
Parliament. The basis of his disagreement with Mangope concerned the differing 
interpretations of the eventual goal ofBophuthatswana independence. For Malebane-
Metsing, Mangope had betrayed the original intention of 'independence' which was a 
means of moving towards a federal South Africa: 
'Since independence we had been convinced that the future of the Southern African 
region would be a federation in which all the independent states, including South 
Africa, would come together and form a federal government. Mangope has since 
changed his stance on this, and I could not go along with this~"' 
The disagreement was central to a much longer dispute between the BDP and 
its opponents. In the mid 1970s the political parties within Bophuthatswana had split 
due to different interpretations of 'independence'. Whereas Mangope sought 'go it 
alone' ethnic nationalism the opposition parties advocated the promotion of Batswana 
interests in conjunction with black unity in South Africa.'" The PPP were articulating 
a federal option with Bophuthatswana as part of South Africa and attempted to contest 
the elections in a free and fair manner. However, the restrictions applying to Trade 
Unions and public gatherings also extended to opposition political parties. Malebane-
Metsing attempted to rally support by contesting the BDP's miss use of political 
102 For example in the wake of the coup a number of ministers either resigned or 
were ftred. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Chief B.L.M.I Motsatsi's 
resignation was particularly surprising given that he was tipped as a possible 
successor to Mangope. Motsatsi apparently 'vehemently' opposed the banning of 
the PPP as this ndiculed Bophuthatswana's clatms of multi-party politics, in 
Afnca Contemporary Record,(I981-1988:B718) op. ctt. 
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power. The PPP specifically rallied around advocating land restoration, free and 
compulsory education, elevating the office of chieftainship, giving civil servants a 
'square deal', better treatment of senior citizens, uprooting corruption and promises not 
to harass political opponents.'" The PPP also campaigned for 'the upgrading of health 
facilities and general improvement of social structures'."' 
It took three years for registration of the PPP to be sanctioned, only four 
months before the elections. Party meetings were made difficult and allowed 
negligible media coverage from the government controlled Bop TV.'" The 
Bophuthatswana Electoral Officer claimed a 47% turn out with six seats won by the 
PPP who complained of widespread rigging.'" The elections can not be gauged as 
legitimising the Bophuthatswana state but nonetheless the BDP certainly believed 
they were a ruling party. The wider political frame of reference for most Batswana 
and black South Africans was for a unitary South Africa. However, there were groups 
who were intent on fomenting local and regional identities. The question of 
Malabene-Metsing would remain significant because following the coup and his exile 
in Zambia he would later re-emerge as a dubious convert to the ANC in the North 
West Provincial Legislative Government (see last chapter). The disapproval of the 
maltreatment of the PPP resonated with a number of civil servants and even Ministers. 
Key white officials still dominated the top positions in homeland structures 
and local blacks resented this racial hierarchy. In particular, most crucially, a faction 
within the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) deeply resented the gross 
inequalities characterising the race relations within the homeland army.'" Shortly 
before the coup Malebane-Metsing issued a report detailing complaints concerning 
nepotism and corruption in Bophuthatswana. Professor Keenan had been so concerned 
about the extent of corruption, which his study had uncovered from local authority 
10
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level to senior positions, that he had met senior officials of the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs to warn them some eighteen months before the coup 
that 'a violent overthrow of the Bophuthatswana government was inevitable'."' 
Nonetheless, the South Africa government and most commentators were taken by 
surprise with the attempted coup in February 1988. 
The President's illusions of grandeur and sovereignty were shattered and his 
iron grip prised from its hold on Bophuthatswana. The Mail announced that the 
emperor had seemingly been dethroned."' In fact the coup had taken place two days 
earlier and this edition of the Mail did not mention it other than in passing because 
Mangope had been reinstalled. The institutional support that Mangope had been 
dependent upon, most notably from the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF), had 
momentarily disappeared. For 16 hours Malebane-Metsing was President. The BDF 
intervention, or more precisely the National Security Unit within the BDF, had been 
premised upon the corruption and influence involving Kalmanovitz, the 'white 
president' of Bophuthatswana. The remainder of the BDF failed to intervene on 
Mangope's behalf and the South African Defence Force (SADF) reacted with great 
haste. Paratroopers were sent almost immediately into SA's supposedly sovereign 
neighbour to quash the coup and restore Mangope. After a short exchange of fire the 
SADF overwhelmed the BDF rebels and freed Mangope from his imprisonment from 
one of the icons of his rule, the 'Independence Stadium'. 
In addition to this direct intervention into Bophuthatswana's affairs, South 
Africa invoked the Broadcasting agreement between the two. The South African 
Foreign Minister stated that the decision to cut off the Bop TV and radio signal was 
made because: 
'south Africa dzd not want any messages dzsseminated that might cause fUrther 
confUsion or despondency among the public of Bophuthatswana'."' 
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The Broadcasting agreement, it was claimed, covered this intervention. The 
excessive heavy handedness of the Pretoria regime related to South African fears of 
even a whiff of ANC influence behind the coup."' The control of the platinum mines 
and other strategic interests were perhaps other contributory factors. The SA 
goverument also feared that a new Bophuthatswana regime would reveal the full 
extent of corruption which was fmally uncovered by the 1994 Skewyiya 
Commission."' Mangope was a leading figure of the anti-sanctions campaign and an 
articulate supporter of the homeland policy and therefore a valuable asset for South 
African policy abroad. 
Mangope was emphatically South Africa's man in Mmabatho, loyal and 
despite occasional outbursts, a reliable, enthusiastic advocate of the bantustan policy. 
This staunch support and nurturing of the Mangope regime was graphically illustrated 
in the SABC coverage of Mangope's speech just following his restoration by the 
SADF. Mangope praised the SADF: 
'I would like to express my very very sincere thanks to the SADF for the excellent 
rescue job they did last night. I would like to say that we have the situation under 
control. Now we have to decide what to do in order to normalise everything. Thank 
you very much'."' 
The following evening, as if to reinforce the Pretoria-Mmabatho axis, Mangope stood 
in Mmabatho, flanked by PW Botha on one side, Pik Botha on the other, and with SA 
Defence Force Minister General Magnus Malan and General Geldenhuys in the 
background. Mangope thanked SA for coming to his assistance as requested: 
'This rescue did not come as a total surprise to me nor my colleagues because I think 
113 The Guardian (U.K) 11.2.88. 
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we count, as I believe South Africa does, we count on South Africa as a very loyal 
friend and want to believe that we are a very loyal friend to South Afrzca. Now there's 
a dzfference between just a good friend and a loyal friend And we believe that we are 
a loyal friend to you and by this wonderful gesture, State President, Sir, you have 
shown yourself to be a very very loyal friend of my young nation, thank you very 
much~'" 
The incident was seized upon by opponents of the homeland system as 
reflecting the 'myth of the constellation of states'. The coup was interpreted as a 'blot 
on the Verwoerdian vision of independence and stable black states linked to SA in an 
harmonious commonwealth of nations'."' Bophuthatswana's connotations of being a 
puppet regime could not be avoided following the coup. The image of the 
powerlessness of the Bophuthatswana regime was most strongly reinforced by one of 
the rebel officers involved who cast doubts on the ability of the BDF to act as an 
independent force. According to the officer the Bophuthatswana National Security 
Unit had no knowledge of counter-insurgency and were armed with only rifles, some 
of which contained only blanks. Despite the inadequate preparation of the NSU and 
even with the rapid response of the SADF, it still took almost 14 hours to suppress the 
rebel faction. The implication was that the BDF would always be ill-equipped to deal 
with any conflicts and would therefore always require the intervention of the SADF: 
~s a result of this state of affairs one may be forgiven for regarding the BDF as the 
SADF's delaying force or assisting force because if confronted by a small well trained 
foreign force or internal rebel force as it was evident on the wake of the 10 February 
coup, the BDF wzll have no alternative but to revert to the SADF~ "' 
116 Mangope, Talks at the South African Embassy, Mafikeng, Bop TV Archtves, 
1988. 
117 Weekly Mail, 19.2.88. 
118 The Bophuthatswana Treason Trial, 32:1988. 
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The SADF intervention was apparently under the pretext of 'loyalty' and 'friendship' to 
Bophuthatswana and PW Botha's justification of creating 'regional stability'. 
However, Mangope was clearly dependent upon Pretoria's assistance. 
There were competing interpretations of and reactions to the coup which 
illustrated the extent to which Bophuthatswana, although condemned as a puppet state 
following the SADF intervention, was in fact representing itself as a 'real' entity. On 
one level the event reinforced the discursive barricades between 'white' and 'black' in 
South Africa with the coup seen by some as reflecting particular cultural traits of 
Africa: 
'The standard response from many white South Africans is simply to shrug shoulders 
and say "that's Africa"-the suggestion being that there is something inherent in the 
people of the continent that tends to corruption, incompetence and instability . Since 
the Second World War, after all, there have been 71 coups in Africa. The Transkei 
contributed merely another two and Bophuthatswana an attempted 74th~'" 
Bophuthatswana was therefore portrayed as merely another African coup statistic 
similar to those black ruled countries beyond the white frontier. As such the 
bantustans were legitimised by their illegitimacy as detached or 'independent' for 
white South Africa. Furthermore, the SA Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, conceded that 
the homelands would never be economically viable but compared their economic 
dependence upon SA to the influence of the IMF!World Bank in Africa. The Pretoria 
regime still advocated Bophuthatswana and the bantustan policy despite the set back 
of the coup. Botha stayed true to the older SA government theme of comparing the 
bantustans to the BLS states and recast questions of'dependence' as simply a matter of 
Pretoria nurturing the,basis for 'viability'.'"' 
119 Sunday Times, 21.2.88. 
120 BBC radio interview quoted in the Star, 7.2.88. 
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7.5.1. Defending the Nation 
The concept of Bophuthatswana was similarly reinforced, although for 
different reasons, through the pronouncements of the BDF officers responsible for the 
coup. These younger officers claimed to be acting against Mangope and the level of 
corruption in his administration rather for of Bophuthatswana per se: 
'Whereas we are positively faithfol, loyal and sincere to the well-being of our beloved 
Bophuthatswana and its people, it is with great concern that we had to take this step. 
Serious and disturbing matters of great concern have emerged and curiously treated 
suspiciously by President Mangope and his government to mention one, the issue of a 
Mr. Shabtai Kalmanovitz, a close associate of President Mangope who openly 
enjoyed preferential economic rights and interests until the leader of the PPP 
questioned his credentials and integrity~ 121 
The BNSU/BDF and PPP were represented as the defenders of the 
Bophuthatswana nation and people. The 'defence' of multi-party politics was 
considered vital following the elections 'deliberately manoeuvred to secure a 
Democratic Party victory by hook or by crook'. The final motivation for the coup 
appeared to be the cover up by the BDP of an investigation conducted by the PPP 
through the courts: 
'For such reasons we the defence forces of the Republic of Bophuthatswana have 
decided to seize ruling powers from the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and to 
entrust such powers to the leadership of the People's Progressive Party... (who) 
strongly denounced corruption... invasion of fUndamental ruling rights... the party 
also enjoys the broad support of the nation'. 122 
121 The Star, 11.2.88. 
122 Ibid. 
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It is highly significant that the tone of this announcement and its cataloguing of details 
of Kalmanovitz's corruption were couched along the lines of a 'defence of the nation'. 
The BDF were acting as if the Defence Force of a nation, a perception that would 
ironically re-emerge during the final collapse of the Mangope regime in 1994. 
As suggested, the coup had also been supposedly directed against racism 
within Bophuthatswana government structures, particularly the BDF itself. The extent 
of resentment and bitterness was revealed in the investigation following the coup. 
This became known as the 'Bop Treason Trial' with hundreds of alleged participants 
rounded up and put on trial. The major grievances of the faction within the BDF 
concerned the inequality between white and black soldiers. One of the rebels claimed 
that there had been unequal access to transportation, medical benefits, training 
courses, weaponry, disciplinary measures, appointments, access to sports facilities and 
even the Mess. Some of the accused officers questioned the credentials of the white 
South African and Rhodesian officers employed within the BDF and cited a wide 
number of incidents to which it was concluded: 
Taking this comparison into consideration, one finds out that injustice, 
maladministration and apartheid prevails because such (white) officers were not 
taken to task.. Tswana's were kept in the dark.. and not allowed to attend 
conforences where policies are adopted. This Motswana's self-confidence as a leader 
is killed and he is converted into a human robot, executing the orders of his master'.'" 
The coup was likened more to a 'palatial coup' within the ruling elite,"' 
although the news of Mangope's fall had been met with great jubilation in the capital 
city. Rowan Cronje, Mangope's close advisor, was asked to defend accusations of 
racism to which he had replied that he 'did not believe in racism and anyway it took a 
long time to acquire experience in government'.'" The faction behind the coup had 
123 Bophuthatswana Treason Tnal (1988) op.cit. 
124 RDM, 8.2 88. 
125 Ibid. 
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demonstrated their impatience with such a paternalistic attitude and reflected a 
younger generation ofleaders emerging within Bophuthatswana structures. 
Mangope pronounced on Bop TV that 'coups are out' and assured the people of 
Bophuthatswana and the nation's friends that all necessary steps had been taken to 
ensure that the country would never experience a coup- d'etat again."' The coup was 
therefore portrayed as an aberration for which he blamed his own people through their 
failure to adapt to and embrace 'National values': 
'On the day of the coup I had realised that despite the efforts to uplift the standard of 
life of the people and children, the government would not succeed unless the nation's 
most important basic values were firmly inculcated into the consciousness of all the 
people, young and old'."' 
Despite Mangope's rapid return to power the coup was a clear illustration of 
widespread unhappiness with his rule. At the 11th anniversary of Bophuthatswana's 
'independence', given the turbulent year for the state, Mangope announced a 15% 
increase in salaries for public servants. The image of Mangope doffing his hat whilst 
the 'National' anthem played at the 'independence' celebrations captured Mangope's 
fantasy of 'nation-building'."' The hostility of civil servants and bureaucrats would 
eventually precipitate the final collapse of the regime. The number of schemes, 
bewildering range of contacts and vast costs in enhancing 'development' and 'nation-
hood' had created and compounded economic and political crisis. Internal change in 
Bophuthatswana required political reform within South Africa. In the post-coup era 
126 The Ma1l, 4.3 88. 
127 Mangope at the opening of the first session of the 3rd National Assembly in 
Mmabatho, The Mail, 29.4.88. 
128 Ibid. 
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Bophuthatswana became increasingly irrelevant to the major political changes taking 
place in South Africa itself. 
Chapter Eight 
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8. From 'Nation-Hood' to Regionalism and the North West 
Province: Bophuthatswana's Implosion and the birth of the 
'new' South Mrica, 1988-1994. 
8.1. Introduction 
The 1988 coup had indicated Bophuthatswana's continuing unpopularity and 
vulnerability. In the post-coup era the Mangope regime repressed political opposition 
and dissent. Bophuthatswana's increasingly authoritarian behaviour was in contrast to 
the historical reforms made by the De Klerk administration in 1990 and the initiation 
of talks leading the way to majority rule in a unitary South African state. The changes 
at the national level of South African politics created a profoundly different context 
threatening Bophuthatswana, ultimately, with reincorporation into South Africa. The 
Mangope regime was confronted with considerable challenges. In response, a range of 
strategies were devised to position Bophuthatswana in the post-apartheid era. Faced 
with the impracticalities of its continuing fragmented existence, and the popular 
support for reincorporation into South Africa, Mangope's intransigence, obstinacy and 
disastrous miscalculations eventually precipitated a semi-revolutionary situation in 
Mmabatho. The regime was overthrown and Bophuthatswana was reincorporated lnto 
South Africa, with Mmabatho competing with other cities in the region in order to 
become the new North West Province's capital. 
The early 1990s were characterised by Mangope's defiance and rhetoric of 
'independence'. It is shown, however, that Bophuthatswana made preparations to 
scale down its 'nation-hood' and 'independence' into a presentable regionalist 
discourse. The final six years of the regime, and the increasing shift to a regionalist 
position based upon 'rational' socio-economic and ethnic criteria, are discussed 
through the following issues. 
First, the coup had revealed Bophuthatswana's security and intelligence 
weaknesses. Mangope acted to remove potential dissent within his own state 
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structures and to discourage political opposition more generally. The State of 
Emergency in 1990, and increased state funding of the military and police, indicated 
the increasing authoritarianism of the regime. Second, the profound realignment in 
South African politics, with the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), 
South African Communist Party (SACP), Pan-African Congress (P AC) and the 
release of Nelson Mandela, was portrayed by the regime as undermining 
Bophuthatswana's sovereignty. The Bophuthatswana administration declared its 
intention to remain 'independent' and refused to be bound by the negotiations of the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Negotiating Council's 
deliberations to deliver a post -apartheid settlement. Bophuthatswana promoted a 
conception of Tswana ethno-nationalism directed against what was portrayed as a 
Xhosa dominated ANC. The mobilisation of ethno-nationalism in Eastern Europe was 
used to legitimise Bophuthatswana's own ethnic claims and, together with anti-ANC 
rhetoric, was promoted by the Mangope regime within fora such as the United Nations 
and Eastern Europe itself. Third, in 1991 the South African-Tswana regional initiative 
forum (SATSWA), a coalition of regional conservative forces, marshalled by the 
Bophuthatswana Administration, attempted to form a bulwark against the ANC and 
National Party (NP). The preparations included SATSWA's regional demarcation 
proposals, which were based on linguistic, ethnic and socio-economic arguments, for 
an expanded Tswana-Boereland region and, with it, the territorial expansion of 
Bophuthatswana itself. Locally, a range of projects within Mmabatho were initiated to 
make the city a suitable capital for a new region. Other measures to maximise 
Bophuthatswana's influence within a new regional context included the creation of 
the Information Service of Bophuthatswana (lSOB) and the covert funding for 
propaganda campaigns, with state payments to the ruling BDP (recast as the 
Bophuthatswana Christian Democratic Party). 
Despite the preparations, Mangope remained obstinate and determined to 
preserve Bophuthatswana. The defiance led to dubious alliances, including the white 
right wing, which alienated Bophuthatswana residents and administrators. The 
increasingly desperate measures made by the regime suggested an impending 
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'implosion'' in the face of popular opposition. A strike by Bophuthatswana's civil 
servants precipitated the regime's overthrow. South African administrators were 
placed in control and, one month before the first ever democratic elections in South 
Africa, Bophuthatswana was reincorporated. 
8.2. Post-Coup Repression 
The previous chapter mentioned the Bophuthatswana Treason Trial in the 
aftermath of the coup. Bophuthatswana's security forces rounded up over 500 people 
who were suspected as involved in the coup. The included PPP members' and the 
military factions who had taken part in the rebellion. By late 1988, despite the large 
number of detentions, the regime still presented 'Bop. as a place for all'. A special 
session of Parliament, however, authorised an additional 'clamp down', with a 
constitutional amendment bill allowing the regime more powers when involving 
'crimes against the state'.' The Bophuthatswana regime became extremely intolerant 
of any opposition and despised criticism. The authoritarianism attracted increasing 
criticism internationally, from human rights organisations. A letter from the President 
of the International Human Rights Group was published in the Mail. The letter 
highlighted the 'non-existence' of Bophuthatswana and condemned the detention of 
eight members of PPP and the continued imprisomnent of three hundred other 
detainees. The regime's sensitivity to criticism was illustrated by the inunediate 
response to this letter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bophuthatswana, S.L.L 
Rathebe, vehemently defended the right for Bophuthatswana to be classified as a 
nation-state because, it was stated, Bophuthatswana had a population and a 
government in control.• The security measures were therefore justified in terms of a 
defence of 'national' sovereignty. The concern for the defence of the 'nation' was 
1 This term was used by Peires (1992) op.cit, to denote the collapse of the outer-
facade of state hood in the bantustans. 
2 The banned opposition People's Progressive Party. 
3 The Mail, March, 1988. 
4 The Mail, 12.8.88. 
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reflected in the increasing state expenditure allocated to Defence and Police. As a 
percentage of the national budget, the combined share of these two departments 
doubled from 5.2% in 1986 to 10.3% in 1992.' Mangope also moved against potential 
adversaries in his own cabinet and administration. 
1bree Ministers had resigned after the unsuccessful coup. All the resignations 
were apparently connected to 'Mangope asserting control over the government in a 
more forceful manner' .• The white Defence Minister resigned following the fiasco of 
the coup. However, the other two resignations were more significant. Firstly, the 
Minister of Education, Mr. Holele, although giving no public reason, the resignation 
appeared to reflect a younger generation's impatience with the limitations of 
Bophuthatswana's political system and structures.' Lastly, although broad indications 
ofMangope's power base within the cabinet have been suggested,' the resignation of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs, Chief B.L.M.I. Motsatsi, should caution against any 
generalisations which predetermine the political orientation of the chieftaincy. 
Motsatsi was the Kgosi (Chief) of the Batlokwa ba Bogatsu tribe, in addition to his 
Ministerial position. Motsatsi' s resignation was linked to his refusal to undermine 
constitutional democracy, which was reflected by his decision not to use his position 
to ban the opposition PPP. Although traditionalist interests were represented in the 
cabinet, ministers acted in a range of ways shaped mainly through the demands made 
of state leaders and the loyalty demanded by Mangope. 
Mangope's authoritarianism intensified following the South African 
government's decision, in February 1990, to unban the ANC, SACP, PAC and to 
release Nelson Mandela. The pressures for reincorporation were mounting but 
Mangope gave an early indication of his defiant attitude: 
5 There was a particularly sharp increase following the coup itself in 1988. 
Calculated from the North West/Bophuthatswana Statistics, op.cit. 
6
_Afrzca Contemporary Notes and Records, 1987-1988:B778, op. cit. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See chapter's three and six. 
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'Bophuthatswana will be independent one hundred years from now'.' 
The working forum of the CODESA talks were convened in 1991 and attempted to 
negotiate a vision of post-apartheid South Africa acceptable to all of the major 
players. The difficulties included the configuration and details of the constitutional 
framework and the new regional demarcations. At the inauguration of the talks the 
Bophuthatswana administration was the only 'independent' bantustan which stated 
that it wanted to maintain its 'independence'. The depiction of a sovereign territory 
increasingly undermined by 'outside aggressors' was common place: 
'Its (the state of emergency) introductzon was reluctantly forced upon us by the 
foreign elements intent on using unscrupulous methods to undermine democratic 
order in Bophuthatswana, with the clear intentzon of ultimately removing my 
Government from power using intimidation and other illegal methods'." 
Although the State of Emergency was lifted in 1991, a special session of Parliament 
amended the Internal Security Act with a requirement 'making it compulsory for 
organisations, bodies or groups indulging in political activity in Bophuthatswana to 
register' with the authorities." The regime clearly perceived itself to be undermined 
by ANC mobilisation, referred to as 'political thuggery'. In 1990 the Mafikeng Anti-
Repression Forum (MAREF) was established in order to monitor the territory wide 
repression. The Lawyers for Human Rights organisation defended legal cases 
involving the victims of Bophuthatswana state oppression. MAREF indicated that 
Bophuthatswana's repressive system was maintained by 'the ever existing legal 
restrictions which thwart political expression, association and activity'. These were 
identified as the State of Emergency, Internal Security Act no. 32 of 1979, as 
amended, Section 3 of the 'notorious' security clearance Act 32 of 1979 and Section 
'The Mazl, 23.2.90. 
10 Mangope in Pioneer, Vol. 13, No. I, Autumn issue, 1991. 
11 Ibid. 
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36 of the Industrial Conciliation act No. 8 of 1984." Political parties were required to 
register in the territory before they could organise. The ANC, because it had refused 
to recognise Bophuthatswana, did not register, and was considered by the 
Bophuthatswana regime as 'foreign'. Both the Mafikeng Secretary of the ANC and 
also the chairman of MAREF were deported from Bophuthatswana." The Mail 
covered ANC meetings, but because these organisations were deemed illegal, 
publication was prevented, which led to accusations that the journalists were spying 
for Mangope. There were also internal leaks from within the Mail to the government 
which pre-empted publication of stories regarded as inflammatory. 
The Mail covered the opening of an ANC office in Mafikeng. It was claimed 
by one journalist that, even before the story went to print the next day, Mangope had 
already learnt of these intentions and delayed publication of the newspaper until the 
story was removed. The implication was that the role of the editor was especially 
important for deciding what could go in the newspaper and perhaps what government 
itself should know." In this climate of censorship the Mail became a 'mouthpiece' for 
Mangope. Even journalists began to disassociate themselves from the Mail." 
Throughout Bophuthatswana, funerals became an important platform for ANC 
supporters to express solidarity through the display of ANC colours, flags and other 
symbols. At one gathering in 1990, a 50 000 strong crowd attended the funeral of a 
local women activist. ANC and Communist Party banners and flags were on display 
demanding 'away with Bop!' to which Mangope replied in the Mail, 'Never!'." 
Despite these attempts to quell opposition it became self-evident that serious unrest 
12 The Maf1keng anti-Repression Forum ( 1990) The State of Repression in 
Bophuthatswana, Mafikeng. 
13 Ibid. 14 SonnyBoy Mogkadi (1995) op. c1t. for example, descnbed the previous editor 
Ron Talkien as 'a fnend of authority'. The close links between the Mail and the 
Bophuthatswana Government were also shown by Leslie Sehume, the editor in 
the early 1990s, transferring from the Mall to the Department of Information, 
the government's propaganda wing. 
" 'I d1d not even want to carry the paper on me, gomg to and from work, as I d1d 
not want to be associated w1th 1t', SonnyBoy Mogkadi, News Editor, The Mail, 
interview, Mmabatho, December, 1994. 
16 The Mail, February, 1990. 
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was sweeping the territory. Policeman were shot dead, buildings petrol bombed and 
crowds of students and demonstrators were fired upon by the security forces. 
By the early 1990s Bophuthatswana's network of authoritarian control was 
described as follows in a Black Sash Report: 
'Within Bophuthatswana, a pervasive system of control and information keeps people 
in subjection The network of authoritarian government runs through the whole 
society. It starts at the centre of power in the President's office in Mmabatho and 
filters through the chiefs and the headmen, and even their families, to the school 
principals and officials of the ruling BDP (Bophuthatswana Democratic Party) at 
quite junior levels. The security forces, too, seem to be omnipresent'." 
This network of repression was not only centred on urban areas but, as seen in chapter 
seven, was also concerned with maintaining control in rural areas. According to 
Daphne and de Clercq, the only successful parastatal rural development project, the 
Thusano Foundation, which had been involved in self-help building schemes, was 
regarded by Mangope as anti-BDP and closed down in April1991." Bophuthatswana 
was described as a 'vicious rash at the heart of South Africa, taunting and inflaming 
the political process, holding the country to ransom', a 'slap in the face to the "new 
South Africa'"." The Washington-based human rights organisation Africa Watch 
produced a report in September 1991. Since 1977, it remarked, political life in 
Bophuthatswana 'has been characterised by continued torture, arbitrary dismissals, 
harassment and deportation of opponents of the regime'." In an early strategy to 
mitigate the strength of the ANC, Pretoria based diplomats continued to refer to 
Bophuthatswana's status as a 'special case'." Bophuthatswana was given 
17 Grasping the Prtckly Pear· The Bophuthatswana Story, A Black Sash Publication, 
1990. 
18 Daphne, P. and de Clerq, F. (1992) op.cit. 
19Afrtca South, November, 1991. 
20Africa Watch, in ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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encouragement to reposition itself in the unfolding political situation. 
8.3. Bophuthatswana Manoeuvring 
The changing landscape of South African politics and the fundamental 
realignments had prompted Bophuthatswana to devise a range of counter-strategies. In 
199111992 the Directorate of Development Planning was added to the Directorate of 
Strategic Planning, which had been created in 1990 to devise different strategies for 
Bophuthatswana" In 1992 the propaganda function of the Department of Information 
was taken over by the newly formed Information Service of Bophuthatswana (ISOB). 
These structures, and the media in Bophuthatswana, blended a discursive combination 
of ethno-nationalism, anti-communism, fear of a radical urbanised Xhosa ethnic group 
and, increasingly, grafted these concerns onto a territorial base. 
8.3.1. Ethno-nationalism and Anti-communism 
The Mail newspaper was at the forefront of governmental efforts to project the 
imagery of a beleaguered nation defending its territory against the Communist 
inspired ANC. One particular strategy was to foment Tswana fears that the ANC was 
dominated by an aggressive Xhosa ethnic group." On many occasions, when 
addressing 'his' people, Mangope manipulated history to represent the Batswana as 
fundamentally different from other 'nations'. The Batswana were portrayed as gentle 
and accommodating but also fearful ofXhosa domination. People were frightened into 
believing that ifBophuthatswana did not exist then the Batswana would be turned into 
Xhosa by young urban radicals." Bophuthatswana's population were bombarded by 
these ideas and repeatedly told that Bophuthatswana was 'their place' and the only 
'home' for the Tswana: 
22 Schoeman, D. (I 995) op.cit. Schoeman had returned to the Bophuthatswana 
administration in 1991 and was made the Director of the Directorate of 
Development Planning and Administration. 
23 For example, Mazl, 5th October, 1990. 
24 Gcinumkhonto, M, interview, op cit. (1995). 
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'Modern day Bophuthatswana is a political continuation of a people whose values, 
history and political administration go back for centuries. On those grounds Bap. 
demands for itself self-determination '.25 
These ancient Batswana rights, values, traditions and history, were therefore 
associated with Bophuthatswana and presented as threatened by the ANC and other 
ethnic groups. 
Bophuthatswana's promotion of ethno-nationalism was encouraged by the 
resurgence of 'nationalism' in the context of Eastern Europe. This tactic had been 
indicated during a BOPIIA presentation in 1988. The South Africa Foundation's 
Director General, K. von Schiming, recognised the increasing potential that an 
'ethnic' discourse could have to legitimise Bophuthatswana's existence. von 
Schiming drew a parallel between Bophuthatswana's ethnic sovereignty and the 
emerging ethno-nationalisms ofEastem Europe: 
'where ethnic groups are in the process of trying to establish thezr own sovereignty, 
or limited sovereignty'.,. 
Bophuthatswana therefore sought to enhance its own claims for ethnic group 
sovereignty in the context of the global mobilisation of ethnic differences. Mangope 
also blamed the violence on communists and pledged to defend the 'Nation'. In 1993 
Mangope and other Bophuthatswana officials visited Latvia and attempted to provide 
a convincing historical parallel between the two which supposedly included the 
common bond of: 
' . . the fear of communism, which in South Africa is a threat in the form of the ANC'. rr 
"' The Ma1l, 21.2.92. 
26 V on Schirning, K. 1988, BOPIIA, (1988:49) op. cit. 
27 The Ma1l, 9.1.93. 
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The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was alluded to by an editorial in the Mail 
through which the National Party's promotion of ethnic differences under separate 
development was justified because, it was claimed, different ethnic groups 'did not get 
on and separation would prevent violence'." 
These issues of sovereignty and ethnicity were presented by Mangope to the 
United Nations Security Council. In 1992 the Security Council, under Rule 39, invited 
a range of South Africans to address a meeting on the political situation in South 
Africa. Although hailed by Mangope as an implicit recognition of Bophuthatswana, 
the President had in fact been called to speak in his 'personal capacity'. Mangope's 
speech crafted a blend of Batswana historical rights within Bophuthatswana and a 
defence against the disorder and communist threat of the ANC/Alliance. South Africa 
was described as riven by chaos and likened 'in microcosm to the macro-situation 
prevailing in Europe after the two great wars, and more recently after the collapse of 
communism': 
'In those times of need, men of vision emerged to fashion order from chaos and to 
restore national pride and industriousness where there was only dejection and 
apathy . . We in Bophuthatswana are living proof that the people of our region have 
what it takes to rise from the ashes of near extinction and succeed where others 
thought we would fail'." 
The implication was that the Batswana ethnic group had faced 'near-extinction' which 
was emotively stated as 'loss of identity', only to be salvaged by the creation of 
Bophuthatswana: 
28 The Ma1l, 7.5.93. 
29 The following extracts are taken from Mangope's address to United Nations 
Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and 
Nmety-Sixth Meeting, S/PV.3096, 16 July, 1992, United Nations Security 
Council, New York. 
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'My people, the Batswana people who speak the Setswana language, have known 
betrayal, subjugation, fragmentation, loss of identity and dignity, and the inhumanity 
of apartheid'. 30 
Bophuthatswana was presented as resurrecting 'national pride'. As seen in the context 
of the Pan-Tswanaism of the 1980s, Mangope had worked around associating 
Bophuthatswana with apartheid South Africa by again emphasising British colonial 
betrayal and Bophuthatswana's historical claims. Mangope strongly emphasised the 
mystical and god given qualities of Batswana ethnicity as rooted in a pre-ordained 
destiny culminating in 1977 and Bophuthatswana 'independence'." Bophuthatswana 
supposedly took back 'that which was rightfully ours'. The economic differentiation 
of Bophuthatswana from other bantustans was represented as the outcome of 
enlightened economic policies through which 'we have become one of the sole 
beacons of light on the otherwise dark continent of Africa'. " The 'lightness' of 
Bophuthatswana was contrasted to the ominous gathering of dark thunder clouds of 
'unrest and violence' obscuring the 'sunlight of stability and progress to which 
Bophuthatswana has become accustomed'. The violence sweeping South Africa, and 
the creeping destabilisation through mass action, strikes and boycotts in 
Bophuthatswana, was attributed to the ANC. On the other hand Bophuthatswana was 
portrayed as: 
' ... historically a non-violent nation and everything we have achieved to date has been 
via the process of civilized discourse and negotiation'. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 The economic differences were also promoted by the Mail which suggested that 
the 'national' symbol of the leopard was, like Bophuthatswana, 'proud, 
independent and free'. These qualities were supposedly reflected in a 'progress 
report' which indicated some of Bophuthatswana's economic strengths. These 
included a turnover of over R3 billion per annum in the Bophuthatswana mining 
industry, 30% of the worlds platinum, 60 000 employees in factories in the 
region. A Matriculation pass rate of 63% was also regarded as placing 
Bophuthatswana in the 'top ten in SSA'. The Mail, 26.6.92. 
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The concluding statement proposed that the potential 'anarchy and hopelessness' and 
problems of the region could be resolved through the adoption of a confederal system 
between 'constituent sovereign elements'. Bophuthatswana and Batswana salvation 
could be secured through a federal system. Mangope's attitude remained one of public 
defiance in the face of pressures for reincorporation, whilst, however, a number of 
more tangible tactics were being pursued to strengthen the case for a federal/regional 
option. 
The most significant strategy was the SATSWA initiative which added a wider 
conception of regionalism to Bophuthatswana's ethnic rhetoric and also embraced 
regional conservative interests. 
8.3.2. The SATSWA initiative 
Mangope first proposed a potential 'regional' option in the 1990 
'independence' day speech. This regionalist vision was convened at the first 
SATSWA symposium held in Mmabatho on March 15 1991 which attracted 320 
delegates. 120 were from Bophuthatswana state structures including the University, 
parastatals, government, Mmabatho town council and with some private sector 
representatives. The 200 delegates from South Africa included regional Afrikaner 
academics from Potchefstroom University, businessmen, mining interests and, 
significantly, farmers." Mangope indicated that one of the major factors behind the 
fornm was to provide the region with greater bargaining power in the emerging 
constitutional negotiations." The forum was also Mangope' s initial foray in order to 
persuade conservative Afrikaners, that together with Bophuthatswana,: 
' ... these are people whose forefathers shared the same land in peace for several 
generations. People whose destinies were inseparably intertwined in this part of the 
33 P1oneer, Autumn issue, 1991. 
34 The following extracts are taken from Pioneer, Ibid. 
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world'. 
Initially then, Mangope played down political motivations for the forum. Instead 
Mangope was at pains to emphasise co-operation on the basis of 'rational' socio-
economic regional interests. The presentation identified a few core areas of 
'commonality' including an emphasis upon concern for the decline in the economy, 
'dangerous levels of unemployment', 'socialistic threats of nationalisation and the 
redistribution of wealth and land', which would scare away potential investors. In a 
particular appeal to rural based Afrikaners, Mangope stressed the danger of urban-
centred government planning and expenditure: 
'In this process the needs of the less densely populated rural areas may be easily 
overlooked'." 
The appeal to farmers and rural values included an alleged concern for the 'rapid 
deterioration of the economic viability of farming operations in our area and the 
resultant negative effects on rural towns'. Mangope suggested the need to pool 
physical and human resources together regionally because 'drought, inflation and 
unemployment do not stop at international borders'. A strategy was proposed in order 
to promote 'common concerns' surrounding infrastructure, water resources, geology 
and tourism. 
By the second SATSWA forum in March 1992, Mangope's address shifted 
focus to emphasise not only regional material interests but also a specific 
interpretation of regional history. The political context was more emphatically stated 
with appeals made to regionalism in order to combat the creation of a unitary state 
perceived as the 'winner takes all'. Lawrence and Manson suggest that Mangope's 
presentation sought to manipulate Afrikaner sentiments and beliefs by speaking 
emotively in Afrikaans." Mangope appealed to common values, beliefs and norms 
" Ibid. 
36 Mangope was also a fully qualified Afrikaans teacher and he had claimed to have 
--- ----------------------------------------------------
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between the 'Afrikaner en die Batswana'. These included Christianity, peaceful co-
existence, free enterprise and above all the belief in 'waade aan ons tradities, ons taal 
en ons geskiedenis (worth in our traditions, our language and our history)." The 
presentation then identified sinister threats to this commonality. Mangope drew a 
parallel between the contemporary situation in South Africa and the nineteenth 
century when the Batswana had supposedly stood firm with the Griqua and 
Voortrekkers to defend their beliefs and Christian civilisation against 'enemy' tribes 
and regiments. In this way Mangope made powerful emotive appeals for cementing 
bonds between the Batswana and Afrikaner." The falsification of a presumed Tswana 
'unity' was foremost in the SATSWA argument which became: 
' ... elevated to a truism while at the same time the differences between the Tswana and 
other African chiefdoms, especially the Zulu and Xhosa, are exaggerated and 
highlighted to preserve a regional identity in the face of the threat of absorption into 
a unitary state dominated by more powerfUl and numerous forces'." 
SATSWA was therefore extended from a purely socio-economic regionalist function 
to embrace the 'ethnic factor'. The fear of 'swamping' by other ethnic groups had 
been a justification by Mangope for 'independence'." The Bophuthatswana 
government manipulated the threat of Xhosa and ANC 'swamping', combining this 
with regional conservative fears, including loss of material benefits and jobs within a 
new ANC inspired dispensation. These arguments were used to justify SATSWA's 
proposed regional demarcations for South Africa's provinces. 
a deep respect and understanding for Afrikaans culture. See Gastrow, S. Who's 
who in South African Politics, Ravan, Jo'burg (1987). 
37 In Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit. 
38 Lawrence and Mans on indicate that Mangope falsified history in order to present 
the Batswana as unified which historically was not the case, particularly 
involving relations with the Afrikaners. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See Chapter Three. 
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8.3.3. Regional Demarcations 
CODESA was postponed indefmitely in June 1992, following the ANC's 
complaints of unacceptable levels of violence and the impasse with the NP regarding 
the detail of transitional structures and constitutional powers. The talks resumed in 
September but were primarily bilateral, between the ANC and National Party. The 
exclusion of other groups aroused a great deal of anger, from Chief Buthelezi in 
particular. Multi-party talks were not resumed until April 1993. In the interim the 
ANC's regional proposals and bilateral negotiations had prompted SATSWA's own 
proposals. By 1992 the question of regionalism had been firmly placed at the centre of 
South Africa's political debates." All the major political players released their 
proposals for the new regional demarcations and SATSWA grasped the 'regionalist' 
issue with both hands. The ANC's first set of proposals for South Africa's new 
provinces were based largely upon the outline of the old 'development regions'," but 
also included the ANC's suggestion that both the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans be 
amalgamated. In 1993 the ANC's next proposals, significantly, as it turned out for 
SATSWA and other regional interest groups, requested that the former Xhosa 
bantustans be added to a Border/Kei area to form a coalesced Region D." SATSWA 
interpreted these proposal as reflecting the ANC's desire to create an enlarged Xhosa 
territorial base, regarded, presumably, as justifying SATSWA's own ethno-regional 
claims. The National Party's proposals at first envisioned the formation of potential 
political alliances against the ANC, with most of the Bophuthatswana regions, for 
example, preserved in a North West region. 
In October 1992 COSAG (Concerned South Africans Group) was formed as a 
right wing bulwark alliance against the ANC and National Party. COSAG consisted of 
41 Muthien, Y. G. and Khosa, M. M. (1995) 'The Kmgdom, the Volkstaat and the 
New South Africa: Drawing South Africa's New Regional Boundanes', JSAS, 
Volume 21, No. 2, June. 
42 See Chapter Seven. 
43 See Figure 8.1 a) and b). According to Fox these proposals were probably in 
order to combine poorer areas with richer areas in the event that regions mtght 
be dependent upon local revenue. Fox, R. (1995) "Regional Proposals: their 
Constitutional and Geographical Significance", in Lemon, A. ( ed.) ( 1995) The 
Geography of Change m South Africa, Wiley. 
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Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Kwa-Zulu, the Afrikaner Volksunie (A VU) (and later the 
Conservative Party and the Free Cape Movement). The National Party were regarded 
by COSAG as in 'cahoots' with the ANC. SATSWA also regarded ANC and NP 
collusion as acting 'primarily for the benefit of an urban bourgeoisie and the Xhosa 
ethnic group', claiming that 'all others would be excluded from full participation in 
the benefits of political patronage." The 1993 SATSWA document called the 'Current 
Status' made a further appeal to the socio-economic basis of regionalism: 
'Whilst the political dimensions of the regional debate are widely reported on, little 
attention is given to the fundamental challenge of how socio-economic development in 
a new regional dispensation is to be achieved'." 
It was claimed that SATSW A was not representing specific political interests but was 
merely 'an objective and scientific analysis as contribution to the debate on 
regionalism'. However, the demarcation process was inherently political. SATSWA's 
first regional proposals, in 1991, to amalgamate parts of the Northern Cape, Western 
Transvaal and some farming areas of the North Western Transvaal, had been reflected 
in the National Party's first proposals which suggested a similar demarcation for the 
North West. By the time of SATSWA's 1993 report, the initial focus had expanded 
dramatically to embrace a 'Tswana-Boereland superstate' ." The justifications for the 
proposed enlarged demarcations were extremely informative and reflected the 
recasting of history, ethnicity and geographical boundaries to promote the 
contemporary objectives of SATSWA. 
SATSWA's 1993 document focused upon its 'regional options', which were 
underpinned by the historical territorial claims of the Bophuthatswana government. 
The 1871 Keate Award, as seen in chapter two, was used to stake Bophuthatswana's 
territorial claims in the 'new' South Africa. Interestingly, the historical lands were 
44 SATSWA proposals in Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op cit. 
4
' The SATSWA initiative (1993:1) The Current Status, Craft Press Mmabatho. 
46 See also the Star, 27.3.93. 
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described as 'Botswana territory', suggesting the colonial carve-up that had taken 
place of territory, originally stretching from the Caprivi Strip to the Vaal River in 
South Africa and Bophuthatswana's Thaba N'chu region. This historical detail formed 
the basis of SATSWA's 'Option One' which stressed the inclusion of as much 
Bophuthatswana territory as possible. Furthermore, Northern Cape land, in region J, 
was considered as part of the original Keate Award and therefore regarded as 
rightfully belonging to Bophuthatswana." The tactics were a remarkable caveat to the 
regional proposals and the outcome to the historical claims made by the 
Bophuthatswana regime in the 1970s to regain territory from South Africa. Incredibly, 
in Bophuthatswana's twilight years, with the pressures for reincorporation mounting, 
Mangope now proposed the addition of territory that had eluded Bophuthatswana and 
had created the fragmentation which had plagued the illegitimacy of the regime. The 
Bophuthatswana government went as far in calling for the recreation of borders of the 
old territory of British Bechuanaland." 
The bravado and high ambition was reflected in SATSWA'S 'Option One' 
with proposals made on the basis that seven regions in all would be created in South 
Africa 'Option One' therefore had been based upon SATSWA's earlier proposed 
demarcations, with some extra areas, giving a total population of 3 891 369, a GGP of 
21 624 249 and an area of238 326 squared kilometres. This gave the proposed region 
a ranking order amongst South Africa's other provinces, from 1 to 7 (one being the 
largest), of 5, 5 and 2, respectively. However, there were also proposals for a greatly 
expanded geographical base. SATSWA claimed that the demarcations were based 
upon 'groups expressing their preference'. These additions were proposed as 'Option 
Two- the largest possible region', based upon a linguistic focus which covered other 
parts of the Northern Cape and Orange Free State. SATSWA also suggested that a 
corridor, mnning from the west to the east, north of Lesotho, be kept open as part of 
SATSWA or Kwa Zulu-Natal but not for the PWV. In a most astonishing suggestion 
SATSWA declared that large numbers of people in Botshabelo were Tswana 
47 The SATSWA initiative (1993:71) op.cit. 
41 The Ma1l, 6.4.92. 
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speaking, 'with stwng alhances towmds Bophuthatswana'. As they had origmally 
been part of Bophuthatswana, the area, it was claimed, should be mcluded as part of 
the regional proposal. These ptoposals reflected the ethnic criteria that underpmned 
many of the regional demarcations. Kwa-Zulu demanded terntory that had been 
. 
conquered by Shaka, various Afrikaner groups attempted to resurrect the ot&. 
sovereign Boer Republics of the last century and there was even a coloured claim for 
an independent state m the Western Cape. The Volkstaat proposals were based on the 
claim that ethnicity should be the fundamental consideration m the demarcation 
process: 
'You cannot change a Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaner, Venda, Tswana, Swazi, etc. into a 
colourless homo genic frame called a South African'." 
a) African National 
Congress 
...------:~., 
bl African National 
Conoress 
Figure 8.1 ANC and National Party Regional Proposals" 
" Oral evidence to the CDDR, cited in Muthien, Y. G. and Khosa, M. M. 
(1995:309) op.cit. 
so Adapted from Christopher, A. J. (1994) Atlas of Apartheid, Routledge, London. 
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The SATSWA 'Current Status' report therefore claimed that other areas, supposedly 
dominated by Afrikaners and Tswana speakers, be included in 'Option Two': 
'This fact strengthens the Bophuthatswana government's desire to group together 
what belongs together'." 
SATSWA's targets included political parties throughout region C (Orange Free State), 
who were to be approached: 
' .. .for their views as it is believed that the principles and values emphasised by 
Bophuthatswana provide opportunities for the aspirations and needs of various 
individuals and groups to express themselves'." 
Parts of region 'G' (including the farming areas of Ellisras, Thabazimbi and 
Nylstroom in the north-western Transvaal), were again justified for inclusion because, 
it was claimed, SATSWA had been approached by some of these areas at its 1993 
conference in Potchefstroom. NP proposals had originally not included the Odi and 
Moretele regions ofBophuthatswana into the North West, for economic factors," and 
perhaps also political reasons." However, SATSWA considered these areas to be an 
integral part of its envisioned region which illustrated, by this stage, that 
Bophuthatswana would ouly be encouraged to rejoin South Africa if Bophuthatswana 
was not split up. All these additions would have given a population of over six 
million, a GGP of over 37 million and an area of almost 500, 000 squared kilometres, 
51 Ibid. pp74. 
52 Ibid. pp73. 
53 Initially, according to Fox, the omission of these districts by the NP was based 
upon economic criteria statmg that Odi and Moretele were functionally part of 
the PWV. Fox, R. (1995) op.cit. 
54 These regions had consistently opposed the Bophuthatswana regime, in 
Drummond, J. (1991) "Reincorporating the bantustans into South Africa: the 
question of Bophuthatswana", Geography, 76(4). 
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ranking 3, 2 and I respectively." The National Party's drastically changed proposals 
supported Bophuthatswana's (and SATSWA's) expansion into the Orange Free State, 
even as far as Thaba N'chu." Another indication of the NP-Bophuthatswana proposals 
was the visit in 1993 by a Bophuthatswana delegation to the Chief Minister of Qwa 
Qwa and the National Party in the Orange Free State." The Qwa Qwa bantustan 
administration was also a member of SATSWA and appeared to support a link with 
Bophuthatswana." In the same year Mangope told his own Parliament that 
Bophuthatswana would not surrender its 'independence' and instead preferred self-
rule to 'centralised authoritarianism'. However, by August 1993 Mangope had also 
indicated that Bophuthatswana would accept a federal option as long as it was 'not 
merely a disguise to reintroduce a unitary govermnent' ." 
The regional demarcations and proposals also, crucially, depended upon the 
nature of a final constitution. There were heated debates concerning the Negotiating 
Council's proposals that an elected constitution-making body should write the 
constitution. Bophuthatswana gave notice that it would not be bound by the 
Transitional Executive Council (multi-party body negotiating the interim 
constitution). Whilst the constitutional issue remained unresolved, the Commission on 
the Demarcation/Delimitation of States/Provinces and Regions (CDDR) was 
appointed by the Negotiating Council in May 1993. Although facing daunting 
demands and conflicts, the CDDR's public hearings were also characterised by an 
absence of black and cormnunity representatives and, the repeated demands of various 
groups, reflecting 'the ability of establishment groupings to mobilise their 
constituencies'... The CDDR was also significantly given the specific brief to 
rationalise the fragmented TVBC territories and structures. As Muthien and Khosa 
" The final option 'Option Three' was a combination of One and Two on the basis 
of six negotiated regions in South Africa, with a smaller area but similar 
population and GGP to 'Option Two'. 
,. Fox, R. (1995) op.cit. See figure 8.1 d). 
"SAIRR, (1993-1994:524) op.cit. 
"Muthien, Y. G. and Khosa, M. M. (1995) op.cit. 
'
9 SAIRR, op. cit. 
"'Muthien, Y. G. and Khosa, M. M. (1995) op.cit. 
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suggest, this focus was greatly problematised by the 'emotional appeals' made in the 
hope of restoring 'ethnic kingdoms' and to correct the devastation of colonial and 
apartheid dispossession and fragmentation of the landscape." 
PWV Pretorta-Witwaterarand-
Vaal Triangle 
r.::::1 Districts reassigned 
l!::::j In final neootlatlons 
E East Grlqualand 
U Umklmzulu " 
:\ 
: ) 
I '- -- ,.-
1 
I 
I 
I 
..... /~ 
NORTHERN CAPE 
0 tOO 200I<m 
Figure 8.2 CDDR 's Final Demarcation of South Africa's New Provinces, 1993." 
The CDDR's original proposals reflected a compromise between the ANC and 
NP." The final boundary adjustments were adopted by the Negotiating Council in 
61 SAIRR, op. cit. 
62 Adapted from Christopher, A. J. (1994) op. cit. 
63 Fox, R. (1995) op.c1t. This compromise included the NP's desire for a separate 
Western and Northern Cape, the ANC's proposed Eastern Cape and the 
separation of the north west from the Orange Free State. 
-- ----------------------------------------------------------------
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November 1993 with the acknowledgement of both the difficulties of the process and 
scope for possible changes. The Council adopted a number of changes to the regional 
demarcations subject to referendums or, in some cases, an agreement between the 
majority parties elected by voters of the region. Although Fox notes that 'the regional 
demarcation process will continue through the activities of the Commission on 
Provincial Government'," except for one or two changes, the SATSWA objectives 
would not be met by the CDDR. The 'new' North West Province was, however, larger 
than the development region J, and included the majority of the former 
Bophuthatswana regions, including Odi and Moretele and the capital Mmabatho. 
In July 1993 the Negotiating Forum confirmed 27 April 1994 as the date for 
South Africa's first ever majority election. COSAG walked out of the negotiations 
because they demanded a prior agreement regarding the constitution and the election 
date itself was opposed. The absence of CO SAG did not put an end to the negotiation 
process. Legislation was drawn up for the transitional period and further attempts 
were made to include the other factions in negotiations. Bophuthatswana, the A VU 
and Ciskei returned to the negotiations. In October 1993 the Freedom Allliance (FA) 
was formed by a consolidated white right wing group called the Afrikaner Volksfront 
(A VF), the Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Kwa-Zulu administrations and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP). The major demands of the FA were based upon self-
determination for the 'peoples of southern Africa'. The FA called for southern Africa 
to be divided into a number of member states which alone would have the power to 
determine boundaries." In November, 1993 despite the absence of the FA and 
disapproval of other groups, the Multi-Party negotiating forum endorsed the 
recommendations of the Negotiating Council and Negotiating Forum. The new 
legislation included the draft transitional constitution and also the nine newly 
demarcated boundaries. At the end of 1993 the Transitional Executive Council was 
inaugurated to oversee the transition to majority rule. 
64 Ibid. 
" The FA also stated that free and fair elections would only take place after a final 
constitution had been written. 
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For the homelands, most significantly of all, on 2 December 1993 the 
Negotiating Council approved the draft legislation through which South African 
citizenship would be returned to homeland residents from the 1 January 1994, prior to 
their reincorporation on the day of the elections in April. Mangope refused to 
acknowledge this legislation. Levels of unrest were increasing throughout South 
Africa and the ANC march into Ciskei in the previous year had led Mangope to 
declare: 
'We have the resolve, the means and the abzlity to defend our sovereignty'." 
Significantly, as it turned out, the CP responded to increasing ANC threats of 
enforced incorporation, as if a declaration of war against the CP as well as 
Bophuthatswana. The ANC attempted to assuage the FA through bilateral meetings 
from October 1993 but to no avail. In December 1993 Mangope outlined the essential 
conditions for the FA's inclusion in the elections: 
- a one-phase system of constitution making 
- provision for exclusive powers for regions, as well as clear demarcation of, and 
constitutional protection for, regional borders 
- recognition of the right of regional governments to levy their own taxes and raise 
additional funds autonomously 
- recognition of the right of regional governments to write their own constitutions, 
provided these were consistent with a bill of rights and the national constitution 
- provision for two ballot papers, one for provincial elections and the other for 
national elections"' 
The South African government and ANC suggested that scope would be available to 
negotiate possible changes as long as the FA entered into a commitment of the broad 
proposals, including abiding by changed legislation, participation in the elections and 
66 The Mazl, 11.9.92. 
67 From SA1RR (1994:36&37). 
Chapter Eight: Bophuthatswana's Implosion 371 
acceptance of the results of the Independent Electoral Commission." By early 1994 
Mangope and other FA members still refused to agree to the TEC's terms. The 
political pressures and intensity reached a crescendo which swept aside Mangope and, 
with him, Bophuthatswana. 
8.4. Obstinacy and 'Implosion'. 
Bophuthatswana was one of the crucial remaining links in the FA's efforts to 
resist majority rule and the creation of a unitary state. Bophuthatswana had set itself 
up as an immovable object in the path of the irresistible force shaping the 'new' South 
Africa. The SATSWA initiative was a clear indication that despite the defiance, 
Mangope was investigating a range of options besides Bophuthatswana's stance for 
'independence' or nothing. Further indications of the preparations for the 'new' South 
Africa, and attempts to secure minority and material interests, were the award of 
Bophuthatswana government contracts to a consultancy firm called Q-projects. These 
contracts were supposedly intended for 'voter education' projects in 1992 and 1993, 
in response to the possibility of a referendum on reincorporation and also 
Bophuthatswana's contestation of the April elections. The contracts were worth R6 
million and in effect were propaganda exercises to promote and 'to popularise the 
BCDP' (Bophuthatswana Christian Democratic Party)." In addition a further RIO 
million was paid to or on behalf of the BCDP through another dubious 'project' 
sanctioned by the National Security Council of Bophuthatswana.70 Mangope himself 
68 At this stage the NP, and NP within government, briefly advocated limited self-
determination for various sub-regions within the North West Provmce, 
including the AVF, Bophuthatswana's regtons and for the CP. The proposals 
reflected the NP's earlier extended demarcation of the North West province to 
include the Orange Free State option. 
69 The Q-group project is discussed in the ftndings of the Skewyiya Commission 
which found that 'it is our view that a fraud was perpetrated on the people of 
Bophuthatswana' and that tax payers money was used on a fraudulent 
propaganda project. 
70 The 'Western Management and Futura Accounts' issue under which these 
payments were made also indicated a labrmythine system of payments to vanous 
officials in the Bophuthatswana admtnistration. See Skewyiya Commission. 
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had apparently also made his own preparations by illegally using government 
accounts to transfer over RI ,3 million to a personnel Channel Island account." 
In the early 1990s the number of projects being developed in Mmabatho also 
suggested that Bophuthatswana was promoting the city as a regional capital." In 1990 
for example Mangope unveiled a plan at the inaugural banquet of the Bophuthatswana 
Arts Council to promote the arts: 
'My dream is that this Arts Council will reflect not only the rich cultural heritage of 
the Batswana but will firmly and courageously reflect our very cosmopolitan 
society'." 
During the period associated with the SATSWA initiative, Mmabatho was ear marked 
for large investment funds. New civic buildings costing R18.5 million were due for 
completion in September 1994. A Structure Plan was devised for Mmabatho and 
extensive upgrading of roads proposed which would cost over RIO million. The City 
Engineer (himself a member of SATSWA) spoke enthusiastically on Bop TV about a 
total investment of R53 million and with 'more flocking in', through which it was 
claimed, Mmabatho 'will be far advanced compared to many (cities) in SA'." There 
were also Bophuthatswana government initiatives in the rural areas. In 1993 extensive 
television coverage was given to a new R2 million water reticulation scheme for 
Lonely Park and other areas around Mmabatho and elsewhere in the Molopo Region." 
A range of speeches proclaimed the arrival of 'progress' for villagers." New structures 
were established in rural areas of Bophuthatswana with self-help schemes and village 
committees which represented a departure from previous policy." The 
71 Ibid. 
72 The link between the SATSWA initiatives and the city's development projects 
was suggested by Mpobole, K. (1995) op.c1t. 
73 The Ma1l, 30.3.90. These kind of developments would be an important factor in 
the designation of the North West's Provincial capital. 
74 Bop TV News Archives, 20.12.93. 
75 Mmabatho Television Archives, 24.11.93. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Louis Du Pisani, Development In Southern Africa (DISA) Ltd., affiliated to 
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Bophuthatswana administration appeared to be, belatedly, redefming its relationship 
with rural dwellers through cynical manoeuvring to encourage rural support. 
With all of these obvious preparations for entry into a unified South Africa 
why then did Mangope continue to remain defiantly 'independent'?: 
'He (Mangope) played his cards carefUlly to gain from the system as much as he 
posszbly could before he joined it. I think that all along he knew that he was going 
into South Africa but then at the critical stages, his advisors told him to call the 
TEC's bluff, when they should not have. Instead he should have accepted the 
inevitable fact, but, given the ANC hatred for him, plus the ties to the AVF, he was 
stubborn enough to resist'." 
Bophuthatswana's relative economic clout in comparison to the other 
homelands was probably another added element. However, with over 50% of 
Bophuthatswana revenue still provided by the South African government and the 
customs union, Bophuthatswana could easily be economically crippled if sanctions 
were applied by South Africa." Nonetheless, the extra economic weight did bolster 
Mangope's posturing. During the negotiation period, as mentioned earlier, there had 
also been encouragement from Pretoria regarding Bophuthatswana as a 'special case' 
which required 'special treatment'. It was noticeable that the South African 
government failed to deal decisively with Bophuthatswana until the regime had fmally 
collapsed. Bophuthatswana's alleged differentiation from the other bantustan's had 
been a long-term tactic used by Mangope. In addition to the economic argument, as a 
further ploy to encourage its 'special case' status, Mangope also consistently 
emphasised the 'colonial origins' and ethnic basis of his regime's existence. All of 
these features reinforced Mangope's determined opposition but still fail to account for 
his ultimate decision to defy the 'new' South Africa. One of the Bophuthatswana civil 
Border, Huff and Smith, Engmeers, interview, March, 1995. 
78 Schoeman, D. (1995) op.cit. 
79 See Daphne, P. and de Clerq, F. (1992) op.cit and Shepherd, A. (1993) op cit. 
--- ---------------------------
Chapter Eight: Bophuthatswana's Implosion 374 
servants, quoted above, who had extensive discussions with Mangope concerning the 
alternative scenarios for Bophuthatswana, suggested that ultimately it was the dubious 
alliances which Mangope had entered into which determined his final appalling error 
of judgement. 
The AVF's own objectives to secure a 'Volkstaat' were regarded as possible 
whilst Bophuthatswana still existed. The A VF envisioned their own Volkstaat within 
an eularged North West Province." The AVF's faith in Mangope as champion of the 
cause of separate ethnic development extended even to their offers to provide armed 
back -up in the event of conflict within the territory. This offer combined with 
Mangope's pride, obsession, inability to lose face and refusal to back down in the 
defence of 'his' creation, Bophuthatswana." This 'alliance' and the obstinate elements 
in his cabinet simply exacerbated popular frustrations: 
'I think that the sudden outburst of hatred came out at a late stage as Mangope looked 
for allies and associated himself with the AWB and people like Hartzenberg of the 
CP. They became sort of trustees. They came here and saw in him the sort of person 
who was against integration of all the people in SA. He listened to them when he 
should not have. He also had a few dze-hards in his own cabinet who were absolutely 
blind to realities. They were just people who saw the Tswana nation as the ultimate 
answer, their extreme right to the Bophuthatswana area'." 
The opposition intensified throughout 1993, particularly amongst students at the 
University of Bophuthatswana. Mangope sacked various officials in parastatals, such 
as AGRICOR and BOP TV, in order to remove, again belatedly, the racial 'ceiling' 
80 Muthien, Y. G. and Khosa, M. M. (1995) op cit. 
81 It should also be noted that in a vote to determine whether Bophuthatswana join 
the elections or note, apparently the cabinet voted 9 for and 13 against. This 
ftgure was given at a meetmg of Mangope's relaunched political party, the 
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), attended in Montshiwa, 26 3.95. 
The cabinet certainly contained some diehard Tswana nationalists but the figure 
given might also have been an attempt to shift the blame and miscalculation 
from Mangope himself who was heading the UCDP's local election campaign. 
82 D. Schoeman (1995) op. cit. 
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that had blocked the promotion of Batswana employees within these structures. He 
also castigated the civil servants and threatened them with the loss of their jobs and 
benefits, if they joined or identified with the ANC or SACP. According to the 
secretary of the ANC Mmabatho branch, the ANC had been mobilising day by day 
within Mmabatho." The hysteria concerning the ANC mounted and Mangope 
appeared to have alienated key sections of his support base through his increasingly 
desperate actions. Lawrence and Manson suggest that by early 1994 Mangope had lost 
the support of intellectuals, students, civil servants and other members of the petty-
bourgeoisie, including business interests. The Bophuthatswana regime had planned to 
meet on March 15 to discuss its future strategy but the meeting never took place. 
The initial spark for the conflagration that engulfed the regime was the strike 
by civil servants for a 50% pay rise." The strike was also fuelled by the increasing 
concerns regarding state employees' pensions, based on rumours that the regime 
intended to use these funds to maintain the support of the security forces." By March 
11, the protests of civil servants, staff in hospitals and schools, was accompanied by 
rebellions on the streets of Mmabatho, with a growing wave of students and other 
residents also taking part. The protests were underpinned by two political requests, 
firstly, the reincorporation ofBophuthatswana and secondly, the right to free political 
activity in the territory ... 
March 10 was the crucial turning point with the protesters able to convince 
sections of the police force to side with them in the dispute. Looting and rioting then 
broke out with celebrations erupting in the capital. Mangope played his last available 
card and called in the militias of the AVF. These also included the AWB under 
Eugene Terre Blanche, whose presence alienated the fmal support Mangope had from 
the security forces. The appalling actions of the A WB neo-fascists, as differentiated 
from the A VF, included the cold-blooded killings of over 30 civilians, most shot 
randomly and in the back by the gun toting militias patrolling Mmabatho. The A VF 
" Phlardy. 
84 Laurence, P. (1994) Afrzca Report, Vol. 39, No. 3. 
" Guardian, 1.3 .94. 
86 Laurence, P. (1994) op.cit. 
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then requested the A WB to withdraw from Mmabatho. During the withdrawal there 
was an exchange of fire between Bophuthatswana security forces near Maflkeng 
Police Station and some A WB members in the convoy. One car was hit and two 
wounded A WB members, under the gaze of the world's media, were executed by a 
Bophuthatswana policeman. The killings signalled the routing of the white right in 
South Africa. Shortly after the A WB invasion South African soldiers were sent into 
the area Mangope was officially deposed by the TEC and although bitterly contesting 
his dethronement, he was finally ousted. Bophuthatswana's capitulation was followed 
by the Ciskei regime's collapse and then just one week before the elections, the Kwa-
Zulu administration came into the elections. The framework for the 'new' 
democratically elected South Africa had fmally, if not miraculously, been installed. 
Chapter Nine 
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9. Conclusion: Bophuthatswana's Legacy, 'Confined to the dustbin of 
history' or back to the Margins? 
9.1. Introduction 
The ANC's victory in South Africa's historic first ever democratic general 
election was a momentous achievement heralding the birth of the 'new' South Africa. 
Few observers could fail to be moved by the emotion surrounding Nelson Mandela's 
inauguration as South Africa's President. The varied collection of heads of state 
attending the inauguration reflected South Africa's re-entry into the international 
community of nations' and especially the optimism concerning the country's 
promising continental role. Most of the country was gripped by the novel outpouring 
of 'South Africanism' expressed by black and white alike. Given the length of struggle 
and palpable relief of many that the transition to post-apartheid South Africa had 
finally been achieved, the celebrations were made all the more joyful. The most potent 
symbol of enforced separation, the bantustans, were seemingly 'confined to the 
dustbin of history'.' South Africa was hailed as the 'Rainbow Nation', 'unity' was 
proclaimed and nation-building initiated. The emotions were reminiscent of the 
euphoria of other African 'liberation movement' victories in the context of 
'decolonisation'. By way of conclusion, the legacy of the Bophuthatswana era, and the 
major fmdings of the thesis, are assessed through a range of regional issues which 
have particular importance for South Africa's contemporary nation-building efforts 
and struggle to envisage a democratic and tolerant post-apartheid era. 
South African nation-building is underpinned by the continuing emphasis 
upon anti-raciallcolonialist sentiments and, in addition, by the ANC's rapid embrace 
of development and neo-liberal ideology.' One could be forgiven for seeing parallels 
between the South African situation and the 1960s processes associated with nation-
1 South Africa was readmitted into the Commonwealth and to the United Nations. 
2 Independent, 16.3.94. 
3 See Crush, J. (1995) "Introduction", op cit. 
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building throughout independent Africa. Historically, the dominant paradigm of 
modernisation was perceived as the panacea for nation-building in the African 
context. Over ten years ago, in identifying the continuum between the institutions of 
colonial and 'liberated' Africa, Michael Crowder asked of the African nation-state 
'whose dream was it anyway?'.' African nationalist movements have been consistently 
undermined by challenges to unity and nation-building. In order to move beyond the 
failed efforts to retain unity there is an urgent need to further our understanding of 
how and why it is that both the 'nation-state' and 'development' invariably become 
repressive and authoritarian. Reasons for this failure are urgently sought in the context 
of not only South Africa's transition but also as part of a global 'struggle for 
democracy in a changed world'.' The creation of national cultural identities more 
generally reflects the unsteady combination of 'local fragments' and 'western' features.• 
Moreover, the place and territoriality of local identities are constrained by and 
prisoner to western abstractions of space and economy.' 
Race relations and segregation have been central to South African national 
historiography' and its academic literature. The examination of ethnic and 
developmental dynamics within the bantnstans has similarly been overshadowed by 
the need to explain, and to contest, the apartheid state and policy, in terms of race or 
class in particular. To identify the importance of ethnicity and culture was somehow 
to reinforce, or concede to the ideas of apartheid philosophy and social engineering. 
The close association between culture and apartheid has in turn, ironically, obscured 
conceptions of regionalism and the creation and mobilisation of cultural and social 
differences, particularly in South Africa's marginalised regions. The analysis adopted 
here has benefited from the insights gained from a detailed study ofBophuthatswana's 
twenty year time span, which has provided an historical, geographical and regional 
4 Crowder, M. (1987) "Whose dream was it anyway? Twenty-f1ve years of African 
independence", African Affairs, No. 342, January, pp. 7-24. 
'Chomsky, N. in ROAPE issue on democratisation, no. 50, 1992. See also Held, D. 
(1992) Prospects for Democracy, Polity Press. 
6 Dun can, in chapter one. 
7 Sachs, W. (1992) op.cit. 
8 Beinart, W., and Dubow, S. (eds.) (1995) Segregation and Apartheid, Routledge. 
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context. Whilst the major focus of the thesis has been to address the conflicts of 
'nation-building', it has been demonstrated that these were situated within deep-seated 
regionalist concerns which have been underpinned by the 'discriminatory and 
discerning logic' of identity formation during the apartheid era. 
The short history of Bophuthatswana, 'now one with Nineveh and Tyre ... a 
historical might-have-been, never-was, not-a-hope',' is a particularly powerful 
evocation of the limitations of 'nation-building'. Bophuthatswana's experience has 
provided a number of examples of the conflicting ideas, identities and institutions that 
underpin 'nation-building', regionalism and modernisation in a region of South Africa 
in which these conflicts and issues have received little previous attention. The thesis 
has shown: 
-the manipulation of 'traditionalism' and cultural differences as tools of political 
control and 'national' identity. 
-the creation of a 'national' capital as the embodiment of the spirit and practices of 
'nation-building' which seeks to combine the specificity of Tswana culture with the 
apparent universalism of modernity. 
-the distortion of 'development' through the lens of 'national' priorities and 
international norms, including the 'prestige' project, rather than concern for local 
needs and participation. 
-the ensuing crisis of!egitimacy and conflict of!oyalties. 
-the conversion ofbantustan sovereignty into regionalist discourses. 
These features, and many more, are applicable to the incantations of other 
'nation-building' efforts to generate a sense of national cultural homogeneity. 
Moreover, the specificities of Bophuthatswana's relationship to South African 
apartheid policy provides a particularly striking illustration of the coercion, fiXing and 
embrace of identities as a modernist project. For all the traditionalist and ethnic 
rhetoric underpinning the creation of the bantustan policy in South Africa, these 
9 Jacobson, D. (1995:186) op.cit. 
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territories have been thoroughly subordinated to Eurocentric conceptions of 
modernisation. In order to distinguish the Batswana from other ethnic groups, 
Mangope's regime sought to identify and signify the meanings attached to Batswana 
cultural differences. However, in translating these internal impulses into nation-
building they became embedded in a modernist framework. This framework has cast a 
shadow over apartheid's specific historical time span and, arguably, the conceptions 
and imagination of post-apartheid society and space as well." The rise and demise of 
Bophuthatswana speaks directly to these current efforts to forge national identity in 
South Africa 
The legacy of the Bophuthatswana era is now briefly discussed in the context 
of the problems and possibilities of the politics of transition in the North West 
Province of South Africa and Mmabatho's changing role as regional capital. A range 
of ideological and institutional ambiguities remain and how these are coped with will 
determine the future course of South Africa. These issues address the practicalities of 
reincorporation and, most importantly, the continuing contested nature of identity in 
South Africa 
The specific issues include the legacy of Bophuthatswana's imprint upon 
administrative structures and institutions of the North West; traditionalism and the 
rural periphery; the relationship between these issues and Mangope's particular 
imprint of authoritarianism and patronage; fmally, and overall, the central importance 
of the 'ethnic' question in the 'new' South Africa. The influence of Bophuthatswana's 
virulent Tswana etlmo-nationalism as a form of popular consciousness remains to be 
seen. 
9.2. Dismantling and Adapting Bophuthatswana's Structures and Institutions 
The North West Province, one of nine provinces in post-apartheid South 
Africa, contains most of the former Bophuthatswana regions and importantly the 
10 Norval, A. J. (1995) "Decolonization, demonization and difference: the difficult 
constitution of a nation" op. cit. 
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'capital', Mmabatho. The ANC secured a landslide 85% of the vote in the North West 
during the provincial elections in 1994." The victory was a clear mandate for the ANC 
and an emphatic denunciation of 'separate development' and Bophuthatswana. 
However, during the period of field work from late 1994 to early 1995 in Mmabatho 
and the surrounding area, a number of tensions were becoming evident in the 
transitional phase. Lawrence and Manson have indicated the ambiguities of this 
period. On the one hand there was confusion and uncertainty associated with the 
power vacuum caused by the authoritarian practices and then sudden collapse of the 
Bophuthatswana regime. Mangope's leading civil servants, cabinet ministers and 
secretaries were dismissed. Residents showed their anger with the old politics of 
patronage by targeting businesses with BDP connections during the riots of March 
1994.11 On the other hand there was the rapid growth of alternative structures known 
as Staff Associations which were allegedly popularly elected at the University and 
within a number of parastatals and provincial departments." Civic 
associations/organisations were also fornling in and around the Mmabatho. In the 
rural areas some chiefs were forced out of office whilst others returned from exile. 
These newer structures represent a break with the authoritarianism of the past and also 
the real potential possibilities for popular democratisation. 
These possibilities must be cautioned by the question of the social basis of the 
old and new structures and the class base of the transition. The middle classes in the 
homelands have been identified by Peires as battered guardians of democratic values 
and as well placed to refurbish democracy in the former bantustans." Other studies 
11 Out of 30 seats in the North West Legtslature the ANC won a massive 26, the NP 
3 and the FF, I. SAIRR, Fast Facts, July, 1994. Although Mangope's UCDP 
registered for the elections in the final moments of his regime, they decided 
against contesting the elections and instead waited for the local elections of the 
following year. 
12 Amongst other places, a bottle-store (equivalent to an off-license) and fast food 
outlet were destroyed because of connections to the BDP. Also the Mmabana 
Centre, although a parastatal, had millions of rands worth of damage, allegedly 
because it was headed by Mangope's daughter in law who had refused to close 
the centre following civil servant protest. 
13 Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit. 
14 Peires, J. (1992) "The Implosion of Transkei and Ciskei", Afncan Affairs, 91: 
365-87. 
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have questioned this assumption and have indicated that the formation of the middle-
classes in the bantustans has shown extreme regional variations. Bank, for example, 
suggests that the bantustan middle classes have not been economically strong or 
politically independent. Within Bophuthatswana the middle classes appeared to have 
been close to the ruling government in order to derive substantial economic benefits." 
Whilst in Mmabatho, it was becoming clear that many members of the petty-
bourgeoisie were coming out in favour of the ANC (or the National Parcy) and civil 
servants were publicly identifying with the objectives of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). However, two questions need to be asked. 
Firstly, to what extent are these social groups guardians of democracy? A 
number of professional people interviewed lamented the ousting of Mangope, 
described him as a 'good man' and claimed that the former President of 
Bophuthatswana had done more for the region and the Batswana than any had before 
or would do in the future. The various estimates of Mangope's percentage of the 
provincial vote, had he contested the elections and based this upon the 'development' 
achievements of Bophuthatswana, were placed at between 15-30%. Significantly, 
state structures and professionals (and the older generation in rural areas) were cited 
as potential allies. The greatest single source of problems during the transition 
appeared to be the protestations of civil servants in Garona the former 
Bophuthatswana administrative centre, who claimed they were being overlooked for 
promotions and excluded by ANC appointed officials who brought with them their 
own 'teams'." Administrative structures were to be radically down-sized, threatening a 
number of retrenchments within the civil service. State employees in Mmabatho had 
also demanded parity of wages with the rest of South Africa Another source of 
concern was that with the new parity came the South African levels of taxation. 
Extravagant housing, car and entertainment allowances that had been a feature of the 
Bophuthatswana era were to be withdrawn. 
" It should be reminded that the initial downfall of the Mangope regime related to 
economic factors such as fear of pensions and pay panty. 
16 These sentiments were expressed to the author by a number of civil servants. 
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Secondly, the secretary of the Maflkeng ANC branch described Mmabatho as 
'the power base of autocracy'." With the balance of power shifting from the old 
patronage system to what extent are these old structures of malpractice and corruption 
crossing over into the new administration? 
9.2.1. Skewyiya Commission 
One of the outcomes of the terms of transition ratified by the TEC had been 
the protection of civil servant positions held in the former bantustans, at least in the 
short term. The ANC were committed to democratising structures and creating 
'transparency' and therefore established a number commissions to investigate abuses 
of state positions in the former Bophuthatswana. In 1994 the Skewyiya Commission 
had been appointed by the regional government led by the Premier, Popo Molefe, and 
was an important step in this process. The Commission was established to investigate 
the extent of corruption in the Bophuthatswana government and parastatals. The 
specific brief of the Commission was to focus on the misuse of government funds for 
personal ends by Bophuthatswana officials, particularly Mangope himself. The 
substantial payments made to certain individuals, and in order to sponsor various 
'projects', has been connected to attempts to politically destabilise the ANC and 
improve the image ofMangope's BCDP in the North West." One of the most serious 
outcomes to the Commissions findings is the extent to which the politics of patronage 
has crossed over into North West structures. The continuation of the fraudulent final 
'Q-project' contract illustrates these concerns:" 
17 Ephraim Phlhardy Motoko, Secretary Mmabatho Branch ANC, interview, 
Mmabatho, March, 1995. 
18 Weekly Ma~I&Guard1an, 15.9.95. 
19 The fmal contract awarded to Q-projects was supposedly to undertake 'voter 
education' projects. However the commission's investigation of the contract has 
revealed the labynnthine network of money laundermg and front organizations 
in Bophuthatswana. The terms of the final contract to this orgamzation 
continued well into 1995 and advent of the North West Administration. The 
administration had supposedly honored the contract which had been made before 
the collapse of Bophuthatswana. However, the Commission unveiled that the 
contract bad in fact been fraudulently signed after the fall of Mangope and 
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'Perhaps most difficult for the Molefe administration to confront, why should an 
organisation that had succeeded in bribing at least one official in March 1994 
hesitate to offer bribes to men and women in the new provincial administration'." 
With the inheritance of this embedded legacy of patronage to what extent does the 
Molefe administration, and the ANC more generally, have the ability and political 
will to pursue these investigations? Many of the old structures remain untouched." In 
the event of continuing frustrations, difficulties and unrest these remnants of the old 
order could act as fault lines of instability." There is of course a more insidious 
question of the continuing ideological impact of the old structures upon the new ANC 
oriented context. 
9.2.2. The Batswana Arbiters 
The current situation is undoubtedly compounded by over twenty years of the 
deeply personalised and paternalistic rule of Mangope. It has been shown how 
Mangope's rule was buttressed by considerable efforts to nurture Batswana ethno-
nationalism. A specific interpretation of Tswanaism was shaped around 
'traditionalism' as a form of political control within Bophuthatswana's institutions. It 
was noticeable whilst in Mmabatho that many residents complained of the new 
administration because they 'did not know them'. The distrust of 'outsiders' bordered 
backdated to February 1994. See Skewyiya Commission (1995) op.cit. 
20 Weekly Mail&Guardwn, !5.9.95. 
21 For example the Motimele Commission was also established to investigate 
irregularities in Bophuthatswana local government. During the A WB invasion of 
Mmabatho, f1ve officials on the local council apparently assisted the A WB by 
providing council facilities, communications and even fire arms Although two 
years after the event, these officials were still receiving full pay and extended 
leave. SAPA 12.2.96. 
22 These concerns also apply to the former Bophuthatswana security forces. For 
example, a local trade unionist was murdered by members of the police force 
almost a year after the ANC reg1onal victory, personnel communication with 
Gcinumkhonto, M., Deputy Secretary of the SACP, North West Province South 
Africa, personnel communication, 1995. 
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upon the xenophobic. These attitudes even extended to Popo Molefe, a Batswana 
himself, because he was considered an 'outsider', from urban South Africa. The 
pattern was replicated in many state structures and parastatals and was characterised 
as a: 
' ... paternalistic power wielded by those who see themselves as the arbiters of the 
Batswana foture. You can not break into their decision-making processes. I have 
found this at the university and I understand it is also true of the government 
administration'." 
This hold upon decision making by the Batswana 'arbiters' was also indicated by the 
resentment towards Molefe's efforts to cater for the entire province and not solely the 
former Bophuthatswana areas. A number of -people in Mmabatho expressed 
resentment when Molefe gave speeches in other parts of the North West because 'they 
could not see them' (the provincial leadership). The Bophuthatswana Government 
Buildings at Garona had been closely associated with Mangope and the BDP. In the 
context of the new North West Province and attempts to make structures accountable 
and transparent, the old perception and style of governance remained embedded. State 
employees still took their grievances to Garona and became frustrated when informed 
that they should instead approach national departments and offices outside of 
Mmabatho and the North West. 
The assets of the former homeland were contested, including even the future 
status of the capital city itself. Mmabatho had been extremely dependent upon 
government functions and finance" and its future would be radically changed if as it 
was being debated, the capital for the North West Province were placed elsewhere. 
Ironically, Mmabatho's 'excellent' public sector facilities inherited from the 
23 Personnel Communication with Professor Graeme Addison, Head of the 
Department of Communications, University of North West, (formerly UNIBO) 
May, 1996. 
24 Chapter Five indicated that government was 50-60% of Mmabatho's local 
economy. 
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Bophuthatswana administration and large body of civil servants were important 
factors in the decision. The city lacked some of the advantages of regional towns but 
was regarded as: 
~ .. perform(ing) a unique and essential role and function in terms of its locality, sphere 
of influence, hzstory and impact on development and the people surrounding it'." 
The Select Committee on a Capital City for the North West recommended that 
Mmabatho/Mafikeng be nominated as the regional capital city. Perhaps the dire 
consequences of the removal of Mmabatho's capital status was considered too 
inflammatory by the new ANC dominated regional legislative. The transfer and 
disposal of Bophuthatswana's 'national' assets were beginning to illustrate the 
emergence of a conflict of interests more widely between South Africa's regions and 
centre. 
9.2.3. Bop TV and Plurality 
The fate of Bop TV's considerable assets and over 750 employees, illustrates 
the problems of Bophuthatswana's reincorporation. Bop TV was, significantly, the 
only TV news station which was separate and independent from the state owned 
SABC. The ANC's official position on bantustan structures aimed at eradicating 
'islands and enclaves of separate development' such as Bop TV." However, Bop TV's 
previous Director General, Solly Kotwane, suggested that it would be a 'tragedy' if the 
Corporation was not allowed to fulfil a national role in the 'new' South Africa. The 
underutilisation of the Corporation would moreover deny the 'plurality of views' 
which the Independent Broadcasting Authority had been appointed in 1995 to 
engender." However, the ANC and SABC appeared intent on reincorporating Bop TV 
25 The North West Cap1tal Question, Report By Professional Team, August 1994, 
ref. 09PJI I. 
26 Phetwe, S. (1995) op.cit. 
27 Kotwane, S. (1994) Bop TV News Archives, 18.10.94. 
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and this issue has become a long-standing dispute which to date is still not resolved. 
A local academic was appointed by the provincial legislative to head a 
technical committee to explore the possibilities for the Corporation to remain 
independent of the SABC. The academic in question, Professor Addison, head of the 
Department of Communications at the University of the North West (formerly 
UNIBO), criticised the ANC's desire for the redistribution of the Corporation's assets 
to the central state. These intentions were described, by Addison, as if the South 
African state sought to play 'big brother' to the regions. The 'centre', based on Gauteng 
and other Metropolitan areas, was regarded as inadequately catering to the region's 
broadcasting needs. Bop TV's fate therefore symbolised the deeper problem of 
regional interests usurped by the central state. Above all, the decision to dissolve Bop 
TV was seen as reinforcing Metropolitan dominance and securing the position of the 
centre against the regions." Kotwane described the conflict as reflecting 'the same 
monopoly and centralisation of views' as previously displayed by the old centralised 
SABC. Bop TV's proposed incorporation into the SABC was most likely motivated 
by the Central government's concerns about the potential influence that broadcasting 
could have for Regional governments, with lnkatha control of Kwa-Zulu/Natal and 
the NP victory in the Western Cape. The IBA's behaviour was described as 'centrist' 
by Addison who also suggested that the IBA had apparently buckled to ANC pressure 
in order to avoid a political show down." By early 1996 over 700 redundancies were 
announced at Bop TV, although the corporation was exploring 'options from the 
private sector to retain its viability', apparently with the support of the provincial ANC 
government." According to Addison there was also 'evidence of interference ( in the 
running ofBop TV) by the North West provincial government ofPopo Molefe and his 
cabinet, in spite of professions to the contrary'." The emerging centre-region conflict 
therefore represents another potential fault line. 
The regional ANC Party was itself riven by internal disputes, in part an 
28 Weekly Mail& Guardian, 8.9.95. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Weekly Maii&Guard10n, 2.2.96. 
31 Personnel communication with Prof. Addison, April, 1996. 
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outcome of the Bophuthatswana era. The influence of Mangope's personalised rule 
and Batswana chauvinism within Bophuthatswana's structures precipitated conflicts 
within the ANC itself. The problems of integrating the new and the old finally 
surfaced within the provincial ANC government. The former leader of the PPP in 
Bophuthatswana, 'Rocky' Malebane-Metsing had resurfaced in Zambia following the 
1988 coup in Bophuthatswana. With the collapse of Bophuthatswana, Malebane-
Metsing had been installed as the North West's head of the Department of Agriculture 
and Environmental Affairs. Malebane-Metsing had assumed that he would become 
the provincial premier because he claimed, he 'understood the Batswana' and knew 
what they wanted." When it became apparent that Molefe was the preferred choice in 
the North West, a disgruntled Malebane-Metsing made increasingly bizarre 
allegations against Molefe. On the eve of the ANC's 1995 provincial conference 
Malebane-Metsing was ousted. The ANC was forced to admit to 'serious intra-
organisational conflicts' and that there had been a faction within the provincial ANC 
that had supported Malebane-Metsing." Embittered by his ousting, Malebane-Metsing 
has since relaunched the old PPP in the North West. Whilst many of these issues can 
be attributed to the 'teething' problems of transition, other fault lines represent more 
enduring concerns of the Bophuthatswana legacy. 
9.3. The Lessons of Lotlamareng: Tradition, Patronage and Mmabatho's 
Urban Bias. 
Historically, colonial Mafeking, and Mmabatho, have literally overshadowed 
the 'Stadt' and extracted facets of local practice and values in order to control and 
subordinate it. Mangope consistently stressed the virtues of rural and traditional areas. 
32 Gcinumkhonto, M. (1995) op. cit. 
33 Mayibuye, "How the wild west was won", December, 1995. Interesttngly 
according to the secretary of the Mmabatho ANC and also the Deputy of the 
Provincial SACP, Malebane-Metsing had never been a true convert to the ANC 
and his contestation of apartheid from within bantustan structures was also 
criticized. Based on interviews. There were also other ANC problems at branch 
level and with regional executive committees and members of the 'alliance' 
(COSATU and the SACP). 
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However the huge material and ideological chasm between rural and urban areas in 
the former Bophuthatswana, presents a fundamental challenge to the urban-centred 
and modernist conceptions of 'development' in South Africa. Mmabatho's great 
expense and opulence in comparison to surrounding rural areas is a stark and powerful 
reminder of the urban bias which was bestowed upon this 'national' capital. 
Substantial developments continued until the collapse of the Mangope regime. 
Residents of the capital were popularly thought of as 'too demanding, insensitive, 
spoilt and so on' by rural dwellers." In contrast to Mmabatho's development, rural 
areas were at best dependent upon patronage for the delivery of clinics, schools, roads 
and other facilities. Bophuthatswana development was done as a 'favour' rather than 
an integrated process of goverurnent, leaving a legacy of authoritarian and 
inappropriate development schemes surrounding Mmabatho." The bias of resources to 
Mmabatho and other urban areas was deepened by the lack of an adequate 
goverurnental department to deal exclusively with rural areas, despite 85% of the 
Bophuthatswana population being rural based." The eo-option of traditional structures 
into the old regime has created a number of conflicts in the transitional period within 
the rural and peri-urban areas around Mmabatho. 
A strong indication of the degree of popular resentment against certain Tribal 
Authorities was provided during the riots of March 1994. In 1987 there had been 
proposals from the Bophuthatswana Parks Board to establish a 'Nature Reserve' on 
tribal land as part of the Mmabatho Green-Belt Project. The plan was devised by 
investors, the Parks Board, an engineering company and a team of consultants. The 
local chief was apparently told by Mangope to give the investors the land." Following 
the initial use of consultants to assess the local corurnunity's opinions, the engineering 
firm and Parks Board took control of the process and dealt exclusively with the local 
34 Ephraim Phlhardy Motoko, Mmabatho Branch Secretary, ANC, interview, 
29.3.95. 
" Ibid. 
36 Mbopole (1995) op. cit. 
37 Gcinumkhonto, M., Deputy Secretary of the SACP, North West Province South 
Africa, personnel communication, 1995. 
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chief." The local tribe was to receive R20, 000 each year from the scheme but 
according to local residents they had not benefited from the project at Lotlamareng 
Dam. The growing resentment towards the scheme reflected local dissatisfaction with 
the Stadt's handling of its budget and the inadequate monitoring of tribal levies." 
The construction of a fence around Lotlamareng, previously tribal land, 
symbolised the growing frustration with Mmabatho's Green-Belt Project. The fixing 
ofBatswana culture was illustrated by the construction of a replica 'cultural village' at 
the site, as 'a living monument to the Batswana and other groups', in addition to the 
creation of recreational and barbecue facilities. The inappropriateness and failure of 
the project to meet the contemporary needs of local residents was finally manifested 
during the riots of March 1994. Residents symbolically cut down the fence and 
destroyed the reception area buildings and other facilities. The incident reflects the 
continuing ambiguities and fundamental problems associated with 'traditional' 
structures." 
The younger generation of activists in SANCO (South Africa National Civic 
Organisation) accused the Barolong Tribal Authority in the Stadt of being supportive 
of the former BDP and Bophuthatswana regime. The disagreements developed into a 
fundamental conflict as the chiefs and traditional structures were regarded as 
authoritarian and unelected aristocrats, and as obstructing democratisation. During the 
build up to the local elections, the Premier of the North West administration accused 
chiefs of obstructing the registration of voters at local Tribal Authority Offices, and of 
sabotaging the elections." The continuing importance of chieftaincy and 'tradition' in 
the rural peoples lives problematises the current conflicts. The ANC and Alliance 
(COSATU and the SACP) argued that chieftaincy had lacked security during the 
38This was according to Louis Du Pisani of the Development in Southern Africa 
company, a team of consultants who after initially surveying and assessing 
residents opinions and desires, were removed from the project. Du Pisani (1995) 
op.cit. 
39 Gcinumkhonto, M. (1995) op. cit. 
40Another concern of residents was the alleged impact that the Green-belt project 
had m polluting the water supply for the Stadt. 
41 Popo Molefe, Bop TV News Archzves, 8.10.94. 
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Mangope era because it was incorporated into the political and administrative process. 
The Alliance emphasised its aims towards 'restoration of the dignity' of chieftaincy: 
~ . we are not against chiefs, we are also advocating protection of culture but in a 
democratic manner. You can not just maintain culture that is not transforming, chiefs 
must also transform. We are not destroying the nation but building it. You don't have 
to destroy culture but must instead encourage people to except transformation as part 
of the democratisation process'." 
The Bophuthatswana era illustrated that there was nothing inherently beneficial about 
'tradition' or 'culture'. 'Tradition' per se has failed to empower rural areas, with the 
Mangope regime's manipulation of 'tradition' linked to paternalism and 
authoritarianism. The control function of 'tradition' has left a another deep imprint 
upon communities within the former Bophuthatswana: 
'The people have been misinformed for too long. Most can not read There is a very 
high illiteracy rate. They should and must be able to understand the situation around 
them. But like before they expect everything to be done for them- the people in the 
rural areas complain that development is not to do this and do that. Even when the 
government thinks for them they are not proactive. Now they can say "we want ten 
classrooms, we are ANC and want the government to come"- that is one legacy'." 
The legacy of repressive control and stifling of accountable and open democratic 
procedures is also connected to the lack of both political understanding and tolerance. 
It was claimed by one local ANC official that Mangope had done his utmost to 
impose his political ideas upon residents. People in the rural areas internalised this 
authoritarianism, as if, 'Mangope knows what we are thinking': 
42 Gcinumkhonto, M. (1995) op. cit. 
43 Phlhardy, op. cit. 
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'They are getting very much confused, community involvement is a new thing for most 
of the community and will take time for them to come to grips with democratic process 
and they are not yet aware of this'." 
The difficult debates surrounding the incorporation of the Stadt into Mmabatho's 
Municipal boundaries is once again a pertinent issue for the area. More generally, the 
renegotiation of tradition and modernity could possibly be used to redefme local 
government and democracy in Africa." The aforementioned issues are all related, in 
one way or another, to the legacy of the imprint ofBophuthatswana's Batswana ethnic 
populism upon the South African landscape. 
9.4. The Ethnic Question and the 'Failure' of Bophuthatswana Ethnic 
Nationalism 
For over twenty years Mangope had consistently promoted the conception of 
Bophuthatswana as the 'place of the Batswana'. The widespread frustration during the 
transitional order (happily publicised by the previously Mangope aligned Mail 
newspaper) was manipulated by Mangope's relaunched political party, the United 
Christian Democratic Party (UCDP). At a meeting of the UCDP in Montshiwa 
Township, in preparation for the 1995 local elections, the old themes and discourses 
promoted by the Bophuthatswana regime were repackaged to local residents. UCDP 
speakers, including former cabinet ministers in the old regime, informed the audience 
that 'the Batswana had no where else to go'." The level of developmental achievement 
in Bophuthatswana was praised, and the end to the previous access to resources of the 
"Phlhardy, op. cit. 
45 There is a growing literature on the failure of the nation-state in Africa to 
accommodate rural needs and the growing return to rural institutions such as 
chieftaincy and rural identities. There are important implications for the ways 
in which new 'mixtures' of governance and democracy may be more appropriate. 
See for example, Sklar, R. (1993) "The African frontier for political science", 
in Bates, R. H. et al. (eds.) Africa and the DISC1plmes: the contr~but1ons of 
research m Africa to the social sc1ences and the humanities, University of 
Chicago Press. 
46 Translated from Setswana, during a UCDP meeting (1995) op.cit. 
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old Bophuthatswana was lamented by the speakers. It was suggested that the region 
would never again see the resources made available to the Bophuthatswana 
government. With all of the problems associated with the transition and with 
manipulation by elements associated with the UCDP, what success did the UCDP 
have in South Africa's first ever democratic local elections in 1995? 
Mangope and the UCDP had been thoroughly discredited by the Skewyiya 
Commission whose fmdings were released just before the elections took place. 
Furthermore, for all the ANC's organisational problems and clashes with chieftaincy, 
the ANC's power base was undoubtedly within the rural areas." Tills rural support was 
reflected by the overwhelming ANC share of the provincial vote. The ANC won 
74.2% of the vote, followed by the NP at 7.6%, FF 4.5% and the PAC 1.7%. The 
UCDP failed to make any significant inroads into the provincial vote for all the pre-
election rhetoric and hype of the Mail. However there were some interesting local 
variations. On some of the local councils, formerly within the old Bophuthatswana, 
the UCDP captured around 10% of the seats. In Mmabatho, the former stronghold of 
Bophuthatswana, the UCDP gained just 11.1% of the seats (not winning any wards 
but 2 seats as per centage of votes). There were similar results in Lehurutshe 
(Mangope's home region) and the huge Central District (including parts of the Stadt). 
The UCDP results hardly registered a significant protest vote against the ANC and 
also clearly failed to manipulate the ethnic vote. However, it should be pointed out 
that the turn out in rural areas was particularly low, below 40% in most cases and 38% 
in Mmabatho. The low rate of participation could probably be attributed to a 
combination of the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of voter education and a failure to 
explain the purpose of the elections following so soon after the general elections. 
Furthermore, the opposition of some chiefs to registration, and perhaps a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the ANC (but with the UCDP as an unlikely substitute) were 
additional factors. These factors notwithstanding, the provincial and local election 
votes appeared to emphatically illustrate the defeat of Mangope's particular 
47 Phlhardy, op. cit. 
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interpretation of ethnicity: 
'1 am a Motswana myself, and it is a fact that you can not change, no matter who 
comes next, you can not change. Mangope was trying to emphasise this obvious fact 
(of ethnicity), so much that it became boring to us. We don't want to be told we are 
Tswanas because we know this. Maybe other people wanted to know like those from 
Rhodesia (Cronje} who were here but we knew they were not Motswana So I don't 
think that appealed to a lot of people, what I can rather say is that because most of 
the leaders at the time did not have a lot of exposure and if people believed hzm at the 
time it was because they thought only Tswana's can live. But they have realised that it 
is secondary to be a Motswana~" 
These reflections on 'Tswanaism', by an ANC activist with experience of organisation 
around Bophuthatswana, capture the contradictions ofMangope's ethnic discourse; the 
failure to inculcate a specifically loyal and popular Bophuthatswana identity. Did 
Bophuthatswana ethnic identity 'fail' and if so why? 
The thesis has provided examples of Mangope's state-led efforts to politicise 
ethnic and cultural differences in Bophuthatswana. Culture and values were contested 
and commandeered by the state in order to instil homogeneity and the 'sameness' of 
ethnic identity. However, Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' always popular 
legitimacy because most of the time the state failed to popularise these differences. 
Bophuthatswana's short lived 'national' identity is contrasted to the spectacular 
mobilisation of ethno-nationalism in Kwa-Zulu and elsewhere. How are 
Bophuthatswana's differences explained? 
Undoubtedly the existence of Botswana as a Tswana state diluted Mangope's 
use of symbols and the impact of 'Tswanaism', not unlike the relationship between the 
Qwa Qwa bantustan and Lesotho." More generally Bank suggests that perhaps the 
48 Phlhardy, op. cit. 
49 See Bank, L. (1995) op.cit. for reference to Coplan's study of Qwa Qwa. 
Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) refer to the contradictions between 
Botswana and Bophuthatswana, op.cit. 
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role of the state in promoting ethnicity has been over emphasised. Instead Bank calls 
for renewed focus upon the local level 'in-group dynamics' of identity formation rather 
than state and elite-led constructions of boundaries between different ethnic groups. 
Whilst a very important observation, it can be argued that Bophuthatswana did have a 
degree of 'success' exactly when attempts were made to create inter-ethnic conflict. 
This mobilisation of etlmo-nationalism was particularly acute in areas of 
Bophuthatswana where competition for resources and jobs from the state were most 
pronounced." It should be remembered that Bophuthatswana's promotion of Tswana 
commonality took place within a population of which over 33% were classified as 
'non-Tswana' (unlike Bank's example ofQwa Qwa). At different times some groups in 
Bophuthatswana did overcome 'internal/local' differences in order to mobilise as an 
ethnic group. This tendency therefore suggests that additional factors must be sought 
to further explain the failure to popularise ethnic nationalism in Bophuthatswana. 
Bophuthatswana identity should not be confused with Batswana identity. The 
bantustans signified and intensified, for the majority of black South Africans, the 
struggle to reclaim their birth right as South African citizens. The anti-apartheid 
struggle, although based upon a range of different strategies and discourses 
emphasising either class, race and nation," to a large extent subsumed these 
ambiguities and, in doing so, sharpened the question of loyalties in apartheid South 
Africa. Nation-building in Bophuthatswana was subordinated to the role and function 
intended for the bantustans; to form a political and racial trench between 'white' and 
'black' defined South Africa. 
Mangope's emphasis upon 'nation-building' and the enactment of 
modernisation simply exacerbated the contradictions. His attempts to rejuvenate 
'traditional structures' and mobilise ethnic identity were contradicted by the impetus 
towards modernisation and its implicit emphasis that Batswana culture should be 
modified, adapted, updated. Apartheid policy spoke deeply, intimately and violently 
so See Lawrence, M and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit. 
" See Marx's interesting article on discourses of opposition in South Africa, Marx, 
A. W. (1991) "Race, Nation, and Class Based Ideologies of Recent Opposition 
in South Afnca, Comparative Polit1cs, April, pp.313-327. 
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to the relationship between modernity and identity. Bophuthatswana's experiences 
reflect the need to keep in view both local detail and more global 
structures/discourses." Bophuthatswana's manipulation of tradition and attempts to 
create a viable 'national' identity and modernise, rapidly became incapable of posing 
an anti-modernist challenge to the dominant eurocentric ideas shaping the bantustans 
as separate and different from 'white' South Africa. As a consequence, culture and 
tradition were detached from these communities and became a political and 
authoritarian tool for the Bophuthatswana state. Hettne suggests that the damage 
inflicted on communities in the pursuit of the abstractions of 'National' development 
or the 'National' economy can be mitigated by emphasising the local/territorial, ethno 
and environmental scales." 
The contemporary post-apartheid context and the shifting role of competing 
identities raise interesting and important questions for ethnic identity in South Africa. 
The contradictions of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' should not obscure the 
popular impulses towards ethnicity which have been historically detectable in the 
region. The manipulation of these impulses through the bantustan system should not 
invalidate or deny the existence of 'different' identities. Bophuthatswana was sustained 
by ethno-nationalist and modernisation discourses. Furthermore, the regional 
demarcation process outlined in section 8.3.3, appeared to place ethnic and regional 
identity at the centre of South African political agenda. The creation of a 
Bophuthatswana identity failed ultimately to nurture popular loyalty and to reach 
peoples daily experiences. However, it has been shown how Mangope made many 
references to the Batswana being swamped by other ethnic groups. The constant 
vulnerability of the Batswana as a minority group had been the initial justification for 
the creation of an 'independent' Bophuthatswana. Within this scattered entity, the 
52 King, A (1992) "Rethinking Colonialism", puts this as the need to undermine 
master dtscourses by prioritizing the particular whilst also specifying the 
colonizers own particularisms, in "Forms of Dominance, Alsayyad, N. (ed.), 
Avebury. 
" Hettne, B (I 994) "The Future of Development Studtes", Forum for Development 
Studies, No. 1-2. 
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Batswana became the majority, whilst within the 'new' South Africa the Batswana 
once again revert to being a minority group. The scales of competing identities is once 
again in realignment. The old grievances, fears, concerns and the poverty which 
regional discourses of Batswana ethnicity addressed, remain. There are also pressing 
material concerns. In the North West Province alone, 53% of all households live 
below the poverty line and there is 'extensive' poverty. There is an existing backlog 
of approximately 190,000 housing units and only 49% of the region's labour force is 
formally employed." Considerable efforts must be made to put South Africa back into 
Africa" and to embrace multi-culturalism without this simply becoming a meaningless 
hegemonic term. To reiterate Sharp's challenge for South Africa: 
'We have to ensure that our society offers all its members the opportunity to 
participate in, and draw benefit from, mainstream political and economic activity, as 
well as the opportunity to proclaim their difference '.56 
Only then can we hope to avoid the return to the margins. 
" Figures given at the Local Government, Housing, Planning and Development 
conference, Mmabatho, IS" June, 1994. 
" Simon, D. (1994) "Putting South Africa (n Geography) back into Africa", Area, 
Vol. 26. 
'
6 Sharp, J. in Democracy m Action, 31.8.94. 
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